One Formula,Two Experiences: political divergence of Hong Kong and Macao since retrocession

Since the return of Hong Kong's sovereignty to the People's Republic of China, the territory's political development has diverged from that of Macao. The poverty of leadership, state–society confrontations, deinstitutionalization and Beijing's explicit intervention have marked Hong Kong's political development from 1997 to 2004. Since April 2004, the Hong Kong governing style has converged with that of Macao in terms of its pragmatism. Although Macao's political development is characterized by leadership finesse, state–society partnership and institutionalization, its relatively weak civil society and lack of democratic reforms are by no means an attractive ‘one country, two systems’ model to Taiwan; nor does Hong Kong's ‘one country, two systems’ appeal to the Republic of China. Yet, the political corruption and chaos that punctuate Taiwan's democracy have failed to have any positive demonstration effect on Hong Kong and Macao. While the models of Hong Kong and Macao are bound to diverge from that of Taiwan, political development in the two Chinese Special Administrative Regions is gradually converging.     

China's Strengthened New Order and the Role of Propaganda

The issue of whether or not the current regime in China is sustainable is one of the key questions of interest to specialists on Chinese politics today. The authors of this paper contend that the CCP government has actually strengthened its hold on power in recent years, rather than weakening it, as so many analysts predicted. The paper uses CCP propaganda work in the current era as a lens to consider why this might be so and utilizes the term ‘Popular Authoritarianism’ to describe China's new political order.     

The impact of reform on the party and ideology in China

In the People's Republic of China (PRC), the monolithic organization of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its unchallenged official ideology, Mao Zedong Thought, used to be the two mighty pillars sustaining Communist rule during Mao's era. Since the late 1970s, however, these two pillars have been shattered by a series of post‐Mao economic and political reforms under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. As the result of a drastic decline in the standing of the party leadership and its official ideology, the ruling methods and foundation of the current regime have also changed. How did the reforms significantly affect the party and the official ideology? How did the changes in the roles of the party and ideology, in turn, redefine the nature and ruling methods of the current Communist regime? What do these changes imply for the future of this regime and the course of ongoing political and economic modernization? These questions, which are crucial for our understanding of the nature of sociopolitical transition in China, will be addressed in this article.     

China's Prolonged Stability and Political Future: Same political system,different policies and methods

Contrary to the earlier political upheavals which culminated in the 1989 Prodemocracy Movement, China has achieved an extended stability in the 1990s. This paper argues that the prolonged stability resulted from a set of changes in China's state‐society relations, and much of it was related to the 1989 movement. After the 1989 movement, the CCP veterans selected younger leaders who were both reform-minded and had a Machiavellian sense of politics. This new leadership skillfully managed the economy and contained dissident activities from public attention. Reform and the booming economy also provided many opportunities for intellectuals and students and turned them from the earlier economic 'losers' into the current 'winners'. As market forces penetrated into China more deeply and the state no longer took charge of everything as it used to, the Chinese became less interested in national politics, and political conflicts localized. This paper also argues that although China's state‐society relations underwent great changes, the state still bases its legitimacy on performance and is thus intrinsically unstable. A political reform that aims at changing the basis of state legitimation becomes crucial.     

China's Economic Diplomacy towards the Arab Countries: challenges ahead?

Since the outbreak of the Arab revolts in late 2010, China has adhered to its ‘business-first’ economic diplomacy towards the Arab countries, a policy driven by China's ongoing geoeconomic interests. The ten-year-old China–Arab States Cooperation Forum serves as the nucleus for China's economic diplomacy in the region. The Chinese authorities have also initiated interagency coordination and central–local governments' power sharing in order to pursue this diplomacy successfully. However, while its economic diplomacy may be evolving, China, unlike what it has achieved in Black Africa, seems to have failed to develop strategic, political and cultural exchanges with its Arab counterparts. The intertwined geopolitical and geoeconomic factors that have emerged since the Arab revolts might make it harder for China to reap economic benefits while shelving political entanglement to sustain this economic diplomacy in the longer run.     

