Sir Austen Chamberlain and British Foreign Policy 1931–37

This article seeks to analyze Sir Austen Chamberlain’s critique of British foreign policy in the six years before his death in 1937. It presents Chamberlain as one of the most perceptive contemporary observers of the international scene, and in particular of Hitler’s Germany. Unusually among British politicians, Chamberlain drew a direct causal connection between the domestic policy of the Nazi regime and its likely behaviour in the international arena. However, it is suggested that the basis for his understanding was an innate anti-Germanism, which can be dated back to his experiences as a young man in the 1880s.     

Austen Chamberlain and the continental balance of power: strategy, stability, and the league of nations, 1924-29

As foreign secretary from November 1924 to June 1929, Austen Chamberlain dominated British foreign policy. Central to his diplomatic strategy was the maintenance of the European balance of power and, in this circumstance, pursuit of a leadership role for Britain within the League of Nations. The foundation upon which Chamberlain based his European strategy lay with his determination to have Britain play the vital role of stabilizing relations between France and Germany, whose mutual antipathy after the Great War, compounded by the severity of the Treaty of Versailles, threatened continental security. By October 1925, his work bore fruit with the conclusion of the Locarno agreements. For the remainder of his tenure at the Foreign Office, Chamberlain used Locarno - and Germany's membership in the League that was part of that settlement - as the diplomatic mechanism to underwrite his strategic conception of the balance of power. This article addresses the neglected issue of the strategic base of Chamberlain's European policy and addresses three criticisms of his record as foreign secretary.     

Sir Alfred Zimmern lectures Australia, 1938: a utopian on Munich?

Abstract

Professor Sir Alfred Zimmern, a highly prominent British commentator on international politics, was a notable visitor to Australia in 1938. Due to the critiques of EH Carr, Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, Zimmern became associated with the ‘utopian’ school of analysis of the inter-war period. In a stay lasting five weeks which coincided with the Munich crisis, his (now neglected) lectures and broadcasts were widely reported. Zimmern did not fully endorse the Munich agreement, which had been negotiated by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and was supported by Australian Prime Minister Joseph Lyons. He was privately critical of Australian policy-makers. Despite Bull’s claim that Zimmern was a believer in progress and thus bound to discern the growth of order in international affairs, Zimmern’s analysis of the Munich agreement emphasized the return of power politics and the dangers of war. Further examination of his 1930s writings shows that such possibilities were not inconsistent with his broader analysis of international relations.     

Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Chamberlain's Grand Strategy Revisited

In The Gathering Storm, Winston S. Churchill claimed that during the 1930s British leaders were willfully blind to the German threat and failed to meet it by rearming. Accepting the Churchillian narrative, leading IR scholars regard British grand strategy during the 1930s as glaring example of strategic adjustment failure. This article reappraises British grand strategy during the 1930s and rejects both the Churchillian narrative, and the scholarly claims that Britain did not adjust its strategy to the German threat. In the 1930s, Britain did balance against Germany and focused on countering what policy makers perceived as the key threat facing Britain: its vulnerability to German air attack. Britain's grand strategic options were limited by external conditions and by domestic economic constraints. Neville Chamberlain, therefore, was playing a weak hand, and did the best that he could with the cards he was dealt. Britain's 1930s grand strategy is one of the historical cases most frequently used by IR scholars for theory testing. For that reason alone, it is important to get the history right. This is not the only reason, however. The 1930s have provided many of the concepts, images, and metaphors that have dominated the discourse about American foreign policy since World War II. Because scholarship about the events of the 1930s shapes the discourse about real-world policy, getting the history right matters.     

“Possession is Nine Tenths of the Law”: Britain and the Boundaries of Eastern Europe since 1945

This article argues that British policy on boundaries in Eastern Europe after 1945 was based on hardheaded Realpolitik whereby the justice of any given border was of entirely secondary importance to wider policy imperatives. British disregard for the legal and moral merits (or demerits) of respective cases was justified by British policy makers on two counts: firstly, international relations could not assess boundary disputes on a case-by-case basis as such thinking had undermined international stability to the point of global conflagration after 1918; secondly, British policy makers declared that it was their aim to stabilize the international system by means of détente. In reality, the proclaimed goal of universally beneficial goals by means of a “pragmatic” consolidation of the status quo hid a real desire to institutionalise a system that was seen as the best possible option for Britain given the harsh reality of its relative decline after 1945.

