The star of David in a cedar tree: Jewish students and Zionism at the American University of Beirut (1908–1948)

The American University of Beirut's emergence as a hub of Arab national and cultural identity in the first half of the twentieth century has been well documented by historians. The simultaneous Zionist presence on campus has been largely overlooked. Zionist ideas were predominantly promoted by Palestinian Jewish students who formed a small but vocal minority at AUB prior to 1948. Faculty and non-Jewish students also regularly collaborated with and traveled to Zionist institutions in Palestine for academic, athletic, and leisure purposes. For Arab students on campus, therefore, Zionism was not an abstract concept, but rather a national identity embodied by fellow classmates and friends on campus. As the conflict in Palestine increased in the 1930s and 1940s, so too did political activism and tensions on campus between Zionist and Arab nationalist students. This article analyzes this unique period of exchange, collaboration, and friction at AUB, which came to a swift end with the outbreak of the 1948 War. By focusing on the interactions between Arab and Zionist Jewish students at AUB, I seek to extend the ‘relational’ approach towards Jewish-Arab contact beyond Palestine's borders.     

What the surrender of extra‐territoriality will mean to us

The paper argues that during the Mandate period the Labor Zionist movement was able to successfully create a Sabra identity based on its ideology that was constructed in opposition to the presumed characteristics of the “exile Jew” and how such an identity played a central role in the formation of a security oriented foreign policy. Labor's creation of the Sabra through the "Hebrew Revolution" can be considered as one of the most successful episodes of the twentieth century in which a new identity was created in order to serve ideological goals. Labor's Zionist ideology, which sought to create a “new Jew” that would form the basis of the Jewish national movement, was translated into an identity that in contrast to the diaspora Jew relied on collectivism, agriculture, secularism, and most important of all physical strength and sacrifice in defence of the Jewish nation. This translated into a security-oriented foreign policy that heavily relied on military force and emphasized internal power and strength, which Labor elites argued could only be achieved through self-reliance and independence particularly in regards to defence issues. Such an orientation would form the basis of Israeli foreign policy for years to come.     

The Jews of China and their Contribution to the Establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine in the First Half of the Twentieth Century

This article deals with the contribution of Zionists throughout the world to the building of the National Home in Palestine, including the Zionist communities in the Far East – India and China. It examines the vast Zionist activity taking place in China, with the Zionists of China making a significant contribution, especially considering the small size of its Jewish community. In contrast to popular belief, in the period discussed in our research China was not distant and disconnected from the Zionist centres in Palestine and Europe. Written Zionist propaganda and Zionist representatives did not overlook China. The notable extent of donations and investments made by the Jews of China benefiting the National Home through the Jewish Colonial Trust, the Jewish National Fund, and the Foundation Fund is the result of two main factors: firstly, the economic strength of the community, especially the very wealthy Iraqi Jews, and secondly, the Zionist passion of the Chinese Jews. The Kadoorie family, whose donations assisted in purchasing land for the Hebrew University, the building of Ha'emek Hospital, and the establishment of the Galilee agricultural school, played a pivotal role. There is no doubt that Eliezer Kadoorie serving as head of the Zionist Organization in China as well as some of its institutions helped widen the circle of donors among upper and middle class Zionists in China, and shared in their prominent part in creating the Jewish National Home in Palestine.     

The arithmetic of rights: Zionist intellectuals imagining the Arab minority May–July 1938

ABSTRACT

This article examines Zionist debates regarding the status of the Arab minority in the Jewish State following the Royal Commission's recommendation to partition Palestine. Three conclusions arise from the debates: first, that the Zionist leadership regarded the civil and political rights of the Arab minority to be dependent on the power equilibrium between Jews and Arabs in all of Palestine. Second, the Zionist leaders imagined the Jewish State as a parliamentary democracy, but argued that a democratic regime should be created only after a Jewish majority had been achieved. Finally, because democracy in the Jewish State – including minority rights – was dependent on the creation of a Jewish majority, Zionist plans to transfer Arabs out of the Jewish State were not considered by them to be undemocratic, but rather a precondition to the creation of a Jewish and democratic state.     

Israel's Middle Eastern Jewish Intellectuals: Identity and Discourse

The intellectual movement HaKeshet HaDemokratit HaMizrahit (The Eastern Democratic Rainbow) was established in 1996 by second and third generation Middle Eastern and North African Jewish immigrants who are faculty members, graduate students, actors, artists, educators, businessmen and women, and media workers. These self-identified Mizrahi Israeli intellectuals aimed to initiate new debates in Israeli society with their criticism of Zionist narrative and policies by applying post-colonial theory to expose the construction of social categorisation among Jewish Israelis. In their discursive contribution they addressed several issues of historical and contemporary inequality between groups of Israeli citizens. By examining the motivation behind this intellectual activism, the present article asks what the Mizrahi identity means to people labelled as Mizrahim and why it is important.     

