Retrospective Congressional Oversight and the Dynamics of Legislative Influence over the Bureaucracy

Research stresses that congressional committees increase their oversight of the bureaucracy during divided government. We extend this research by developing an explanation, rooted in a more dynamic view of policymaking, for why Congress would sometimes conduct vigorous oversight under unified control as well. In short, committees seem to engage in what we call “retrospective oversight” and take advantage of newly friendly executive administration to refocus existing policy made under a past opposition president. We assess our perspective using two separate sources of data on oversight hearings spanning more than 60 years and find support for our claims regarding retrospective oversight.     

Congressional Party Defection in American History

In this paper, we analyze the roll‐call voting behavior of House and Senate members who changed party affiliation during the course of their political careers. We analyze members who switched during the stable periods of the three major two‐party systems in American history: the Federalist‐Jeffersonian Republican system (3d to 12th Congresses), the Democratic‐Whig System (20th to 30th Congresses), and the Democratic‐Republican System (46th to 106th Congresses). Our primary findings are that the biggest changes in the roll‐call voting behavior of party defectors can be observed during periods of high ideological polarization and that party defections during the past 30 years are distinct from switches in other eras because of high polarization and the disappearance of a second dimension of ideological conflict.     

The Economic Sources of Congressional Approval

Abstract Models of congressional approval have, in both theory and specification, often imitated models of presidential approval. Through their modeling decisions, researchers have implicitly assumed that the economic determinants of presidential and congressional approval are identical. Such assumptions have discouraged other researchers from testing competing hypotheses about the economic determinants of congressional approval. Using aggregate‐level time‐series analysis, this study investigates the question of whether or not the economic determinants of approval vary by the target of political judgment. I find that presidential approval is driven largely by sociotropic prospections, a result consistent with previous research. In contrast, I find the public relies most heavily upon egocentric retrospections when judging the U.S. Congress.     

Presidential Campaigning in the 2002 Congressional Elections

Theories involving coattails, surge and decline, presidential popularity, and the economy ascribe little importance to presidential efforts to influence congressional elections. Since such efforts do occur, we ask: What happens when a president campaigns for fellow partisans? We examined President George W. Bush's decisions to campaign for certain House candidates in 2002, and we assessed the effect of his visits on Republicans' electoral successes. Both the competitiveness of a race and the president's electoral self‐interest increased the likelihood of a visit on behalf of a candidate. Neither party loyalty nor presidential support in Congress had an effect. We conclude that presidential campaign visits significantly enhance candidates' electoral prospects.     

Issue Voting and Partisan Defections in Congressional Elections

In every election cycle the fate of some candidates is determined by partisans who defect from their usual voting habits to cast a ballot for the candidate of the opposing party. Defections in congressional elections have been attributed to incumbency, presidential approval, partisan strength, and factors related to individual voters. Our systematic assessment of the impact of issues on voter defections shows that party‐owned issues and performance issues associated favorably with one party affect the likelihood of partisan defections. The results suggest that congressional candidates can use issues to draw supporters away from the opposing party and to keep partisan voters loyal.     

The Dynasty Advantage: Family Ties in Congressional Elections

Political dynasties, families in which multiple members have held elected office, commonly feature in the U.S. Congress. I explored the electoral origins of this phenomenon and determined that members of political dynasties have a significant advantage over first‐generation politicians in open‐seat House elections. Using an original dataset containing candidate‐ and district‐level covariates for all candidates in open‐seat House contests between 1994 and 2006, I found that dynastic politicians enjoy “brand name advantages,” giving them a significant edge over comparable nondynastic opponents. In contrast, hypotheses concerning potential advantages stemming from past political experience and fundraising ability yield null results.     

中国当代法学教育的两极化构想

中国的法学教育面对21世纪的挑战与机遇,明显地显现出其知识结构的缺陷。针对于此,在培养法学人才 方面,应区分法律精英教育和法律常识教育。法律精英教育高于法律本科教育,取消法律本科教育;法律常识教育主 要普及于中小学教育。这样,就可以适应我国当代社会的发展和建设法治国家的需要。     

Explaining Final Term Changes in US Congressional Foreign Travel

Recent scholarship demonstrates US legislators acquire human capital (that is, contacts, knowledge, and skills) in Congress that maximises post-elective earnings because they anticipate re-entering the labour market after leaving office. This literature has not, however, addressed how legislators’ expectations of entering specific professions affect their in-office activities. This article examines this question within the context of final term, employment-particular changes in House members’ foreign travel. Representatives entering the private sector are predicted to travel more in the last period to augment their human capital in foreign affairs and signal their expertise to prospective employers, while retiring legislators are expected to travel less because they lack incentives to maintain productivity levels. Analysis supports the former but not the latter prediction.     

The Use of Party Brand Labels in Congressional Election Campaigns

In spite of the centrality of partisanship to many theories of lawmaking, and the important role that party cues play in shaping voters' evaluations of political candidates, remarkably little is known about the circumstances under which congressional candidates use partisan symbols on the campaign trail. Employing data on candidates' televised advertisements over six elections (1998–2008), the present study explores the “supply side” of partisan cues and finds that candidates are strategic about their use of party symbols. And while personal and district‐level factors influence how candidates utilize partisan rhetoric, we show that the institutional context in which they campaign also matters.     

Political Bargaining and the Timing of Congressional Appropriations

Although Congress passes spending bills every year, there is great variation in the amount of time it takes. Drawing from rational models of bargaining, we identify factors that systematically affect the duration of legislative bargaining in the appropriations process. Analysis of spending bills for fiscal years 1977 to 2009 shows that delays are shorter when the ideological distance between pairs of key players decreases and distributive content is higher, but they are longer following an election. We find that congressional parties matter but that intraparty conflict matters as well, which suggests that Appropriations Committees retain significant autonomy in Congress.     

