The computer as mediator: Law of the sea and beyond

Occasionally, analytic models have found their way into complex policy negotiations. This article scrutinizes four such cases. When they appear independent and credible, models can play a variety of traditional mediating roles: They can foster learning, help define the negotiating agenda, stimulate communication, and suggest joint gains. These constructs can also offer artificial common ground for proposals to be tested, disputants' differences to be dovetailed, and adversaries “convinced” to move from entrenched positions without “conceding” to bargaining opponents. Yet, where the negotiators' basic values or ideologies actively clash, the special kind of rationality provided by models may prove to be irrelevant.     

Offsetting Uncertainty: Reassurance with Two-Sided Incomplete Information

Conventional models of bargaining and reassurance under incomplete information assume that actors' behavioral signals are objectively cooperative or noncooperative. Even if actors are uncertain of each other's preferences, they know what types of actions the other will view as cooperative. Yet on many real-world issues, cooperation is subjective, and what constitutes a cooperative action is conditional on the receiver's preferences. We present a formal model showing that in these cases, two-sided incomplete information actually incentivizes honest behavior and facilitates credible signaling. Because uncertain senders do not know whether a particular action will be interpreted as cooperative, they have little incentive to misrepresent, and instead honestly pursue their true goals. Thus, where cooperation is subjective, mutual uncertainty is “offsetting,” such that credible signals allow actors to quickly and accurately update their beliefs. We illustrate this logic through a case study of the Sino–Soviet split, and highlight the model's implications for contemporary U.S.–China relations.     

Different encounter behaviors: Businesses in encounters with regulatory agencies

Studies on regulatory encounters have shown that the interaction between regulator and regulatee is important for implementation of public policy. Much of this research examines how the behavior of frontline workers in such encounters affects regulatee compliance, that is, an outcome of the encounter, but we know less about the behavior that regulatees bring to these encounters. This paper therefore examines how businesses behave in encounters with regulatory authorities, and whether we can identify distinct, multidimensional types of encounter behavior. Using survey data from representative samples of Danish businesses and an exploratory cluster analysis, we identify five types of encounter behavior. We label these “Cooperators,” “Accommodators,” “Game players,” “Protesters,” and “Fighters.” We believe this framework provides a useful next step in a research agenda on businesses' behavior in regulatory encounters.     

理解治理多样性：一种国家治理的新科学

现代社会及其公共事务的复杂性对治理构成了严峻的挑战。为了应对公共事务的复杂性、多规模性、嵌套性和动态性,很多研究者提出了不同的治理理论,并且都试图寻找“治理万能药”,以一种治理方式适用所有情景。然而人类要真正解决所面临的公共事务治理难题,就需要实现“认识论哲学”的转型,以“多样性”的思维范式取代“单一性”思维范式,按照“治理多样性”的新范式来重构治理体制“。治理多样性”分析范式是一种治理的新科学,其分析框架主要包括“行动者、机制、物品属性、结构和绩效”等要素,核心是公共事务与治理系统的有效匹配,实现基于“多行动者——多机制——多属性——多结构——多目标”的治理,多样性是其内在逻辑。治理本身是一个复杂演进和相互调适的过程“。治理多样性”要应用于治理实践,就需要发展出“诊断、设计和学习模型”。     

A System-of-Systems Perspective for Public Policy Decisions

Problems of increasing complexity are facing decision makers within government and industry, and the key characteristic of these problems is that they are of system-of-systems type. With multiple, heterogeneous, distributed systems involved (including policies and economies as well as technologies), effective analysis for decision-support quickly becomes unmanageable within the “stovepipe” context that still characterizes many organizations in the research and development community. There is not a process/field of study in place that can enable us to systematically solve these types of problems, exemplified by the Next Generation Transportation System. While indeed numerous tools are available to help, they cannot be used effectively because the people who build and understand the tools all speak different languages. Much confusion still remains about words and phrases for system-of-systems type problems, let alone the best modeling approaches for dealing with them. While pockets of organizational restructuring may address this challenge for particular projects, there is a lack of systematic thinking at the basic level about how to address the challenges. This paper recommends that intellectual, financial, and institutional resources be invested for the purpose of initiating and nurturing a field of study that will enable us to better address this important type of problem. The future of transportation serves as a motivating example of a multidomain, system-of-systems problem of critical importance to the nation and in need of effective decision-support. The analogy of creating better maps and “navigation aids” for decision makers will be employed, emphasizing that, when navigating a minefield, knowing where not to go is the key factor in successfully traversing the terrain (i.e., making wise decisions).     

