PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER EC COMPETITION LAW: ANOTHER ANTITRUST DOCTRINE IN SEARCH OF LIMITING PRINCIPLES?

The main objective of this article is to shed light on the compatibilityof price discrimination with EC competition law. We offer ananalytical framework which distinguishes between different categoriesof price discrimination depending on their effects on competition.Our framework suggests that different tests are needed to assessthe lawfulness of price discrimination practices under EC competitionlaw. A related objective of the article is to show that Article82(c), the main Treaty provision dealing with price discrimination,should only be applied to the limited circumstances where anon-vertically integrated dominant firm price discriminatesbetween customers with the effect of placing one or severalof them at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other customers(secondary line injury price discrimination). In contrast, Article82(c) should not be applied to pricing measures designed toharm the dominant firm's competitors (first line-injury pricediscrimination) or to partition the single market across nationallines.     

THE CHALLENGES OF ECONOMIC PROOF IN A DECENTRALIZED AND PRIVATIZED EUROPEAN COMPETITION POLICY SYSTEM: LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

Since the announcement in late 2002 of the Modernization Plan,and continuing in 2005 with the release of the Green Paper ondamages actions, the European Commission has been committedto a significant restructuring of the EU's approach to enforcingcompetition laws. Under the revised system as envisioned bythe Commission, national competition authorities and privateparties will assume a far greater role in supplementing thework of the Commission, which for 50 years has been the predominantcompetition policy enforcer in Europe. The goal is not onlyto produce a system of shared enforcement authority, but topromote the continued evolution in Europe of a "culture of competition,"while avoiding the creation of a "culture of litigation." Ifnational competition authorities and private parties acceptthis invitation, however, they are likely to face the same kindsof demands for substantial economic evidence from their nationalcourts that the EC has faced from the Court of First Instanceand the European Court of Justice in some of its most complexand challenging recent cases. This paper asks whether nationallevel enforcers, public and private, will have the proceduraland evidentiary tools necessary to respond to demands for sucheconomic proof. Drawing on the Commission's recent experiences,as well as lessons from the U.S. experience, it asks whetherthe Green Paper's treatment of economic evidence is adequategiven the importance that economic proof plays today in competitionlaw cases. It then urges the Commission to devote additionalattention to identifying and advocating reforms that will moreactively facilitate the disclosure, development, and presentationof economic evidence. This paper particularly questions theGreen Paper's preference for the use of court-appointed expertsin lieu of party-secured expert witnesses. It argues that partyand court-appointed experts can perform very different functionsin competition law cases and should not be viewed as substitutes.Moreover, it suggests that the Green Paper may significantlyunderestimate the degree to which party-secured expert economicwitnesses will be necessary if national level enforcers—publicand private—are to be adequately equipped to meet theburdens of proof they will face. If national enforcers systematicallyfind that they lack the procedural tools necessary to developthe economic evidence they need to meet those burdens, theywill reduce or abandon their efforts to initiate competitionlaw actions and it will be less likely that the promise of decentralizationand privatization can be realized.     

THE PROGRESSIVE APPEARANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS IN INTEGRATION PROCESSES. TOWARD A REFORMULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND A HUMANIST VISION OF COMMUNITY LAW

The success of the European Union is the paradigm that should be kept in mind by other blocs or integration movements （NAFTA, the Andean Community, CARICOM, the African Union, APEC, etc） with the goal not only of building a global commercial space together, through the opening of relations, but also the future reformulation of an international community that, like the European Union, can create its own institutions, which in time may even replace the United Nations, and begin to dream of other kinds of organisations.     

所有权的类型及其立法结构 《物权法草案》所有权立法之批评

<正>所有权制度是物权立法的核心,《物权法草案》专以第二编加以规范。但在我国,所有权的性质及其具体制度的设计,历来被笼罩着一团迷雾,其轮廓依稀可见,真实面目却难以辨识。表现在立法活动中,包括学者建议稿在内的各种物权法草案,对国家所有权、集体所有权和公民个人所有权之区分的立法态度迥异,迎合者有之,拒斥者亦有之。《物权法草案》第四章和第五章的大部分条文,就属于前一情况。此种立法态度的分歧,主要原因应该是立法者和学者