The real costs of tuition tax credits

Calculations of the costs of tuition tax credits should include estimates of the induced migration from public to private schools. The estimate by the President's advisors that his 1983 tax credit proposal would cost up to $800 million by 1986 neglected the migration factor. It is demonstrated that a migration from public to private schools of about from 1 to 1.4% of the present public school enrollment is all that is necessary to secure savings from migrants that just offset the loss in federal tax revenue from tax credits granted to incumbent private school families. Greater migration will generate net revenue gains to governments as a whole.     

Tax impact from elimination of the retirement test

The OASI eligibility provisions include a retirement test (or earnings test), and in 1979 aged beneficiaries who are under age 72 give up $1 in current benefits for each $2 of annual earnings above $4,500. If the retirement test were eliminated, total OASI payouts would increase because aged workers would no longer forfeit benefits. Aged workers also might increase earnings or delay retirement if this penalty on work effort were removed. Increased earnings would generate additional OASDHI taxes and individual income taxes. This article examines the fiscal effects on OASI benefit payouts and increased tax receipts if the retirement test were eliminated.     

How Governments Respond to Business Demands for Tax Cuts: A Study of Corporate and Inheritance Tax Reforms in Austria and Sweden

How responsive are democratic governments to business demands for tax cuts? We research this question in comparative case studies of cuts in corporate taxes and inheritance taxes in Austria and Sweden. We find that governments, regardless of partisan composition, are responsive to business demands, but that fiscal and electoral goals attenuate responsiveness. In both countries, the limited revenues generated by inheritance taxation and greater alignment of business demands with middle‐class voter interests resulted in governments heading business demands for an abolition of this tax. Goal conflict were larger for corporate tax cuts. In both countries, governments tried to minimize these goal conflict by adopting compensatory policy measures, specifically measures to broaden the tax base and simultaneous tax cuts for low‐income groups. The findings suggest that the policy output of business‐friendly tax cuts reflect a balancing of conflicting goals, rather than outright business dominance.     

Policy analysis through microsimulation: the STATS model

This article gives a nontechnical introduction to a microsimulation model developed by the Social Security Administration to consider the effects of tax and benefit proposals on the economic status of population groups. This model, the Simulated Tax and Transfer System (STATS) model, uses information from a nationally representative survey of households to calculate taxes or benefits for thousands of persons or families, case by case. Then the model aggregates across individual cases to produce estimates for economic and demographic groups of interest to policymakers. Groups are defined by such characteristics as family income, age, sex, and marital status. The article explains the model's microsimulation approach and its emphasis on the economic status of population groups. It describes the procedures for simulating taxes and benefits and then illustrates the use of the model by considering a proposal to change the way Social Security benefits are taxed. The article also discusses the primary data source and the extent to which it limits the types of estimates that the model can produce.     

The excessive costs of creative finance: Growing inefficiencies in the production of low‐income housing

Abstract

The paper examines creative finance as a means of low‐income housing production and preservation. The low‐income tax credit has evolved as the main federal housing production program in recent years. But this evolution can only be understood as a last resort. The inefficiencies of this approach outweigh any advantages. High transaction costs, inappropriate targeting of benefits, and insufficient monitoring are among the problems. Recent changes in the tax credit may actually cost the government more. Furthermore, current policy in fact creates the same time bombs now exploding in the prepayment projects. Current proposals for housing reform and revitalization have positive features, but are either underfunded or still rely on creative finance. What is needed is a direct one‐ or two‐step low‐income production program.     

Interest group demand for taxation

Researchers have typically ignored the determinants of the tax structure of the public sector. Political scientists have concentrated their analyses on the expenditure side of the public ledgers while economists have avoided the issue by assuming that taxes are exogenously determined. In this paper we have shown that a behavioral model of political interest groups can be employed to gain insights into the political selection of taxes. The theory provides a general complement to the well-documented analysis of special interest demand for public expenditures.Our analysis raises several important policy questions. First, is the influence of interest groups on the determination of tax systems desirable from a public policy perspective? For example, special interest groups dominated by high and middle income individuals may prefer regressive tax systems which reduce their own tax burden. Certainly the impact of interest groups on the well-known regressivity of state and local tax systems is an area worthy of additional investigation.     