“There is no government on earth which divulges its affairs less than England, or is more punctually informed of those of others.”

—Sagredo, Venetian Ambassador to London in the Sixteenth Century.

     

The British government and the sale of arms to the lesser European powers, 1936-39

This article considers sales of British arms in the prelude to the Second World War, during the end of last Baldwin government, and the Chamberlain government, which had political as well as commercial motivations. Particular attention is paid to the leading British arms manufacturer, Vickers-Armstrong, and sales to Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland. There was often a concern that a failure to procure British arms would lead countries to turn to Germany and Italy. The interest in meeting these requests often conflicted with growing domestic defence needs for the same equipment. The conclusion is drawn that Britain ultimately failed to inspire potential allies with sufficient confidence to commit themselves to Britain.     

Liberal intervention in the foreign policy thinking of Tony Blair and David Cameron

David Cameron was a critic of Tony Blair's doctrine of the ‘international community’, which was used to justify war in Kosovo and more controversially in Iraq, suggesting caution in projecting military force abroad while in opposition. However, and in spite of making severe cuts to the defence budget, the Cameron-led Coalition government signed Britain up to a military intervention in Libya within a year of coming into office. What does this say about the place liberal interventionism occupies in contemporary British foreign policy? To answer this question, this article studies the nature of what we describe as the ‘bounded liberal’ tradition that has informed British foreign policy thinking since 1945, suggesting that it puts a distinctly UK national twist on conventional conservative thought about international affairs. Its components are: scepticism of grand schemes to remake the world; instinctive Atlanticism; security through collective endeavour; and anti-appeasement. We then compare and contrast the conditions for intervention set out by Tony Blair and David Cameron. We explain the similarities but crucially the vital differences between the two leaders' thinking on intervention, with particular reference to Cameron's perception that Downing Street needed to loosen its control over foreign policymaking after Iraq. Our argument is that policy substance, policy style and party political dilemmas prompted the two leaders to reconnect British foreign policy with its ethical roots, ingraining a bounded liberal posture in British foreign policy after the moral bankruptcy of the John Major years. This return to a pragmatic and ethically informed foreign policy meant that military operations in Kosovo and Libya were undertaken in quite different circumstances, yet came to be justified by similar arguments from the two leaders.     

'Far too dangerous a gamble'?1 British intelligence and policy during the Chanak crisis, September-October 1922

In considering the role of intelligence in the events that culminated in the 1922 Chanak crisis, particular attention is given to the extent to which intelligence assessments of Turkish Nationalist troop strengths influenced British decisions. Key political figures included Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, Winston Chuchill, and Austen Chamberlain, as well as military officers such as General Harington and Admiral Brock, and the diplomat Sir Horace Rumbold. It concludes that the final armistice, signed at Mudania, met British objectives, but only after running too high a risk.¹Harington to Maurice, 8 Jan. 1923, 23 April 1923, Maurice 3/2.     

"The Quest": The Strange Life of W. J. Garnett

This article investigates the career of a British diplomat, William Garnett, whose unusual life has until know been neglected by historians. Garnett's papers, held at Lancashire Record Office, are a particularly rich source for historians of British diplomacy, the British Foreign Office, and overseas travel in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Garnett was often outspoken and indiscreet in his private correspondence and his archive, on which this article draws, provides valuable insights into British representation and British policy in the countries to which he was posted in the period 1902-1919.     

