Jordan and The Peace Process

The following speech by HRH Crown Prince Hassan of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was delivered by Jawad Anani, Minister of State for Prime Ministry Affairs, in Washington, D.C., on September 26,1994, at a meeting sponsored by the Middle East Policy Council.     

Malaysia: Unsung Hero of the Philippine Peace Process

Abstract

The October 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro between the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front was a milestone in the peace negotiations. Attributing this success solely to Philippine President Benigno Aquino III's popularity fails to account for Malaysia's peace facilitation. Keeping the talks on track appeared counterintuitive as Filipino public opinion often cast Malaysia as a dishonest broker. Contrary to popular belief, Kuala Lumpur's foreign policy eschewed support for Moro secession. More importantly, the effectiveness of the Malaysian-led International Monitoring Team as a peacekeeping force fostered peace in communities. This article illustrates how mediation and local-level peace can trump national-level rhetoric.     

阿拉伯国家在菲南和平进程中的作用

在菲南和平进程的两个阶段中,阿拉伯国家的角色经历了两次转变:从摩洛穆斯林的支持者转为双方谈判的中介人,从停火协议的维护者转为全面和平的推动者.它们成功地促成菲南局势从战乱转向和谈、从纸上和平转向实际和平,并促使菲南由局部和平向全面和平过渡.阿拉伯国家所以能发挥这样的作用,原因在于它们拥有影响冲突双方的实力、公正解决冲突的立场以及由菲律宾的灵活外交策略促成的相互间的良性互动关系.     

中美关系正常化进程再探讨--"1969-1979年中美关系正常化国际研讨会"综述

在中美《上海公报》发表30周年之际,中央党校国际战略研究中心与美国哈佛大学费正清东亚研究中心于2002年1月18-19日在北京联合举办"中美关系正常化国际研讨会",对中美关系正常化进程中的有关问题进行了研讨.     

欧盟参与中东和平进程:动因、角色与困境

出于地缘政治、经济、安全、移民、历史等方面的原因,同时受欧盟扩大其国际影响力的动机驱使,欧盟谋求在中东和平进程中扮演重要角色,并有意同美国的中东政策拉开距离。虽然中东和平进程是欧盟共同外交与安全政策取得成效最多的领域之一,但由于欧盟的共同外交与安全政策一直面临期望-能力差距的困境,欧盟在中东和平进程中更多的是在经济援助上发挥主导作用,政治进程仍被美国主导。欧盟想要在国际政治舞台上扮演一个强有力的国际行为体角色,需要突破自身在外交与安全领域所面临的期望-能力差距的困境。本文从地缘政治理论出发,基于国际行为体属性和期望-能力差距两个分析概念,对欧盟参与中东和平进程的动因、角色与困境作一分析。     

Civil and Uncivil Actors in the Guatemalan Peace Process

Abstract This paper examines the Guatemalan peace process by focusing on different actors in civil society. It considers the peace negotiations between the government/ military and the guerrillas, rather than the realm of electoral procedures, to be the main locus of political transition. Challenging the work of many elite-centred theorists of democratisation who claim that civil society is an ephemeral and largely insignificant actor in transitions, the analysis considers both popular actors and business associations, one of the major‘ uncivil’ actors in Guatemalan civil society, and shows that civil society can have an impact on transitions on multiple levels. In attempting to explain the degree of impact, the paper illustrates the need to examine both the surrounding political opportunity structure and internal factors such as organisation, strategy and leadership.     

Understanding Israel's Long Conflict in Lebanon: The Search for an Alternative Approach to Security During the Peace Process

The Arab‐Israeli peace process pointed to a resolution of the Middle East's most persistent conflict, as the Rabin and Peres governments developed a sensitivity to the Arab‐Israeli ‘security dilemma’, but by 1996 the process was deadlocked. Events stalled progress, but so did ingrained attitudes that continued to shape policy that was inconsistent with the peace process. The following article explains some of the Realist norms and values at the root of security thinking in Israel, and charts their inertia in Israeli policy during the peace process, focusing on its approach to Lebanon. The article gives an insight into why Rabin and his successors struggled to find an alternative policy towards Lebanon, and how this prolonged the Arab‐Israeli conflict. The efforts of the Netanyahu and Barak governments to find a solution to the policy problem of Lebanon are outlined.     

The Oslo Peace Process and Two Views on Judaism and Zionism, 1992–1996

The article contends that the Oslo Peace process was as much about Jewish identity in Israel as it was about borders and security. This is because these factors are interrelated. This made the peace process highly contentious, particularly because it happened when post-Zionism was at its peak. While Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres saw Oslo as the fulfillment of Zionism, the religious right saw it as negating Zionism. This is because the Oslo process involved a change in three precepts of Zionism: Greater Israel, self-defence and pioneering settlement. This difference of opinion was compounded by the way Rabin managed relations with his critics on the religious-right. The conclusion notes how the collapse of Oslo has led to a reversion to pre-Oslo Jewish world view.