"Braxton Hick's" or the birth of a new era? Tracing the development of Ireland's abortion laws in respect of European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence

In Ireland, Article 40.3.3 degrees of Bunreacht na hEireann (the Irish Constitution) guarantees the right to life of the unborn child and the equal right to life of the mother. Abortion in Ireland is permissible only where there is a real and substantial risk to the mother's own life. Since Ireland became a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950,2 there have been concerns that it could result in Ireland being compelled to introduce a right to abortion. This article commences with a review of the extant law on abortion in Ireland, tracing the Constitutional protection afforded to the unborn child. The article will discuss the impact of the European Court of Human Rights' jurisprudence in regard to access to abortion and to information on abortion services in Ireland in an effort to ascertain if it really has resulted in a radical change to Irish abortion laws. As such, it will also be necessary to examine the more recent decisions of the ECtHR such as Tysiac v. Poland, and A, B, and C v. Ireland, to determine both the approach of the ECtHR to access to abortion in general and also to consider if it has resulted in a liberalisation of abortion law in Ireland.     

Tensions in the Regulation of Abortion in Britain

This article discusses policy and practice in abortion provision, paying particular attention to the provision of counselling before abortion. It discusses the way the Abortion Act 1967 constructs the woman seeking abortion, the reasons for the development of a policy about abortion counselling in the 1970s, and that policy's relationship to the assumptions about women underlying the statute. The ways in which policy has developed since 1977 are considered, and how policy and practice have come to view women seeking abortion in a way that contrasts with the construction of them that emerges from the law. Thus, the article argues, given that the 1967 Act and other rules that regulate abortion provision seem to rest on contradictory assumptions, the law should be reformed in line with policy and practice.     

Life and death before birth: 4D ultrasound and the shifting frontiers of the abortion debate

The development of 4D ultrasound technology has democratised fetal imagery by offering direct visual access to realistic images of the fetus in utero. These images, which purport to show a responsive being capable of complex behaviour, have renewed debate about the personhood of the fetus and the adequacy of current abortion regulation. This article considers recent abortion law reform initiatives in the United Kingdom and the United States and observes two shifts in the frontiers of these debates. The first concerns a shift from viability to sentience as a criterion of legal significance. The second concerns a shift toward constructing abortion in terms of feticide as distinct from the termination of pregnancy. Both strategies seek to deploy morphological similarities between the sentient fetus and newborn baby as a basis for extending law's dominion over the fetus.     

Abortion and legal policy

This paper reviews four legal policies in abortion from a critical theory of law perspective. Since the Comstock era, abortion policy has undergone radical shifts from criminalization in the last quarter of the nineteenth century to decriminalization in the late 1960s, followed by legalization and medical control over the last decade. Yet, until recently, little scholarly attention has been given to the social and political implications of these various policy shifts (almost all studies focus on the current legal phase only) often in isolation from other social and political realities. In this paper we draw on historical, demographic, participant-observation, interview, and documentary and legal materials to analyze the transformations of legal control structures in abortion. This shows both the creation of abortion law, which is imbedded in structures of sexual domination, and the contradictions in abortion law, which express antagonisms in civil society as well as promote alliances within ruling groups. The abortion case further clarifies the failure of legality to transcend existing gender inequalities, thereby contributing to further erosion of welfare rights for poor women and their children.     

Bracket creep in Australian abortion indications: when did rubella arrive?

This article highlights a common misconception about abortion law that is apparent from reading Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52; namely, that fetal abnormality forms a prima facie case for lawful abortion across Australia. This fallacy stems from the legacy of British law drafted in the aftermath of the thalidomide crisis of the early 1960s, and continues to shape beliefs about Australian abortion law in society and within the judiciary. The article notes the fundamental contradictions between British-style law that provides for abortion on the ground of fetal abnormality and New South Wales case law that provides for lawful abortion in regard to the health and wellbeing of the woman. The author concludes that it is misguided and erroneous to configure abortion law in terms of the fetus inconsistent with the tradition of abortion law, and New South Wales authority.     

