Soviet Bloc and Western Bugging of Opponents’ Diplomatic Premises During the Early Cold War

This article examines Soviet Bloc and Western bugging of their opponents’ diplomatic premises in the early Cold War, from 1945 to the late 1960s. It explains the process of audio surveillance, identifies significant cases of bugging and describes the countermeasures taken by Western states. The paper concludes that the Soviet Union was able to gather a considerable amount of intelligence from bugging Western embassies in Moscow during the early Cold War. In particular, bugging enabled the Soviets to break the diplomatic ciphers of the United States, Britain and West Germany.     

German Federalism in Historical Perspective: Federalism as a Substitute for a National State

A German national state was founded comparatively late in themodern era. In 1871 the German princes formed the German Empire.Unde Prussian hegemony, the Empire remained dependent on itsmember states. The constitution of the Weimer Republic of 1919turned the relations between the federation and the states upsidedown. The Länder, as the constituent states close to beinga decentralized unitary state. The Nazi regime centralizd it.After World War II, the West Germans and the Western Alliesagreed on forming a federal type of government. There was, however,controversy about the kind of federalism to be established.The West German Basic Law retained the tradition of a secondfederal parliamentary chamber in which the Land governmentsare represented. Sovereignty is shared and exercised jointlyby the federation and the Länder in most domestic policyfields.     

‘Gross inefficiency and criminal negligence’: the Services Reconnaissance Department in Timor in 1943–45 and the Darwin war crimes trials in 1946

The post-World War II Australian military war crimes trials of Japanese from 1945–51 have been criticised for using a rule of evidence considerably relaxed from the ordinary requirements of a criminal trial, one that did not require witnesses to give evidence in person. Circumstantial evidence suggests that, in relation to a trial held in Darwin in March 1946 for war crimes committed in Timor, the secretive Special Operations Australia, otherwise known as the Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD), took advantage of the rule. This article argues that the SRD did not allow their members to give evidence in person in an attempt to control and limit the dissemination of information about their operational and security failures in Timor from 1943–45. The SRD operation was adjudged by its own official historian as displaying ‘gross inefficiency and criminal negligence’. While the SRD’s failures were known to select personnel at the time, access restrictions to archival records in the post-war period, including the war crimes trials, meant that the extent of its failures and how it appeared to manage knowledge of them has not been widely known.     

Contours of Memory in Post-Nazi Austria

Knight discusses both domestic and foreign aspects of the post-war Austrian 'landscape of memory', going back to the Anschluss and the antisemitic violence that followed it. In the years after 1945 this memory was sidelined, first by the West in the interests of the Cold War and then by the Soviet Union, although it has persisted in a subterranean sort of way. Since the 'Waldheim affair' it has surfaced to join a new international politics of sensibility about the Holocaust and related issues. Austria started in 1945 from a position similar to that of Germany but thereafter took a different course in respect of the 'national question' and the creation of a governing party coalition. Paradoxically, at a time when Austria has ceased to be exempt from scrutiny, sections of its society have become more sensitive about the magnitude of Nazi crimes than they ever were before.     

Entering the Lists: MI5's great spy round-up of August 1914

One of the most famous successes of the British Security Service, popularly known as MI5, was its great spy round-up of August 1914. According to all previous histories, official and unofficial, Vernon Kell, the first head of MI5, masterminded the arrest of 21 out of the 22 German agents working in Britain, crippling the German intelligence network within hours of the outbreak of the First World War. The event is still celebrated by MI5, but a careful study of the recently-opened records shows it to be a complete fabrication. This article examines the six surviving lists of suspects to show how and why MI5 created and perpetuated this remarkable lie.     

Seeing things differently: contrasting narratives of British and German photographic intelligence during the Second World War

This study examines Anglo-American narratives of British and German photographic intelligence (PI) in Europe during the Second World War. According to these narratives, Germany relegated PI to tactical and operational applications; by contrast, Britain performed these same functions but also made strategic use of the discipline. This paper reevaluates how British and German PI actually differed. It further examines whether each side’s successes and failures were within the ‘agency of agencies’ – how much did PI successes and failures directly result from intelligence organizations’ choices and actions? Finally, this paper identifies implications of these narratives for comparative intelligence studies and historiography.     