To What Extent Did the Jewish Brigade Contribute to the Establishment of the Jewish State?

Whilst the desperation of key international Zionist leaders, such as Chaim Weizmann, to field a fighting force against the Nazis consisting entirely of Palestinian Jews is evident in their correspondence, it is difficult to ascertain just how significant the practical contribution of the Jewish Brigade was to the Zionist project. The political effect of activities such as facilitating illegal immigration and, post-war, quietly training Jewish underground forces in Palestine cannot by their very nature be evaluated. Yet perhaps the Brigade's most important contribution to the embryonic state of Israel was the huge leap in political and cultural strength that boasting such a force represented.     

Bringing the British back in: Sephardim,Ashkenazi anti-Zionist Orthodox and the policy of Jewish unity

This article analyses the British role in establishing and maintaining a Jewish–Arab demarcation line by means of a policy of Jewish unity and by enabling Ashkenazi Zionist control of the Yishuv. In the first part, it analyses British policy towards the local Sephardi as well as the local Ashkenazi anti-Zionist Orthodox communities, both of which for different reasons did not neatly fit into the Jewish/Zionist–Arab binary. I argue that the British followed a policy of Jewish unity at the inception of the Mandate which they upheld repeatedly against Ashkenazi anti-Zionist Orthodox efforts and which by 1936 had created a truism enforcing a binary understanding of the conflict. In the second part, this article analyses the ways in which these communities presented themselves vis-à-vis the British. I argue that despite different strategies of maximizing their influence, both communities foundered on the existing power configurations.     

The Zionist–Arab incident of Zarnuqa 1913: a chronicle and several methodological remarks

The article deals with the Zarnuqa incident which took place on 23 July 1913 between the colonists and guards of Rehovot, and the Arab rural population in their vicinity, an incident which is considered by historians as a milestone in Zionist–Arab relations in late Ottoman Palestine. The aim of the article is to present the various narratives available to researchers today, starting with the various Jewish sources, then examining the Arabic sources and, finally, external ones. We analyse each of the sources and draw general conclusions about the sources historians can use today when studying this formative period of Zionist–Arab early encounters. The decision to examine several different narratives provides a multidimensional perspective on the event. Our aim is not to determine whose narrative is closer to historical reality (which would certainly be elusive), or to find out who started the fight and who is to be blamed but rather to present the different narratives, how each side described the event, and what the narrators chose to emphasize and what to omit. The article illustrates the difficult task facing historians dealing with late Ottoman Palestine, the period of the early Zionist–Arab encounter and conflict.     

Guizot's Absence of a Plan for Jerusalem

Historians have speculated over the existence of an 1841 plan by the French foreign minister François Guizot to internationalize Jerusalem as a Christian city, a plan holding major implications for the eventual emergence of a Jewish state and for European–Ottoman relations. This article aims, based on fresh archival and other sources, to provide a definitive evaluation of Guizot's plan, its scope, and its motivations. It broadens the field to encompass other great power plans mooted in 1841, including plans of a Protestant yet Zionist flavour, and it reassesses the political weight of early nineteenth-century European religious impulses with regard to Palestine.     

The Jewish neighbourhoods of Jaffa and the question of annexation to Tel Aviv at the end of the British Mandate

One of the most complex issues facing British rule on the local municipal level towards the end of the Mandate period was the problem of Jaffa's Jewish neighbourhoods. This question, which emerged with the outbreak of the 1936 disturbances, engaged the government thereafter until the end of the Mandate. The demand by the residents of Jaffa's Jewish neighbourhoods for annexation to Tel Aviv – actually for municipal detachment from Jaffa – constituted the root of the problem. In this setting of the sharpening of relations between the authorities and the Jews and Arabs in 1945–1947, all three involved parties found themselves deeply immersed in it in the attempt to bring about its resolution. The annexation problem ceaselessly preoccupied the institutions of the Jewish Yishuv as a Zionist–Yishuv struggle of the highest order. This period gave rise to a series of unprecedented moves by the Jewish side, which were intended to influence the British government toward solving the problem. The article examines its development of the problem from the viewpoint of the three sides concerned in the years 1945–1947, with the focus on the policy line adopted by the Jewish side, its implications and its results.     

