The Populist Surge in Post‐Democratic Times: Theoretical and Political Challenges

Populism has often been described as a great challenge and threat to Western democracies. Not surprisingly, at a time in which we are witnessing a significant rise in populist actors in Europe and the US, scientific analyses and commentary regarding populism have become particularly popular and, indeed, necessary. My aim in this article is to offer a brief yet comprehensive overview of the ongoing debates in a bid to problematise the supposed ‘imminent threat’ of populism in light of recent developments within the political systems and societies of established democracies, especially under conditions of crisis. I understand populism as a specific type of discourse, and thus as a way—among others—of doing politics and appealing to groups of people. Thus, I highlight the varying orientations that populist movements might take, depending on the ideological traditions with which they are closely articulated and the sociopolitical environment in which they manifest. Last, I relate the ‘populist surge’ to discussions regarding post‐democracy.     

The role of memory in populist discourse: the case of the Italian Second Republic

Cento Bull's paper takes as its starting point Ernesto Laclau's and Chantal Mouffe's conceptualization of populism as counter-hegemonic, and argues, with reference to the Italian case, that populism not only takes the form of a rejection of the establishment and political elites, but also entails a construction of ‘the people’ that requires, as well as the development of empty signifiers as shown by Laclau, also the deployment of common myths based on a collective memory of an imagined past. Cento Bull therefore argues, in line with Ritchie Savage, that the role of memory in populist discourse has been underestimated. Specifically, many populist movements and leaders engage in a fundamental redefinition of who constitutes ‘the people’ accompanied by mistrust and demonization of the Other, which is predicated upon (and justified with recourse to) a reimagining of the nation's and/or democracy's ‘founding moment’. Furthermore, many populist movements make use of a political rhetoric revolving around the ‘anti-subversive impulse’ and aimed at instilling fear and a sense of being under threat.     

Representing the People: Laclau as a Theorist of Representation

Going beyond conventional conceptions of political representation, Ernesto Laclau takes representation to be a general category and not just limited to formal political institutions, and he takes representation to be performative in that it also brings about what is represented. This article examines the implications of this conceptualization of representation for Laclau’s theory of populism. Laclau takes populism to be exemplary of his conception of representation because populism is a discourse that brings into being what it claims to represent: the people. This is important for current debates about populism and the crisis of democratic institutions, whether domestic or international. I show how our conceptions of representation inform how we think about populism and liberal democracy, and specifically about populism as a threat to liberal democracy at the domestic or global level. I show this in the context of a reading of Jan-Werner Müller’s influential critique of populism.     

Populism: a deflationary view

This paper takes a critical, synoptic view of the current upsurge of populism. Populism, it is argued, has long been a feature of liberal democracies in so far as claims are made for democracy to be as directly expressive as possible of the will of its subjects. Yet populisms are hybrid in form and parasitic on existing political arrangements. What unites them is more to do with what they oppose than what they espouse. Above all, it is the norms of liberalism that are brought into question by populist proponents of direct democracy with their characteristic hostility towards elites, experts and the so-called establishment. In so far as all populisms can be dangerous this lies in the degree to which they oppose the existing norms of liberalism and seek to undermine its moderating institutions. Rather than relying on generic theories of populism to explain contemporary developments, what needs investigation is the degree to which particular populisms prioritize fear over judgement, unqualified assertion over reasoned deliberation and resentment over the moderation of power.     

Right‐wing populist party supporters: Dissatisfied but not direct democrats

Right‐wing populist parties tend to combine criticism of how liberal democracy functions with calls for greater direct democracy. But do their voters share that support for direct democracy? In this article, survey data is used to examine, first, whether right‐wing populist candidates in Australia, Canada and New Zealand were more supportive of direct democracy than candidates of other parties. Second, the views of right‐wing populist voters about the functioning of democracy and direct democracy are investigated. While right‐wing populist candidates turned out to be far more likely to support direct democracy, right‐wing populist supporters did not mirror the candidates. Although these were among the most dissatisfied with how democracy worked, they did not necessarily favour referendums more than other voters. The findings have implications both for how we conceive of the relationship between populism and direct democracy and the remedies proposed for redressing populist discontent.     

