Revolution without regime change: The evidence from the post-Euromaidan Ukraine

What effects does a revolution have on the stability or change of a hybrid regime? Has the Ukraine's regime changed since the 2014 revolution? To answer these questions I examine the changes in formal and informal institutions and the quantitative and qualitative composition of elites after the change of power in Ukraine in 2014. I argue that despite greater than in the post-orange period quantitative renewal of elites, qualitative change has not occurred. Meanwhile, the old operational code, or modus operandi, of elites' political culture, composed of clientelism, secretive deals and quota based nominations to government positions continues to operate. The lack of elites' renewal and the dominance of informal rules over formal procedures – two factors that keep the institutional core of Ukraine's hybrid regime unchanged.     

Democracy,confusion, or chaos: Political conditionality in Kenya

We argue that the policy of conditioning all economic development aid on a process of democratization is a mistake. Good economic policy should be rewarded for its own sake. The process of democratization is costly to participants, and forcing it prematurely can lead to institutional collapse rather than development. Unclear definition of political conditionality has made donor policies inconsistent and capricious. We make these arguments conceptually and then review the experience of one of the most explicit cases of conditionality-induced “democratization”—Kenya. An aid cutoff stimulated the government to hold multiparty elections for the first time in many years. Despite the apparent success, the human and economic costs have been high, and the political changes less than donors hoped.     

Democracy, Law, and Comparative Politics

This article offers a revision of democratic theory in light of the experience of recently democratized countries, located outside of the northwestern quadrant of the world. First, various definitions of democracy that claim to follow Schumpeter and are usually considered to be “minimalist” or “processualist” are critically examined. Building upon but clarifying these conceptual efforts, a realistic and restricted, but not minimalist, definition of a democratic regime is proposed. Thereafter, this article argues that democracy should be analyzed not only at the level of the political regime but also in relation to the state—especially the state qua legal system—and to certain aspects of the overall social context. The main underlying theme that runs through this article is the concept of agency, especially as it is expressed in the legal system of existing democracies. I dedicate this article to my daughter Julia, for the metonymy and much love Guillermo O'Donnell is the Helen Kellogg Professor of Government at the University of Notre Dame. He has written many books and articles on authoritarianism, political transitions, democratization, and democratic theory. His latest book,Counterpoints, was published in 1998 by the University of Notre Dame Press. O'Donnell is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. I presented previous versions of this paper and received useful comments at seminars held in April and May 1999 at the University of North Carolina; Cornell University; Berlin's Wissenschaftszentrum; the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, August 1999; and in September 1999 at the Kellogg Institute. I also appreciate the comments and criticisms received from Michael Brie, Maxwell Cameron, Jorgen Elklit, Robert Fishman, Ernesto Garzón Valdés, Jonathan Hartlyn, Osvaldo Iazzetta, Gabriela Ippolito-O'Donnell, Iván Jaksić, Oscar Landi, Hans-Joachim Lauth, Steven Levitsky, Juan Linz, Scott Mainwaring, Juan M. Abal Medina, Martha Merritt, Peter Moody, Gerardo Munck, Luis Pásara, Timothy Power, Adam Przeworski, Héctor Schamis, Sidney Tarrow. Charles Tilly, Ashutosh Varshney, and Ruth Zimmerling. I am particularly grateful for the careful revision and editing undertaken by Gerardo Munck and Ruth Collier for the present issue ofSCID.     

Limitations of rational-choice institutionalism for the study of Latin American politics

This article analyzes the analytical limitations of rational-choice institutionalism for the study of Latin American politics. Adherents of this approach have made important contributions by analyzing topics that Latin Americanists traditionally neglected, such as the political impact of electoral rules and the processes of legislative decision-making. But rational-choice institutionalism has difficulty explaining the complicated, variegated, and fluid patterns of Latin American politics. It overemphasizes the electoral and legislative arenas and—in general—the input side of politics; it overestimates the importance and causal impact of formal rules and institutions; it does not explain the origins of political change and often suggests a static image of political development; it offers an incomplete analysis of institutional creation by neglecting the importance of political beliefs; it cannot fully account for crisis politics; and it puts excessive, analytically arbitrary emphasis on “microfoundations.” The article questions whether these limitations can successfully be overcome, arguing that rational-choice institutionalism—while an important addition to the debate—is not inherently superior to other approaches applied in Latin American Studies. Kurt Weyland is associate professor of government at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of two books—Democracy without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil (Pittsburgh, 1996) andThe Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela (Princeton, 2002)—and of numerous journal articles on democratization, market reform, social policy, and populism in Latin America. His current research focuses on the diffusion of policy innovations across countries. I would like to thank Barry Ames, James Booth, Ruth Collier, Marcelo Costa Ferriera, Wendy Hunter, Mark Jones, Fabrice Lehoucq, Scott Mainwaring, Gerardo Munck, Anthony Pereira, Tim Power, Ken Roberts, Charles Shipan, Richard Snyder, Donna van Cott, and two anonymous reviewers for excellent comments.     