Abortion laws in African Commonwealth countries

This paper provides an overview of the range of current (1981) abortion laws in the African Commonwealth countries, traces the origins of the laws to their colonial predecessors, and discusses legal reform that would positively provide for legal termination of pregnancy. The authors claim that the range of these laws demonstrates an evolution that leads from customary/common law (Lesotho and Swaziland) to basic law (Botswana, The Gambia, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria's Northern States and Seychelles) to developed law (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria's Southern States, Sierra Leone, and Uganda), and, finally, to advanced law (Zambia and Zimbabwe). The authors call for treating abortion as an issue of health and welfare as opposed to one of crime and punishment. Since most of the basic law de jure is treated and administered as developed law de facto, the authors suggest decriminalizing abortion and propose ways in which to reform the law: clarifying existing law; liberalizing existing law to allow abortion based upon certain indications; limiting/removing women's criminal liability for seeking an abortion; allowing hindsight contraception; protecting providers treating women in good faith; publishing recommended fees for services to protect poor women; protecting providers who treat women with incomplete abortion; and punishing providers who fail to provide care to women in need, with the exception of those seeking protection under a conscience clause. The authors also suggest clarifying the means by which health services involving pregnancy termination may be delivered, including: clarification of the qualifications of practitioners who may treat women; specification of the facilities that may treat women, perhaps broken down by gestational duration of the pregnancy; specifying gestational limits during which the procedure can be performed; clarifying approval procedures and consents; and allowing for conscientious objections to performing the procedure.     

Roe v. Wade and the history of abortion regulation

In "Roe," the Supreme Court found that the privacy right in the 14th amendment's view of "personal liberty" encompasses a woman's right to choose an abortion. The Court found that "abortion is a fundamental right." These conclusions are mistaken. The Court's analysis of "the history of abortion regulation" had a lot of errors and did not consider the state of technology in which abortion evolved. Sir Edward Coke, a 16th and 17th century jurist, said that abortion was a "great misprison." Quickening, the point at which a woman feels life, was used to determine fetal viability. State courts, therefore, viewed "abortion after quickening as common law crime." By the end of 1868, 30 to the then 37 states had passed laws restricting abortion. The Supreme Court said that the 19th century laws were passed to guard the mother's health "against the dangers of unsafe operation." In the 15 months before "Roe," 5 state courts said that their abortion laws were constitutional. They said that this was "intended to protect the lives of unborn children." Therefore, the Court's belief that "the state courts focused on the State's interest in protecting "the health of the mother" was unexplainable. The Court said that in many states the woman couldn't "be prosecuted for self-abortion." 17 states did "incriminate the woman's participation in her own abortion," but the Court did not note this. The Court's premise about the greater hazards of late abortions is mistaken. The states were concerned, in the late 19th century, about whether the attempted abortion caused the death of a child. The "right to an abortion" can only be seen as "fundamental" if it is "implicit" in the "ordered liberty" concept or "deeply rooted" in US tradition and history. "Roe" struck down the abortion laws of all 50 states and should be overturned.     

互联网法律规制的若干问题探讨

互联网应用极大地改变了人们的生活方式,互联网领域的法律问题也改变着法律的世袭领地,创造出了法律的"混血儿"。调整因互联网应用而产生的各类社会关系的法律规范即互联网法,其调整手段涉及公法和私法领域,是一个正在成长中的兼具特异性范畴和共同性范畴的综合性法律部门。互联网立法既要针对互联网发展的特点,制定互联网领域的单行法,又要在现有的民法、刑法、知识产权法等部门法中增加针对互联网领域的专门条款,以达互联网法律规制的目的。     

The Legal Education and Training Review: regulating socio-legal and liberal legal education?

The Legal Education and Training Review (LETR) which reported in June 2013 conceded that undergraduate law degrees are generally outside the remit of the review other than when there is a direct impact on the provision of legal services. On first glance therefore the review has few implications for those of us interested in delivering a liberal legal education and developing socio-legal approaches to law and legal study. However, on closer reading, the report contains a number of suggestions which, if taken up by the regulators, have significant potential to change law degrees, even if regulation remains “light touch”. This article explores those issues with a particular focus on the implications for liberal law degrees and socio-legal approaches to law teaching. In particular the article will explore issues around possible changes to foundation subjects; the creation of a framework of learning outcomes; the possible strengthening of legal writing and research in the curriculum and the opportunities offered for the introduction of more socio-legal material; and the trickle-down effect likely to be felt by providers of undergraduate law degrees of changes in regulation of legal services and as a result of student, employer and other stakeholder expectations.     