Framing blame: toward a better understanding of the effects of populist communication on populist party preferences

Although previous research has argued that the media play a crucial role in populism’s success, we know too little about how populist messages affect preferences for populist parties. To advance this knowledge, we conducted an experiment in which the core of populist rhetoric – constructing the people as innocent in-group opposed to the establishment as culprit out-group – was manipulated in news articles. The findings indicate that when political elites are blamed for a salient national problem, people are more likely to vote for a populist party and less likely to vote for the largest party in government. Populist vote intentions are indirectly affected via blame perceptions. These findings offer important insights into the media’s role in the electoral success of populism.     

Podemos: the ambiguous promises of left-wing populism in contemporary Spain

The paper inquires critically into Podemos as an instance of left-wing populism in contemporary European politics, putting forward four claims and a major thesis. First, Podemos was started as an original endeavour to ally in a hybrid mix two divergent approaches to democratic politics: the horizontal, open and networked mobilizations of the multitude, and the vertical, hierarchical, formal and representative structures of party formations, on the other. Such an amalgam might serve to combine the virtues of different models of democracy. Second, Podemos’ populism exemplifies a creative version of a ‘politics of the common’, but the terms of the ‘common sense’ are inflected in the direction of social rights, inclusion and egalitarian democracy. Third, Podemos illustrates a unique ‘reflexivity’ in the pursuit of populism. The party leadership has taken its cues from E. Laclau’s hegemonic theory of populism and implements it in its political strategy. Fourth, since the autumn of 2014, Podemos has arguably seen the gradual preponderance of a vertical, ‘hegemonic’ logic, reflecting a particular reading of populist theory which is prevalent among the party’s leadership. The broader thesis is that a dualist politics, which welds together horizontalism and verticalism in a conflictual bind, is a prima facie plausible strategy for renewing democracy in the present critical context. But a political organization like Podemos will be able to redeem its democratic promises as long as it maintains a constructive balance between these two political logics, avoiding the reassertion of centralized leadership and the suppression of pluralism which are typical of the populist tradition.     

Progressive Responses to Populism: A Polanyian Critique of Liberal Discourse

This article explores the recent rise of populist politics from the perspective of Karl Polanyi's theory of the ‘double movement’. It firstly introduces Polanyi's understanding of interwar populism, and relates this to his broader critique of liberal economic thought. This framework is then used to analyse three prominent explanations for populism which emerged in the wake of the UK's 2016 EU referendum: globalisation; cultural reaction; and social media. I show how each of these explanations exogenises contemporary populist movements, narrating them as something external to the liberal economic restructuring pursued globally since the 1980s. Failing to diagnose adequately the causes of contemporary populist movements, which lie in this utopian attempt to treat labour as a commodity, they cannot support an intellectually coherent progressive response to Brexit. Finally, I outline a political agenda centred on labour de‐commodification, which could directly address populist grievances and reclaim the discourse of ‘taking back control’ for the left.     

Authoritarian populism and response to COVID-19: A comparative study of the United States,India, and Brazil

As the phenomenon of populism is in the preliminary stages of exploratory research, the present study involves an empirical investigation involving a case study of the United States, India, and Brazil to examine whether a correlation exists between populism and management of COVID-19. The study adopts the ideational approach of populism as a set of ideas or discourse to review how core conceptual features of populism have impacted on management of COVID-19. The study has two main objectives: (1) to examine whether populism in the United States, India, and Brazil has determined “a populist response” to the pandemic in dealing with the health crises and (2) to explore the management of COVID-19 in the states led by right-wing populism and the commonality of populist approaches adopted in handling the health crisis. Comparing the three states' statistical data of management models, the study has argued that common populist mechanisms such as distrust for experts, contempt for institutions, and suspicion of “others” have guided the US, India, and Brazilian leadership response to COVID-19. It further argues that leadership in the United States, India, and Brazil has prevented effective management by politicizing the crisis, aggravating social polarization, and contradicting expert advice. Moreover, populist and nationalist orientation of the leadership has evaded responsibility in these states with the leadership blaming ethnicities for spreading the virus and by weakening societal solidarity.     