The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917–1923: British Imperialist Imperatives

The article sets the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the final confirmation of Britain's Palestine Mandate in 1923 within the context of national imperial concerns: in particular, anxieties over the security of the Suez Canal and the country's sea-route to its economic and military power-base in India. In 1917 strategic issues were paramount in the progressive annexation of Palestine by the Lloyd George coalition, this the essential territorial precondition for the pursuit of the Zionist project. In 1923 these global considerations were again to the fore when the new Conservative administration, less Zionist than its predecessor, decided finally to accept and implement the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine and the obligation therein to advance the cause of a Jewish national home. And throughout this period there was a widespread sense in official circles that Zionist settlers might perform as direct agents of Empire, acting as grateful, loyal, and developmental servants of the British imperial interest. Paradoxically, however – and largely on account of the ill-informed and reflexive manner in which plans were formulated in London – the entire exercise was, in the long-term, to prove a source of profound weakness to Britain's strategic authority in the East. Palestine policy, like so much imperial reasoning in the twentieth century, was to prove intrinsically delusional.     

The map as an official symbol and the ‘Greater Israel’ ideology

This article examines the combined use of maps and symbols as an official symbol of political organization. Used in combination, a map and an emblem push the geographical component to the forefront of cultural–political discourse as an element of myth, drawing attention to an aspect that is not a conscious part of daily life. The article explores how the map of the Land of Israel was used as an official symbol by Zionist organizations, and attempts to decipher the political–cultural significance of the symbolic geography they employed. A symbolic map of Eretz Yisrael was adopted by three Zionist organizations: the Jewish National Fund (JNF); HaMahanot HaOlim Socialist–Zionist youth movement and the Revisionist movement. Aside from their differences in mission and raisons d’être, the organizations in this study represent different models of map and symbol usage. The main distinguishing feature was in their use of outlines and borders.     

From Missionary to Ministerial Adviser: Constance Duncan and Australia‐Japan Relations 1922‐1947

The contribution of A. Constance Duncan (1896‐1970) to Australia‐Japan relations has been overlooked in mainstream historiography. This article examines her role in the development of these relations from 1922 to 1947. She was one of the few women to be accepted into the elite inner‐circle of intellectuals influencing Australian foreign policy during this period. In 1922 she embarked on a career in Japan as a missionary, or “foreign secretary”, for the Young Women's Christian Association. She returned to Australia in 1933 and took up a position with the Bureau of Social and International Affairs. Her familiarity with Japanese culture and society, together with an abiding interest in promoting world peace, led naturally to her participation in the world of international relations at a time of heightened interest in the Asia‐Pacific region and Japan in particular. She was part of an intellectual movement that considered an educated Australian public to be of paramount importance in future Australia‐Japan relations and international relations generally. This article traces her activities and examines her influence in the educational field and on Australian foreign policy‐making.     

Between Homeland and Exile: Iranian Jewry in Zionist/Israeli Political Thought*

This article explores the contingent nature of Zionist/Israeli understandings of Iranian Jewry, a particularly important “Oriental” (Mizrahi) group that has not yet received the attention it deserves in critical scholarship. Central to the Zionist project has been a juxtaposition of the opposition between East and West, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, between Exile and Land of Israel. These oppositions can be read as extreme expressions of the desire to assimiliate the Jews into the Western narrative of enlightenment and redemption. When applied to Iranian Jews, however, these oppositions become replete with tensions and ambiguities. First I show how, during the first three decades of the state of Israel, Israelis situated the Shah's modernization programs as part of the “West”, thereby removing Iranian Jewry from an “exilic” space. I then explore how the 1979 Iranian revolution further challenged these axiomatic oppositions. Iranian Jews living in Israel posed a serious challenge to Zionism's axiomatic assumptions. Nurturing a distinct ethnic (Mizrahi) identity within the Jewish state, they resisted the majoritarian and homogenizing tendencies of Israeli hegemony and demonstrated the fractured nature of Jewish identities.     

A Jew in Cairo: the defiance of Chehata Haroun

This article is the first to expound on Chehata Haroun's personality, his beliefs, and the implications thereof, all of which will be scrutinized within the context of the national and political transformations that convulsed the Land of the Nile, especially its Jewish community, from the late 1940s onwards. For the most part, the emphasis will be on three strands of the activist's critical views of the Middle East. The first is his claim that the Zionist movement and the Arab leadership are jointly responsible for the asphyxiation of Egyptian Jewry. This argument was promulgated in a letter that he addressed to President Gamal ?Abd al-Nasser in February 1967. The second strand is that Haroun's Jewishness does not contradict his Egyptian national identity, his uncompromising devotion to communism and humanism, ardent opposition to imperialism, or his identification with the Palestinian cause. The third contention is that the Jewish community and its heritage constitute an indivisible part of the Egyptian social and cultural fabric.     

