Brief for bioethicists for privacy as amicus curiae supporting appellees

Amicus, an ad hoc group of philosophers, theologians, attorneys, and physicians, believe that adults should consult their doctor when making personal decisions. The doctor-patient relationship would be protected under the Constitution. In "Griswold v. Connecticut," the Supreme Court said that a state law which forbid married couples from using contraceptives was unconstitutional; that the couples should have a right to privacy. In "Roe," the Supreme Court recognized that a patient and her doctor should have privacy. In "Doe v. Bolton," the Supreme Court found that the State of Georgia was violating the patients' and physician's freedom. In "Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth," the Supreme Court said that a general informed consent provision was alright because it did not take away the abortion decision. The post- Roe state laws were ways to control doctors and patients so that a particular philosophical view could be imposed. The major question in Webster is whether personal decisions should be made by doctors and patients or the state. Both parties must agree to the decision. Section 188.205 of the Missouri law was before the Court in Webster. This section makes it illegal for public funds to be used to encourage a woman to have an abortion that wasn't necessary to save her life. There are medical conditions for which abortion is reasonable - Tay-Sachs disease, for instance. The child usually dies by 3 years of age. Without genetic screening, many at-risk couples would abort all pregnancies. 95% of all prenatal screenings are negative. State medical treatment decisions are arbitrary and impersonal. Having control over important personal decisions is necessary for freedom.     

DO LOWER COURTS ANTICIPATE CHANGES IN SUPREME COURT POLICIES?: A Few Empirical Notes

This paper takes advantage of the change from the Warren Supreme Court to the Burger Supreme Court to investigate a phenomenon not usually examined in judicial impact research—anticipatory reactions. The research question is whether and under what circumstances federal courts of appeals anticipate changes in policy by the Supreme Court. Changes in the citation of Warren Court civil liberties decisions from the Warren Court era to the early Burger Court era are used to evaluate this question. It is hypothesized that moves away from Warren Court decisions would be greatest for decisions which received minimal support on the Warren Court and for important or salient policies. Contrary to these expectations it was found that during the Burger Court era the number of citations of Warren Court decisions actually increased, the percentage of positive citations increased, and the increases were greatest for decisions receiving minimal voting support on the Warren Court and for decisions classified as important.     

最高人民法院裁判、司法解释的法律地位

The decisions and the legislative interpretations of judicial interpretations of the Supreme Court of China can be considered as a part of Mainland China’s customary law, and carried by decisions and judicial interpretations. Customary law is the very source of its normal force and they are supposed to be an informal source of the law for they have the required characteristics for substantiating customary law. Accordingly, the legislative judicial interpretations and decisions of the Supreme Court that are qualified to be promulgated in the Gazette of the Supreme Court should be standardized by the requisites of customary law and have the quality supposed to be universally fair. Cao Shibing is a senior judge of the Supreme Court of China majoring in civil law, and he was awarded the doctorate of law by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Till now, he has published an amount of academic works, for instance, On Anti-monopoly Law (1996), Resolve of the Problems in the Suretyship Law of China and its Prospect (2001), On Insolvency Law of China (2003), and his translated book in Chinese (1998) —The Death of Contract (originally written by Grant Gilmore in 1995).     

The triumph of vengeance over retribution: the United States Supreme Court and the death penalty

In this article the author uses a review of Welsh S. White'sThe Death Penalty in the Nineties as a framework for analyzing recent trends in the United States Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence. Since 1976 the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment at least in part on the notion that the death penalty serves the useful social purpose of retribution. This article, however, contends that it is imperative to distinguish between retribution and vengeance as rationales for criminal punishment. Modern retributive theory calls for punishments to be guided by considerations of proportionality, fairness, and equality. Vengeance-based punishments, on the other hand, are aimed at satisfying the victim's and society's desire for retaliation and are not limited by the retributive principle that punishment must be proportionate to the severity of the crime and the moral blameworthiness of the offender. The article analyzes recent Supreme Court decisions that are not examined inThe Death Penalty in the Nineties-decisions that allow the introduction of victim-impact evidence into capital sentencing proceedings and permit the death penalty to be imposed on 16-year-old offenders, mentally retarded defendants, and those who neither kill nor intend to kill. These decisions, it is argued, demonstrate that the contemporary Court has bestowed judicial approval on vengeance as an acceptable justification for capital punishment.     

