US Covert Operations toward Iran,February–November 1979: Was the CIA Trying to Overthrow the Islamic Regime?

This article examines US covert operations toward Iran from February until November 1979. It focuses especially on whether the CIA was trying to undermine or overthrow Iran's nascent Islamic regime, as many Iranians believed. The article details the extensive covert contacts the CIA and other US personnel established in this period with Iranian officials and various Iranian opposition factions. Its main conclusion is that US officials established these contacts for the purpose of gathering intelligence about the rapidly changing situation in Iran, rather than to undermine the Islamic regime. Indeed, US personnel never encouraged these Iranian contacts to plot against the regime and often explicitly discouraged them from doing so.     

Iraq's oil war in the USA during the October 1973 War

While the October 1973 War has been studied from many angles, the Iraqi–American perspective has never been fully investigated. During this war the Ba^cth regime in Iraq felt compelled not only to send forces to the front, but also to harm American oil interests. As Washington was trying to mitigate the militant situation and prevent the imposition of an oil embargo, Baghdad continuously adopted a confrontational anti-American, anti-Israeli stance. This article uncovers evidence to show that while the Ba^cth regime did indeed attack American interests, it only did so in ways that would not endanger Iraqi stability and economic interests. The article is based mainly on US National Archives documents, as well as on Iraqi sources.     

Unexplored regions of the Hadhramaut

Over the last few years publicly-expressed anti-British sentiment has been on the rise, tapping into a latent Anglophobia in Iranian political culture. Iran's relationship with the British goes back much further than the relationship with the Americans, who benefit from a curious indulgence. During the 19^th century, Iran was largely seen through the prism of British interests in India, yet Russia, which loomed large at that time, has also seemingly escaped responsibility for its role. Certainly the advent of oil changed British focus and the confrontation over Anglo-Iranian Oil came to define British-Iranian relations for the modern era. Yet paradoxically, there is, somewhere, a deeper and more complex relationship in which a degree of mutual respect remains.     

After the euphoria: The United States and South Africa in the 1990s

The United States welcomed the recent transition in South Africa and has worked closely with the new government since April 1994. Traditional American interest in South Africa was motivated first by opposition to communism and then by opposition to apartheid. However, the demise of those systems as well as uncertainties regarding South Africa's transition make it doubtful that the US will give the country as much attention in the next several years. In the more distant future shared interests are likely to bring the United States and South Africa closer.     

Decolonization in Reverse: The Iranian Oil Crisis of 1951–53

The decolonization process in the 1940s and 1950s in Middle Eastern states under Great Britain's informal influence did not aim at recognizing the same type of independence of these states as that enjoyed by Britain and the United States. In the 1940s Washington laid the groundwork for its leading role in Iran during and following the Iranian oil crisis, whilst London with the assistance of the Americans in part reasserted British influence after the crisis. The United States achieved a paramount position in Iran with the assistance of its oil companies and through cooperation with Great Britain, and at the expense of the latter and the Soviet Union.     

Bargain and Barter: China's Oil Trade with Iran

The US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and its ratcheting up of sanctions aimed to cut Iran's oil revenues virtually to zero by reducing trade between Tehran and its top foreign customers, especially China. This article examines the dynamics of the Sino-Iranian oil business and finds that the Chinese have never terminated their imports; instead, when Beijing cannot deal with Tehran directly, it continues the flow through subterranean methods. This practice holds some benefits for both sides, but the Iranian economy has become highly dependent on bartering with the East Asian power: exporting crude and receiving part of the revenues in Chinese goods and services. The two countries have vowed to keep up the oil trade, as sanctions have led Iran toward a growing economic and technological orientation toward the East.     

Monitoring the rise of a radical force: the British Embassy in Athens and the Ascent of the Greek Panhellenic Socialist Movement, 1974–1981*

The article deals with perceptions, conceptions and policy implementation of British diplomacy towards the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) from its formation in 1974 until its first rise into power in 1981. PASOK, a political movement that was to dominate Greek politics for more than twenty years, entered the Greek political scene as a new, radical force that threatened Western values and interests and aspired to reshape the international orientation of the country, in a period of high Cold War tensions. It will be shown that British diplomacy, despite its opposition to PASOK, was forced by political realities to modify its policy significantly, in order to accommodate PASOK and preserve its interests in a country that was considered as a vital ally of the Western world.     