Is There a “Singles Tax”? The Relative Income Tax Treatment of Single Households

The existence of a "marriage tax," in which many married couples pay more taxes when married than their combined taxes as single individuals, is well known. However, largely lost in the attention devoted to married taxpayers is the treatment of single taxpayers. This article examines the relative tax treatment of single and married taxpayers. Various types of representative taxpayers are constructed, and the difference in income taxes paid by single taxpayers and married taxpayers is calculated. These calculations show that there is a "singles tax"; that is, a single individual typically pays a greater income tax liability than a married couple with identical income, especially when the main transfer programs are considered.     

Extending the EITC to noncustodial parents: Potential impacts and design considerations

This paper examines the noncustodial parent earned income tax credit (NCP EITC), a new type of credit recently enacted in New York and Washington, D.C., and proposed by Senator Bayh and then‐Senator Obama in 2007. The NCP EITC offers an earned income tax credit to low‐income noncustodial parents who work and pay their full child support. This paper provides background information about the policy and presents national estimates of eligibility and benefits for an NCP EITC under three alternative policy scenarios. It also discusses several key design and implementation issues. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Does the Local‐Option Sales Tax Provide Property Tax Relief? The Georgia Case

This study examines the effect of a one percent local-option sales tax (LOST) on property tax level, millage rate, and total spending level in Georgia counties. The study covers a 13-year period for 136 Georgia counties. The findings suggest that the law, which requires rollback of property taxes when the LOST is used, led to actual property tax relief as well as millage rate reduction. Regression results show that counties collecting the LOST tend to have per capita property taxes that are an average of $12 or 1.8 mills lower than counties that do not collect the tax. Whereas an extra dollar of LOST revenue provides about 28 cents in property tax relief, it leads to an increase in total spending of about 48 cents. In sum, the LOST has achieved the objectives of property tax relief, but on balance it is more an augmentation of than an effective substitute for property taxes in Georgia counties.     

Progressive Taxation: Applying Hayek's Constraint

That progressive taxation might offset a disproportionate burden of indirect taxes upon low income households sits at the heart of a suggestion from Friedrich Hayek. This concerns the manner in which a degree of progression might be accommodated and constrained to preclude arbitrary tax hikes upon minority income groups. While Hayek's proposal is permissive of socialist aims, it looks for efficiency in resource usage as reflected in the aspiration ‘that each should feel that in the aggregate all the collective goods which are applied to him are worth at least as much as the contribution he is required to make’.     

Vox Populi? Oregon Tax and Expenditure Limitation Initiatives

This article provides a brief history of tax and expenditure limitation initiatives in Oregon, along with a narrative of contemporary events. Largely as a consequence of the initiative's increased role in the formulation of Oregon's fiscal policy, state and local taxes paid by Oregon households declined from 7.4 percent of income in 1989 to 6.8 percent in 2003; state revenue, which is heavily dependent upon personal income taxes, has become increasingly income elastic; and state and local governments now rely on user fees to an almost unprecedented degree.     

State Sales Tax Policy in a Changing Economy: Balancing Political and Economic Logic Against Revenue Needs

Soon after implementation in the 1930s, the general sales taxes emerged as the largest state tax source. In 1990, income taxes produced nearly as much state revenue as did sales taxes. Although income tax revenue have increased significantly, the sales tax is not in jeopardy of being replaced in the immediate future. The sales tax still remains a vital state fiscal concern, particularly to those states without a broad individual income tax.     

Inequality, the politics of redistribution and the tax mix

Political economy literature generally predicts a positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution. However, there is no clear empirical evidence supporting such a relationship. By incorporating an informal sector that evades income taxes, we account for the tax-base effect that, along with the political channel, determines the equilibrium redistribution and tax mix. We find a non-monotonic relationship between inequality and redistribution and explore under which conditions an unequal society relies more heavily on indirect taxes to finance redistribution. Ultimately, this paper shows the limitations of the income tax to finance redistribution in developing countries even when taxes are democratically chosen.     

Spreading the Wealth

The new American president promoted the value of “spreading the wealth around” as an election theme, providing low-income families with tax breaks, rebates, and credits. The practice of using federal income taxes to re-distribute wealth, which sometimes reflects the noblest of goals, frequently generates significant unintended harm. Prominent among those unplanned casualties is a reduction in charitable giving: American voluntary wealth transfers (e.g., charitable contributions) are in danger of being crowded out by mandatory transfers (e.g., federal taxes) used to redistribute wealth. This paper considers the social and economic costs of raising taxes that crowd out charity.     

