Britain Betwixt and Between: Uk SIGINT Alliance Strategy's Transatlantic and European Connections

Intelligence alliances are among the most intimate and enduring international security relationships. International partnerships have proven to be especially relevant to signals intelligence (SIGINT), where collaboration among allies has been crucial for extending the range and scope of geographic coverage. One of the earliest and most enduring SIGINT alliances dates back to the Second World War, when Great Britain and the United States collaborated in intercepting German and Japanese electronic communications and shared the intelligence product. This Anglo-American wartime partnership subsequently evolved and expanded during the post-war and Cold War eras, and continues up to the present as the core of a wider plurilateral SIGINT alliance involving Australia, Canada and New Zealand as well. Britain's accession to the European Communities, now the European Union (EU), did not, at first, detract from its transatlantic intelligence connection. By the late 1990s, however, European partners had begun to challenge Britain's alliance strategy for SIGINT, in particular, out of heightened concern for their own communications security and in response to the increasing salience of economic intelligence in contemporary international affairs. British statecraft now found itself confronted by mounting pressure from EU partners to reorient the UK intelligence away from its long-standing transatlantic SIGINT connection, so as to undermine American reach and also promote a potentially competing European capability to achieve global coverage in signals intelligence collection. While the 2003 war against Iraq certainly consolidated the trans-Atlantic alliance between the UK and USA, while alienating the Americans from the so-called 'Old Europe' led by France and Germany, the longer term spin-offs from that conflict seem likely to exacerbate those pressures on British intelligence strategy.     

Shifting borders: Islamophobia as common ground for building pan-European right-wing unity

ABSTRACT

In recent years, Islamophobia has become a useful tool for right-wing parties to mobilize electors in many European nation-states. The general xenophobic campaigns of the 1980s have given way to Islamophobia as a specific expression of racism. It is not only the new incarnations of right-wing populist parties that are making use of Islamophobic populism, but also right-wing extremist parties, whose traditions hark back to fascist or Nazi parties. This development appears unsurprising, as Islamophobia has somehow become a kind of ‘accepted racism’, found not only on the margins of European societies but also at the centre. Another interesting concomitant shift is the attempt by such parties to gain wider acceptance in mainstream societies by distancing themselves from a former antisemitic profile. While the main focus on an exclusive identity politics in the frame of nation-states previously divided the far right and complicated transnational cooperation, a shared Islamophobia has the potential to be a common ground for strengthening the transnational links of right-wing parties. This shift from antisemitism to Islamophobia goes beyond European borders and enables Europe's far right to connect to Israeli parties and the far right in the United States. Hafez's article explores this thesis by analysing the European Alliance for Freedom, a pan-European alliance of far-right members of the European parliament that has brought various formerly antagonistic parties together through a common anti-Muslim programme, and is trying to become a formal European parliamentary fraction in the wake of its victory in the European elections in May 2014.     

China and Europe: engagement,multipolarity and strategy

Abstract

Ever closer relations between China and Europe over the last decade have sparked speculation about an emerging axis or balance of power vis-à-vis the United States. China, the European Union and its key member states have expressed a preference for a more balanced international order based on multilateral institutions. Despite a rapid and extensive expansion in economic and political relations between China and the European Union, there is no evidence for balancing against the United States in strategic areas. Rather, the variations in the positions of China, the European Union and the United States can more accurately be seen as policy or interest bargaining. Because the European Union does not share US security interests in the Asia-Pacific region, the European Union and its key member states can seem at variance with the US position on China. Bargaining over the failed attempt to lift the European Union's arms embargo against China shows that the European Union and the United States are not so far apart on strategic issues in the Asia-Pacific.     

Towards a post-ethnic Europe

Martiniello looks at the ethnic and post-ethnic identities that are being created, reproduced and asserted in the European Union, and how they are linked to ideas about citizenship and belonging in a new type of political society that might be called a 'non-state'. His discussion falls into two parts. First, he presents a critical view of European culture, identity and citizenship as they are now, for the most part, conceived. He then briefly presents David Hollinger's view of post-ethnicity in the United States, and tries to see what we can learn from it for a European context. In conclusion, he claims that the post-ethnic perspective is a rich and normative one that can help us to envision a future democratic, multicultural and open Europe     

Antisemitic Europe and the ‘Third Way’: The Ideas of Maurice Bardèche

Abstract

Maurice Bardèche is an important neo-fascist writer whose ideas derive from those of Pierre Drieu la Rochelle and Robert Brasillach. After 1945 he argued that right-wing thought had been ghettoized and even imprisoned by a post-Nuremberg liberal political establishment. In the face of a US military and cultural occupation of Western Europe and an encroaching Communist Soviet menace, Bardèche argued for a united European ‘third force’ to confront these two enemies. His dream was of a fascist-ruled Europe that would regenerate and defend the continent and the West against Communism and liberalism. Organic and idealist fascist states, without the faults of Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Italy, would implement a moral revolution, bolster economic affairs and prevent Europe being swamped by foreign goods, such as Asian electronics. He regretted Europe's membership of NATO and its being sucked into Cold War conflicts in the Middle East and in support of Israel. Europe's and fascism's enemies were blamed for all their ills, and a Jewish conspiracy was blamed for its campaign against the world whether in the guise of US financial power or through its control of Bolshevism, the latter being judged responsible for terrorism and subversion in the developing world. Bardèche was purely a warrior of the pen, and was important primarily for providing a link between fascism and neo-fascism and a training ground for new fascist writers in his journal Défense de l'Occident.     