Institutions and growth in East Asia

Institutions have played a central role in political economy explanations of East Asia’s growth, from the developmental state to the micro-institutions of industrial policy. A review of these institutional explanations finds that few if any of the postulated institutional explanations involve either necessary or sufficient conditions for rapid growth. This finding suggests two conclusions. First, there are multiple institutional means for solving the various collective action, credibility, and informational problems that constitute barriers to growth. The search for a single institutional “taproot” of growth is likely to be a misguided exercise, and more attention should be given to understanding the varieties of capitalism in East Asia. Second, institutions are themselves endogenous to other political factors that appear more consequential for growth, including particularly the nature of the relationship between the state and the private sector. Stephan Haggard is the Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego. He is the author ofPathways from the Periphery: The Political Economy of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (1990) andThe Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis (2000). He is the co-author (with Robert Kaufman) ofThe Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (1995) and (with David McKendrick and Richard Doner)From Silicon Valley to Singapore: Location and Competitive Advantage in the Hard Disk Drive Industry (2000). Also with Robert Kaufman, he is co-editor ofThe Politics of Economic Adjustment (1992). He is currently working with Robert Kaufman on a project on changing social contracts in East Asia, Latin America, and Central Europe. I am indebted to Tun-Jen Cheng, Rick Doner, Cheng-Tian Kuo, Greg Noble, and Andrew MacIntyre, not only for comments but for extended discussion of these issues over the years.     

A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Korean and Japanese Clientelism

Clientele networks are differently structured across nations, depending on the political institutional setup and the configuration of political and social forces. The political institutional setup, which is cross-nationally different, determines where clientele networks are formed, how extensive they are and how long they can persist. The configuration of political and social forces, which varies over time, defines who takes the lead in clientele networks and how effective they are for producing policy effects. A comparison of Korean and Japanese clientelism suggests that the Korean case represents a form of national-level, defensive, non-cumulative and high political-risk clientelism, while the Japanese case illustrates a form of local-level, cumulative and low political-risk clientelism. Korean clientelism is not a copy of the Japanese variant. Based on this analysis, the author suggests that not every social organisation is functional for democratic governance. He also points out that the gradual process of disintegrating clientele networks is on the move.     

Waves of democratization

The term, “waves of democratization,” popularized by Huntington (1991), can be conceptualized in at least three ways: as rises in the global level of democracy, as periods of positive net transitions to democracy, and as linked sets of transitions to democracy. Each of these approaches to the concept carries distinct theoretical implications and generates somewhat different historical patterns. The three approaches are examined using four cross-national, time-series operationalizations of democracy. Charles Kurzman is an assistant professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is currently studying the wave of democratization of the early twentieth century.     

Neo-patrimonial practices and sustainability of authoritarian regimes in Eurasia

The article analyzes authoritarian regimes within the post-Soviet territory in terms of informal practices (clannishness, clientelism and patronage) and their characteristics used by political leaders to form a power coalition. It has been argued that any of these informal practices determine a power coalition of a certain size, which is consequential for regime sustainability. Power coalitions formed on the basis of a clan-like nature is the least effective way to retain power and generally leads to regime destabilization. Clientelism, which allows for forming a power coalition on a wider basis, is a more effective strategy in terms of regime sustainability. Maximum regime sustainability is reached when patronage practices are used, which require more material resources and are only accessible to a limited number of wealthy states.     

The Emperor’s new clothes: Labor reform and social democratization in Chile

This article analyzes the relationship between political and social democratization in recent democratic transitions by illustrating how the two processes were at odds in the case of labor reform in Chile (1990–2001). Labor reform served simultaneously to consolidate political democracy and slow down the momentum of social democratization. It was a tool for signalling policy change to legitimate the democratic regime, but at the same time leaving the liberal economy intact. The Chilean case calls into question the thesis of a natural progression from political to social rights prevalent in democratic theory, and allows us to generalize about the way marketization places limits on democratic deepening. The article first discusses what would be appropriate criteria of social democratization considering contemporary labor issues and labor relations in Chile. It then investigates the political process of labor reform. Ongoing legal debates through the 1990s show the extent of path dependence set in motion by the timid nature of the first social reforms in Chile’s new demoncracy and their muting effect on citizenship. Louise Haagh obtained her doctorate from the University of Oxford (St. Antony’s College) in 1998, and for the next three years held a British Academy Postdoctoral Research Fellowship at the College. In 2001 she began a lectureship at the University of York.     