Chinese Corporate Governance and Prospects for Reform

A critical element in China's current economic reform program is the creation of modern corporate governance structures in its corporations. Many of China's largest firms are caught between market incentives and political pressures, creating a situation ripe for managerial inefficiency. This article examines the financial and regulatory structures necessary for an efficient corporate governance system to function in China, and it assesses how these structures currently operate in the economy. The article identifies key failures in fostering modern corporate governance practices, which in turn jeopardize central elements of the government's reform program. The article includes a case study of the governance practices of PetroChina Company Ltd, the internationally listed subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation. The success or failure of the government's efforts to create proper governance mechanisms will carry important economic and political ramifications for China. Indeed, the successful implementation of corporate governance reforms may mark the final stages of China's evolution into a market economy.     

The Tibet Problem in the Milieu of a Rising China: findings from a survey on Americans' attitudes toward China

The Lhasa riots in 2008 re-captured the world's attention on the Tibet problem. As China continues to grow as a rising power, it raises a concern over whether the perception of a rising China will affect how American people think about the Tibet problem. In this article, the authors apply public opinion data to evaluate this question. The results show that the perception of China's hard power or soft power has little influence on Americans' view of the Tibet problem, while factors of political values and China's policy stance matter greatly. Our findings suggest that the huge difference in political values between the PRC and the US makes it tough for both sides to agree on a resolution to the Tibet problem. In the long term, China needs to improve its human rights record and present itself as a responsible great power to win over the hearts of foreign publics rather than conduct a public relations campaign according to its own imagination.     

Consultative Leninism: China's new political framework

This paper puts forward the concept of consultative Leninism to describe the political system that has taken shape in China after the death of Deng Xiaoping. It argues that the Communist Party has made its essentially Leninist political machinery more resilient in confronting the huge social and political challenges that the current global financial crisis may unleash in China by incorporating consultative elements. Consultative Leninism has five defining characteristics: an obsessive focus upon staying in power; continuous governance reform designed to pre-empt public demands for democratization; sustained efforts to enhance the Party's capacity to elicit, respond to and direct changing public opinion; pragmatism in economic and financial management; and the promotion of nationalism in place of Communism.     

How Do Americans Evaluate China's International Responsibility? An Empirical Assessment

China in recent years has been asked by other major powers to take a greater share in international responsibility in response to the rise in China's national capability. Negative perceptions about how China is dodging its international responsibility exist not only among policy makers around the world, but have spread to worldwide mass publics, especially across the American people. In this article, we apply the dataset from the ‘Americans’ Attitudes toward China Survey' (AACS) to investigate what the American public think of China's international responsibility and which factors explain the varying evaluations from different theoretical perspectives. The results indicate that Americans' negative evaluations of China's international responsibility are associated with poor ratings regarding China's fulfillment of its domestic obligations and apprehension regarding China's potential threat, but has little to do with China's international behavior. To reduce these negative evaluations, China needs to improve its human rights conditions, give people more political rights, and convince the American public of the benevolence of its ascending power. In addition, persistent efforts toward soft-power construction are also very important since Americans who are interested in Chinese culture or knowledge tend not to think that China is dodging its international responsibility.     

A New Chinese Discourse of India

Conventional wisdom has held that China is a success and India is a failure, that India's democracy leads to its poverty and religious intolerance, and China's economic reform without political opening was the only correct path to development and stability. The success of the Indian domestic software industry awed many Chinese and contributed to recent online discussion of India among Chinese scholars. This article sheds light on the changing views of India in China through surveying online articles posted on two major Chinese websites. The new discourse focuses on the historical, cultural, and institutional roots, particularly government policies that have led to the current situation in India. The new Chinese discourse also reflects evaluations of China's own economic policies in the past few decades.     

马克思政治伦理的基本观念与当代价值

马克思政治伦理以哲学—人性的分析、实践唯物主义思维方式以及历史唯物主义的科学方法,实现了政治关系从"应然"到"实然"的转变。马克思政治伦理具有客观必然性,其基本观念蕴含着三个方面,即马克思哲学的政治性质、对政治经济学批判以及科学社会主义理论的方法,这三个方面是相互融合、相互交织在一起的。马克思政治伦理思想超越了西方传统政治伦理思想,实现了革命性变革,它对于构建当代中国政治伦理学的理论体系,促进中国特色社会主义政治文明发展具有极其重要的价值和意义。     