In search of reliable results: Socialist values and political trust in unified Germany – A comment on Campbell's analyses and conclusions

In a recently published article in this journal, Ross Campbell argues that adherence to socialist values establishes a hitherto neglected factor when it comes to the explanation of differences in East and West German citizens’ political trust. As the results of his study indicate, adherence to socialist values impacts negatively on citizens’ political trust, this effect is more pronounced and more stable over time for East German as compared to West German citizens and is sufficiently strong to eliminate aggregate‐level differences in political trust between East and West Germany. However, this research note suggests that Campbell's article contains several substantial inconsistencies and obscurities that question the reliability and validity of the empirical findings presented. It provides a re‐analysis of Campbell's main arguments and shows to what extent his initial conclusions can be upheld after the shortcomings have been remedied. The results of this re‐analysis suggest that socialist values indeed exhibit a negative impact on German citizens’ political trust, which is relatively stronger for East as compared to West German citizens. However, contrary to Campbell's initial results, the negative effect of socialist values on political trust is robust over time for both East and West German citizens. What is more, there is no empirical evidence confirming that differences in adherence to socialist values between East and West German citizens are sufficiently strong to account for aggregate‐level differences in political trust. In light of these findings, two of Campbell's three main conclusions are dubious and call for further examination.     

Counter-Subversion in Early Cold War Britain: The Official Committee on Communism (Home), the Information Research Department,and ‘State-Private Networks’

This article applies the concepts of ‘transnationalism’ and ‘state-private networks’ to early Cold War Britain to analyze the aims and methods of governmental and non-governmental counter-subversion and propaganda in the ‘Cultural Cold War’. Using recently declassified and underutilized files, the article explores the roles of the Official Committee on Communism (Home) and, more particularly, the Foreign Office Information Research Department. The Attlee and Churchill administrations of the late 1940s and early 1950s increasingly perceived the primary non-military threat of communism to Britain as part of Soviet-inspired transnational subversion of western European societies. This created a growing impetus for a symmetrical, transnational response through both domestic and foreign clandestine ‘indoctrination’ campaigns operating via influential non-state British institutions. Despite constitutional concerns still relevant today, in 1951 ministers endorsed the domestic component of this response as a fully-fledged strategy that would encourage greater state intervention in British society in the Cold War struggle for both liberty and security.     

British Intelligence and the Mandate of Palestine: Threats to British National Security Immediately After the Second World War

Recently declassified Security Service (MI5) records reveal, for the first time, the full extent of the threat that Zionist terrorism posed to British national security immediately after the Second World War. It is well established within the historical literature that after 1945 Britain faced violent campaigns by Jewish terrorist groups in the Mandate of Palestine. Hitherto unacknowledged in the historiography, however, is the fact that the threat of Zionist terrorism extended from Palestine to Britain itself. This article studies the nature of the threat posed by Zionist terrorism within Britain after 1945, and explores the counter-terrorist measures that MI5 devised to meet it. Overall, as this article shows, MI5's concerns with Zionist terrorism after 1945 offer a striking new interpretation of the history of the early Cold War.     

The Reckoning: Official Inquiries and the Iraq War

The moral and political reverberations of the Iraq War of 2003 are still being felt all over the world. In the belligerent democracies of the West, official inquiries of all kinds and conditions have probed and exposed the nature of government, the reflexes of the national security state, and, most extraordinarily, the sensitive relations between rulers and intelligencers. For all parties the consequences have been severe. Focusing on Britain, and especially on the inquiries led by Lord Hutton and Lord Butler - an odd couple but a revelatory combination - this article takes stock of the reckoning.     

Reparations for Historical Human Rights Violations: The International and Historical Dimensions of the Alien Torts Claims Act Genocide Case of the Herero of Namibia

Between 1904 and 1908, German colonialists in German South West Africa (GSWA, known today as Namibia) committed genocide and other international crimes against two indigenous groups, the Herero and the Nama. From the late 1990s, the Herero have sought reparations from the German government and several German corporations for what occurred more than a hundred years ago. This article examines and contextualizes the issues concerning reparations for historical human rights claims. It describes and analyzes the events in GSWA at the time. It further explores whether international humanitarian law and international human rights law today permit reparatations to be obtained. The article therefore examines the origins of international criminal law, as well as international human rights and humanitarian law, to determine whether what occurred then were violations of the law already in force. Finally, the article examines and evaluates the Herero reparations cases, as well as the potential impact of the cases on the wider reparations movement that sees an increasing number of claims for events that occurred during colonial times.

