FACTORS INFLUENCING LEGISLATORS'USE OF POLICY INFORMATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PROMOTING GREATER USE

Despite a tremendous growth in the volume of policy analysis in the past decade, recent research indicates governmental decisionmakers make little direct use of such research; at best, policy-oriented research alters a decisionmaker's conceptualization of the policy problem over the long term. Previous efforts to explain policymakers'limited use of policy research have generally not considered the opportunities and constraints presented by specific decisionmaking contexts. To a large extent, the research utilization literature has focused on attitudinal and demographic characteristics of decisionmakers and has adopted as a central focus the "two-communities" theory which asserts that frequent, direct use of policy research by policymakers is unlikely because of the competing worldview and belief systems of policy researchers and policymakers. While the two-communities theory may partially explain the limited use of policy research, it ignores the institutional incentives motivating decisionmakers. More specifically, this earlier research does not consider the different motivations of policymakers and their relative impact on use of policy information. To expand the explanation of decisionmakers'use of policy information, I postulate a model of legislators'use of policy information that includes four types of factors that influence legislators'propensity to use policy information. These factors-worldview and attitude toward social science, perception of the way policy issues are considered in the legislature, perception of the legislative structure, and legislative orientations-combine two-communities type of independent variables and perceptions of the legislative environment. In this way, policymakers'use of policy information can be examined more realistically and comprehensively.     

An analysis of legislative inefficiency and ideological behavior

This paper explores the theory of legislative inefficiency and the role of ideological preferences of legislators. It is shown that inefficiency can be caused by many factors other than legislative ideological behavior. Three major sources are emphasized: cost of voting and policy position information asymmetries across groups of voters and barriers to entry in political competition. Ideological preferences of legislators is not a cause of inefficiency independently. Legislators who care about both policy and winning will give inefficient representation to their constituents only when groups of voters are prevented from participating equally in the legislative process.     

Barriers to competition and the effect on political shirking: 1953–1992

Economists and political scientists have offered a variety of explanations for why legislators might rationally choose to ignore the preferences of their constituents, political parties, and presidents. The broad conclusion of this literature is that there is an element of “shirking” in congressional voting. The objective of this paper is to suggest that the effects of shirking in congressional voting may have increased over time, largely in response to the raising of barriers to competition in congressional elections, thereby enabling legislators to vote their own preferences without fear of losing reelection. We use a quasi-experimental design that controls for the effects of party, region, electoral safety, presidential control of the White House, and constituency factors, in isolating the causal effects of barriers to entry on a continuous series of roll-calls regarding the raising of the debt limit between 1953 and 1992. We find that “shirking” in legislative voting on debt limit legislation is a post-1970s phenomenon.     

Legislators,organizations and ties: Understanding interest group recognition in the European Parliament

What explains Members of European Parliament's (MEPs’) decisions to recognize some interest groups as relevant policy actors? Addressing this question is fundamental for understanding the role of political elites in shaping patterns of interest representation and interest groups’ role in legislative decision making. Building on theories of legislative behaviour and informational theories of legislative lobbying, we argue that MEPs give recognition to those organizations that are instrumental for achieving key political goals: re-election, career-progression and policy influence. The pursuit of these goals generates different patterns of MEP recognition of interest groups. We contribute to the literature in three ways. Conceptually, we propose interest group recognition as a key concept for understanding interactions and links between legislative and non-legislative actors. We illustrate the high conceptual relevance of recognition for interest groups research while noting its conspicuous neglect in the literature. We address this gap and place the concept central stage in understanding legislators’ attention to and behaviour towards interest organizations. Theoretically, we build on a classic framework explaining legislators’ behaviour and refine it through the lenses of informational theories of legislative lobbying. We argue and show that legislators recognize organizations that enhance electoral prospects in their home Member States, and that legislator–group ideological proximity and an interest group's prominence in a specific policy field affect MEPs’ decisions to recognize some organizations as relevant actors. Our argument acknowledges the importance of the broader context in which MEPs operate and pays attention to how they react to and interact with it. Empirically, we propose an original and innovative research design to identify and measure recognition with the help of social media data. Our measurement strategy constitutes a significant improvement insofar that it reduces the challenges of measurement bias usually associated with self-reported data generated through interviews, surveys, or the textual analysis of newspaper articles and official documents. Our research design allows using fine-grained measures of key dependent and explanatory variables and offers the very first analysis of MEP interest group recognition that holds across decision-making events and policy areas. We test our argument on a new dataset with 4 million observations recording the recognition of more than 7,000 organizations by 80 per cent of MEPs serving in EP8. We find that MEPs are more likely to recognize organizations from their Member State, particularly under flexible- and open-list electoral institutions. MEPs are also more likely to recognize organizations that share their ideological affinities and are prominent actors in policy areas legislators specialize in.     