Magnetic law: Designing environmental enforcement laws to encourage us to go further

The European Union has some of the world's most ambitious and highly developed environmental laws on its books, but their effectiveness is severely compromised by non-compliance. With the UNECE Aarhus Convention (1998), Europe launched an innovative legal experiment, democratizing environmental enforcement by conferring third party citizens and environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) with legal rights of access to environmental information, public participation, and access to justice in environmental matters. Based on some 2000 surveys and over 150 interviews with stakeholders from three Member States – France, Ireland, and the Netherlands – we adopt a holistic, 360° perspective, capturing the views of regulated parties, NGOs, and the general public on this private governance experiment. Our data provide important new insights into the practical effectiveness of Europe's laws enabling private environmental enforcement, its (intended and unintended) effects on farmers' compliance decisions in the vital area of nature conservation, and how law might be used to stimulate pro-environmental predispositions.     

Japan and the Kyoto Protocol: reconstructing ‘proactive’ identity through environmental multilateralism

The aim of this article is to interpret Tokyo's pivotal role in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations as a practice of reconstructing Japan's identity of an ‘international’ and ‘independent’ country. The text bases this argument in poststructural national identity scholarship, which believes that discursive differentiation to international forces (‘others’) plays a decisive role in formulating state's identity. For most parts of the post-war history, United States served as the most significant other for Japan's self construction. Japan narrated itself as a ‘weak’ and ‘subservient’ country dominated by the ‘dominant’ West. This narrative, however, has been significantly altered after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Japan's identity entrepreneurs began describing Japan as an ‘independent’ or ‘normal’ country, one that proactively contributes to world affairs. Tokyo's legitimization of the Kyoto Protocol was in line with this identity reconstruction. The image of a proactive environmental leader created a symbol of Kyoto that overshadowed the opponents of the Protocol, and lead Japan to ratify it albeit the United States chose to withdraw from it. Once the ratification was over, however, the practical implementation failed to comply with Japan's symbolic commitment.     

The role of civil society in European integration

This paper explores the concept of ‘civic society’ in Western political thought, charting the changing understanding of this concept through history and its manifestation in contemporary political and social life. The paper draws out the inferences for our understanding of the role of government, particularly with the European Union and its relationship with citizens and other representative community‐based and non‐governmental organisations. The paper argues that the fundamental values that are central to civic society underpin the proposed EU Charter on Fundamental Rights and maintains that effective European integration requires responsible participation by Europe's citizens. Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

Japan's policy on steel trade disputes with the United States: a comparative analysis

Abstract

This article examines interactions among the United States, Japan and the European Union over steel trade disputes with particular interest in Japan's reactions to the disputes. For this objective, this paper establishes an analytical framework that takes into account bilateral, international, and domestic factors in formulating a state's external policy and relations. It was found that the special relationship with the United States still impinged on Japan's reactions to steel trade disputes, but its influence has gradually declined. Moreover, growing familiarity with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and practices and collaboration with other countries enabled Tokyo to expand its policy options to handle steel trade conflicts with Washington. Significantly, Japan formally adopted seemingly bold measures to cope with the US steel safeguard action, but the measures’ substantial influence on the US government was limited compared with those adopted by the European Union. Weak policy coordination among ministries prevented Japan from formulating strategic and effective measures in managing steel trade disputes with the United States.     

European air combat capabilities

The United Kingdom electorate's unanticipated vote to leave the European Union risks worrying NATO allies about the UK's reliability as a defence partner at a time when Russian threats appear to be rising. To allay this concern, the British government could expand its customary multinational collaboration with European partners on defence aerospace projects, such as a new crewed combat aircraft.     

China's security agenda after the cold war

The end of the cold war has changed China's basic perception of world politics and its conception of national security. In the cold war era, Chinese leaders tended to view national security from the perspective of global balance of power and China's strategic relations with the two superpowers. It was in Beijing's security interests to maintain a comfortable position in a strategic triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States. When the Soviet Empire and the East European communist regimes collapsed, the structure of the postwar international system dissolved, and the old parameters for Beijing's security strategy disappeared. The Chinese leadership suddenly found itself in a totally new world in which China needed to reorient and redefine its security strategy on a new strategic axis.