The German intelligence estimates in the west, 1885–1914

Little has been known of German intelligence estimates prior to the First World War. The recent discovery of several German intelligence documents, including a classified history of German pre-war intelligence operations which was written during the inter-war period, in addition to some important German pre-war intelligence analysis, now gives considerable insight into the German intelligence estimates as well as their relationship to German war planning from 1885 to 1914.     

Myth or Reality? The Red Hand and French Covert Action in Federal Germany during the Algerian War, 1956–61

During the Algerian war of independence (1954–62), Federal Germany became the theatre of a series of unexplained bombings and shootings that targeted Algerian nationalists and German arms dealers. At the time, these crimes were attributed to the Red Hand, a counter-terrorist organization or parallel secret service with a mission to defeat the enemies of l’Algérie française. This article argues that the attacks on West German territory were executed neither by vigilantes nor by renegade agents. Instead, they were carried out by the French foreign intelligence service SDECE with the full approval of the highest political authorities in Paris. Using the case of Federal Germany as an example, this article seeks to reveal how and why covert action – including state-sanctioned murder – became an integral and important part of the Algerian war, particularly of France's campaign to undermine the Algerian rebels' efforts to procure military and non-military supplies. The article will show that the Red Hand served merely as a cover to detract from the state's resort to such violent and criminal means.     

From the horse's mouth: Luftwaffe POWs as sources for air ministry intelligence during the battle of Britain

British military intelligence as derived from the interrogation of prisoners‐of‐war (POWs) during the Second World War has been under‐valued by historians, whose attention has focused primarily on signals intelligence. While Sigint, in particular Ultra, was of undoubted value, Britain's armed services nevertheless attached much credence to POW‐derived intelligence, and by the war's end an abundance of information had been gleaned from the half a million plus Axis prisoners by then held in Britain. This article will examine the work of the Air Ministry Intelligence section known as AI1(K), which was responsible for POW interrogation, during the Battle of Britain, and attempt to illustrate both the wealth and value of such intelligence at a time when Ultra was still in its infancy.     

Roger Hesketh and the de Guingand letter

Historians have long questioned the extent to which British Intelligence knew about Japan's impending operations on the eve of the Pacific War. An examination of archival sources from Britain, Canada and the United States, as well as credible post-war testimony from former participants in Second World War intelligence operations, produces several conclusions. Throughout 1941, British Intelligence pointed to a war with Japan in South-East Asia. On the eve of the Pacific War, intelligence staff of the British Commonwealth monitored the vast expanses of the North Pacific. Apart from anticipating conflict in South-East Asia, British Intelligence, according to some sources, also suspected that a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent, an assessment shared with the United States.     

Britain Betwixt and Between: Uk SIGINT Alliance Strategy's Transatlantic and European Connections

Intelligence alliances are among the most intimate and enduring international security relationships. International partnerships have proven to be especially relevant to signals intelligence (SIGINT), where collaboration among allies has been crucial for extending the range and scope of geographic coverage. One of the earliest and most enduring SIGINT alliances dates back to the Second World War, when Great Britain and the United States collaborated in intercepting German and Japanese electronic communications and shared the intelligence product. This Anglo-American wartime partnership subsequently evolved and expanded during the post-war and Cold War eras, and continues up to the present as the core of a wider plurilateral SIGINT alliance involving Australia, Canada and New Zealand as well. Britain's accession to the European Communities, now the European Union (EU), did not, at first, detract from its transatlantic intelligence connection. By the late 1990s, however, European partners had begun to challenge Britain's alliance strategy for SIGINT, in particular, out of heightened concern for their own communications security and in response to the increasing salience of economic intelligence in contemporary international affairs. British statecraft now found itself confronted by mounting pressure from EU partners to reorient the UK intelligence away from its long-standing transatlantic SIGINT connection, so as to undermine American reach and also promote a potentially competing European capability to achieve global coverage in signals intelligence collection. While the 2003 war against Iraq certainly consolidated the trans-Atlantic alliance between the UK and USA, while alienating the Americans from the so-called 'Old Europe' led by France and Germany, the longer term spin-offs from that conflict seem likely to exacerbate those pressures on British intelligence strategy.     