The Role of International Clientelism in the National Factionalism of Palestine

In this article I investigate the role of the international community's policy in the national factionalism in Palestine. I attempt to illuminate how international policy has contributed to the sustaining of internecine Palestinian violence as Fatah, which lost the elections in 2005 and 2006, has been motivated not to hand over power. In the process of selecting allies in the fight against Islamist terrorism, the epitomic undemocratic feature of Arab political culture, clientelism, has been promoted over democracy. Hamas seizing power in Gaza in 2007 probably resulted from the need to tame unruly militant groups which were sponsored by leaders of the Palestinian Fatah party, which again were supported by Western powers. To understand the national splitting in Palestine there is a need to analyse the interconnection between warlords, local clientelism and international clientelism.     

Varieties of Authoritarianism: The Organization of the Military State and its Effects on Federalism in Argentina and Brazil

While much has been written about democracy and democratization, far less attention has been paid to the institutional organization of authoritarian regimes. Scholars have focused on the causes, economic policies, societal support, intra-elite conflicts, or human-rights violations of authoritarian regimes. More recently, political scientists have also studied the role of elections and legislatures on the survival of authoritarian regimes. However, the very different ways in which authoritarian regimes, and military regimes in particular, organize the government, occupy the state apparatus, and modify the country’s political institutions have largely gone under-theorized. This essay contributes to fill in this void by analyzing how the last military regimes of Argentina (1976–1983) and Brazil (1964–1985) organized power within the state and the legacies of such organization on the institutions of federalism. The essay argues that variation in the organization of the state under the military regimes accounts for the divergent origins of post-developmental decentralization, which in turn explains the contrasting evolution of intergovernmental relations in each country. The article contributes to the recent literature on electoral authoritarian regimes by showing that elections and legislatures matter not only to regime survival but also to policy outcomes.     

Explaining Ethnic Autonomy Regimes in Latin America

Through a systematic examination of nine cases, the author identifies factors that enabled indigenous movements in five Latin American countries to secure formal recognition of politico-territorial autonomy regimes. All nine cases occurred within the framework of a larger regime bargain—either (1) peace talks intended to end armed struggle when the regime faced a serious challenge to maintain political order or territorial control, or (2) a severe crisis of legitimacy and governability that forced political elites to renegotiate fundamental regime structures via the process of constitutional reform. In the five successful cases, changes in the political opportunity structure occurred that favored indigenous autonomy claimants. These changes were the opening of access to decision-making spheres and the emergence of an influential ally. Donna Lee Van Cott is assistant professor of political science at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. She is author ofThe Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America and editor ofIndigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America.     

Why Political Competition Can Increase Patronage

Patronage is important in developing countries, but its relationship to political competition has received little attention. Major literatures generate opposing predictions. In the good governance and democracy literatures, robust political competition is the antidote to patronage. But for scholars studying the process of democratization, competitive politics is associated with heightened social tensions and instability. Using data from an original survey covering 88% of local governments in Ghana, I show that political competition can increase patronage: where local elections are closely fought by the two main parties, local governments provide significantly more public sector jobs. I use qualitative data from 9 months of fieldwork to show the causal channel. I find a bottom-up phenomenon in which pressures for patronage come from parties’ own volunteers. Volunteers actively use their parties’ vulnerability in competitive elections to extract rewards. I locate the root of volunteers’ power in the nature of the party system, and I demonstrate that for 19 African countries, variation in party system strength is linked to certain forms of clientelism. These findings challenge assumptions that competitive politics will reduce patronage, as well as assumptions that a decline in one form of clientelism means a decline in all forms of clientelism.     

Elites and institutions in conservative transitions to democracy: Ex-authoritarians in the Brazilian National Congress

Although many students of democratization accept that new democracies are impacted by various legacies of the previous authoritarian regime, little attention has been paid to the relationship between characteristics of the political class and the imperative of institution building in the new democracies. Conservative transitions to democracy, where continuity in the political class remains high despite the change in regime, are notably dependent on the participation of ex-authoritarians in the process of institution-building. Many such elites were socialized to marginal or fictional representative institutions under authoritarianism, leading them toward political practices which may subsequently be inimical to the development of effective instituions under democracy. A study of ex-authoritarians in the Brazilian Congress reveals their weaker commitment to legislative institutionalization, thus illustrating some of the tradeoffs and drawbacks of conservative transitions to democracy. Timothy J. Power is assistant professor of political science at Louisiana State University. He is currently writing a book on the role of the political right in Brazilian democratization.     

