Democracy,creeping socialism,and ideological socialism in rent-seeking societies

Rent-seeking societies suffer from a serious distortion of incentives. Incentives to engage in distributional struggles, to seek contrived transfers are strong, but incentives to engage in productive work are too weak. Stagnation and some unemployment should be expected. Long lasting democracies within unchanged borders create a permissive environment for rent-seeking. The provision of rents very much depends on government. The stronger the governmental involvement in the economy, the higher social security spending, the more rents the government is likely to generate. Therefore, creeping socialism understood as increased government control of the economy should reinforce the rent-seeking society and the corresponding negative effects on growth and employment. Whether such creeping socialism is backed by ideological socialism or not should make little difference for growth or employment. These ideas have been tested and partially supported by a 19 nation sample of industrial democracies, using data from the sixties and seventies. By and large, the rent-seeking approach is fairly successful in explaining national differences in economic growth rates, but receives ambiguous support or less for unemployment. Olson's (1982, 1983) proposition about the negative impact of long lasting democracy within unchanged borders on economic growth is much better supported than the growth-retarding effects of government revenues or social security spending are.     

Income inequality,electoral systems and party polarisation

This study analyses why income inequality and party polarisation proceed together in some countries but not in others. By focusing on the relationship between income inequality, the permissiveness of electoral systems and party polarisation, the study offers a theoretical explanation for how the combination of income inequality and permissive electoral systems generates higher party polarisation. After analysing a cross‐national dataset of party polarisation, income inequality and electoral institutions covering 24 advanced democracies between 1960 and 2011, it is found that a simple correlation between income inequality and party polarisation is not strong. However, the empirical results indicate that greater income inequality under permissive electoral systems contributes to growing party polarisation, which suggests that parties only have diverging ideological platforms due to greater income inequality when electoral systems encourage their moves towards the extreme; parties do not diverge when electoral systems discourage their moves towards the extreme.     

Political competition,party polarization,and government performance

Lack of party competition may impair government efficiency. If the voters are ideologically predisposed to cast their votes in favor of one political party, they may reelect an underperforming incumbent. Party polarization may magnify this effect since the median voter faces a higher cost of selecting a better, but ideologically distant incumbent. Alternatively, if the electorate is evenly divided between parties, polarization may induce parties to invest more effort in improving their election prospects. The current paper analyzes efficiency in Norwegian local governments. Efficiency has been measured by means of panel data on government service output over a 10-year period. Electoral dominance has been measured as number of elections wherein one party bloc receives at least 60 % of the votes, measured over six consecutive elections. Party polarization is defined as the ideological distance between the two party blocs, and it is measured on basis of survey data on the ideological preferences of elected politicians. Lack of party competition reduces efficiency, the effect being stronger in governments where more party polarization exists. These agency losses are larger in high-revenue municipalities.     

Sectoral reallocation, distributional coalitions and the welfare state as determinants of economic growth rates in industrialized democracies

Abstract. This paper investigates three propositions about economic growth. It rejects the proposition that differences in the size of the agricultural sector or in opportunities to reallocate resources from this sector to other sectors of the economy significantly contribute to the explanation of differential growth rates among industrialized democracies. It supports Olson's proposition that long lasting democracies suffer from an accumulation of distributional coalitions whose rent-seeking activities retard economic growth. It also supports the proposition that the welfare state contributes to economic decline. Technically, this paper applies cross-sectional and pooled regression analyses of growth rates on employment in agriculture as a percentage of civilian employment, age of democracy, and social security transfers as a percentage of GDP. Data refer to the 1960–82 period and 19 nations.     