Populism and Connectivism: An Analysis of the Sanders and Trump Nomination Campaigns

This paper is an analysis of the Trump and Sanders’ campaigns for the presidential nomination of their respective parties. It studies the structure of the relationship between the campaign and its supporters through communication on each candidate’s Facebook page. While both campaigns have been termed populist, we differentiate populism from connectivism and develop an account of a connective campaign as a species of connective action. Whereas populism is predicated on a singular people, connectivity involves the acceptance and recognition of difference as a resource for political activity. Whereas populism involves a hierarchical authority relationship, connectivity is based on a reciprocal authority relationship. Finally, populism articulates an anti-establishment demand while connective campaigns demand for citizens to have the capacity for consequential engagement with political life. The empirical results demonstrate that connectivism and populism are distinct in practice and that these attributes hang together as two separate concepts. Further, we find that Trump’s campaign communications emphasize populist themes, for Sanders such themes are limited and in the shadow of connectivism.     

Populistische Demokratiekonzeptionen und die Wahl der AfD: Evidenz aus einer Panelstudie

This contribution studies the effect of populist conceptions of democracy on voting for populist parties drawing on the case of the “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD). Building on dominant definitions of populism, we conceptualize a populist orientation towards democracy via three elements–the privilege of the majority will over minority rights, the demand for absolute responsiveness from representatives to the majority will and negative views of political pluralism–and propose a corresponding measurement model. Our empirical analysis shows that such populist conceptions of democracy are particularly strong among AfD supporters. Moreover, they exhibit significant and substantial effects on voting intentions for the AfD in multivariate analyses and, leveraging the panel structure of the data, are able to predict changes in party preferences towards the AfD over time.     

Lock them up! Punitive aggression and populism as political vigilantism

Populist leaders and movements are incredibly diverse, but one factor that most share is the tendency to pick fights. Populists often stir up conflict and use aggressive rhetoric that would destroy the reputation of mainstream politicos. Furthermore, many of these fights have little material benefit for base-level supporters, and often actively harm them. Yet populist militants generally reward combative behavior. Why is populism so conflict prone? And why do populists so often escape negative consequences for provoking damaging dustups? I argue that these sorts of conflict are driven by an emotional impulse that lies at the heart of populism: punitive aggression. Populists view political problems as the result of malign actions by hostile outgroups, and they perceive the state as either negligently allowing or actively abetting these actions. The failure of the state to punish the guilty breeds an intense and deep-seated desire to harm those seen as violating norms and values, regardless of the cost. Observational and experimental data are consistent with the hypothesis that, while the never-ending conflict typical of populism may harm its adherents’ interests, it continues because it satisfies much more basic emotional and psychological needs. This paper suggests that confronting and challenging populists may be difficult because forceful responses will reinforce the bond between the leader and his or her followers.     

‘No regionalism please,we are Leghisti !’ The transformation of the Italian Lega Nord under the leadership of Matteo Salvini

Whilst the Lega Nord has traditionally been defined as a regionalist populist party, since Matteo Salvini became its leader in 2013 it has undergone a process of profound ideological transformation. This article assesses this momentous change and the impact it could have on the future of the Lega, drawing on a content analysis of Salvini’s and the party’s Facebook posts, as well as interviews with regional leaders. It argues that, under Salvini’s personal style of leadership: (a) regionalism has been replaced by an empty form of nativist nationalism, which fails to address socio-economic issues related to the North–South divide; (b) populism remains central to the party’s strategic communication, but the EU has taken Rome’s place as the people’s ‘enemy’; (c) this ideological shift has paid-off at the 2018 general election, but is underpinned by latent fractures between the leader and regional representatives which could have profound implications in the future.     

The comparative effectiveness of populist rhetoric in generating online engagement

Worldwide, voters are supporting populist candidates who promise to upend “politics as usual.” Despite all we know about populism, we still do not know how individuals respond to populist content during campaigns, particularly compared to other common content in liberal democracies. This paper adapts framing theory to an online electoral context to argue that populist campaign messages will generate more online engagement compared to three alternative conceptions of the relationship between the people and the elites: pluralism, technocracy, and neutral messages. The paper adapts Snow and Benford's seminal 1988 theory of resonance to studies of populist communication and assess whether populism resonates more with online social media users. An original dataset using the campaign Tweets of 22 national-level actors across five countries is used to test the theory: Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Italy, and Spain (N = 1777). The findings suggest that citizens on Twitter engage with populism more than its alternatives in certain contexts.     