State Power and the Economic Origins of Democracy

Recent comparative politics scholarship on regime change has not taken state capacity seriously. Prominent works on the relationship between democracy and economic inequality center on the expectation by economic elites that democratization will lead to economic redistribution. But state capacity is necessary for redistribution, and where extractive capacity is lacking, rational economic elites should not fear that suffrage expansion would lead to effective redistribution, nor should the masses expect to gain economically from democratization. State capacity thus acts as a scope condition for the effect of inequality on regime outcomes. This prediction is confirmed through replication and extension of the analysis in Boix (2003), with the addition of the presence of a regularly implemented national census as a proxy for state capacity. In strong states, the effect of inequality on regime change is confirmed. But where the state is weak, inequality is shown to have no effect on regime outcomes. Thus, including state capacity in theories of regime change calls into question general claims about the “economic origins” of dictatorship and democracy.     

Will Information Technology Reshape the North-South Asymmetry of Power in the Global Political Economy?

Digital technologies are sufficiently disruptive to current ways of doing things to call into question assumptions about the “inevitability” or “natural state” of many economic processes and organizational principles. In particular, the impact of digital technologies on our conceptions of property rights has potentially dramatic implications for the North-South divide and the distribution of power in the global political economy. Drawing on recent experiences with open-source property rights regimes, we present two scenarios, the “imperialism of property rights” and the “shared global digital infrastructure,” to highlight how debates over property-rights could influence the development of the global digital infrastructure and, in turn, contribute to significantly different outcomes in global economic power. Steve Weber is director of, the Institute of International Studies and professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley. His most recent book,The Success of Open Source, was published in April 2004 by Harvard University Press. Jennifer Bussell is a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of California, Berkeley. Her research is on the political determinants of information and communication technology access in developing countries.     

The public costs of private blessings: Fundamentals of the economic role of government

The main thrust of this overview is to demonstrate how the shift of government authority over time—from a defense of the realm against foreign intruders to an adjudication of conflicting citizen claims—has created a new set of problems and challenges for the modern state in search of development. It is argued that the power of the state expands as traditional forms of economic rivalries and class claims weaken, and as recourse to legal decision-making becomes widely accepted by all social and economic sectors. Government has proven better able to satisfy existing claims than at initiating new forms of social relations. Experiences in a variety of economic structures thus argue for a continued interplay of public and private, federal and personal claims. Irving Louis Horowitz is Hannah Arendt Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08933. Among his major works on development theory and practice areThree Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification (Oxford University Press, 1965, 1972), andBeyond Empire and Revolution: Militarization and Modernization in the Third World (Oxford University Press, 1982). He was founding editor ofStudies in Comparative International Development.     

Patterns of culture and democratization in Kuwait

Conventional wisdom asserts that Islam and tribalism dispose the countries of the Arab Middle East against democratization. Yet the local culture in the region resembles those in the ancient world where democracy was first established, and neither resembles the pattern of political development that occurred in Western Europe, today’s democratic paradigm. Kuwait, a city-state that has enjoyed a high level of collective wealth throughout the period following World War II, displays many of the attributes of the “positive liberty” that Isaiah Berlin, Hannah Arendt, and others see as characteristic of ancient democracies. Vigorous participation in a range of public spaces acts as a check on runaway state power. Kuwait’s record on “negative liberty” is poor, which is why it diverges from the western European model. Population growth and its effect on political development is eroding Kuwait’s qualities as a city-state and pushing it toward mass politics. It is not possible at this stage to predict with any confidence whether these new trends will result in further liberalization or a more authoritarian polity. Mary Ann Tétreault is a professor of political science at Iowa State University. She is the editor ofWomen and Revolution in Africa, Asia, and the New World (1994) and the author ofThe Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and the Economics of the New World Order (1995). She is presently working on a monograph on democratization in Kuwait and, with Robin Teske of James Madison University, is preparing an edited volume on power and social movements.     

Political transition and civil society: The cases of Kenya and Zambia

Studies of regime change that focus on the “high politics” of transition tend to overlook the importance of civil society in democratization and liberalization. This article explores the role that organizations and institutions in society play as agents of political change. Elements of civil society influence both the processes and outcomes of political transitions. Case studies of Kenya and Zambia indicate that associational arenas representing civil society made important contributions in liberalizing and democratizing authoritarian regimes. Beyond this, contrasting the two cases highlights the factors that influenced their efficacy as agents of political transition. Differences are found in the character of the civil societies in the two countries. These differences help to account for the extent of Zambia’s transition when compared to Kenya. Peter VonDoepp is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida. From 1992 to 1995 he held a Foreign Language/Area Studies Fellowship at Florida’s African Studies Center. He is currently conducting research in Malawi on the role of religious institutions in political change. Until 1997