‘Strong,United and Independent’: the British Foreign Office,Anglo–Iranian Oil Company and the internationalization of Iranian politics at the dawn of the Cold War, 1945–46

This article challenges traditional accounts of the 1946 Cold War Crisis in Iran by moving beyond Soviet–American confrontation to focus on British policy. In contrast to the United States, Britain was a major stake-holding power in Iran due to the valuable holdings of the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). By comparing the reactions of the AIOC and Foreign Office, continuity between the events of the 1946 Crisis and later developments in the Mosaddegh premiership becomes apparent. Soviet interference in Azerbaijan prompted great concern from representatives in Iran, but the central Foreign Office pursued a more cautious policy. Only concerns relating to the growth of domestic Iranian communism in the form of the Tudeh Party and the threat this entailed to the British concession prompted the Foreign Office and AIOC to take measures rendering them partially complicit in the internationalization of Iranian politics, setting an important precedent for future action. This article evaluates the policy-making process and its impact on Anglo–Iranian relations by utilizing records from the UK National Archives, British Petroleum Archive and diplomatic personal papers.     

The campaign against the Anglo‐Iranian agreement of 1919

The Anglo‐Iranian agreement of 1919 was a major turning point both in the modern history of Iran and in her relations with Britain. It was the brainchild of Lord Curzon and the Foreign Office in which the other British government departments eventually acquiesced with reluctance, although the government of India retained its opposition to it. It failed because of the fears it created for the loss of Iran's independence, mainly as a result of the secrecy with which it had been negotiated, and the rigidity with which it was upheld. A vigorous campaign was conducted against it by Iranians as well as the United States, France and Russia. Yet it might not have failed had India, the India office, the Treasury and the War Office provided the requisite instruments for its success. Its failure resulted in the 1921 coup, the rise of Reza Khan and the Pahlavi state, and a new chapter in Anglo‐Iranian relations.     

Becoming a “Good Nixon Doctrine Country”: Political Relations between the United States and Singapore during the Nixon Presidency

The Nixon Doctrine, which devolved US troops from direct involvement in Asian conflicts but gave priority to military sales and economic assistance, was considered by some commentators to be an inefficacious foreign policy approach that did little to serve US interests in Asia during the Cold War. Using Singapore as a case study, this article demonstrates that Richard Nixon's foreign policy approach improved US‐Singapore relations significantly from 1970 onwards. After a period of flirtation with the Soviet Union during 1968–72, Singapore came to be labelled a “good Nixon Doctrine country” by the US government in 1973. Through the sale of US military equipment and economic assistance, Singapore and the US cultivated bilateral ties that endured after the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam in 1973 and the fall of Saigon two years later.     

The East Asian financial meltdown

In view of China's economic growth and rising international status, Latin American and Caribbean countries will accord increasing priority to their relations with the Asian giant. China's permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council is also a factor to reckon with. Today, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Mexico have established strategic partnerships with China. While the vast distance between China and Latin America generates difficulties in transportation and mutual understanding, it also means that both parties have no serious conflicts of strategic and political interests. Their Third World orientations in diplomacy contribute to a 95% concurrence in their votes in the United Nations. While the Chinese leadership seeks to promote multipolarity to curb US unilateralism, it appreciates its limitations in Latin America. In addition, China and the Latin American and Caribbean countries value good relations with the US. In the foreseeable future, China will increase its investment in Latin America and more Sino-Latin American business joint ventures will be formed. These trends may well reduce trade frictions associated with China's economic expansion.     

IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE IN A POST-ISIS IRAQ

Iran's influence and presence in Iraq have increased significantly in recent years. The collapse of the Saddam's dictatorship in 2003, after the US invasion, served to inflate Iran's influence in Iraq, particularly in the post-ISIS era. In this connection, Iran has used various means and tools to develop its strategy in Iraq. This article argues that Iran's current strategy in Iraq stems from a Realpolitik agenda rather than an ideological one, concerned more with political, economic, and security interests than pursuing revolutionary objectives per se. To this end, Tehran has largely relied on long-established relationships with several pro-Iranian political parties and militia groups. These relationships are often couched in religious ideological terms as a foundation and justification for its future strategy in post-ISIS Iraq. The questions that this paper will address are the following: what was Iran's role in defeating ISIS in Iraq? How has Tehran benefitted from its long-term relationships with Iraqi political parties and militia groups? What are the Iranian sources of power in Iraq and how do they help Iran gain strategic dominance in Iraq?     

制度距离、文化差异与中美贸易摩擦中的权力因素——基于1980~2018年美国对外贸易争端数据的定量研究

中美贸易摩擦是体系压力和美国国内因素共同作用的结果。基于1980~2018年美国对外贸易争端数据的定量研究,文章采用面板负二项模型对中美两国间的制度距离、文化差异和相对实力差距的缩小等结构性变量,以及美国国内政治等单元层次的中介变量、贸易和投资等渠道变量,对中美贸易摩擦的影响进行了实证考察。研究认为,中美间军事、经济和科技实力差距的缩小即相对实力分布的变化会显著强化美国作为守成大国对中国作为崛起大国发起贸易摩擦的可能性;中美两国间的政治、经济制度距离和文化差异或价值观的不同也会显著影响中美两国间发生贸易摩擦的可能性,同时,与美国政治关系良好、在制度和文化上与其接近的国家并不必然意味着与美国贸易摩擦的减少;美国国内不同政治行为体、社会行为体的利益诉求、政策偏好,与贸易的交互效应一起,会进一步增加中美两国因实力差距的缩小、制度和文化(观念)差异等体系因素或结构性变量所引发的贸易摩擦发生的概率;经济因素依然是决定中美贸易摩擦的基础性因素,中美贸易失衡、中国对美直接投资的迅速增加以及中国对美国市场渗透率的提升、美国国内经济绩效的波动、美国国内收入不平等程度的加剧,与贸易的收入分配效应一起,也会显著提升两国间发生贸易摩擦的可能性。     

“a carefully weighed plan with adequate safeguards for us”: Economic Policy and the Coordination of Australian-US Approaches to Japanese Aggression, 1939-41

The historical narrative of Australia's foreign and defence policy-making during the Pacific War tends to foreground the years 1941–42, characterising them as the turning point when the government realised that Britain alone could no longer protect Australia's regional security interests and turned to the United States of America for its salvation. This article makes a contribution to the alternative view, arguing that Australia was looking to the US well before Prime Minister John Curtin's famous “looks to America” proclamation. It does so with a focus on Australia's thinking and policy towards the engagement of the US in the years 1939-41, arguing that the coordination of its economic policy with the US, rather than seeking insight into high-level strategic planning, offered the nation the greatest opportunity to tie its security interests in the Asia-Pacific region with those of the US. In exploring the role of economic policy in Australia's preparation for war, this article offers new insight into the maturation of Australia's foreign policy apparatus.     

Her Majesty's Protected Subjects: The Mishaqa Family in Ottoman Damascus

The protégé system that the Ottoman Empire encountered as the result of diplomatic relations with European powers later became a clear threat to the very existence of the empire. Among these powers, Britain, until the nineteenth century, executed its consular affairs via the Levant Company in the Middle East, but later employed local people, mostly non-Muslim Ottomans, as dragomans, consular agents and vice-consuls to execute its services in the region. The dragomans not only translated treaties and official documents, but also commented on the messages to and from the authorities and this gave them much more important roles. In this regard, members of the Mishaqa family served the British and later American interests under different posts ranging from dragoman, to consular agent and vice-consul. As they gained confidence, they were accorded British consular protection which provided them considerable privileges, and passed their duties to their sons. Unlike similar Levantine families who assumed dragomanship in the imperial centre as a household tradition, members of the Mishaqa family were deeply embedded in the local society and therefore could give insights on social and political changes in the Ottoman province of Damascus. After attaining British protection in 1840, members of the family served in British and American consulates until the beginning of the First World War. However, the protégé status of the family members paved the way for continued debates over their nationality and citizenship. This article attempts to present the basic codes of consular protection and Ottoman responses within the context of the story of Mishaqa family.     

