Struggling for the Kurdish vote: religion,ethnicity and victimhood in AKP and BDP/HDP rally speeches

This study explores the competition for Turkey's Kurdish vote through the instrumentalization of religion, ethnicity and victimhood in political competition. This becomes possible through the study of rally speeches of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi – AKP), the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Bar?? ve Demokrasi Partisi – BDP) and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halklar?n Demokratik Partisi – HDP), in Turkey's June 2011 and June 2015 general elections. The AKP campaigns framed the resolution of the Kurdish issue along with an updated version of the ‘Turkish Islamic Synthesis’. The issue of ethnicity was toned down in contrast to the idea of common victimhood of pious Turkish and Kurdish Muslims in republican Turkey. On the other hand, the BDP/HDP moved from a more ethnic-oriented and exclusive identity approach in 2011 to a more inclusive, liberal and extrovert agenda based on a civic definition of Turkish national identity in 2015. Religion and victimhood appear as the two most enduring symbolic resources for political party mobilization.     

Intellectuals and Political Power in Social Movements: The Parallel Paths of Fadlallah and Hizbullah

This article examines the intellectual impact of Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935–2010) on Hizbullah's political behaviour. Many depicted Fadlallah as the ‘spiritual guide’ and ‘oracle’ of Hizbullah, while others accentuated his socio-political independence and the potential he represented as an ‘alternative’ to Hizbullah and Iran. This study argues that Fadlallah directly influenced Hizbullah's political worldviews, but the Islamic movement's socialisation in Lebanon, its dependence on Iran and its war with Israel have led it to pursue a separate path from Fadlallah. But despite the separation, the Ayatollah shared a common world vision with Hizbullah and the Islamic Republic, and would not have formed an alternative. The article is divided into two sections. The first examines the socio-political origins of Fadlallah and Hizbullah as an intellectual and a political movement, respectively, and conceptualises the discursive and political fields that motivate the behaviour of the two actors. The second section assesses the impact of Fadlallah's ideas on Hizbullah by focusing on three main themes: (1) Islamic liberation and resistance against injustice; (2) the Islamic state and Lebanon; and (3) Wilayat al-Faqih and Islamic Iran.     

Oil and intra-state conflict in Iraq and Syria: sub-state actors and challenges for Turkey's energy security

The continuing dependency on fossil fuels of the Middle East not only in Turkey's energy mix but also in world energy demand requires further analysis of oil and conflict in the region since the fall of Mosul in Iraq to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in June 2014. This article addresses the relationship between oil and conflict. Then, it examines the case of Turkey's increasing energy relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government to elucidate the implications of inter-state and intra-state conflict on regional interdependence in the region. The argument asserts that risks of an abrupt regime change or revolutionary regime formation in the aftermath of civil war in Syria and ethnic or sectarian violence in Iraq, which are highly associated with intra-state conflicts, present challenges for Turkey's energy security and most importantly for human security in the region.     

Do the Kurds have ‘no friends but the mountains’? Turkey's Secret War against Communists,Soviets and the Kurds

A Kurdish proverb says that the Kurds have ‘no friends but the mountains’. This was not what the Turkish authorities believed. Using new and previously unexploited archives both in English and Turkish, this article offers a new interpretation of Turkey's perception of the Kurds. By analyzing Kurdish activities and their alignment with Communist movements and Soviet activities, it shows how Turkey's threat perception was shaped by international contexts, especially through the Cold War. In addition, the Kurdish nationalist movement in the Middle East played a pivotal role in regional intelligence cooperation between Turkey, Iraq and Iran. This article argues that Soviet and Communist activities had an important role in shaping Turkey's threat perception of the Kurdish minority in the country. Turkey's perception of subversive threats involved an intertwining of Communists, Soviets and Kurds. This affected the Kurdish bid for independence for most of the twentieth century.     

From Islamic Radicalism to Islamic Capitalism: The Promises and Predicaments of Turkish-Islamic Entrepreneurship in a Capitalist System (The Case of İGİAD)

The rise of Turkish Islamic capitalism, and with it an Islamic bourgeoisie and the accompanying lifestyle has profound implications for the Muslim world, since the Turkish Muslims have been backed by a relatively successful democratic and liberal system that has allowed them to integrate more easily into the global system. Focusing mainly on the members of the Islamic-oriented Association of Economic Entrepreneurship and Business Ethics (?G?AD), the aim of this article is to demonstrate the inherent (in)compatibility and contradictions between Islam and capitalism in contemporary Turkey, and by extension in the Muslim world. From the start, for the Turkish Muslim bourgeoisie, the burning questions were ‘how to earn’ and, more importantly, ‘how to consume’ within a capitalist system while still not transgressing Islamic boundaries. In order to overcome these challenges, the article argues that, rather than creating an ‘alternative Islamic economic system’, Islamic actors have reduced – in some cases, even eliminated – this discursive and ideological tension between Islam and capitalism by (a) trying to introduce Islamic morality into capitalism and (b) redefining both Islam and capitalism. Through these mechanisms they have also broadened and deepened Turkish modernity.     