Beijing's security strategy after the cold war is redefined by its domestic priorities, growing foreign economic relations, the new security environment in Asia, and concerns over territorial disputes. In a sense, the myopic conception of security based on war and peace is fading away. Beijing's thinking on national security becomes more inclusive, diverse, and complicated. The nature and intensity of external threats has changed. China's growing economic ties with the outside world have redirected Beijing's attention to economic interests and security. The Chinese leadership realizes that its security is affected not only by the military forces of other countries, but also by political, economic, societal, and environmental factors in international relations Beijing needs to employ both traditional military defence and non‐military actions to safeguard its territorial integrity and to realize its full capacity in world affairs.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse China's security agendas after the cold war. It first examines the impact of the end of the cold war on China's thinking on national security, then discusses Beijing's threat perception and changing defence strategy. This is followed by an examination of domestic stability considerations and economic interests in Beijing's security strategy. Finally, it discusses the implications of China's growing power for regional security.     

TOWARDS “UNITY IN DIVERSITY” IN EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT AID THROUGH DONOR HARMONIZATION AND DECENTRALIZED COOPERATION? A CASE STUDY OF FLANDERS AND BELGIUM

Official donors have over the past decade pledged to enhance aid effectiveness by improving donor harmonization. To this effect, the European Union (EU) launched initiatives on a division of labor among its Member States. At the same time, the EU encourages Europe's subnational authorities to engage in their own development cooperation. This however seems to undermine the same harmonization effort. Belgium, characterized by multiple levels of government, illustrates that these two approaches to aid effectiveness—collective division of labor at the national level and decentralized cooperation at lower levels—are only partially compatible. In partner countries where both the federal Belgian and regional Flemish governments are active donors, Belgium's composite aid is poorly harmonized. A principal–agent framework helps to explain such selfish positioning. This article argues that a higher degree of complementarity and harmonization among Belgium's various authorities is feasible, albeit in forms that are specific to recipient country and context. As both donors are not so much competing in aid supply policies but rather in terms of supply management, such technical arguments may assist in lessening the political pressure to selfishly emphasize diversity over unity. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preparing for Armageddon: Jic 1 (Final) and the Soviet Attack on Canada

From 1945 to 1947 Canada shifted from a dependency on Great Britain for wartime operational intelligence to a junior partnership with the United States in the production of strategic threat assessments of the Soviet Union. Working through the Military Cooperation Committee the primary objective of Canadian and American officials was to update the wartime Defence Plan (ABC-22), with a Basic Security Plan for the post-war defence of North America. Each country was to produce a detailed 'Implementation' based on an intelligence 'Appreciation' of the threats facing North America in the 'air-atomic age'. Towards this end, the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee prepared JIC 1 (Final), a report on when, where, and in what capacity the Soviet Union would strike Canada in the event of the next major war. The basic problem facing the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee was to incorporate American sources in the assessment of Soviet capabilities without simply producing a carbon copy version of the assessment of their continental ally. Moreover, the Canadians were particularly concerned that they produce a 'made in Canada' assessment of Soviet intentions. The report was completed and approved by Canadian and American defence officials in 1947 and updated versions became the basis for continental defence planning until the signing of the 1957 Norad agreement.     

GPS vs Galileo: Balancing for Position in Space

ABSTRACT

This study comprises an investigation of Europe's motives to develop the independent satellite navigation system known as Galileo, despite the existence of America's successful – and freely available – Global Positioning System (GPS). The study begins with an analysis of both systems to familiarize the reader with global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), to provide an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of GPS and Galileo, and to highlight the systems' similarities and differences. Although the two systems have different founding principles, they employ similar infrastructures and operational concepts. In the short term, however, Galileo will provide better accuracy for civilian users, at least until GPS upgrades take effect. But performance is only part of the rationale. The author contends that Europe's pursuit of Galileo represents a desire for enhanced performance and independence, as well as an economic incentive. With Galileo, Europe hopes to achieve political, security and technological independence from the United States. Additionally, Europe envisions overcoming the US monopoly on GNSS by seizing a sizable share of the expanding GNSS market and setting a new world standard for satellite navigation. Finally, the author explores Galileo's impact on the United States and reviews US policy towards Galileo. The article concludes with recommendations to strengthen the competitiveness of GPS.     