Birth Order,Preferences, and Norms on the U.S. Supreme Court

The members of the U.S. Supreme Court have different ideas about what constitutes good judicial policy as well as how best to achieve that policy. From where do these ideas originate? Evolutionary psychology suggests that an answer may lie in early life experiences in which siblings assume roles that affect an adult's likely acceptance of changes in the established order. According to this view, older siblings take on responsibilities that make them more conservative and rule‐bound, while younger ones adopt roles that promote liberalism and greater rebelliousness. Applying this theory to the Court, I show that these childhood roles manifest themselves in later life in the decisions of the justices. Birth order explains not only the justices’ policy preferences but also their acceptance of one important norm of judicial decisionmaking, specifically their willingness to exercise judicial review.     

Judicial Review of Politics: The Israeli Case

In the tradition of studies questioning the impact of celebrated court rulings, this article discusses the effectiveness of the judicial review of politics conducted by the Israeli Supreme Court. The Israeli Supreme Court is generally viewed as a highly influential, almost omnipotent body. During the last two decades, the Court has intervened repeatedly in the so–called political domain, thereby progressively eroding the scope of realms considered non–justiciable. It has ventured to enter domains of 'pure' political power to review the legality of political agreements, political appointments (appointments of political allies to public positions), and political allocations (government funding to organizations affiliated with its political supporters). The prevalent perception is that these developments had a significant impact on Israeli political life. The present article challenges this view and argues that, on closer scrutiny, the influence of the Court on many of the issues reviewed here is negligible. First, many of the doctrines developed by the Court in order to review political measures proved ineffective. Usually, when the Supreme Court (acting as a High Court of Justice) engages in judicial review, it lacks the evidence needed in order to decide that administrative decisions on public appointments or public funding should be abolished because they were based on political or self–serving considerations. Second, the norms mandated by the Court hardly influence politicians' decisions in everyday life, and are applied only in contested cases. The reasons for this situation are not only legal but also socio–political. Large sections of current Israeli society support interest–group politics and do not accept the values that inspire the Court.     

最高人民法院裁判、司法解释的法律地位

本文结合审判实践详细分析了最高人民法院司法解释的各种类型及其相应的法律地位,并从对最高人民法院裁判的两种认识——“个案既判力说”和“解释义务说”出发,进一步提出了“习惯法说”,指出最高人民法院的裁判和司法解释中的“立法型”解释可以构成我国以裁判和司法解释为载体的习惯法,它们的普遍效力来源于习惯法并因具有习惯法的品格而成为法律的非正式渊源。基于此,本文主张最高人民法院“立法型”司法解释和值得刊登于公报上的裁判,应尽量以习惯法的构成要求为标准,具备“人们普遍认为它是正确的”品质。     

中国“例制”构建中的法院角色和法官作用

我国案例指导制度中的法院角色和法官作用有着鲜明的特色,案件审理阶段法院和办案法官往往并没有参与案例指导的意识,而是在案件裁判后由审判庭之外的综合部门通过遴选的方式确定典型案例,经编辑后报审判委员会研究讨论,再逐级报最高人民法院确定并发布。指导性案例的产生不是按照管辖制度自然地"涌现",而是被人为地"发现",这一点明显不同于国外的做法。相比较,"涌现"方式符合司法经济原则和司法规律,而"发现"方式充满人为因素,成本高而效率相对较低。案例指导制度不应被管辖制度"牵着鼻子走",而应当通过变更管辖制度,与司法规律相适应。     

Naming Names: The Impact of Supreme Court Opinion Attribution on Citizen Assessment of Policy Outcomes