Islam,ethnicity and the state: contested spaces of legitimacy and power in the Kurdish-Turkish public sphere

ABSTRACT

The pro-Kurdish nationalist mobilization in Turkey was mostly built on the right to self-determination aligned with the Marxist-Leninist ideology for the insurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the early 1980s and ethnic minority rights for the secular-leftist pro-Kurdish legal parties in the 1990s. The Turkish state mostly framed the legal and illegal pro-Kurdish mobilization as ‘the enemy of the state’ and ‘the enemy of Islam’ in its counter-insurgency efforts. However, in the 2000s, the PKK and the pro-Kurdish legal parties became more tolerant and inclusive toward Islamic Kurdish identity by mobilizing their sympathizers in events such as ‘Civic Friday Prayers’ and a ‘Democratic Islamic Congress’. This move aimed to function as an antidote to the rising popularity of the ruling conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Kurdish Hizbullah in the early 2000s. In other words, Islam and pious Muslim identity has increasingly become contested among Turkish Islamists, Kurdish Islamists, and the secular Kurdish nationalists. This article seeks to unpack why, how, and under what conditions such competing actors and mechanisms shape the discursive and power relationships in the Kurdish-Turkish public sphere.     

Revelation or revolution: a Gramscian approach to the rise of political Islam

This article seeks to conceptualise the contemporary phenomenon of ‘political Islam’, or Islamic fundamentalism as it is usually classified in the West. This paper takes the view that those movements that utilise the ideology of political Islam are not primarily religious groups concerned with issues of doctrine and faith, but political organisations utilising Islam as a ‘revolutionary’ ideology to attack, criticise, and de‐legitimise the ruling elites and the power structure on which their authority and legitimacy is based. Since the one‐party authoritarian state is the norm in most of the Middle East, only Islam has been able to provide the marginalised, alienated, and disgruntled masses with an oppositional force capable of articulating their specific grievances and general displeasure with these regimes. A Gramscian framework helps to demonstrate that these organisations classified as ‘political Islam’, and promulgated by the core Islamic scholars of the twentieth century, are authentic counter‐hegemonic movements focussed on the overthrow of these despotic regimes and the acquisition of political, economic, and social power.     

Explaining Political Islam: The Transformation of Palestinian Islamic Movements

This article aims to present a comprehensive explanation of the development of Islamic political movements among the Palestinians. It focuses specifically on the analysis of three Islamic movements: two that are active among the Palestinians of Israel (e.g. the 1948 territories)—the Southern Islamic movement and the Northern Islamic movement—and the Hamas movement that is active among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Through the analysis of these movements, the authors have identified three different major strategies used by the movements under consideration: The ‘politics of acceptance’ by the Southern Islamic Movement, the ‘politics of difference’ by the Northern Islamic Movement, and the ‘politics of resistance’ by Hamas. Four factors together constitute the basis for a multi-layered explanation of the different approaches adopted by political Islam: the context, the public orientation, the leaders' movements' preferences and the interpretation of the religious text.     

Radical Islamism,Traditional Islam and Ethno-Nationalism in the Northern Caucasus

This study examines the interplay between Islam and collective identity and their position in potential conflicts by exploring the dynamics of Islam, ethno-nationalism and civic society within different parts of the Northern Caucasus. Historical and anthropological approaches are used for a comparative analysis of Daghestan and Chechnya in the east and of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkesia in the west. The study demonstrates the importance of local context and historical background to the understanding of ethnicity, nationalism, civic identity and their interplay with Islam. The analysis highlights that the different history and socio-cultural characteristics of the different regions in question leads to different approaches to religion which contain a paradox. In Daghestan and Chechnya, Islam is well established and the authorities have to collaborate with different Islamic bodies in their struggle against ‘Wahhabism’. In Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkesia the ‘legitimate’ Islamic leaders – whether those representing the state or leaders of other Islamic movements – are powerless. While this represents the overall weak position of Islam in these areas, paradoxically it also opens options for radical Islamists to gain support, in the context of economic hardships, weakening of other sources of identification, and corruption. This process is generated and fostered by policies that limit ethno-nationalism and expand the struggle against radicalism to a struggle against religious activity in general. The Northern Caucasus has often been perceived as a major locus of radical Islam, and as a strategic rift in the ‘clash of civilizations’. This study claims that the significant rifts and conflicts are between different Islamic alternatives. Important variables crucial to this discussion highlighted by the case of the Northern Caucasus are ethnicity, nationalism, civic identity and their interplay with Islam. At the same time, this case also highlights that the potential of radicalism in Islamic societies is not the mere result of its own ‘characteristics’, but is also a product of policy towards Islamic societies by outside actors, in this case Russia.     