COORDINATION IN GOVERNMENT: DECOMPOSITION AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY AS A FRAMEWORK FOR “USER FRIENDLY” STATUTE LAW*

Abstract: Many interactions between adjacent elements of public administration are “resolved” by a weak form of bi-lateral and non-hierarchical coordination. There are quite intractable obstacles to achieving a good fit between bi-lateral resolution and higher order aims of government. Formal limits to the results that can be achieved by coordination may be derived from the requirements for optimality in the “Decomposition Model” of decentralised administration. Limits to human capabilities are widely recognised in contemporary computer software that is designed to be “user friendly”, yet in the design of systems of statute and administration the limits of human rationality are commonly ignored. Proper statutory definition of functional boundaries can harness innate strengths in the “bounded rationality” of which mere mortals and their institutions are capable, and partially guard against the unwanted effects of its weaknesses. Three main classes of interactions may be defined, and can be dealt with respectively by (a) an external and superior source of statutory power, (b) the use of temporary concurrence powers, and (c) statutory plans. The trick is to be clear about which applies in the circumstances.     

Managerial Responsibility

The concept of managerial responsibility is a shining thread in the literature of public administration, but its definition within our constitutional scheme remains elusive. How will we know responsible public management when we see it? We propose one answer: Public administration should be conducted according to what we term a “precept of managerial responsibility,” which involves four interrelated elements derived from the classical literature of public administration: judgment, accountability, balance, and rationality. We apply this precept to one of the most vexing problems of public administration theory and practice, institutional reform litigation. This application illustrates how the precept solves a major theoretical problem of American public administration by defining a role for administrative officers that fully comports with the Madisonian scheme of separated institutions—legislative, executive, and judicial—sharing power.     

Serving Clients When the Server Crashes: How Frontline Workers Cope with E‐Government Challenges

Implementing e‐government in the contemporary American state is challenging. E‐government places high technical demands on agencies and citizens in an environment of budget austerity and political polarization. Governments developing e‐government policies often mobilize frontline workers—also termed “street‐level bureaucrats”—to help citizens gain access to services. However, we know little about how frontline workers cope in these challenging circumstances. This article fills this gap by examining frontline workers implementing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Based on a qualitative analysis, the authors find that frontline workers “move toward clients” when coping with stress: they bend the rules, work overtime, and collaborate in order to help clients. They are less inclined to “move away” or “move against” clients, for instance, through rigid rule following and rationing. In other words, frontline workers try to serve clients, even “when the server crashes.” Frontline workers, then, can play a vital role in the successful implementation of e‐government policies.     

我国《刑法》第13条“但书”的司法适用分析

"但书"司法适用的现状暴露出令人担忧的问题,归结起来,集中表现在两个方面:一是"但书"司法适用少,作为支撑无罪司法判决的法律依据引用得更少;二是"但书"司法适用不统一、不协调。目前,论证和阐明"但书"司法适用的必要性和可行性是当务之急。从必要性角度分析,传统犯罪构成理论体系的完善需要出罪机制的建立,它是刑事诉讼法适用的内在需要和实体前提。从可行性角度分析,它是刑法总则统率、指导分则的内在要求和具体体现,是法律规范基本构造发挥效用、保持生命力的重要体现,具有司法解释的合法性保障和认可依据。据此,可从程序和实体两个维度构建"但书"的司法适用路径,使其在司法实践中发挥实效。     

No-Fly Zones: A New Model for Male Sexuality

The predominant paradigm nowadays for understanding male sexuality is derived from Kinsey's assumption that men can be classified as individuals with specific scores on a scale, scores that predict whether future partners will be male or female. Each man is defined by an essence, homo- or heterosexual or somewhere in between. However this is an incorrect view of male sexuality, because it makes us unable to say why a man is attracted to or has sex with a specific person: the same person can be attractive or unattrative depending on circumstances, and he can act or not act on his inclination depending on circumstances. The more correct view of male sexuality is thus of “fly” and “no-fly” zones, which understands male sexuality as defined by variable situations, not a score of the individual in all situations. This conception allows us to avoid the theoretical mistakes of the current assault on “sexual assault.”     

Risk and the limits of governance: Exploring varied patterns of risk‐based governance across Europe

Risk‐based approaches to governance are widely promoted as universally applicable foundations for improving the quality, efficiency, and rationality of governance across policy domains. Premised on the idea that governance cannot eliminate all adverse outcomes, these approaches provide a method for establishing priorities and allocating scarce resources, and, in so doing, rationalise the limits of what governance interventions can, and should, achieve. Yet cursory observation suggests that risk‐based approaches have spread unevenly across countries. Based on a comparison of the UK, France, and Germany, this article explores the ways in which, and why, such approaches have “colonised” governance regimes in the UK, but have had much more limited application in France and Germany. We argue that the institutionally patterned adoption of risk‐based governance across these three countries is related to how entrenched governance norms and accountability structures within their national polities handle both the identification and acceptance of adverse governance outcomes.     