‘A question between empires’: the restriction of Japanese immigration in British Columbia and the reassessment of Japan's foreign policy, 1907–1908

Abstract

Great Britain was the first of the major Powers that revised its unequal treaty with Japan, recognizing the success of Japan's modernization and its growing role in the international arena. However, British Columbia perceived Japanese residents as a threat to ‘the British character’ of this regions' population profile. After the movement against Japanese residents in British Columbia peaked during the anti-Japanese riots in Vancouver in September of 1907, Canadian Minister of Labor Rodolphe Lemieux headed a diplomatic delegation to Tokyo to negotiate the restriction of Japanese immigration to Canada. The dispatch of this mission revealed some of the complexities in relations between the Colonial and Foreign Offices in London on the one hand and the Dominion's and British Columbian governments on the other. Based on previously unused primary sources, this article will examine the interplay between the policy towards Japanese migrants in the British Dominion of Canada and the British policy towards Japan as a nation.     

Solving the “Manchurian Problem”: Uchida Yasuya and Japanese Foreign Affairs before the Second World War

This article re-examines British diplomacy in the Venezuelan boundary dispute, 1895–96. The analysis focuses closely on the actions of the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, and his Ambassador to Washington, Sir Julian (later Lord) Pauncefote. It argues that a combination of Salisbury’s deliberate foot-dragging, and his failure to understand how seriously US politicians viewed the dispute, meant that disagreement was unnecessarily prolonged and exacerbated. Thus, at a time when the British government was beset with other imperial problems it was ultimately forced to concede to US demands. Consequently, the article argues that the issue was not only poorly handled by Salisbury, but was also a significant moment in US foreign policy.     

Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967–1970

The military coup of 21 April 1967 brought to power a repressive dictatorship in Greece. It proceeded to deprive Greeks of their human rights and civil liberties, outraged international public opinion and strained transatlantic relations during the Cold War. The “Greek case” culminated in the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe and calls for its expulsion from NATO. This article will analyse the foreign policy considerations that determined British policy towards the Greek junta during 1967—such as Cold War realities, alliance dynamics, economic and commercial imperatives, regional instability in the Mediterranean and domestic pressures. It will look at how these factors coalesced into shaping British policy towards the Greek junta into one in which human rights had little bearing. The article will also consider the impact of the “Greek case” on the image and credibility of the Labour government of 1966–1970 and explain why vociferous anti-junta activities in London were to create such policy difficulties for the British government.     

Sovereignty and Human Rights: Re-examining Carter’s Foreign Policy Towards the Third World

This analysis examines the evolution of Jimmy Carter’s human rights policy towards the Third World during the course of his Administration. By exploring the impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, it analyses how Carter responded to international outcry by pairing sovereignty as a human right, which specifically appealed to the concerns of newly independent nations in the late 1970s. Carter’s shift is explained first by a brief outline of his initial human rights policy and stumbling blocks; second, by examining Third World responses to the dual invasions; and, finally, exploring how this affected Carter’s human rights policy. It moves beyond claims that Carter abandoned his human rights agenda as he encountered an increasingly volatile international environment, instead examining the very real ways that he re-imagined this policy in the face of a changing global landscape.     

Introduction

Even before 1865, it was an axiom that British foreign policy was designed and pursued to ensure international stability. Stability not only gave security to the British Isles and to its global Empire; it minimized disruptions to trade and commerce - the life-blood of 'Great' Britain. In the century after 1865, the pursuit of international stability remained at the heart of diplomatic initiatives supported by capable armed forces and a strong economy. The grand strategy by which successive British governments endeavoured to achieve these national and imperial ends involved the maintenance of a balance of power - both in Europe and in the wider world where the protection of British interests in the form of prestige, markets, strategic outposts, and lines of communication preoccupied cabinets, the Foreign Office, the service ministries, other departments of state, and, sometimes, public opinion. In one sense, there were a number of individual balances of power - in Western Europe, in the western and eastern Mediterranean, in the Western Hemisphere, in South Asia, and in the Far East and Pacific Ocean. In the British diplomatic parlance of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these balances were represented as 'questions', like the 'Eastern Question'; and the answers to these questions combined in the minds of those responsible for British foreign policy as representing a global balance of power. In this context, the European balance of power had decided importance because any continental disequilibrium could imperil the security of the home islands, the centre of the Empire, and the well-being of Britain's people and economy.     