Reconstruction of the state: Lobbying against political corruption in the Czech Republic

High level of distrust in political elites accompanied with a strong perception of corruption in Czech Republic has led to an increase of several anti‐corruption nongovernmental organisations' activities. About 18 organisations have created in 2013 an open coalition and established a project called “Reconstruction of the State” (Rekonstrukce státu). This project is oriented towards political parties and political elites to lead them to adopt nine anti‐corruption legislative proposals. This paper analyses how the project operates in its formal and informal aspects, which communication means are preferred and how the lobbyists interact with the politicians and political parties. Apart from the analysis of publicly available pieces of information from the project's website and official printed materials, semistructured interviews with activists and field research were performed. It can be seen that Reconstruction of the state has been most successful regarding agenda‐setting, but in the context of the legislative process, it has to face many obstacles either from legislators themselves or competitors with different goals.     

State structure and political representation: Comparing the views of statewide and sub‐state legislators across 14 countries

How the recent creation, re‐invention or reinforcement of regional levels of political decision making across Europe compounds political representation is one of the key issues of contemporary democratic government. Despite growing scholarly interest, the critical question as to whether the regional institutional setting has brought about distinct representational roles among sub‐state legislators has yet to be addressed. To advance research in this field, this study bridges the literature on multilevel politics and legislative studies that to date have developed in isolation. Using innovative survey data from 14 statewide and 56 regional legislatures across Europe, it provides the first comprehensive test of how the state structure affects a legislator's views on representation. The results highlight that, relative to legislators in unitary states and national legislators in multilevel states, legislators at the regional level are more constituency‐oriented. Moreover, this heightened responsiveness to constituents at the regional level is not offset by weaker collective representation operating through political parties. Beyond these findings’ immediate relevance to scholars of federalism/regionalisation and parliaments, they also speak to the wider normative debate about the quality of political representation and public policy.     

THE POLITICS OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT: MONITORING EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN SIX STATES

Legislative oversight traditionally has been viewed as a rational tool for achieving democratic accountability. Legislators conduct oversight to ensure consistency between implementation and official policy directives. The major theme of this paper is t h a t oversight is best understood as an integral part of legislative-administrative politics. By examining how six states monitored recent educational reforms, the author finds that legislators conducted oversight in ways that minimized time commitments and maximized political benefits.
The paper concludes that legislative interest in controlling implementation often was secondary to political considerations. Oversight, therefore, may not really be effective as an accountability tool.     

AGENDA-SETTING BY STATE LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUSES: POLICY PRIORITIES AND FACTORS OF SUCCESS

As their representation in legislative chambers has increased, black state legislators have organized into caucuses to maximize their policy influence. These caucuses act as policy entrepreneurs in initiating and advancing minority policy goals. The North Carolina Legislative Black Caucus is il- lustrative of an emerging force in half the states in moving minority policy issues from the systemic to the formal legislative agenda. Using the 1987 North Carolina Legislative Black Caucus as the research setting, supple- mented with selective data on other state caucuses, this article offers insights into the types of policy initiatives state legislative black caucuses advance. Also, situational and political factors that may foster successful agenda-setting are explored.     

THE POLITICS OF LEGISLATIVE CURTAILMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: OBSTACLES TO POLICE-PATROL OVERSIGHT

State Administrative Procedure Acts (APAs), like their federal counterpart, attempt to even the odds that citizens’rights will be protected as administrative agencies exercise quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions. North Carolina is one of several states which has recently attempted to constrain agency power in rulemaking and complaint adjudication. This is a case study of policy outcomes attained by the North Carolina General Assembly in its 1985 revision of the state's APA. Why did some state legislators’efforts to assume stricter oversight over administrative rulemaking fall far short of the kind of control and accountability they aimed for? We explore three types of obstacles to APA reform encountered in North Carolina. Each is relevant to other states. First, direct surveillance or “police-patrol” techniques of legislative oversight impose undesirable political costs on legislators. Second, there is an absence of (or categorical precedence is against) the adoption of such techniques. Third, executive-legislative branch conflict and complex separation of powers issues arise when state legislatures attempt to curtail administrative rulemaking in significantly new and restrictive ways.     