"Pro-life" absolutes, feminist challenges: the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law 1986-1992

This article asks how Irish abortion law developed to the point of stopping a young pregnant rape victim from travelling abroad to have an abortion in 1992 (Attorney General v.X). The author argues that this case, which ultimately saw the Irish Supreme Court overturn that decision and recognize the young woman's right to abortion, was the last chapter of the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law. The feminist critique of that law needs to consider its particular fundamentalist aspects in order to clarify the obstacles posed to the struggle for Irish women's reproductive freedom. The author argues that a fundamentalist narrative ordered the post-colonial and patriarchal conditions of Irish society so as to call for the legal recognition of an absolute right to life of the "unborn." The Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitutional right to life of the fetus in three cases during the 1980s is evidence that Irish abortion law was constructed through a fundamentalist narrative until that narrative was rejected in the Supreme Court decision in Attorney General v. X.     

互联网金融刑法规制扩大化的反思与限缩

互联网金融在规范与事实维度均存在刑法规制扩大化倾向。究其缘由,传统刑法规制模式存在秩序法益宽泛化、刑法规范抽象化、刑事治理优先化的弊端。该模式不仅会造成刑法自身机能的紊乱,而且无益于互联网金融的健康发展。当前,在"大力发展民营经济"和"鼓励金融创新"的时代背景下,应合理限缩刑法介入互联网金融的范围,并以金融秩序与自由并重扩充秩序法益内容,以监管科技与刑事规制联动彰显刑法独立品格,以非刑措施与刑事手段并用构建多元制裁体系,进而实现互联网金融刑法规制模式的优化转型。     

Procreative torts: enhancing the common-law protection for reproductive autonomy

Roe v. Wade's twenty-fifth anniversary is likely to herald widespread scholarly commentary on the decision's continued vitality and the future of abortion in the United States. However, if such commentary focuses solely upon the constitutional dimensions and political aspects of a woman's right to privacy, an important dimension of this right will be overlooked. Few commentators have considered the extent to which tort law safeguards a woman's interest in reproductive autonomy. In this article, Professor Northern argues that the interest in reproductive autonomy has not yet received the full protection to which it is entitled and that tort law is poised to evolve distinct causes of action for the interference with procreative autonomy interests. Professor Northern begins with an overview of the medical and psychological literature on abortion-related risks. She goes on to discuss current trends in abortion malpractice litigation. The author then reviews the three basic types of malpractice causes of action--battery, negligence, and lack of informed consent--and explores their application to abortion malpractice claims. The focus of the article then shifts to the development of specialized procreative torts, and Professor Northern contends that courts should go beyond previous decisions to redress any substantial interference with procreative autonomy. Finally, the author asserts that legislative alternatives to the common-law development of procreative torts, such as right-to-know statutes, are less protective of women's interests. Professor Northern concludes that tort law could and should be used to more fully protect women's interests in procreative autonomy.     

Post-colonial Fragments: Representations of Abortion in Irish Law and Politics

The Republic of Ireland has become infamous for its legal stance against abortion, especially since it went as far as stopping, albeit temporarily, a young rape victim from travelling abroad for an abortion in 1992. I argue that one of the rationales behind anti-abortion law is a post-colonial urge to mark Irishness distinctively by constructing it in exclusively 'pro-life' terms. I discuss examples of how Irish colonial experiences have been used to justify the effort to keep Ireland abortion-free, and to resist that effort. Representations of colonial history in the context of Irish abortion law and politics have changed over time and between groups. Such changes indicate a need for post-colonial critique to account for the fragmentation of colonialism as it is displaced, a need which the conceptualization of post-coloniality as a historical object can address.     

价格垄断及立法规制

虽然各国立法分类和理论研究都没有将价格垄断作为一般规制对象而单列,但并不能由此否认价格垄断行为具有相对独立性。对价格垄断行为的立法规制有两种立法体例:一元管制和二元管制。我国采二元管制的立法体例,即国家对价格的监管除了通过反垄断法或竞争法外,还制定专门的综合性价格法。反价格垄断法体系作为一个有机整体,是互相关联、衔接和配合的。反价格垄断法律规制对象有:垄断价格、固定价格、价格歧视和低价倾销。     

UK Abortion Law: Reform Proposals,Private Members’ Bills,Devolution and the Role of the Courts

UK abortion law remains unsettled, and subject to on‐going controversy and reform. This article offers a comprehensive critique of all reforms implemented or proposed since 2016. It examines reforms proposed in both Houses of Parliament and contextualises them within a public law analysis, showing both that the complex parliamentary processes relating to Private Members’ Bills have frustrated reform attempts, and that these attempts have been contradictory in their aims between the two Houses. Secondly, it examines the unique positions of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales to show the extent to which devolutionary settlements have influenced both reforms and executive involvement. Finally, it examines the potential impact of the courts on abortion law following Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission's Application for Judicial Review, showing that the Supreme Court's reframing of the debate in human rights terms is likely to affect abortion law, not only in Northern Ireland, but in the whole of the UK.     

