Equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market

We study an organized market for votes, in which trade is directed by a market "specialist". This market mechanism always produces an equilibrium outcome, and whenever vote buying occurs the alternative chosen is Pareto superior to the alternative that would be chosen without trade. We then characterize the equilibrium outcomes in a one-dimensional policy space, and show that if the distribution of ideal points is skewed enough, then the equilibrium with vote buying differs from the equilibrium without vote buying (the median ideal point). This difference reflects the ability of an intense minority to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for side-payments.     

浅议从信托关系定位破产管理人

关于破产管理人在破产程序中的法律地位问题,历来争议颇多,众说纷纭,由于英美法上的破产管理人的信托人地位鲜有内部争议,因此很多学者认为我国可以借鉴英美破产立法观点,以信托关系为基础为破产管理人定位。     

The introduction of professional regulation and labor market conditions

There has been increasing concern by policy makers about the impact of occupational regulation and the process by which it is introduced. This paper examines the introduction of mandatory licensure laws to replace public certification of registered nurses at the state level. Historical analysis supports the hypothesis in economic models that small groups with concentrated interests like occupations will dominate the introduction of laws and suggests examining changes in labor market conditions may be useful in predicting future demands for legislation. Estimates of an empirical model of the diffusion of licensure across states for nurses suggests this type of quality assurance regulation was introduced first where the quality of services was probably already relatively high and that policies reducing the impact of licensure on geographical mobility may reduce pressure for new laws. Patterns in the introduction of laws also have implications for evaluating their impact.     

Politicians,Scandals, and Trust in Government

In this paper we examine the role that political scandals play in eroding regard for government and political institutions in general. We know that scandals can lower regard for individual politicians and government leaders. Yet, less is known about how scandal influences attitudes toward institutions and the political process. It has been widely assumed that such attitudes are influenced by factors that lie largely beyond the control of individual politicians. Using data from the U.S. and the U.K. we show that scandals involving legislators can have a negative influence on their constituent's attitudes toward institutions and the political process. One consequence of this finding is that, instead of looking for scapegoats in Hollywood or among the failings of voters themselves, politicians should first get their own House in order.     

Trust Your Compatriots, but Count Your Change: The Roles of Trust, Mistrust and Distrust in Democracy

Although trust is clearly central to human relations of all kinds, it is less clear whether there is a role for trust in democratic politics. In this article, I argue that trust is central to democratic institutions as well as to democratic political participation, and that arguments which make distrust the central element of democracy fail. First, I argue for the centrality of trust to the democratic process. The voluntary compliance that is central to democracies relies on trust, along two dimensions: citizens must trust their legislators to have the national interest in mind and citizens must trust each other to abide by democratically established laws. Second, I refute arguments that place distrust at the centre of democratic institutions. I argue, instead, that citizens must be vigilant with respect to their legislators and fellow citizens; that is, they must be willing to ensure that the institutions are working fairly and that people continue to abide by shared regulations. This vigilance – which is reflected both in a set of institutions as well as an active citizenry – is motivated by an attitude termed 'mistrust'. Mistrust is a cautious attitude that propels citizens to maintain a watchful eye on the political and social happenings within their communities. Moreover, mistrust depends on trust: we trust fellow citizens to monitor for abuses of our own rights and privileges just as we monitor for abuses of their rights and privileges. Finally, I argue that distrust is inimical to democracy. We are, consequently, right to worry about widespread reports of trust's decline. Just as distrust is harmful to human relations of all kinds, and just as trust is central to positive human relations of all kinds, so is distrust inimical to democracy and trust central to its flourishing.     

Diversity,Trust, and Social Learning in Collaborative Governance

Scholarship on collaborative governance identifies several structural and procedural factors that consistently influence governance outcomes. A promising next step for collaborative governance research is to explore how these factors interact. Focusing on two dimensions of social learning—relational and cognitive—as outcomes of collaboration, this article examines potential interacting effects of participant diversity and trust. The empirical setting entails 10 collaborative partnerships in the United States that provide advice on marine aquaculture policy. The findings indicate that diversity in beliefs among participants is positively related to relational learning, whereas diversity in participants' affiliations is negatively related to relational learning, and high trust bolsters the positive effects of belief diversity on both relational and cognitive learning. In addition, high trust dampens the negative effects of affiliation diversity on relational learning. A more nuanced understanding of diversity in collaborative governance has practical implications for the design and facilitation of diverse stakeholder groups.     

States, Counties, and the Questions of Trust and Capacity

This study indicates that there is a high level of confidenceamong county representatives that state officials will be responsiveto local needs, but less confidence in state willingness toprovide fiscal support for programs. The preference for continuedfederal funding of programs is strongly evident. County representativesfeel that their policymaking and administrative responsibilitiesare increasing but that their fiscal (taxing and borrowing)capacities are not being expanded as quickly. The highest levelsof trust in state officials were found among those county representativeswho perceived the greatest increases in local government capacitiesto respond to local problems.     

Trust and growth

Using data from U.S. states, we find a positive relationship between trust and growth. According to our results, a 10 percentage point increase in trust increases the growth rate of GDP by 0.5 percentage points and the growth rate of manufacturing employment by 1.3 percentage points over a five-year period. Our results are robust to the endogeneity between trust and growth.     