The Bedouins in the Galilee in the War of Independence of Israel 1948–1950

The relations of the Bedouins with the Jewish population during the War of Independence were very complex. The Bedouins were both opponents and friends. Bedouin groups helped the Jews in their struggle against the Palestinian national movement and against the Arab armies like Arab-al-Hib. Before the foundation of the state, these Bedouins had already participated in the protection of the security of the Jewish population. They supplied intelligence on events of the Arab and Palestinian sides, and also fought by the side of the Jews in the War of Independence, but at that time other groups joined the Palestinian national movement and took part in the struggle against the Jewish population, more so after the declaration of the partition plan in the United Nations. Subsequently, Bedouin fighting gangs were established and they joined the Palestinian struggle with the Jewish population.

The Bedouin positions during the war had implications for their fate in the State of Israel. The War of Independence allowed a significant part of the Bedouin tribes to escape to the neighbouring Arab states – Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. Many of the Bedouin tribes that escaped did so as they were connected with fighting with the Arab gangs and the Arab Liberation Army. The Bedouins who were in the Zionist camp during the war or who adopted a neutral position stayed in the territory of the borders of the State of Israel.     

Building the country or rescuing the people: Ben-Gurion's attitude towards mass Jewish immigration to Israel in the mid-1950s

In mainstream scholarship, David Ben-Gurion is described as one of the main supporters and primary advocates of the policy of encouraging mass Jewish immigration to Israel (aliya) in the 1950s. The Zionist movement had two different motives for supporting aliya: Diaspora Jews’ need for a safe haven (which would require mass aliya), and the need to build a solid and stable Jewish society in mandatory Palestine/Israel (which would require selective aliya).

When Ben-Gurion, in the 1940s, came to favour mass aliya, he did so because of the immigrants’ potential contribution to the attainment of statehood and then the independent state.

In the first years after independence, when entire communities immigrated to Israel, they included old and infirm people who did not fit the image of the pioneers of pre-state aliya. Nevertheless, for Ben-Gurion, their demographic contribution outweighed the burden of their absorption. By 1952, he had changed his mind and became one of the strongest supporters of selective immigration. He continued to support selectivity even when, in 1955, the safety of Moroccan Jews and their freedom to emigrate was in jeopardy. Ben-Gurion's attitude to aliya from Morocco, in the shadow of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal, reflected his priority – a strong and secure Israel.     

An Imperial German Battle to win over Mesopotamia: The Baghdad Propagandaschule (1909–17)

This article investigates the German cultural diplomatic efforts in the Ottoman Empire between 1900 and 1918 and the example of the German so-called Propagandaschule in Baghdad. The article argues that contrary to recent scholarship, the German Empire had a considerable and well-designed secular-based cultural diplomacy programme, especially in the Ottoman Empire. This finding is important for the social history of the Arab provinces of the late Ottoman Empire, as it gives the local population, especially the Muslim part, a much stronger agency in daily life than recently argued. The finding breaks with the assumption that the local population only had the Ottoman state schools or western missionary schools to choose from. The Muslim population in particular favoured the possibility of secular education.     

Youth,politics and republicanism in the formative years of the state of Israel

The article focuses on the political establishment's attitude toward Israeli youth during the early years of statehood, viewing it from a new angle: regarding young people as a political force reflecting the effects of contemporary social development. I focus on those described as hegemonic youth, members of Israel's social and economic elites. This approach sees the attitude of the political establishment toward the youth as a political expression and suggests an instrumental approach toward youth and the youth ethos in Israeli society as a tool to construct republicanism. Hence, despite publicly having declared the need to strengthen the Zionist youth movements and young national activism, the state's financial and organizational efforts were mainly invested in generating alternatives to the pioneering youth movements, along with the effort to change their ideological and organizational base. These alternatives included ‘good citizenship’ education in schools and informal settings, which were disconnected from the Labor Movement's values and were suited to urban adolescents; the attempts to narrow the dominant position of the parties and the settler movements in pioneering missions, favoring state mechanisms instead; an increase in the state's investments in supplementary education; and the establishment of settings for youth and student clubs.