Picking a loser? A social choice perspective on the Danish government formation of 1975

All democratic systems are theoretically open to so-called election inversions, i.e., instances wherein a majority of the decision makers prefer one alternative but where the actual outcome is another. The paper examines the complex 1975 Danish government formation process, which involved five rounds of negotiations and at least five competing alternatives. We demonstrate that in terms of party preferences the final outcome was not the Condorcet winner but rather one that could have been beaten by at least three other government alternatives in head-to-head comparisons. The Danish procedural system of “negative” parliamentarism combined with simple plurality rule to produce the electoral inversion.     

Congressional committees as users of analysis

Structural arrangements in the Congress work against the use of analysis, but newer developments, such as growth in staff professionalism and activity of the congressional support agencies, tend to promote it. Interviews with committee staff show that they are aware of much analysis, use it primarily for political advantage, but that they also take it seriously as warning of problems and as guidance on particular issues. Staff value information more when they know and trust its source and understand its political motivations. The use of analysis to reconceptualize problems is not much in evidence, perhaps because such “enlightenment” takes place elsewhere and filters into the Congress through informal channels.     

Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand‐Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence

How can states signal their alliance commitments? Although scholars have developed sophisticated theoretical models of costly signaling in international relations, we know little about which specific policies leaders can implement to signal their commitments. This article addresses this question with respect to the extended deterrent effects of nuclear weapons. Can nuclear states deter attacks against their friends by simply announcing their defense commitments? Or must they deploy nuclear weapons on a protégé's territory before an alliance is seen as credible? Using a new dataset on foreign nuclear deployments from 1950 to 2000, our analysis reveals two main findings. First, formal alliances with nuclear states appear to carry significant deterrence benefits. Second, however, stationing nuclear weapons on a protégé's territory does not bolster these effects. The analysis yields new insights about the dynamics of “hand‐tying” and “sunk cost” signals in international politics.     

Governance-Theorien und Governance-Probleme: Diesseits und jenseits des Steuerungsparadigmas

In recent years, the governance perspective has found a remarkable resonance in political science. Its development has focussed on institutional forms of governing in post-hierarchical contexts. Its popularity has been fuelled by the promise to provide for a practically relevant, design-friendly integration of different disciplines, approaches, and theories. The predominant view of governance is still strongly committed to the idea of political “steering”. It is doubtful, however, that in a post-hierarchical context problems of governing are adequately described as problems of “steering” and its improvement. It is thus argued that we should understand governance in ways which can not be reduced simply to steering. Three such alternatives are presented. Only a pluralistic understanding of governance can help us understand what the practical problems governance research promises to elucidate are actually about.     

Market failure,government failure,and the private supply of public goods: The case of climate-controlled walkway networks

Two opposing models of public-goods undersupply are those of “market failure” and “government failure”. Empirical work on the relative explanatory power of these two frameworks has been limited by the scarcity of acceptable data. The case of climate-controlled walkways in major urban cores is a rare instance where such difficulties can be overcome. We investigate the supply of CCWs in 55 large city-cores in North America. We find that (1) CCW networks are well-supplied by market forces, when (2) such forces are not frustrated by government policy. We also find evidence that (3) rules-based regimes dominate discretion-based regimes. These results are consistent with the position that the “government-failure” paradigm is a viable alternative to the traditional “market failure” paradigm.     

Non-redundant groups,the assurance game and the origins of collective action

To discuss the origins of collective action this paper introduces the concept of the non-redundant group (n-group) of persons such that the contributions of all are needed, if outsiders do not contribute, to obtain the collective good. The paper shows that the members of an “n-group” face the structure of payoffs of the Assurance Game, and therefore, under certain conditions, will pursue collective action. The paper analyzes the situations where one or several “n-groups” exist and discusses the conditions under which an individual could know that he is an “essential member” of the relevant “n-group”.     

Teaching Experience: How to Make and Use PowerPoint-Based Interactive Simulations for Undergraduate IR Teaching

This article is about designing and implementing PowerPoint-based interactive simulations for use in International Relations (IR) introductory undergraduate classes based on core pedagogical literature, models of human skill acquisition, and previous research on simulations in IR teaching. We argue that simulations can be usefully employed at the early transition from “novice” to “advanced beginner” in a learning process, where the student begins to leave behind rational rules in favor of an own situational experience. However, currently available IR simulations for teaching purposes are often high-cost/high-tech and especially time-intensive: if they do not require custom-made software packages with difficult interfaces and expensive licensing fees, they are often targeted at course-long or at least day-long activities that demand extensive preparation of both teachers and students, with book-length manuals, intricate rules, integrated assessment tools, and specific secondary literature, and conventionally target more experienced students. This article explains how teachers can create an easily accessible and class-long (50 minutes) interactive experience for undergraduate IR students to encourage theoretical linkage with own in-class experience at a very low cost. We do this by employing PowerPoint, specifically in-built features such as hyperlinks, interactive pathways, or audio or video integration that can be used interactively rather than passively (as in a standard presentation).