论政府信任的概念内涵、形成因素与政治功能

在西方学术界,目前对于政府信任的研究已经成为当前政府再造工程推动过程中一个重要的研究课题,因此,政府信任应该成为政治学予以重视并加以研究的主题."政府信任"在概念内涵上是指公众在期望与认知之间对政府运作的一种归属心理和评价态度.事实上,公众对于政府信任的程度高低,乃是众多影响因素交互作用的混合结果,如经济、社会、政治与文化等,而深层次的原因在于公众对政府的认知与公共期望之间的相对落差.政府信任涉及的是民众与政府间的互动关系,它能够扩大执政者的合法性基础,实现有机的社会整合,提高公共政策制定和执行的绩效.     

Socialism,associations and the market

Hayek's epistemic arguments against central planning and in defence of market economies have recently been redeployed by some market-socialists against more decentralized models of non-market socialism. This paper considers the cogency of these arguments through an examination of an unpublished exchange in the socialist calculation debates between Hayek and a proponent of non-market associational models of socialism, Otto Neurath. Contrary to the standard view of the debates, Neurath shared many of the assumptions of Hayek's epistemic arguments and similarly criticized technocratic models of planning. The paper outlines Neurath's defence of associational socialism from his early role in the Bavarian revolution through his engagement in the post-war housing movements in Vienna and the unity of science movement. While Neurath's response to Hayek is not entirely successful, his proposals for associational models of socialism point to problems not just in Hayek's criticisms of non-market socialism, but also those of more recent market-socialists.     

Inequality,Diversity and Social Trust in Norwegian Communities

This article examines community effects on social trust in Norwegian communities. The large research literature on social trust agrees that community effects are important, but disagree about which aspects of communities influence social trust. The main current disagreement concerns the relative importance of ethnic diversity and socio-economic factors, such as income inequality within communities and differences in socio-economic standing between communities. We test the competing propositions on a Norwegian dataset consisting of 99 communities and 6,166 survey respondents within those communities arguing that it is particularly interesting to look at the relationship between diversity and social trust in the setting of a wealthy universalist welfare state. It is to our knowledge the first dataset that allows a hierarchical analysis of the determinants of social trust in the Norwegian context. The results of our models show that economic inequality, within and between communities, has a direct negative effect on social trust, but that it is not possible to separate the effects of ethnic diversity and level of unemployment. This study thus lends support to the body of research that first and foremost emphasizes the role of economic inequality in accounts of community differences and social trust.     

Political Trust, Ideology, and Public Support for Government Spending

This article analyzes the relationship between political trust, ideology, and public support for government spending. We argue that the political trust heuristic is activated when individuals are asked to sacrifice ideological as well as material interests. Aggregate- and individual-level analysis shows that the effects of political trust on support for government spending are moderated by ideology. Consistent with the unbalanced ideological costs imposed by requests for increased government spending, we find that the effects of political trust are significantly more pronounced among conservatives than among liberals. The analysis further demonstrates that ideology conditions the effects of political trust on attitudes toward both distributive and redistributive spending. Our findings suggest that political trust has policy consequences across a much broader range of policy issues than previously thought.     

Social Trust, Social Capital and Perceptions of Immigration

Analyses of social capital and immigration have stressed the negative impact that culturally diverse societies have for the development of social trust. Ethnic heterogeneity, according to these studies, is associated with lower levels of social trust. However, social trust has not been studied as an independent variable in order to explain attitudes towards immigration. This article argues that societies with high levels of social capital facilitate the integration of immigrants because those members with high levels of social trust will tend to have more positive attitudes towards immigration. This hypothesis is empirically tested in a cross-country multi-level empirical analysis for sixteen European countries, drawing on the 2002–3 European Social Survey. This analysis shows that, regardless of the impact of other individual-level variables and contextual variables such as levels of unemployment or percentage of foreign population, those with high social capital do exhibit more positive attitudes towards immigration than the rest of the population.     

Equity,efficiency and environmental quality

Many government policies ostensibly designed to serve allocative ends appear to be driven primarily if not exclusively by redistributive considerations. This paper analyzes one such policy, the New Source Performance Standards of the Clean Air Act of 1977, using data derived principally from studies commissioned by and known to those involved in the policy making process. These data are used to produce estimates of the magnitude and relative efficiency of the wealth transfers effected by the policy. Among our conclusions are that, at least with respect to this particular episode, (a) environmental regulation is an extremely inefficient method of transferring wealth and (b) transfers between groups within regions of the U.S. are large relative to transfers between those regions.     

Trust in elections,vote buying,and turnout in Latin America

Although national elections in Latin America are now described as reasonably free and fair by international observations teams, electoral processes are still affected by a series of malpractices (unequal access to the media and public resources, registration problems, vote buying). These irregularities negatively affect citizens' trust in elections. In this paper, we analyze the consequences of low trust in elections and exposure to vote buying practices on electoral participation in Latin America. Using data from the 2010 wave of LAPOP surveys, we find that perceiving that the election is unfair reduces the willingness to participate in national elections, but receiving material incentives during the campaign has the opposite effect of increasing electoral participation. We also show that the effect of trust in elections on turnout is larger in countries where voting is not mandatory.