Interaction between federal taxation and horizontal tax competition: theory and evidence from Canada

The aim of this paper is to determine to what extent and how federal taxes affect local tax decisions. Testing the impact of an increase in the federal tax on horizontal tax competition with Canada-US data for 1984–1994, it finds evidence that an increase in federal tax makes horizontal tax reactions weaker. This is because an increase in federal tax raises the cost, in terms of utility of income, of a unit increase in the province’s tax rate. On the methodological side, it is possible to estimate the impact of the federal tax on the fiscal policy of the province without neglecting control for year effects, which cannot be used in the empirical literature because they are perfectly collinear with the federal tax.     

Tax exporting,federal deductibility,and state tax structure

This paper studies the interaction between the federal and state tax systems during the 1980s and, in particular, considers how the Tax Reform Act of 1986 affected state tax structure. Using a panel data set on state governments over a nine-year period, I estimate tax share equations for six categories of taxes. I find that the state personal income tax is sensitive to changes in its tax price, but find a much smaller sensitivity to changes in tax prices for the general sales tax. I then consider various reasons why the sales tax does not exhibit a sensitivity to changes in tax price and consider the implications of these results for policymakers. The regression results suggest that different income groups are concerned with different tax instruments. Moreover, the results motivate a possible benefit approach to taxation at the state level. Linking taxes, about which a particular income group is most concerned, to services received by that group might generate additional political support for state tax systems during a time when many states are facing fiscal crisis.     

Changing the Federal Tax Philosophy: A National Value-Added Tax or Retail Sales Tax?

Moving the federal government from its heavy reliance on taxes on income and profits to taxes on general consumption has been proposed as a way to improve equity, economic efficiency, and transparency of the tax system. The value-added tax and the retail sales tax offer economically equivalent approaches to general consumption taxation, differing only in how they are administered. A comparison of the two taxes as they now operate, however, suggests considerable advantage for the value-added tax as a national revenue source. Only in terms of requiring fewer businesses to collect the tax is there an advantage to the retail sales tax. The value-added tax is superior or equivalent to the retail sales tax in other important fiscal criteria.     

Repairing the safety net: Is the EITC the right patch?

Using data from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics, this article estimates the impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) on economic risk. Risk is measured through the variance of full income (income holding labor supply constant). The results show that the EITC significantly reduces economic risk, but its effects are weaker dollar for dollar than traditional means-tested programs like Food Stamps. The difference is not statistically significant, however. Moreover, for many middle-class people, the risk-reduction benefits of the EITC exceed the tax burden it imposes. This is less true of means-tested transfers. These results are significant for the politics of antipoverty policy. They show that a real-world antipoverty program can generate enough middle-class economic security to build for itself a solid base of political support.     

Tax Design and The Meddling Factor: Lessons From Hawaii's Liquor Tax

Tax design decisions are subject to many influences, including economic and political realities. Those who make tax policy at the state level are under constant pressure to modify taxes and tax structures at the margin. In making their decisions, policy makers must assess and weigh the often conflicting advice that results from varying outlooks and interests among, as well as within, the groups providing such input.
Using Hawaii's liquor tax as a case study, this paper illustrates how seemingly innocuous policy meddling can turn a good tax into a bad one. The events that led the Hawaii Legislature to decide to substitute a flawed gallonage levy for a successful ad valorem tax are reviewed. The relative merits of ad valorem and per-unit liquor taxes are discussed. Implications of adoption of the gallonage tax are presented. Finally, the article discusses the reasons why meddling may be attractive to both taxpayers and those who levy the tax, and it concludes that tax design criteria should include disincentives to meddle as a reasonable principle of taxation.     

Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in a Median Voter Model

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of capital tax coordination in a simple model of fiscal competition where fiscal policy is subject to majority voting and households differ with respect to their labor and capital income. It turns out that a coordinated capital tax increase may raise or reduce welfare, depending on the relative magnitude of i) economic distortions induced by a labor tax and ii) political distortions resulting from the influence of the median voter on fiscal policy decisions. A negative welfare effect is more likely, the smaller the marginal excess burden of the labor tax and the smaller the ratio of the median voter's labor income to average labor income. We also use empirical estimates of the marginal excess burden of taxation to determine the welfare effects of tax coordination; it turns out that a negative welfare effect of coordinated tax increases may emerge in our model for empirically reasonable parameters.