Independence of the Court of Justice of the European Union: Unchecked Member States power after the Sharpston Affair

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the apex of the EU legal order, and is the supreme arbiter of EU law. For decades, it has delivered judgments, collectively shaping European integration and ‘integration through law’. It has undoubtedly been an authoritative leader in entrenching a European judicial culture, and has benefited from the cardinal principle of judicial independence enshrined in the EU Treaties, which in turn, it has insisted on being upheld as regards national courts. Questions have rarely arisen, however, about judicial independence of the CJEU. The Sharpston Affair of 2020–2021 opened the door to questioning such judicial independence. Is the CJEU at the mercy of the Member States? If so, what are the consequences for the EU legal order? This article reflects on the judicial independence of the CJEU, and offers reflections on how it can be preserved in the future.     

The Court of Justice and the Union Citizen

Abstract Over a decade since the conception of the Union citizen, the aim of this article very simply is to measure his growth and maturity with a sustained analysis of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in this regard. After all, it was Advocate General Lèger who stated that it was for the Court to ensure that its full scope was attained. The article focuses predominantly on three areas of study: Member State nationality law and citizenship, the effect and meaning of Article 18 EC, and the ever‐evolving right to equal treatment for the Union citizen. It is fully updated in the light of recent case law, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, and the newly adopted Directive 2004/58 EC.     

The 2006 Record of the International Court of Justice

This article presents a brief overview of developments relatingto the International Court of Justice during 2006 and reportson certain revisions and additions that were introduced to thePractice Directions and on the latest changes in the Court'scomposition. Finally, a brief outlook is presented on the basisof the status of the Court's docket as on 31 December 2006.     

Exporting Court Innovation from the United States to Continental Europe: Compatibility between the Drug Court Model and Inquisitorial Justice Systems

This paper explores the viability of the adoption of the American drug court model by European countries relying on inquisitorial justice systems, by focusing on the compatibility between key features of each. Discussion of the key features of the European inquisitorial systems focuses on their underlying ideologies and values. Discussion of the key features of the American drug courts is informed by data from a comprehensive nationwide survey of drug courts (the National Drug Court Survey).

The preference for rehabilitative goals, the very active judicial role of the judge, and the collaboration between defense and prosecution in inquisitorial systems are identified as elements highly conducive to the importation of drug courts. Treatment integration and the relative (in) flexibility to establish a legal framework for the operation of drug courts are identified as challenges to potential importation. Overall, there is a great deal of compatibility between key features of the drug courts in the US and key features of the inquisitorial systems of most European countries. This makes the adoption of drug courts in Europe a potentially viable response to illegal drug use and drug‐related crime.     

Principle of Community exhaustion upheld by Court of Justice

The European Court of Justice confirmed that Article 4(2) ofthe Information Directive did not permit member states to introduceor retain a rule of international exhaustion of the distributionright and rejected a challenge to the validity of that provision.     

Kids are Different: The United States Supreme Court Reforms Youth Sentencing Practices for Youth Prosecuted in the Criminal Justice System

In a series of decisions issued between 2005‐2016, the United States Supreme Court relied on emerging scientific research detailing the developmental differences between children and adults to revamp its juvenile sentencing jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment. The research established that youth’s developmental immaturity reduces their culpability for their criminal conduct, while also demonstrating their heightened capacity for change and rehabilitation. The Court focused on the most extreme sentences for youth, banning the imposition of the death penalty on youth under the age of eighteen in Roper v. Simmons (2005), and severely limiting the availability of life without parole sentences even for youth convicted of murder, in Graham v Florida (2010) and Miller v Alabama (2012). This article traces the Court’s evolution in reviewing sentences for youth in our justice system, and considers how the Court’s reasoning in these cases may influence further reforms in the justice system’s treatment of youth looking ahead.     

The European Court of Justice and the Rhetoric of Affirmative Action

The recent Marschall decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to uphold a principle giving precedence to women for promotions in the workplace seems promising for the future of affirmative action. At first glance, this decision seems to indicate that the ECJ has taken a different path, moving away from its earlier Kalanke decision which had jeopardised further development of affirmative action in the European Union. On a closer examination, both Kalanke’s sweeping ban of preferential treatment based on gender and Marschall’s new interpretation appear as discursive replies to the same dilemma: should the Court deny the normative objective of equality contained in EC law to generate meaning, thus turning equality into a mere formal principle and rendering judicial review trivial? Or should it embrace a substantive reading of the fundamental principle of equality between men and women, thus substituting the Court judgment for that of the legislature, and subverting the limits of the ECJ’s powers? The aim of this article is to analyse the ECJ’s rhetorical response to the complexities contained in affirmative action judicial review.     

The joined cases of Dwyer,SpaceNet and VD and SR before the European Court of Justice: The judgments of the Grand Chamber about data retention continue falling on deaf ears in Member States

On 5 April and 20 September 2022, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice rendered three judgments in the cases of Dwyer, SpaceNet and VD and SR. It mainly reiterated its own applicable case law on the retention of and access to traffic and location data. In the VD and SR judgment, the Grand Chamber however expanded its scope to the area of market abuse.Legislation adopted by Member States and decisions rendered by most domestic courts, tribunals and judges do not fully comply with the case law of the Grand Chamber on the retention of and access to traffic and location data. In this particular context, the EU legislature should urgently adopt EU secondary legislation on the retention of personal data to provide legal clarity to all players involved.     

国际法院作用探讨

国际法院是联合国的主要司法机关 ,但尚未发挥其应有的作用。本文在《国际法院规约》的范围内 ,从国际法院管辖权的角度 ,探讨了加强国际法院作用的现实途径 :有所侧重地利用其诉讼管辖 ;充分利用具有多种优势的特别分庭 ;而咨询管辖则为国际组织提供了预防与解决争端的新途径。     

Court of Justice plucks the spider from the web

In recent years the Dutch courts have been willing to grantinterim cross-border injunctions in patent infringement caseswhere the ‘headquarters’ of a group of companiesis located in The Netherlands. A recent decision of the Courtof Justice has put an end to this practice.     

法院、法官与司法改革

今天,应邀参加中国人民大学法学院举办的"大法官讲坛",并作首场演讲,我感到十分荣幸.举办这个讲坛很有意义,它可以作为司法理论与实践的结合点,促进我国法学事业的繁荣,促进司法界与法学界的交流.……     

The United States Supreme Court and the death penalty: The struggle for fairness

In the ten years sinceFurman v. Georgia, the United States has recognized the right of states to adopt and follow different capital sentencing schemes so long as they protect the defendant from arbitrary and capricious imposing of the death sentence. The sentence may not be disproportionate to the crime. Sentencing may be done by a judge or jury. Prospective jurors may not be challenged for cause merely because their deliberations would be affected because a death penalty was possible, but only if they could not fulfill their oath. Habeas corpus petitions in capital cases are not open invitations to avoid finality of judgment and execution of the sentence, but are to find constitutional errors.