Who decides on the future of data protection? Role of law firms in shaping European data protection regime

Drawing on theories of European integration and governance and sociological studies on the influence of elite law firms on rule-setting, this paper shows that law firms (a) operate in the area of data protection that is of extreme complexity and requires expert knowledge; and (b) display characteristics similar to other actors who succeeded in influencing agenda-setting and the results of policy-making despite having no formal competence to do so. This article proposes a hypothesis of the influence of elite law firms in EU data protection rule-setting. It argues that the EU data protection sector is prone to such influence as it is by definition transnational and, at some technical and some core points, inadequate to reflect the real data processing practices and therefore is entrenched with uncertainty. Therefore, the research into politics of data protection in Europe cannot disregard the role of these actors in shaping the European data protection regime.     

Who are Refugees?

Hundreds of millions of people around the world are unable to meet their needs on their own, and do not receive adequate protection or support from their home states. These people, if they are to be provided for, need assistance from the international community. If we are to meet our duties to these people, we must have ways of knowing who should be eligible for different forms of relief. One prominent proposal from scholars and activists has been to classify all who are unable to meet their basic needs on their own as ‘refugees’, and to extend to them the sorts of protections established under the United Nations Refugee Convention. Such an approach would expand the traditional refugee definition significantly. Unlike most academic commentators discussing this issue, I reject calls for an expanded refugee definition, and instead defend the core elements of the definition set out in the 1967 Protocol to the United Nations Refugee Convention. Using the tools of moral and political philosophy, I explain in this article how the group picked out by this definition has particular characteristics that make refugee protection distinctly appropriate for it. While many people in need of assistance can be helped ‘in place’, in their home countries, or by providing a form of temporary protected status to them, this is not so, I show, of convention refugees. The group picked out by the UN refugee definition is a normatively distinct group to whom we owe particular duties, duties we can only meet by granting them refuge in a safe country. Additionally, there are further practical reasons why a broader refugee definition may lead to problems. Finally, I argue that rejecting the call for a broader definition of refugees will better help us meet our duties to those in need than would an expanded definition.     

People We Hire as Executioners: Who Are They? Who Are We?

Christopher Bennett has introduced a new inquiry into the capital punishment debate by looking at whether the role of executioner is one in which it is possible and proper to take pride. He argues that this will depend on the kind of justifications that an executioner can offer in defense of his role and takes as an example the English executioner Albert Pierrepoint as portrayed in the film Pierrepoint: The Last Hangman. Bennett claims that none of the justifications available to Pierrepoint are adequate, that his pride in his role was unjustified, and that this gives us reason to doubt those justifications for capital punishment. I am unpersuaded by Bennett’s arguments and give reasons for thinking that the role of executioner can under certain circumstances be an honorable vocation in which one may legitimately take pride.     

Who’s Your Daddy?

This paper provides a brief explanation and illustration of the phenomenon of semiotics. It then describes the conceptual tools of semiotics and how lawyers can use semiotics in law to create compelling arguments. Last, the paper applies the tools of semiotics to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2008), to reveal the shift in social context that made the lines of legal reasoning behind the outcome appear “self-evident.”     

Who are the Unclaimed Dead?

Unclaimed dead are deceased persons with no known next of kin (NoK) or NoK was located but did not claim the deceased. Unclaimed dead in Marion County, Indiana, 2004–2011, are examined. Comparisons are provided of the unclaimed to the claimed dead population and county death patterns. Race, gender, marital status, age, location, manner and cause of death, NoK, and days to disposition are analyzed. The unclaimed dead were disproportionately male, slightly more likely to be Black, younger at death, died from natural causes, had unknown marital status, were equally likely as not to have NoK, did not die in a hospital, and were subject to autopsy. Nearly half the unclaimed had NoK who did not claim the body; the other half had no identifiable NoK. Unclaimed were more likely to have an autopsy and to die from external causes. Most unclaimed were identified by means outside fingerprints or DNA.     

Who is the parent in cloning?