Perceptional inequality and preferential judgements: An empirical examination of distributional axioms

There are two categories of income distribution evaluations: first, the more-or-less “value-free” perception of income inequality as a statistical dispersion; and second, the valuation of income distributions according to an explicit social welfare function which is meant to capture all of society's value judgements. These societal value judgements can be expressed in the form of preferences. Whereas the inequality perception of income distributions appeals to an observer's sober judgement, the revelation of preferences with respect to specific income distributions appeals to his or her sentiments. This paper is an empirical analysis which investigates the juxtaposition of preferences with respect to income distributions and corresponding perceptions of distributional inequality. We do this through a questionnaire in which attitudes towards various distributional axioms are tested. The source of our data is 1773 completed questionnaires collected from five German universities. Based on our data, we observe that individuals' preference orderings over the set of income distributionssubstantially deviate from their perceptions of distributional inequality. In fact, our test responses showed that even when some income distribution is judged to be more unequal than another, that distribution might be preferred, as it accords higher incomes to each individual. We hold that the preference for these greater incomes expresses a compensation for the increased degree of inequality. This explanation applies both to equiproportional and to equal fixed-sum increases in incomes, which implies a support of Paretian ethics.     

Democracy and distributiveness: patterns of transition from hegemony in divided societies

Many culturally heterogeneous societies with functioning democratic regimes nonetheless fail to grant equal status to different ethnic and cultural groups within their borders. To a great extent, scholars discuss such inequalities within the analytical boundaries of the discourse on democracy and democratization. We argue that such discussions overstretch the concept of democracy. In this research, we offer a novel axis of inquiry, namely distributiveness. We define distributiveness as the egalitarian distribution of resources – political, material, cultural-symbolic, institutional, and territorial – among different ethnic, religious, or cultural groups which self-identify as collectives within society. The aim of this new conceptualization is to (1) restore conceptual clarity to the literature on democracy, (2) enhance our capacity to assess the allocation of resources within a given polity, and (3) elucidate the processes that lead to change in patterns of allocation.     

Partisanship and party preference in government and opposition: The mid-term perspective

Most previous in-depth survey analysis of British political partisanship and party preference has focused upon election times. We use new data from a major panel study covering the years 1965–1974 to investigate trends and patterns in the midterm as well as at general election times.This leads to rather different conclusions about the utility of the party identification concept, about homing tendencies, and about trends in class depolarization and partisan dealignment.The key to political change in Britain is the mid-term of Wilson's 1966–1970 Labour government, not the crisis election of 1974.     

Parties under stress: Realignment and dealignment in advanced industrial societies

The findings of a forthcoming study of electoral change in advanced industrial democracies are reviewed. These findings point to broad‐based processes of change that can be organised around two models ‐a social cleavage model of realignment and a functional model of dealignment. Both types of change are at work in most party systems. Surprisingly, their impact on future party system change is likely to be more reinforcing than contradictory in altering the context of party competition and moving parties further away from the responsible party model.     

Party factions and coalition government: portfolio allocation in Italian Christian Democracy

In this paper I elaborate a recently advanced argument about government formation, and assess it by studying the factions of the Italian Christian Democratic Party (DC). I contend that the costs of making and breaking coalitions depend on political institutions and on the configuration of actors in policy space. Comparisons across parties in Italy and other countries support this argument. So also do comparisons across party factions. The Christian Democratic factions that incurred the lowest office costs to build coalitions were those at or near the left–right median in Italy's core party. When electoral rules were rewritten in the DC, internal party competition over portfolio allocation changed as well. The paper's conclusion outlines how the argument would guide further research on party factions.     

From autocracy to party government: Interpreting regime changes in Spain and Portugal

The Transition to Democracy in Spain. By José Maravall. London: Croom Helm, 1982. Pp.213. £14.95.

Democratic Politics in Spain. Edited by David S. Bell London: Frances Pinter, 1983. Pp.xiii + 203. £15.00.

Spain, Conditional Democracy. Editedby Christopher Abel and Nissa Torrents. London: Croom Helm, 1984. Pp. 198. £14.95.

Portugal, A Twentieth‐century Interpretation. By TOM Gallagher. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983. Pp.xii + 278. £18.50.

Portugal Since the Revolution: Economic and Political Perspectives. Edited by Jorge Braga de Macedo and Simon Serfaty. Colorado: Westview Press, 1981. Pp.xiv + 217. £13.25.

In Search of Modern Portugal. The Revolution and its Consequences. Edited by Lawrence S. Graham and Douglas L. Wheeler. Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1983. Pp.xv + 380. $30.00.     