Why do Legislators Skip Votes? Position Taking Versus Policy Influence

A legislator’s duty is to vote on legislation, yet legislators routinely miss votes. Existing studies of absenteeism have focused on the US Congress, producing useful but partial explanations. We provide added insight by examining absenteeism in American state legislatures. Our data include 2,916,471 individual votes cast by 4392 legislators from 64 legislative chambers. This rich, multistate dataset produces insights that build on and sometimes conflict with Congressional research. We use a multilevel logistic model with nested and crossed random effects to estimate the influence of variables at five different levels. In particular, we investigate whether state legislators miss unimportant votes or important votes. Contrary to what Congressional studies have found, we find that state legislators avoid participating in close or major votes, favoring reelection concerns over policy influence. We also find that state-to-state variations in legislative professionalism—in particular, the length of the session—affect absenteeism, with shorter sessions leading to higher absenteeism.     

Bargaining in legislatures,portfolio allocation,and the electoral costs of governing

What motivates political parties in the legislative arena? Existing legislative bargaining models stress parties’ office and policy motivations. A particularly important question concerns how parties in coalition government agree the distribution of cabinet seats. This article adds to the portfolio allocation literature by suggesting that future electoral considerations affect bargaining over the allocation of cabinet seats in multi-party cabinets. Some parties are penalised by voters for participating in government, increasing the attractiveness of staying in opposition. This ‘cost of governing’ shifts their seat reservation price – the minimum cabinet seats demanded in return for joining the coalition. Results of a randomised survey experiment of Irish legislators support our expectation, demonstrating that political elites are sensitive to future electoral losses when contemplating the distribution of cabinet seats. This research advances our understanding of how parties’ behaviour between elections is influenced by anticipation of voters’ reactions.     

The Role of Political Ideology in the Structural Design of New Governance Agencies

This paper employs theories of structural politics and delegation to develop a set of propositions about the legislative delegation of authority to quasi-governmental entities, known as "quangos." Legislators have incentives to condition their choice of structure for an organization charged with implementing policy on their own political attitudes toward "good government." The quasi-independence of quangos provides credibility for legislators to commit to a process that takes policy making out of their hands while creating a structure that increases the likelihood of achieving their policy goals. Theoretical implications are empirically examined using data on the financial autonomy of Dutch public bodies. The results support the argument that it is important to consider politicians' ideologies directly in governance studies because they form the key component of structural politics.     

Parties for Rent? Ambition,Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies

Party switching by legislators has been common in many countries, including the Philippines, Italy, Nepal, Ecuador, Russia, and Japan. While frequently dismissed as simply an indicator of a weak parties, switching provides a unique window on party systems. To the extent that we understand affiliation decisions, we gain insight on the way politicians use parties to advance their careers. In this article I offer a model of party-membership patterns, where decisions to switch party or to stay put are a function of the strategic interaction of legislators and endogenous party leaders. I test the model on the case of Brazil, where switching is common. Results suggest that Brazilian legislators use parties to maximize pork, ideological consistency, and short-term electoral success, but which of these matters most depends on constituents, i.e., legislators use parties for different purposes in different electoral environments. The approach developed here could easily be applied to study legislative behavior in other political systems.     

The paradox of policy analysis: If it is not used,why do we produce so much of it?

This article explores the apparent paradox that our society invests heavily in policy analysis when empirical studies, political science theory, and common wisdom all suggest that analysis is not used by policymakers to make better policy decisions. It offers a critique of the traditional view of policy analysis and presents an alternative view derived from contemporary literature on the policy process and decisionmaking. The alternative view suggests that there are legitimate uses for analysis other than the problem‐solving use originally envisioned but apparently rarely attained. The two views imply different patterns of use of analysis by legislative committees—a contrast that I subject to an empirical test. An examination of quantitative data on policy analysis use by congressional committees from 1985 to 1994 lends support for the alternative view. The research has two implications. First, despite its scientific origins, policy analysis may be a more effective instrument of the democratic process than of the problem‐solving process. Second, the profession of policy analysis may be in better shape than many who are calling for fundamental changes to its practice seem to believe. © 1999 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