Sir George Clerk and the struggle for British influence in central Europe, 1919-26

During the Great War, Sir George Clerk was a senior Foreign Office official, strongly sympathetic to the cause of the 'oppressed nationalities' of Austria-Hungary and the liberal ideals associated with the journal, The New Europe. In 1919 he was granted a unique opportunity to shape the face of the New Europe when he embarked on his mission to Hungary. As British minister to Czechoslovakia in the early 1920s, Clerk harnessed his idealism for the Czechs to his ambition to make Prague a centre of British influence and power in central Europe. Though this policy ultimately failed, Clerk showed a greater rapport and sympathy for the Czechs than any of his successors.     

Recovering Lost Years: British Foreign Policy After the War of the Polish Succession

A study of a neglected period in British foreign policy serves to question schematic approaches to the history of international relations and to underline the indeterminacy felt by contemporaries, and their sense of the roles of contingency and personality. The problems faced then in conceptualizing international relations can be mirrored today.     

Recovering Lost Years: British Foreign Policy After the War of the Polish Succession

A study of a neglected period in British foreign policy serves to question schematic approaches to the history of international relations and to underline the indeterminacy felt by contemporaries, and their sense of the roles of contingency and personality. The problems faced then in conceptualizing international relations can be mirrored today.     

Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967-1970

The military coup of 21 April 1967 brought to power a repressive dictatorship in Greece. It proceeded to deprive Greeks of their human rights and civil liberties, outraged international public opinion and strained transatlantic relations during the Cold War. The “Greek case” culminated in the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe and calls for its expulsion from NATO. This article will analyse the foreign policy considerations that determined British policy towards the Greek junta during 1967—such as Cold War realities, alliance dynamics, economic and commercial imperatives, regional instability in the Mediterranean and domestic pressures. It will look at how these factors coalesced into shaping British policy towards the Greek junta into one in which human rights had little bearing. The article will also consider the impact of the “Greek case” on the image and credibility of the Labour government of 1966-1970 and explain why vociferous anti-junta activities in London were to create such policy difficulties for the British government.     

‘Gunboats of soft power’: Boris on Africa and post-Brexit ‘Global Britain’

As Britain prepares to leave the European Union after the popular vote of June 2016, the government is embarking on the revision of foreign policy. Boris Johnson, or ‘just Boris’, has been entrusted with forging the new ‘Global Britain’ for the post-Brexit era and reinventing British economy around new relationships. Boris has a track record of misrepresenting and offending foreign peoples, leaders and countries. This article assesses the prospects for Africa in Johnson’s vision for ‘Global Britain’ as presented in his foreign policy speeches. The paper unpacks Johnson’s discursive construction of ‘Africa’ and inserts it into a broader historical and political context of British relations with Africa. It argues that, by constructing Africa as a ‘problem’ and offering liberal values as a condition for development, Johnson is continuing British imperial and post-colonial discourses of ‘developing’ or ‘civilizing’ Africa. In the post-Brexit world of a changing global balance of power, democratic conditionality serves to sustain and reproduce British forms of power and policies.     

Summit diplomacy of the seventeenth century: William III and Peter I in Utrecht and London, 1697-98

This article evaluates the meetings of the Russian Tsar Peter I and the English King William III in 1697-98 as the high point of Russia's 18-month Great Embassy to western Europe. The emphasis is on the diplomatic aspects of Anglo-Russian summits as well as on their results for international relations and diplomacy in Europe with particular focus on dramatic changes in Russia's attitude to international cooperation. Reform of Russian diplomatic machinery, enacted by Peter I as a follow-up of his European journey, were as well to a great degree motivated by his personal contacts with William III and his English and Dutch diplomatic advisors. Based on British and Russian archival sources, the article attempts to prove that Anglo-Russian summitry, and, in the first place, the rendezvous in Utrecht (1 September 1697, old style), signified Russia's intention to acquiesce to the raison d'etat principle in international relations and in practical diplomatic behaviour, thus abandoning religious and political prejudices that had kept Russians on the periphery of European diplomacy.