In July 1996, a sheep named Dolly was born in Scotland. What makes Dolly's birth noteworthy is that she is the result of the first successful cloning attempt using the nucleus of an adult cell. The technique that led to Dolly's birth involved transferring the nucleus of a mammary cell from an adult sheep to the enucleated egg cell of an unrelated sheep with gestation occurring in a third sheep. The possibility of applying this technique to human reproduction raised concerns worldwide with several countries moving for an immediate bans on human cloning. In the United States, President Clinton requested that the National Bioethics Advisory Commission ("NBAC"), a multidisciplinary group composed of scientists, lawyers, educators, theologians, and ethicists study the implications of cloning and issue recommendations. The Commission consulted other scientists, ethicists, theologians, lawyers, and citizens with interests in this advancing technology and concluded that, "at this time it is morally unacceptable for anyone in the public or private sector, whether in a research or clinical setting, to attempt to create a child using somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning." This Article was included in a larger work prepared at the request of, and submitted to the Commission by, law professor Lori B. Andrews. Cloning through nuclear transfer will change the way we create and define families. This Article explores how existing law relating to parentage, surrogacy, egg donation, and artificial insemination may apply in the cloning context to clarify the parent-child relationship established through cloning.     

Who should pay for bad genes?

Parents have long been able to influence the genetic composition of their children through their choice of a reproductive partner, if only very approximately. They are, however, increasingly able to determine the genetic make-up of their children in other, more precise ways, such as by selecting a particular gamete or embryo or by genetically modifying an embryo prior to artificial implantation. This Article discusses parents' obligations to their children and other members of the community stemming from their children's genes. In a just state, it argues, parents would be responsible for redressing any genetic disadvantage their children suffer as a result of parents' voluntary actions. Within the context of a liberal egalitarian account of distributive justice, this responsibility might most fairly be discharged through a compulsory insurance plan that provides compensation to genetically disadvantaged children when they might have had non-disadvantaged children instead would in some circumstances incur greater liability, because they could not fairly push the cost of their choices off on other members of the insurance pool. The Article also asks whether parents wrong a child by allowing it to be born with a genetic impairment when, had they taken steps to remove the impairment, the unimpaired child they had would have been a different person from the genetically disadvantaged child because the better-off child's capacities and experiences differed considerably from those that the disadvantaged child would have had. Contrary to many people's moral intuitions, the Article argues that parents do not wrong such a child. Nevertheless, parents remain morally obligated to bear any added costs occasioned by the child's impairment. Any other approach would allow them unjustly to shift the burden of their choices to other parents. Finally, the Article takes up the much debated question of whether parents harm a child by allowing it to be born with a life not worth living when they could have prevented its birth. It suggests that the answer to this question should be irrelevant to parents' legal liability. Acting on behalf of the parental insurance pool, the state may nonetheless adopt a variety of measures to help potential parents avoid giving birth to such children, which one can assume virtually all would prefer.     

Who is the Author of Halakhah?

The Jewish Law (Halakahh) is probably the older legal system working in our time. It is established on a hierarchy of different texts. The oldest and more authoritative is the Torah (the five books of Moshe), then come the Mishnah, the Talmud, the compilation as Maimonide’s Mishne Torah and Caro’s Shulchan Arukh, then the responsa of the rabbis. While the authorship of the later texts is more or less clear, the one of the Torah is highly problematic, also in the self-understanding of Jewish hermeneutics. This question is discussed in the present paper not from a philological-historical point of view, but from a semiotic one, trying to understand what devices and regimes of enunciation are enacted by the text in order to establish its semiotic-juridical effects. A special double enunciation frame is proposed as the mark of the legislative power in the text, in correlation with another textual device, a sort of divine “signature”. The further evolution of the authorship of the Jewish Law is discussed in its relation with the question of the autonomy in the interpretation of the sacred text.     

Who Should Serve in Nonstaff Departments?

The nonstaff departments of executive committees in our republic have a history that is not very long but quite complex. It began with a "fast take-off," when executive committees of district and city Soviets virtually competed about how to set up more such departments, although their purpose and purview were often given little thought. This take-off was sometimes followed by disillusionment, and this too involved going to extremes. Sometimes the very right of volunteer components of the administrative machinery to exist was virtually denied. But life puts everything in its place. The departments that were really needed took root and became firmly established. And those that had been established just to make a record ceased to exist, as was to be expected.