The manner in which political institutions convey their policy outcomes can have important implications for how the public views institutions' policy decisions. This paper explores whether the way in which the U.S. Supreme Court communicates its policy decrees affects how favorably members of the public assess its decisions. Specifically, we investigate whether attributing a decision to the nation's High Court or to an individual justice influences the public's agreement with the Court's rulings. Using an experimental design, we find that when a Supreme Court outcome is ascribed to the institution as a whole, rather than to a particular justice, people are more apt to agree with the policy decision. We also find that identifying the gender of the opinion author affects public agreement under certain conditions. Our findings have important implications for how public support for institutional policymaking operates, as well as the dynamics of how the Supreme Court manages to accumulate and maintain public goodwill.     

Disqualification of lists in Israel (1948–1984): Retrospect and appraisal

The aim is to review the decisions of the Central Elections Committee and of the Supreme Court regarding disqualification of lists in Israel. Two major questions are addressed: When should tolerance have its limits?; and, What constraints on liberty should be introduced in order to safeguard democracy? The judicial analysis focuses attention on the issue of whether the justices acted in accordance with the law. Consideration is given to the written law and to existing normative considerations which allow justices an exegetic latitude. It is argued that theNeiman decision of 1984 was flawed, that the Court was erroneous in ignoring the licensing effect of its decision, and that democracy does not have to allow a violent list propounding the destruction of democracy to act in order to fulfil its aim. It is neither morally obligatory, nor morally coherent, to expect democracy to place the means for its own destruction in the hands of those who either wish to bring about the physical annihilation of the state, or to undermine democracy. These two cases are the only cases in which democracy has to introduce self-defensive measures and to deny representation in parliament to violent lists that convey such ideas, and that act to realize them.     

“有错必纠”的界限

通过行政法学界20多年的共同努力,有关行政决定确定力和撤销规则的学理框架已经相对成熟。这个学理框架内容是,行政机关作出的行政决定产生实质确定力之后,如行政机关认为它有错误必须予以撤销的,应当遵循若干撤销规则,不能基于"有错必纠"原则而随意行使撤销权。但是,从最高人民法院相关的行政裁判、批复和答复的内容看,最高人民法院一直秉持"有错必纠"原则,并没有受到这一学理框架内容的明显影响,直到作为指导性案例的"焦案"在《最高人民法院公报》上公布,它才改变了原有所持的观点。通过"焦案"所确立的规则是,依法作出的行政决定一旦生效,其法律效力不仅及于行政相对人,也及于行政机关,不能随意被撤销。已经生效的行政决定如果随意被撤销,不利于社会秩序的恢复和稳定。从"焦案"之后地方各级人民法院作出的相关裁判看,作为指导性案例的"焦案"其参考效力并不明显,"有错必纠"原则仍然有着相当大的影响力。这可能与指导性案例欠缺可操作性、强势的成文法传统等原因有关。尽管如此,"焦案"所确立的撤销规则仍然具有它的价值,这种价值不仅显示出学理对实务的影响力,也体现了法治观念的进步。     

Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective

In this article, we examine factors that influence appellate supervision in the lower tiers of the federal judicial hierarchy. Drawing on the insights of agency theory, we develop a framework to assess the determinants of circuit panel decisions to affirm or reverse federal district court rulings. Our analysis of U.S. Courts of Appeals' published civil rights decisions over a 29-year period (1971–1999) offers support for several hypothesized relationships. As expected, the outcome of appellate review varied with the level of agreement between the preferences of the circuit (as principal) and the policy position of the trial court (as agent). In addition, we found that circuits were more likely to affirm trial court decisions that were contrary to the preferences of the federal district court judge, suggesting that circuit judges may rely on ideological signals when evaluating appeals before them. We also hypothesized that the monitoring activities of circuits would be influenced by individual circuits' relationship with their principal, the Supreme Court. Consistent with these expectations, panels were more likely to reverse district court rulings that were incongruous with the policy predisposition of the High Court. In addition, as Supreme Court scrutiny of a circuit increased, the likelihood of a circuit panel subsequently reversing a district court also increased. Although further inquiry is necessary to clarify the interpretation of this result, the finding does suggest that district courts are more likely to engage in decision making that deviates from circuit preferences when that circuit faces more intense supervision from the Supreme Court.     