Congressional Performance,Incumbent Behavior,and Voting in Senate Elections

Conventional wisdom suggests that individual members of Congress have no real incentive to act in ways that might improve public evaluations of their collective body. In particular, the literature provides no clear evidence that public evaluations of Congress affect individual races for Congress, and little reason to expect that voters would hold specific individuals responsible for the institution's performance. We suggest that this conventional wisdom is incorrect. Using multiple state‐level exit polls of Senate voting conducted by Voter News Service in 1996 and 1998, we arrive at two key findings. First, we find that evaluations of Congress do have a significant effect on voting within individual U.S. Senate races across a wide variety of electoral contexts. Second, we find that punishments or rewards for congressional performance are not distributed equally across all members, or even across members of a particular party. Instead, we find that the degree to which citizens hold a senator accountable for congressional performance is significantly influenced by that senator's actual level of support for the majority party in Congress, as demonstrated on party votes.     

Congressional Elections in Presidential Years: Presidential Coattails and Strategic Voting

This article analyzes voting for Congress in presidential election years. The national Democratic vote for the House increases with the Democratic vote for president but decreases with the Democrats' perceived chances of winning the presidency (anticipatory balancing). The evidence for coattails and for balancing become visible only when statistically controlling for the other. The aggregate evidence for coattails and balancing in presidential years is reinforced by the analysis of National Election Studies (NES) survey respondents. That analysis shows that politically informed voters are more likely to vote for Congress against the party that they believe will win the presidency.     

Law and Its Rhetoric of Violence

This article explores the manner in which politico-legal language makes use of metaphors of violence and destruction in order to describe state/legal functions and actions. It argues that although such use of a militaristic hyperbole is generally regarded as normal and appropriate, it is in fact harmful in the way that it presents complex and specific problems as being simple and abstract. From a semiotic point of view, and using the work of Roland Barthes, law is regarded as a system of signs and ‘combative’ legal language can be seen as ideological manipulation through the technique of so-called second-level signification (myth). Although it is conceded that law, similar to all other interpretive systems, cannot avoid the use of metaphoric language, it is argued that we should resist regarding legal language as neutral and ‘natural’ and that we should rather retain the memory of legal concepts and categories as historical, man-made, and therefore always open to revision.     

诗性、修辞与法律价值预设——制度修辞研究之二

法律价值预设作为法律中提纲挈领、统领全局的内容,在法律作为"制度性修辞"的命题、判断和架构中,有着独特的分析意义。法律价值的抽象性、统领性,提供了诗性思维可以充分发挥作用的空间,同时,诗性思维也把法律价值预设结构在修辞世界。不论作为技术的修辞,还是作为本体的修辞,都对法律价值预设作为制度修辞起着论证作用。如果说法律和法治本身是一种制度性修辞,那么,通过法律价值预设能更好地证立这一判断。     

Class War in the Voting Booth: Bias Against High-Income Congressional Candidates

Do Americans care how much money congressional candidates earn? We conducted three experiments to examine how candidates' incomes affect voters' perceptions of the candidates' traits and ultimately their vote intention. Subjects evaluated otherwise identical candidates with annual incomes randomly varying between $75,000, $3 million, and a candidate with no income information provided. Results from the three experiments are remarkably similar. Subjects viewed the $3 million earner as significantly more intelligent than the candidate with no income information provided, but this benefit of high income was overshadowed by significant biases against the $3 million candidate. Subjects consistently viewed the $3 million earner as less honest, less caring, and less representative of them than the other candidates. Ultimately, subjects were less likely to say they would vote for the $3 million candidate. These findings demonstrate that the campaign advantages that high-income candidates enjoy are somewhat offset by voters' initial bias against them.     

Informal politics: the role of Congressional letters in legislative behaviour and careers

Members of the United States Congress are cross-pressured by constituents, party leaders, the president, and even by their own career goals. Yet, they are limited in their time and resources, and must maximise the tools available to them. Given that Congressional letter writing to the president as a tool available to all members occurs so widely, such behaviour informs a deeper understanding of how legislators seek to professionalise as politicians in competitive national politics. Utilising a data set of nearly 13,000 Congressional letters across eight Congresses, the author finds that letter writers systematically differ from non-letter writers, shedding light on the value of letter writing in Congressional behaviour and career aspirations, as well as the drivers behind this form of behaviour. Letter content varies based on the institutional and individual characteristics of the letter writer, suggesting members differ in how they view and use this tool.     

The Rhetoric and Practice of Community Corrections in China

Over the last decade, community corrections in China has operated as an intermediate sanction in response to a growing prison population. Official policy describes this punishment as an alternative to prison, focusing on risk assessment, correctional treatment, and cognitive-behavioral therapies that have been adopted in a number of Western countries. Based on interviews with community corrections officials in Shanghai, this article examines the rhetorical and practical characteristics of this new punishment and, more specifically, considers the consistencies and discrepancies between official policy and its practical implementation. It argues that, despite official policy, community corrections in China is underpinned by intensive correctional supervision that is premised on control, surveillance, and education.     

社会变迁中的法律修辞变化

法律与修辞之间有着密切的联系。通过对法律修辞的历史加以考察,可以发现,传统社会中的法律修辞侧重于文学性的积极修辞,现代社会中的法律修辞则以理性化的消极修辞为主,与推理论证结合得更加紧密。这种修辞风格的变化,反映的是社会变迁中社会分工的专业化。而社会分工的专业化与决策过程的民主化并存于现代社会之中,使得不同修辞风格之间存在着竞争。这种竞争的更深层背景是权力的竞争。