Binding Morality and Perceived Harm as Sources of Moral Regulation Law Support Among Political and Religious Conservatives

Conservatives—both political and religious—are more likely than liberals to support laws regulating traditional or religious morality. The current study applies a moral psychological framework to argue that the association between conservatism and moral regulation law support can be explained in part by binding morality, or a moral orientation that privileges group needs above individual needs and includes concerns about absolutism, collectivism, and purity. Binding morality may directly promote support for moral regulation laws, which enforce traditional rules, discourage deviance, and require adherence to customs regarding bodily and spiritual purity. Binding morality may also indirectly promote support for moral regulation laws by motivating perceptions that “immoral” behaviors are harmful to innocent victims. I test these hypotheses using three analytic samples drawn from the General Social Survey (N = 3669, 7120, 369). Results show that, as expected, binding morality (especially purity) mediates the effects of political and religious conservatism on laws regulating pornography, marijuana, abortion, and euthanasia. Additional analyses exploring views about pornography show that binding morality (especially collectivism) is associated with perceptions of immorality as harmful, which in turn is associated with support for regulation.     

The future of technological law: The machine state

Advances in technology will challenge and change the current manner in which legal regulation occurs. It has always been possible to describe governance and law as a form of technology in itself, but the growth of digital technologies provides a new means by which to regulate the population. This article posits the theory that the inherent characteristics of technology will become inherent within the digitisation of law. As law becomes an increasingly digital entity, it will become more concerned with perfect reproduction of law upon the person, and so more encompassing in its scope. In addition, the increasing use of digital technologies in augmented reality, in 3D and 4D printing both in solid and biological matter, poses a fundamental change in the regulatory relationship between the State and the individual – a challenge the State will need to address.     

民法法典化的价值、模式与学理

文章首先回答中国为什么需要民法典,民法典的价值理性和形式理性为其提供了存在上的正当性;其次探讨了中国民法法典化的模式,指出应以德国五编制为基础;最后提出了中国民法法典化的学术条件,成熟的学理研究是法典化的理论背景;同时作者还指出,民法典作为塑造世俗生活的根本规范,其功能极其有限,我们不应寄予民法典过大的希望。     

Rewriting Roe v. Wade

Presented in this essay are suggestions for rewriting Roe vs. Wade, the case that resulted in the establishment of a constitutional right to abortion. Essentially, the argument is 1 of equal protection. It is suggested that abortion be viewed as presenting a problem that might be termed "the law of samaritanism" -- the law regarding obligations imposed on certain individuals to provide assistance to others. In American law it is a deeply rooted principle that an individual is ordinarily not required to volunteer assistance to another individual who is in danger or in need of aid. The argument presented maintains that if a pregnant woman is required to carry the fetus to term and deliver it, then she is being compelled to be a Good Samaritan. It is argued further that if the generally limited scope of obligations of samaritanism under current law are considered, and the special nature of the burdens imposed on pregnant women by laws forbidding abortion are also considered, the obvious conclusion is that the equal protection clause forbids imposition of these burdens on pregnant women. The argument is developed in a lengthy form and calls for an extended discussion of the law of samaritanism. The uniqueness of the abortion case also creates problems as the equal protection argument is approached, and an approach to equal protection questions is sketched.     

Sustaining the State: Legal Consciousness and the Construction of Legality in Competing Abortion Activists' Narratives

This article investigates how activists involved in both sides of the street politics of abortion simultaneously create, are constrained by, and use law when recounting a period of conflict that resulted in litigation. The activists‐turned‐litigants' construction of legality is explored by identifying and analyzing patterns of inclusion, absence, amendment, and type of law (i.e., state or extrastate) in and across the stories they tell. It is found that even though there are multiple reasons to expect all of these activists to resist or amend the state's conception of law, their narratives ultimately reproduce state law's legitimacy and power. The activists' stories also illustrate that legal consciousness is contextually and experientially based and is therefore subject to change. This finding has implications for legal mobilization as well as for the nature of legal consciousness.