Arab Nationalism and the Arab Union of 1958

The late 1950s was a turbulent period in the history of Arab nationalism. It saw the birth and demise of unity states (the United Arab Republic and the Arab Union), civil war, revolution and Western intervention. Despite its short five-month lifespan, the Iraqi–Jordanian Hashemite Arab Union contributed to the intensification of the traditional Egyptian–Iraqi rivalry, the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 and the American intervention in Lebanon the same year. It was the result of Arab nationalism, lingering British imperial dreams, the East–West conflict, economic considerations and an inter-Arab cold war. The Arab Union had obvious advantages over the United Arab Republic. Two such advantages were the greater number of cabinet posts granted to Jordan by the Arab Union than were granted to Syria by the United Arab Republic, and the fact that Amman retained its status as capital (one of two union capitals), whereas Damascus was downgraded to the status of provincial capital. These advantages, however, failed to prevent the premature demise of the union, which was caused by a combination of negative domestic and regional perceptions, economic constraint and military commitments.     

Britain and the abdication of Reza Shah

On the eve of the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in the Second World War, Sir Reader Bullard, the British minister in Tehran, urged on his government the desirability of removing the Iranian ruler, Reza Shah, from office. Association with the ‘universally detested’ shah, whom he described as a ‘greedy ignorant savage’, was detrimental to Britain's interests and its war effort. In the weeks that followed the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran, Bullard continued to press for and to shape the ultimate British decision to force Reza Shah to abdicate and go into exile. Yet, this was not always Bullard's view of Britain's relationship with the Iranian ruler. When he presented his credentials 20 months earlier, Bullard described it as his ‘urgent duty’ to win Reza Shah's favour. Nor did Bullard's insistence that Britain depose the Shah initially find favour with the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, his Middle East staff at the Foreign Office, or with Churchill. This article traces the evolution of Bullard's own view of Reza Shah and the developments that led the Foreign Office, initially eager to win Reza Shah's favour and even ready to offer Reza Shah a ‘substantial bribe’ for his cooperation, to take steps to topple Reza Shah from the throne.     

HOW THE QOR'AN LED TO THE DOWNFALL OF MOSSADEGH

Apparently, in 1953 the World Bank put forward a compromise proposal to break the impasse between Mossadegh and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Mossadegh asked Hassibi, a devout Muslim, to advise him whether he should accept the proposal. Hassibi consulted Abbas Parkhideh, a member of the oil company board, another devout man. As the story goes, the two men decided to resort to Estekhareh, the Persian practice of using the Qor'an to help with a difficult decision. On the basis of the ensuing consultation of the Qor'an, Habibi advised Mossdegh to reject the Bank's proposal. He did so. The coup that overthrew him occurred within a month.     

The Iraqi Coups of July 1968 and the American Connection

After the June 1967 war, Iraqi President ’Abd al-Rahman ’Arif and Prime Minister Tahir Yahya broke diplomatic relations with Washington and began signing strategic economic agreements for oil development with France and the Soviet Union. On 17 July 1968 their regime was toppled by a coup initiated by members of the Ba?th Party and a group of military officers. Just 13 days later in another coup initiated by the Ba?th, the officer leadership was deposed. This article examines Washington's reaction to the two coups and the indications of the western orientation of the short-lived regime that ended on 30 July. It also reveals findings that support the claim of American involvement in the overthrow of ’Arif.     

Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question, 1968–1970

This paper examines the role of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the late Shah of Iran, in the secret Anglo-Iranian negotiations over Bahrain from January 1968 to March 1970. Despite a clear strategic imperative for abandoning Iran's claim to Bahrain in the wake of the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, the Shah feared that such an act would be seen by the Iranian public as collusion with the British to surrender Iranian territory, thereby further eroding the Pahlavi monarchy's precarious legitimacy. Drawing on British official papers and Iranian oral histories and memoirs, this paper explores for the first time the story of these secret negotiations and the extent to which the Shah's diplomacy was constrained by domestic considerations.