Managing Government Integrity under Hierarchy: anti-corruption efforts in local China

In contrast to the early campaign style anti-corruption strategy based on nationwide uniformity, disparate local integrity initiatives and programs have proliferated in China in recent years. Local innovation in managing government integrity has been encouraged by the Center. Drawing on the author's fieldwork in Guangdong, this article investigates the rationale behind such development and addresses the question of why the central leadership has become receptive to local initiatives in cadre management, an area where political conformity was deemed necessary by an authoritarian regime. It suggests that the strategic adjustment testifies to the institutional failure of the earlier anti-corruption regime that manifested in, inter alia, an acute agency loss problem. The emerging approach to integrity management nevertheless has paradoxical institutional roots. It indicates some new thinking by the central authorities on holding local governments responsible for integrity management. Just as clearly, the adjustment is also driven by the Center's concern about losing control and its desire to ‘manage’ government integrity under hierarchy.     

Political Institutionalization as Political Development in China

Contrary to many doubts, the institutionalization of political leadership survived the succession process in China between 2002 and 2003. In 2004, Jiang Zemin attempted to override the institutionalized political leadership but was unsuccessful. These episodes demonstrate the level of political institutionalization that has been steadily undertaken since the reform and opening of China. After theoretically defining institutionalization as the first significant stage of political development, this article examines the current progress in political institutionalization at two distinct levels: external and internal. This article argues that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership intended to establish political stability directly and facilitate economic development indirectly under the goal of sustaining the political legitimacy of the CCP's rule of China. Finally, this article examines whether China would follow the ideal sequence of political development, i.e. institutionalization leading to participation leading to contestation. Though China has achieved considerable political institutionalization and conducted many experiments of expanding political participation, public contestation is still confined solely to within the party. Thus, it remains to be seen whether or not China will follow the ideal sequence.     

China Goes to Africa: a strategic move?

Entering the twenty-first century, particularly under the reign of Hu Jintao, China began to pursue an increasingly pro-active diplomacy in Africa. Most analysis on China's offensive diplomacy in Africa focuses on Beijing's thirst for energy and raw materials, and for economic profits and benefits. That is why it is often called ‘energy diplomacy’ or ‘economic diplomacy’ as if China, just like Japan in the 1980s, became another ‘economic animal’. But if one looks at the history of the PRC's foreign policy, Beijing has seldom pursued its diplomacy from purely economic considerations. Is this time any different? This article exams China's diplomacy in Africa from a strategic and political perspective such as its geo-strategic calculations, political and security ties with African countries, peacekeeping and anti-piracy efforts in the region, support for African regionalism, etc. It argues that China's diplomatic expansion in Africa, while partially driven by its need for economic growth, cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration its strategic impulse accompanying its accelerating emergence as a global power. Africa is one of China's diplomatic ‘new frontiers’ as exemplified by new Chinese leader Xi Jinping's maiden foreign trip to Africa in 2013.     

Constructing Peace in the Taiwan Strait: a constructivist analysis of the changing dynamics of identities and nationalisms

Economic integration in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly stronger recently. Economic integration should have led to stronger political convergence. Why hasn't it occurred? I argue that democracy in Taiwan and the continuation of the single-party rule in China have created two very different social experiences. These different social experiences have formed two different identities. People in Taiwan are increasingly thinking of themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The growing level of popular nationalism in China has also altered the political identity of mainland Chinese. Such change could force Beijing to accommodate citizens' demand to act more toughly towards Taipei. Further political integration is still possible, but it would require another norm change, perhaps already in the making.     

Domestic Openness in post-WTO China: central and local perspectives

This article seeks answers to three basic questions about the WTO's impact on domestic openness in China: is China a more open society as a result of its WTO membership; in what way has the WTO affected reform and openness; and, is WTO membership leading to political liberalization or translating into a demand for democracy as democracy advocates predicted? To this end, it identifies and analyzes the WTO-related reforms at central and local levels which have had the strongest impact thus far on openness to Chinese citizens. The analysis focuses on the reduction of the Party-state's control of economic activity as manifested in decreasing state monopoly and bureaucratic intervention in the sphere of economic activity, improved legal regulation, and increasing transparency of trade-related rules and rule-making. It argues that the varied depth and scope of the WTO's impact are attributable to differences in the congruence between the WTO principles and China's domestic political logic and the varying levels of effectiveness of external and internal pressure for change.     