Abortion on demand in a post-Wade context: must the state pay the bills?

The legal issues involved with the application of the United States Supreme Court decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton (1973) are reveiwed, particularly the question of whether an indigent pregnant woman now has the right to abortion on demand at public expense. The 2 decisions, based on the Fourteenth Amendment, established that a woman, in consultation with her physician, must be free to choose to terminate her pregnancy, at least in the first trimester. State laws are permitted only to regulate abortion procedures in the second trimester and may only regulate or proscribe abortion itself after the fetus becomes viable. The Court did not rule that indigents had a corollary right to the implementation of abortion, and thus free abortions do not appear to be constitutionally required. However, depending on the type of Medicaid coverage in which the individual state is participating, the medically indigent may receive Medicaid benefits for abortions, at least in the first trimester. Since Medicaid is voluntary for the state, it could drop out of the program entirely or the Congress could specifically exclude abortions from Medicaid coverage. Both actions appear unlikely, however, and abortions for medical reasons clearly seem to fall under Medicaid's purpose. Consequently, despite the Wade and Bolton decisions, the right to abortion is limited by the ability of indigents to pay for it. In the light of the serious complications of illegal abortion, it is concluded that legislators should insure the availability of legal abortions. Such a move would not in itself encourage abortions but would properly extend the right to abortion to all citizens.     

Justices,Political Actors,or Both: An Exploration of the Brandenburg Line Through the Regime Theory Lens

Regime theory seeks to explain decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States by noting that justices tend to decide cases in ways that align with the prevailing political ideology. The theory emerged from political science literature and has not been explored regarding communication law. This article tests regime theory against the progression of seven Supreme Court precedents that led to the threatening speech test established in Brandenburg v. Ohio. The test is traditionally viewed as the fruit of about a half-century of deliberate judicial evolution. The analysis found regime theory helped explain the Court's progression and decisions in this line of cases, but contained some notable weaknesses.     

Reconocimiento y ejecución de sentencias mexicanas de divorcio en venezuela

Judges rule their decisions to enforce foreign divorce judgments and therefore to achieve procedural justice. Notwithstanding of that, the enforcement couldface different challenges, not only about its coercive enforcement —lacking of voluntarily compliance of the original decision— but also ju-risdictional/territorial limitations. These limitations are related with the existence of different locations among the place of the original subject matter, the place of its effects and, the place where the enforcement decision will be ruled. However, geographical boundaries should not affect vested rights. Therefore, it is crucial to grant mechanisms that will ensure the enforcement of foreign decisions. Based on two Venezuelan Supreme Court decisions, this document analyses issues related with the enforcement in Venezuela of Mexican divorce judgments, considering both the Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards and Venezuelan domestic rules.     

Paint It Black: Rhode Island Supreme Court Rejects Lead Paint Nuisance Suit

During the past decade, state and local governments have increasingly brought suits to redress harm caused by products, including cigarettes, firearms, and toxins such as asbestos, lead paint, and even greenhouse gases, based not on the products liability or negligence theories conventionally applied, but on the public nuisance doctrine. Although the public nuisance doctrine potentially offers governmental plaintiffs more lenient standards with respect to issues like product and manufacturer identification, control of the product, proximate cause, and application of statutes of limitation, while limiting manufacturers' defenses, and has generated insurance claims and pressure to enter settlements, nearly all applications of public nuisance law to products claims have ultimately failed when heard by the courts on the merits. In February 2007, however, a Rhode Island trial court, in a groundbreaking decision, entered a judgment on a jury verdict imposing liability on three lead pigment manufacturers for creating a public nuisance, and ordered them to abate the nuisance in Rhode Island at a cost estimated to exceed two billion dollars.