Paternalist populism and illiberal elitism in Central Europe

Through the analysis of the ideology of two Hungarian parties typically considered as populist, this paper investigates how elitism can be integrated into an overall populist appeal. The two parties, Fidesz and Jobbik, exhibit features of paternalist populism and illiberal elitism while offering different responses to the challenges typically confronted by authoritarian populist movements. With regard to Jobbik, the paper uncovers the existence of three distinct ideologies: right-wing populist; ultra-nationalist; and traditionalist and ‘meta-nationalist.’ The paper directs attention to the layered nature of partisan ideological discourses and assesses the relevance of the analysed model for Eastern and Central Europe.     

当前中国大众民粹程度测量研究

对民粹主义的内涵和实证研究的分析表明,民粹主义是一个可以测量的概念。通过对中国民粹主义的表现形式和网络民粹话语的梳理,形成了一个包含仇视官员、民族民粹主义、反体制、仇视富人、民粹司法和仇视专家等6个维度23个指标的民粹程度量表。运用这个量表考察中国社会各阶层样本,发现中国在整体上并不具备明显的民粹主义特征。     

The double-edged sword: the political appropriation of the concept of populism

ABSTRACT

The concept of populism has been in use in political debate for over a century. Because ‘populist’ is often used in a pejorative sense today, those to whom it is applied to tend to reject it. However, a closer look at the history of the concept reveals that while its meaning may fluctuate and even be dismissed as irrelevant, its use can become a political tool. This study of the use of ‘populism’ refrains from making value judgments on the actual populist nature of certain parties or political tendencies. Instead, it analyzes uses of the concept from a historical perspective. Special emphasis is placed on politicians who chose to define themselves as populist, or accept the label imposed by others, with particular focus on the Finns Party of Finland. Such self-identified populists draw their conceptions of populism from the ever-growing field of populism research, striving to appropriate and realize what scholars have only hypothetically described as a professed ideal. A closer look at the uses of populism as a political self-identity forces us to rethink its uses as a pejorative, or as an analytical, concept.     

Empowered and enraged: Political efficacy,anger and support for populism in Europe

This article addresses the psychological dynamics between internal political efficacy, emotions and support for populism. Contrary to the extended idea that populism is associated with low levels of political competence, it is argued that individuals’ self-competence beliefs enhance populist attitudes. Individuals who conceive themselves as able to understand and participate effectively in politics are more critical towards politicians and more prone to consider that citizens could do a better job. The article also hypothesises that internal efficacy enhances the likelihood of experiencing anger, which in turn promotes populist attitudes. Experimental and comparative observational evidence shows robust direct effects of internal efficacy over populism, as well as a smaller indirect impact via feelings of anger. These findings raise important questions regarding the nature of populism and how to fight it in our emancipated and information-intensive democratic systems.     

Rethinking Anti-Immigration Rhetoric after the Oslo and Utøya Terror Attacks

This article examines right-wing populism and populist rhetoric in Norway preceding the July 22, 2011 terror attacks at Utøya and in Oslo. It describes how the mainstream media, academics, and political parties have appealed to the public in an increasingly populist fashion and have spread fear about immigration, immigrants, and integration. It argues that while the populist right-wing Progress Party has adopted immigration and integration as its main cause and has gained support because of it, the Progress Party alone cannot be blamed for the widespread xenophobia in Norway. The media are also responsible for the way immigration, culture, and race have been reported, as are a wide range of politicians for formulating increasingly stricter immigration policies. In the aftermath of July 22 politicians became acutely concerned about their own anti-immigrant rhetoric and how it may have influenced the terrorist Anders Behring Breivik. A broad consensus to address and change the language used in the immigration debate was agreed upon; more openness and more democracy was promised. Much has changed, but even more has stayed the same in Norwegian politics and attitudes to immigration and Islam.