External Contradictions of the Chinese Development Model: export-led growth and the dangers of global economic contraction

China's development model faces an external constraint that could cause an economic hard landing. China has become a global manufacturing powerhouse, and its size now renders its export-led growth strategy unsustainable. China relies on the US market, but the scale of its exports is contributing to the massive US trade deficit, creating financial fragility and undermining the US manufacturing sector. These developments could stall the US economy's expansion, in turn triggering a global recession that will embrace China. This is the external constraint. These considerations suggest that China should transition from export-led growth to domestic demand-led growth. This requires growing the economy's demand side as well as its supply-side. To avoid stalling the US economic expansion, which is critical to China's growth, China should significantly revalue its currency as part of a generalized East Asian upward currency revaluation. Longer term, China should raise wages and improve income distribution. Under export-led growth, higher wages undermine employment. Under domestic demand-led growth, they support it. The challenge is to raise wages in an efficient decentralized manner. History shows that this requires independent democratic trade unions. However, such unions are currently unacceptable to the Chinese political leadership. Creating a domestic demand-led growth regime therefore requires solving this political roadblock.     

An Emerging China and Diasporic Chinese: historicity,state, and international relations

The past decade has seen a growing body of literature on the (re)emergence of China and its implications for the new international order, and this scholarship is accompanied by the attempts from both within and outside of China to establish Chinese schools of international relations (IR). These admirable efforts, however, have been largely state-centric and concerned mainly with the balance of power, with little attention being directed to the diaspora's role in the evolution of China's international relationship and their potential contribution to bridging China studies and international relations theorization. Drawing upon theoretical insights from both IR and diaspora studies and employing a wide range of primary data including archives and personal interviews, this essay examines the diaspora's role (or the lack of it) in China's diplomacy since 1949 and attempts to conceptualize the Chinese experience in an historical and comparative perspective. I argue that historicity and state have played a significant part in shaping the interactions between the diaspora and diplomacy. The Chinese state's resilient capacity in domesticating (potential) diplomatic problems with respect to the diaspora and transforming them into new policy initiatives through facilitating diasporic participation in China's socio-economic and political processes has opened up new venues for the Chinese overseas to be involved in China's diplomacy. This article concludes by considering three different routes in engaging the diaspora with diplomacy at a time of China rising and by calling for strategic integration of diaspora into the emerging discourses on ‘IR theories with Chinese characteristics’.     

China and Central Asia: a new Great Game or traditional vassal relations?

Central Asia and China have been closely intertwined in history and today that relationship has begun to re-emerge. This article analyses the reasons for the close cooperation which has re-emerged in the 1990s and boomed in the twenty-first century. Domestic and internal factors, as well as political and economic considerations are included in the search for an explanation for current relations and future expectations. Despite the fact that China has emerged as one of the world's most powerful states, its dependence on the Central Asian states in regard to oil and gas but also domestic security is intriguing. The future of Sino-Central Asian relations is deeply embedded in joint problems and common interests, but also in fear of domination and external intervention.     

China after Deng: Some perspectives∗

Deng Xiaoping's succession arrangement is different from the typical practice of the supreme leader of a dictatorship. Instead of occupying the highest leadership position himself until his death, Deng has let his “successor” assume office as the supreme leader while he is still alive and influential. Such an arrangement will help avoid a succession crisis and political upheavals upon Deng's death. In addition, the current market‐oriented economic reforms are very unlikely to be reversed in post‐Deng's China because of four factors: (1) public support of the reforms; (2) the vested interest of the “prince party” in the reforms; (3) the new leadership's commitment to the reforms; and (4) the constitutionalization of the reforms. However, there are three major sources of social unrest, which may lead to some political turbulence in the post‐Deng period. These sources are the “June 4th Incident” of 1989, public demand for an end of corruption and for political liberalization, and some socio‐economic problems brought about by the on‐going economic reforms. Although there will be periodical events of socio‐political turbulence, they are unlikely to drag China into a long period of instability or lead to a split of the nation.