On July 1, 2008, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment against the lead paint manufacturers and held that the state attorney general's complaint should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The state had not, and could not, allege facts sufficient to support a public nuisance claim, as the doctrine was construed in Rhode Island or nationally. Relief from the serious harms caused by lead paint was available only through specific Rhode Island legislation and products liability law, not the public nuisance doctrine. The Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision is consistent with recent decisions from other state courts, most notably opinions issued by the highest courts of New Jersey and Missouri during 2007, and has already influenced other public nuisance plaintiffs to abandon their lead paint suits.     

Shifting the Metaphor: Examining Discursive Influences on the Supreme Court's Use of the Marketplace Metaphor in Twenty-First-Century Free Expression Cases

Justices on the Supreme Court of the United States have employed the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor to communicate how they understand freedom of expression for nearly a century. The meanings behind metaphors, however, are not static. This article examines whether justices’ references to the metaphor in twenty-first-century cases remain primarily tied to the original meaning – one related to the Enlightenment ideas at the heart of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's first use of the metaphor in 1919 – or if the meaning has shifted to represent more discourse-based understandings of communication in democratic society, such as those put forth by John Dewey and Jürgen Habermas. This article, through an analysis of twenty-first century Supreme Court decisions that discussed the marketplace metaphor, identifies evidence of a shift in the Court's understanding of the foundational theoretical concepts behind the meaning of the metaphor.     

From Hyderabad to Harvard: how US law schools make it worthwhile to clerk on India's Supreme Court

Since the 1990s, judges of the Supreme Court of India have hired law clerks to help them perform some of their routine tasks. However, while clerkships on the U.S. Supreme Court are considered very prestigious and are extensively written about, clerkships on India's Supreme Court are considered to be of significantly lower value by the local legal profession and teaching market in India. Instead, ironically, clerkships on the Supreme Court of India are often pursued by students interested in getting an advanced law degree (usually an LL.M.) at a U.S. law school. Relying on interviews conducted with law clerks and interns who have served on the Supreme Court of India, and using India as a case study, this paper argues that ambitious Indian law students are adopting strategies to “Americanize” themselves in order to culturally arbitrage U.S. law schools' misunderstandings of the global legal profession.     

最高法院对外国法适用的上诉审查

最高法院位于一国司法体系的顶端,同时负有上诉终审裁判功能和发展法律的功能.最高法院是否应对外国法的错误适用进行上诉审查,各国实践和理论分歧甚大,从中可以概括出三种基本模式:拒绝审查模式、有限审查模式和全面审查模式.从最高法院的上诉裁判功能出发,为落实当事人的上诉救济权利,尤其是在我国二审终审和法官对外国法的查明和确定拥有主导权的语境下,最高法院应对外国法的错误适用进行上诉审查.外国法的适用与本国法律体系的发展并不割裂,相反两者具有实质关联,最高法院从其发展法律的功能出发,也应主动审查下级法院对外国法的错误适用.最高法院解释和适用外国法,有助于增进本国法律体系的包容和开放的精神.     

Applications for release by Australians in Victoria found not guilty of offences of violence by reason of mental impairment

Much research in relation to mental illness and the law has concentrated upon when accused persons are entitled to avail themselves of the defence of not guilty by reason of insanity or mental impairment. However, the decision as to when persons found not guilty by such pleas should be released step by step back into the community involves difficult analyses of the risk of recidivism by persons who have committed serious acts of violence whilst mentally ill. This article analyses some 70 cases heard by the Supreme Court of Victoria in Australia since the jurisdiction to make such decisions has been transferred from the executive arm of government to the judiciary. The jurisprudence generated by the Victorian Supreme Court constitutes Australia's most developed law in relation to prediction of dangerousness. This article evaluates the different and subtle dynamics that have influenced the judges in an increasingly sophisticated way to grapple with the phenomenon of mental illness in deciding when persons who have already killed can safely be released from involuntary detention status within the confines of a forensic psychiatric institution back into the general community.