Inclusion-moderation or political opportunity? Lessons from the case of Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party,PAS)

Much of the recent literature on the inclusion-moderation thesis revolves around Islamist political parties. This paper contends that the case of Parti-Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) is instructive in this regard. I argue that political opportunity is what decides whether a party would adopt more ‘moderate’ tendencies, not its mere inclusion in the electoral system. PAS’ raison d’etre was initially based on campaigning for an Islamic State. Subsequently, when it was in a coalition with two other secular parties, it began espousing the concept of a 'Benevolent State'. When the alliance eventually failed, PAS reverted to calls for an Islamic polity. PAS’ ideological commitment to an 'Islamic state' was dependent on political opportunities. This study argues for a more nuanced understanding of the trajectories of Islamist parties.     

Politics in the Kurdish periphery: clan networks and local party strategies in a comparative perspective

Despite the return to violence and state repression in the Kurdish conflict, the ruling Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi (Justice and Development Party – AKP) has remained the only alternative to the Kurdish National Movement (KNM) for Turkey's Kurdish citizens. What local-level strategies did the AKP employ in Kurdish areas to reinforce its national-level appeal to Islamic values? Under what conditions did local vote-seeking strategies help the AKP to overcome its pro-Kurdish rivals at the ballot box? This article examines the politics of local coalition building in the periphery of the Kurdish landscape – Bingöl and Mu?. Despite their many similarities, the two cities voted for different political parties in national elections. This article examines how the AKP's local party organizations interacted with local authority structures, recruited influential local elites, and pursued new voters. The vitality of clan networks in parts of Bingöl enabled the AKP to build a reliable local coalition. The gradual weakening of clan networks in Mu? and their permeation by the KNM prevented a similar coalition. Instead, the parties of the KNM were able to take advantage of divided clan networks to win national electoral contests in the province.     

Islamic Capital/Anatolian Tigers: Past and Present

This article critically reviews the current literature on ‘Islamic capital’ in Turkey. Instead of a culturalist account that primarily focuses on conservative lifestyles and religious orientations of entrepreneurs as the main indicator of class formation, it tries to identify a criterion on which ‘Islamic capital’ as such can be identified as a separate capital fraction that can pursue a distinct and collective agenda. It discusses the symbiotic relationship between interest-free banks, firms, religious networks and communal linkages in order to understand this peculiar way of capital accumulation in relation to Islamic motifs. It also provides guidelines to understand what the future may hold for this specific capital fraction and assess the explanatory capacity of the term ‘Islamic capital’ under present conditions.     

A Torn Country: Erdoğan's Turkey And the Elections of 2023

This article examines the victory of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey's 2023 presidential election, the role of fear-oriented populist nationalism in Turkish politics, and the implications of the results for society. It argues that Turkey faces a deep moral and social crisis rather than a mere political problem. The article explores the sociocultural origins of polarization, as competing communities with few shared values contribute to divisions. It also analyzes the formation and ideologies of the People's Alliance and the Nation Alliance, the two major blocs involved in the 2023 elections, providing insights into their visions for Turkey. Last, the article scrutinizes the cult of the strongman, the widespread use of nationalism and religion, the utilization of state resources by Erdoğan's administration, and the influence of media—largely controlled by Erdoğan—on public opinion. This includes investigating the impact of alternative truths and narratives on the electoral process. The analysis highlights the deep-rooted moral bankruptcy Turkey faces in the third decade of Erdoğan's rule.     

Between anti-westernism and development: political Islam and environmentalism

As Turkey's Gezi Park protests reminded us, Islamist parties the world over demonstrate utter disregard of the environment in their discourse and actions. However, Islam as a religion places strong emphasis on environmental protection. Thus, as the representatives of Islam that these parties claim themselves to be, it is puzzling that environmental policy is all but absent from most Islamist platforms. I ask, what explains the poverty of Islamists in regards to the environment? I argue that the reason for this poverty is found within and conforms to political Islam's problematic relationship with modernity, particularly in regards to their strong anti-western sentiment and self-purported victim status. My findings suggest that the inattention Islamists give to the environment is due to their association of environmentalism with the West and because of the uniquely unfavourable socio-economic environments in which they exist, which sends environmentalism to the purview of ‘low politics’. This analysis points to an inherent weakness in Islamist ideology – their lack of pragmatic policy. Hence, the peculiar case of Islamists and the environment is but a symptom of a larger issue within Islamism and can be a key element to understanding why and how Islamism is likely to fail.     