Bletchley Park and the RAF Y Service: Some Recollections

The RAF Y Service and the German Air Section at Bletchley Park collaborated in producing a great deal of intelligence about GAF (German Air Force) operations in World War II. However, two errors in pre-war planning reduced this output. The first error was the decision that the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) should be responsible solely for cryptography, the interpretation of Sigint to be the task of the Intelligence recipients. The second was the general assumption that the information obtainable from intercepting the low-grade codes and plain language used in the control of Air operations would only be of intelligence interest while the operations were in progress. After-the-event study of these communications by the German Air Section produced unique information needed by the RAF Commands. The Air Ministry took an unduly long time to agree that this information should be provided to them.     

Nazi archaeology abroad: German prehistorians and the international dynamics of collaboration

Examining the work of German prehistoric archaeologists during the Third Reich reveals the importance of international scholarship in understanding how and why professional academics collaborated with the Nazi regime. Hare's article focuses on a specific cohort of German prehistorians at the University of Kiel and the Schleswig-Holstein Museum of Antiquities whose work was especially valued by Nazi ideologues. Through a study of their correspondence with colleagues at home and abroad, it identifies four key ways in which the international academic sphere informed collaboration at home, including the demands of foreign networks, the politics of cross-border projects and conferences, concerns about the reputation of German academia and the involvement of German archaeologists in occupied countries during the Second World War. Ultimately, this case study of Kiel archaeologists working during the 1930s and 1940s shows that engagement on the international level led both German and foreign scholars to make accommodations with the regime, but also at times led away from Nazi goals and provided a foundation for rebuilding the discipline after 1945.     

The decontamination of German history: Jürgen Habermas and the ‘Historikerstreit’ in West Germany

The ‘Historikerstreit’ in West Germany was opened by the non-historian Habermas who sought to expose what he saw as a ‘scandalous’ revision of aspects of the history of German fascism on the part of leading conservative historians like Nolte, Hillgruber and Stürmer. Habermas sees this revisionism in the wider context of the perceived need to foster a new German nationalism as a means of legitimation. The attempt to decontaminate German history would seem to derive from the need to resist the demands for political realignment in West Germany and to establish a strong pedigree of German anti-communism which takes in National Socialism and its membership of the Anti-Comintern Pact as well as West Germany's membership of NATO. Habermas's critique of conservative historians and the non-rational assumptions of their philosophy of history is essentially linked to his critique of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault and his identification of a common paralyzing influence on discourse.     

Radio-Intercepts,Reconnaissance and Raids: French Operational Intelligence and Communications in 1940

Mentioned in memoirs by a few former military intelligence officers, operational intelligence has had little attention in academic writing on the Second World War before Ultra's decisive contributions began in 1941–2. Especially neglected has been the fighting provoked by the German offensive in 1940 that cleaved through France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg and drove Britain off the Continent. This article tackles this gap, analysing the military intelligence/military operations interface on the French side. It assesses the contributions and shortcomings of radio-intercept intelligence, along with intelligence-gathering by air and ground reconnaissance (demonstrating that German air superiority imposed a ‘battle blindness’ on Allied commanders wanting intelligence on approach marches and formation switches more than a dozen kilometres into the German rear). It reveals that frontline infantry raiding – redolent of intelligence-gathering techniques familiar to veterans of 1914–18 trench warfare – was again widely employed. This proved a highly effective recourse, particularly during the positional battles on the Somme, Aisne and Oise in June 1940, filling intelligence gaps left by more technologically sophisticated but more fragile sources. The factors that kept formations fighting so as to inflict significant delays and heavy losses on the German assaults were robust communications networks (to convey operational intelligence fast enough to permit counter-manoeuvres based on it), and the preservation of French chains of command and control. When these key nodes collapsed, preventing the hard-won operational intelligence being deployed to coordinate French military resistance, the latter declined into a series of disjointed, directionless and unavailing acts of courage that could not exploit the several instances during the campaign when the Germans, too, were afflicted by battle fatigue, re-supply bottlenecks and morale wobbles.