‘The battlefield is in Brussels’: Islamophobia in the Visegrád Four in its global context

ABSTRACT

A common popular and scholarly opinion of Islamophobia in the so-called ‘Visegrád Four’ or ‘V4’ (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) sees it as caused by circumstances unique to Eastern Europe. Specifically to blame, it is alleged, is a distinctive local history of intolerance, especially antisemitism, and the fact that under socialism these countries were exempt from the post-war soul-searching that took place in Western Europe. Kalmar’s paper, instead, decentres Islamophobia in the V4 by considering it less as a limited regional phenomenon, and more in terms of how it is linked to Islamophobia in other European Union member states and the United States. As elsewhere, foremost among the conditions that encourage Islamophobia in the V4 is the alienation of certain publics on the periphery, which is an effect of global neoliberal policies. These have generated, along with Islamism and Islamophobia, a reinvented, essentializing discourse of difference between Eastern and Western Europe. In spite of that alleged difference, however, Islamophobic populism in the V4 is not just a regional threat to liberal democracy, but targets all of the European Union and the world.     

Reflections on Leadership: Jean‐Jacques Dordain of the European Space Agency

In 2015, Jean‐Jacques Dordain retired as director general of the European Space Agency (ESA). This is Europe's NASA and includes a host of sovereign nations that differ in language, culture, economics, and politics. As ESA’s director general, Dordain pulled together a disparate and often quarreling group of countries and got them moving in the same direction. Billions of dollars were involved in a sequence of large‐scale, complex spaceflights. Successes far surpassed failures. Dordain stated that if there is one area of administration about which ESA could teach the world, it is “that of international cooperation. Very simple—it's because ESA is an institutional cooperation venture.” In this Administrative Profile, Dordain comments on the issues he faced in guiding European cooperation as well as relations with the United States and other countries.     

Claims to legitimacy count: Why sanctions fail to instigate democratisation in authoritarian regimes

International sanctions are one of the most commonly used tools to instigate democratisation in the post‐Cold War era. However, despite long‐term sanction pressure by the European Union, the United States and/or the United Nations, non‐democratic rule has proven to be extremely persistent. Which domestic and international factors account for the regimes' ability to resist external pressure? Based on a new global dataset on sanctions from 1990 to 2011, the results of a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) provide new insights for the research on sanctions and on authoritarian regimes. Most significantly, sanctions strengthen authoritarian rule if the regime manages to incorporate their existence into its legitimation strategy. Such an unintended ‘rally‐round‐the‐flag’ effect occurs where sanctions are imposed on regimes that possess strong claims to legitimacy and have only limited economic and societal linkages to the sender of sanctions.     

Space and Security: The Emerging Role of Europe

Space systems have grown increasingly integral to the United States' national security in the post-Cold War era. The diplomatic and military leverage that space capabilities can provide is not going unnoticed by other countries. Since the collapse of the USSR, the United States has enjoyed a near-absolute dominance in space activities. Only the civilian European space program has mounted any sort of technical challenge to the United States, with little interest devoted to space military activities, but the period of US hegemony in the space military domain might come to an end. In recent years the European Union (EU) and its member states have taken numerous steps towards designing and assembling a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a coherent European Security and Defence Policy. Furthermore, several important steps toward linking security needs and space capabilities have been taken by the tandem European Union–European Space Agency and other relevant institutions. Space is now seen as an essential asset for European integration and for non-dependence in the current geo-strategic context, since space-based systems and derived information can bring necessary capabilities for autonomous decision making. The development of an integrated European space capability for security is at an early stage, but it is an ongoing process presenting some opportunities to enhance European independence and security.     

The UK Brexit vote and its potential strategic impact

The United Kingdom's 'Leave' camp is mounting a strident and emotive campaign for the UK's departure from the European Union, and has gained significant popular traction. 'Brexit' would pose serious economic and political risks to the UK and significantly diminish the EU's size and clout. The 'Remain' camp will need to work hard to mobilise voters and put across the EU's benefits more effectively to prevent Brexit.     

The new world [dis] order in the complexity of multi‐polarity: United States of America's hegemonic decline and the configuration of new power patterns

History tells us that the United States of America (US)'s hegemonic predomination materialized from a very long‐ideological battle and/ Cold War, sometimes referred to as the war of words lasted for about five decades from the mid‐1940s to 1989, and consequently stopped after the fragmentation of the Soviet Union Empire. Thus, in contemporary times, it is lamentably regrettable that USA has come to face oligopolistic challenge in the context of both political and economic dominion. The international system is slowly but surely experiencing the emergence of brand new political and economic power patterns vis‐à‐vis China, European Union (EU) and Brazil, Russian, India, China, South Africa (BRICS). In light of the aforementioned, this article assesses the symptoms of US hegemonic decline and how this helps shape the current global academic and/ scholarly debates on the strategic environment. Equally important is the adoption and application of Afrocentricity as the theoretical framework in the quest for ”relocation from the knowledge production margins” and the spirit of the anticipation of the DE‐colonial Political contemplation in South Africa's life‐time. As a theory, it is employed to answer the central question: Is it a reality or a myth that USA's dominion over the international system is coming to an end? Methodologically, this article relied on interdisciplinary discourse analysis and thematic content prevailing documents.