The classification of electoral systems: Bringing legislators back in

It is widely assumed that electoral institutions shape politicians' incentive for personal vote-seeking, with important behavioral and policy consequences. Yet, there is a surprising lack of consensus on how to compare real-world electoral institutions. Using new data this paper examines how legislators' own perception of their electoral incentives in fifteen democracies correspond to some of the most seminal classification schemes in political science. Our survey of 2326 legislators – the empirically broadest study of personal vote orientation so far conducted – demonstrates that legislators do not always understand electoral incentives in the same way scholarly rankings do, highlighting the need for scholars of political institutions to justify their choice of classification scheme. If not, an entire body of literature may be misguided.     

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON PRODUCTIVITY: EPA'S IMPLEMENTATION OF TSCA

Discussions of governmental productivity typically focus on managerial improvements within bureaucratic organizations. A more balanced, political approach to governmental efficiency and effectiveness would give equal emphasis to productivity obstacles and opportunities In an agency's legislative mandate and working environment. EPA's implementation of the Toxic Substances Control Act illustrates how productivity can be signiflcantly affected by minor legislative provisions, b y the configuration of group interests and resources, and by other factors beyond the control of an administrative agency. Some of these obstacles could be reduced i f given appropriate attention in scholarly research and in policy deliberations.     

Revising Road Safety Policy: The Role of Systematic Evidence in Switzerland

In recent years, interest has grown in promoting and employing “evidence‐based policymaking.” This has been accompanied by an increase in available information about the performance of public policies. While existing research concludes that evidence about “what works” rarely prevails in democratic politics, it is inconclusive about which conditions affect the relevance of such evidence in decision‐making processes. This article aims first to clarify these conditions, and second, to present empirical findings from two case studies of road safety policy revision. The findings show how the creation and diffusion, as well as the political context, affect the role evidence plays in legislative policy revision in Switzerland.     

Constituents’ Responses to Congressional Roll‐Call Voting

Do citizens hold their representatives accountable for policy decisions, as commonly assumed in theories of legislative politics? Previous research has failed to yield clear evidence on this question for two reasons: measurement error arising from noncomparable indicators of legislators’ and constituents’ preferences and potential simultaneity between constituents’ beliefs about and approval of their representatives. Two new national surveys address the measurement problem directly by asking respondents how they would vote and how they think their representatives voted on key roll‐call votes. Using the actual votes, we can, in turn, construct instrumental variables that correct for simultaneity. We find that the American electorate responds strongly to substantive representation. (1) Nearly all respondents have preferences over important bills before Congress. (2) Most constituents hold beliefs about their legislators’ roll‐call votes that reflect both the legislators’ actual behavior and the parties’ policy reputations. (3) Constituents use those beliefs to hold their legislators accountable.     

Mandates, Powers, and Policies

Elections provide a mandate to pursue a set of policies. Party label provides a concise ideological cue for voters to choose among candidates, and research on industrial democracies verifies a link between the parties voters elect and subsequent policy outcomes. The combination of inchoate party systems and economic vulnerability elsewhere may weaken the link between voter choice and policy. When examining economic policies in Latin America, there is some controversy as to whether governments carried out "reform by surprise"—promising one thing during a campaign while implementing another in office. We test whether the ideological reputations of executives' and legislators' parties explain whether they adopt market-oriented policies. We find that the future behavior of presidential candidates is difficult for voters to predict. However, the ideological reputation of legislators is a reliable predictor of policy outcomes, and the relationship is clarified by the prospects of collective action by legislative delegations.     

The Impact of Term Limits on State Legislators' Ambition for Local Office: The Case of Michigan's House

State legislative term limits have created major political changesin 16 states. They are also affecting intergovernmental relationshipsin ways that are only now becoming apparent. This article exploresthe argument that legislators with limited opportunities forupward mobility may choose to run for local office rather thanmove up the "political ladder" to a statewide or federal office.Based on the post-legislative career decisions of members ofthe Michigan House of Representatives from 1982 to 2000, theinitial evidence suggests that legislators in Michigan are morelikely to return to local government in a post-term-limit environment.