Secularizing Islamism and Islamizing Democracy: The Political and Ideational Evolution of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers 1984–2012

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) emerged in Egypt in the early twentieth century to resist secularism and political pluralism in favour of religious revival and a unitary Islamic state. After three decades of political participation culminating in its formation of a government in Egypt, the MB has prioritized electoral paths to power, while claiming to defend individual rights, popular majorities and a civil state. Nevertheless, the MB's discourse continues to straddle religious and secular terrain: in recent election campaigns, MB leaders promised to build an ‘Islamic state’ and a ‘caliphate’, all the while insisting that the people, not God are the source of all power. What explains these contradictions, and what do they tell us about the Brotherhood's apparent adoption of political and ideational pluralism and democratic values? The article contends that the MB's ambivalence about democracy is not a sign of dissimulation or lack of ideological evolution. Instead, it has its roots in a 30-year process of partially adapting to democratic and ‘secular’ political ideas by reframing them in religious terms which, however, resulted in creating what the article discusses as a hybrid ‘secularized’ Islamism. This hybridization has both enabled and constrained the Brothers' adaptation to democracy in the post-Mubarak period.     

Taqrib al-Madhahib – Qaradawi's Declaration of Principles Regarding Sunni–Shi‛i Ecumenism

This article discusses the Centrist (Wassatiyya) position regarding Sunni–Shi?a relations, as articulated by the head of this stream, Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Because Centrists deem themselves the ideological heirs of Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, analysis of their position is also instructive of the Brotherhood's view on this important issue. The discussion is founded on al-Qaradawi's ‘Principles for Sunni–Shi?i Dialogue’, which derive historically from the Society for Reconciliation (Jama?at al-Taqrib) that was active in Egypt during the late 1940s. Centrists hold Shi?ites to be religious innovators (mubtadi?un), but not infidels, from which it follows in their view that Sunna and Shi?a divide over ‘branches of religion’, but not over ‘roots of faith’. In this the Centrists are completely opposed by the Salafi Jihadi ideology, the ideological underpinning of the modern Global Jihad. With the desire to reconcile Sunna and Shi?a and unite them against a common global enemy, the Centrists must resolve the inevitable sectarian tensions as they crop up, e.g. the Sunni accusation that the Shi?a seek to actively proselytize the Sunni faithful in Sunni majority countries. In the Centrist view, Sunni–Shi?i reconciliation and dialogue are of practical necessity as regional politics diverge dangerously into a definite Shi?a bloc led by Iran, and a clear-cut Sunni bloc led by Saudi Arabia.     

Hide and seek? Israeli–Turkish relations and the Baghdad pact

The aim of this article is to address the impact of the Baghdad Pact and the Anglo-American defense system and its collapse on the Turkish–Israeli relationship from 1954 to 1958, a discussion that is absent from scholarly studies. The article will highlight the different approaches and views of the two parties and their impact on the cold war alliances and the Arab–Israeli conflict. Examining this from the perspectives of both Ankara and Jerusalem will contribute to a comprehensive study of the bilateral relations during the 1950s. Some of the main questions to be addressed are: to what extent, if at all, did the Baghdad Pact change bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel? What were Israel's main concerns? Were its suspicions of Turkey's changing policy founded? How much was Turkey influenced by Iraq's membership of the Pact and its hostile attitude toward Israel? Was Turkey's attempt to maintain reasonable relations with both Israel and Iraq a realistic aim? All these will be assessed against regional upheavals and the cold war politics with current implications.     

Regime Consolidation and Female Status in a Fledgling Theocracy: Khomeini's Vilayet-e-Fiqh, 1979–89

The Iranian Revolution, through Khomeini's consolidation measures, quickly morphed into an ‘Islamic Revolution’. Khomeini's regime abrogated popular legislation such as the Family Protection Laws of 1967 and 1975, which protected the rights of females, as the clerics sought to institute Shariah (Islamic) laws in an ‘Islamic Republic’. The historical record reveals that the precipitous legal transformation from secular to Shariah law under Ayatollah Khomeini's personal tutelage placed females in a dangerous predicament. Regressive gender policies, however, served to mobilize females to push back against the new social paradigm which had emerged under the rubric of Velayat-e-Fiqh. This article examines this misogynistic trajectory during Khomeini's rule and how it served to galvanize many Iranian women to ‘gender activism’.