Economics, environmentalism and party alignments: A note on partisan change in advanced industrial democracies

'We are neither Left nor Right, we are out in front' was the mantra of the environmental movement in the 1970s and early 1980s. This research examines the relationship between the traditional left/right economic cleavage and the environmental cleavage in structuring party competition in advanced industrial democracies. It begins by discussing the theoretical rationale for the separation of environmentalism from the traditional economic cleavage, and utilises new expert data to describe the evolution of party positions between 1989 and 2002–2003. An initially strong relationship between party positions on both dimensions in 1989 has strengthened over time. The convergence occurs largely because of changes by Green parties and by the addition of new parties that define themselves on both dimensions. This points to the ability of democratic party systems to integrate a new political cleavage, and the process of integration. However, leftist parties still continue to diverge with respect to how they respond to the environmental cleavage.     

Does inequality cause inflation?: The political economy of inflation,taxation and government debt

Public Choice - A democratic society in which the distribution of wealth is unequal elects political parties that are likely to represent the interests of poor people. It is in the interests of the...     

试论党政机关社会主义核心价值体系建设

社会主义核心价值体系的提出,为机关队伍建设提供了思想武器,也对机关建设提出了新的要求。探索了建设党政机关社会主义核心价值体系的重要意义、特殊要求及方法途径。     

The checks and balances of party federalism: German federal government in a divided legislature

In this study, we assess the potential for policy change of the German government of Helmut Kohl after unification combining party positions with formal bicameral settings in a spatial model of legislative action. We distinguish between two policy areas and two types of legislation, mandatory and non–mandatory legislation imposing either a symmetric or asymmetric power distribution between both German chambers. In order to identify German legislators' party positions in different policy areas, we use data from ECPR Party Manifesto research covering the period from German unification in 1990 to the end of the government of Helmut Kohl in 1998. We find that the federal government of Helmut Kohl had a policy leadership position until April 1991 with no procedural differences, but the gridlock danger for governmental proposals was higher on the societal than the economic dimension. Afterwards, the government's potential for policy change was considerably determined by the type of legislation, independently from the policy dimension. At the end of the Kohl era, the governmental policy leadership position was limited to policies that left even the opposition majority of German states better off. The procedural settings mattered greatly on the economic dimension, and the danger of gridlock on societal policy was smaller only for non–mandatory legislation.     

The checks and balances of party federalism: German federal government in a divided legislature

Abstract In this study, we assess the potential for policy change of the German government of Helmut Kohl after unification combining party positions with formal bicameral settings in a spatial model of legislative action. We distinguish between two policy areas and two types of legislation, mandatory and non–mandatory legislation imposing either a symmetric or asymmetric power distribution between both German chambers. In order to identify German legislators' party positions in different policy areas, we use data from ECPR Party Manifesto research covering the period from German unification in 1990 to the end of the government of Helmut Kohl in 1998. We find that the federal government of Helmut Kohl had a policy leadership position until April 1991 with no procedural differences, but the gridlock danger for governmental proposals was higher on the societal than the economic dimension. Afterwards, the government's potential for policy change was considerably determined by the type of legislation, independently from the policy dimension. At the end of the Kohl era, the governmental policy leadership position was limited to policies that left even the opposition majority of German states better off. The procedural settings mattered greatly on the economic dimension, and the danger of gridlock on societal policy was smaller only for non–mandatory legislation.     

Long- and short-term determinants of party preferences: Inter-generational differences in Western and East Central Europe

In this paper we study differences between generations in the degree to which long-term and short-term factors affect party preferences in established and consolidating European democracies. Scholarly literature has shown that younger cohorts in Western Europe are less likely to be guided by social class, religion and left/right than older cohorts. Little is known, however, about the extent to which such differences exist for the effects of short-term factors. Similarly, inter-generational differences in the effects of long- and short-term factors in post-communist countries have remained largely unexplored. Based on the European Election Study 2009, we show differences between generations that are compatible with de-alignment of younger generations along traditional cleavages. Yet, we also see an increased importance of attitudes towards immigration among the younger generations, which could signal a form of re-alignment.