Is there an incumbency advantage or cost of ruling in proportional election systems?

This paper investigates the effects of political representation on electoral outcomes at the party and coalition levels in proportional election systems using data from Swedish local government elections. There are two notions of representation, namely, to hold seats and to belong to the ruling coalition. I refer to the effect of the former as the incumbency effect and the effect of the latter as the ruling effect. The discontinuous variation in the seat share as the vote share varies for parties is used to isolate exogenous variation in incumbency. The discontinuous variation in ruling at the 50% seat share cutoff for coalitions is used in order to exogenous variation in ruling. I find that incumbency determines the distribution of 12% of the total vote, which is similar to the advantage found in majoritarian systems. I find no ruling effect, contrary to the commonly found cost of ruling in proportional systems.     

Explaining variations in enforcement strategy: A comparison of the Swedish health care,eldercare, and compulsory school sector

This article analyzes whether, and if so, why, national inspectorates adopt different enforcement strategies when controlling the provision of welfare services, such as health care, eldercare, and the compulsory school. The findings show that the Swedish Schools Inspectorate uses a predominantly strict strategy, while the Health and Social Care Inspectorate relies on a more situational strategy. To explain this variation in enforcement strategy, the article tests four hypotheses derived from the literature on regulatory enforcement. The findings suggest that the variation between the agencies is not primarily the result of differences in resources or the authority to issue punitive decisions, as suggested by previous research. Instead, we find support for the hypothesis that the definition of quality can explain variation in adopted strategies, and partial support for the hypothesis that differences in regulatory mission can account for a variation in the agencies' formal enforcement strategies.     

A comparative analysis of voter turnout in regional elections

Elections to regional assemblies have become increasingly important as the power and responsibilities of regional governments have increased. Yet, few studies have attempted to explain the considerable variation in turnout in regional elections from one region to another. This article conducts a cross-sectional examination of voter participation in regional elections across nine multi-level OECD states between 2003 and 2006. It contends that standard models of voter turnout in national elections are insufficient to explain variation in turnout in regional elections and argues for the use of independent variables tailored to capture variation across regional communities and regional political institutions. Our findings suggest that variations in the strength of political autonomy and the strength of attachment to the region among the electorate have a strong and positive impact on the level of turnout in regional elections.     

Decoupling trends: Drivers of agency independence in telecommunications: An analysis of high and middle-income countries

Global diffusion of regulatory reforms in telecommunications has prevailed in many countries, engendering major institutional changes and entailing the establishment and/or reform of regulatory agencies. Although the triggers and timing of such agentification processes have been more or less similar, agency independence displays significant cross-country variation. Seeking to explain such variation based on a sample incorporating middle-income countries (MICs), this paper examines the impact of political-institutional settings in which the agencies operate, in addition to the impact of economic parameters. Regression analysis reveals that political rights appear as the central parameter, while their impact is more robust in MICs than in advanced countries. The results underscore considerable cross-national variation in regulatory governance, along with a noteworthy decoupling between MICs and advanced countries. Concurring with the regulatory regionalism perspective, the paper delineates distinct regional clusters, albeit remaining agnostic about the determinants of such clusters.     

The Scandinavian Welfare State: The Institutions of Growth, Governance, and Reform. Review Article

In a review of five recent works on Scandinavian politics and public policy, it is shown that the basis for talking about a Scandinavian model is unfounded. Politics and policies diverge from country to country and within each country from sector to sector as a result of institutional variation. This variation is embedded in institutional history which accounts for strong national path dependency in public policies. However, the institutional set-up at a given point in time also provides political actors with incentives for change. Two of the works reviewed take up this lead as they argue for institutional reform, in one case to protect the welfare state against political erosion, in the other case to facilitate renewed economic growth and improved living standards. The review concludes by arguing for the positive prospects for systematic comparative analysis of Scandinavian politics, providing a mixture of institutional and political similarities combined with theoretically relevant variation.     

Sanction Power, Jurisdiction, and Economic Policy-making: Explaining Contemporary Telecommunications Policy in Japan

Variation in policy-making is an important analytical issue in public policy analysis, but it has not been extensively discussed in the literature on Japanese politics and political economy. Focusing on the interaction between state and societal actors, this article presents a causal argument to account for variation in Japanese economic policy-making. It is argued that variation in policy-making patterns is determined by the strength of a bureaucracy's sanction power and the exclusivity of its jurisdiction. This argument is elaborated through analysis of four related cases of Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) policy-making: the privatization process of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT), the regulation of telecommunications after NTT privatization, the promotion of advanced telecommunications, and the reorganization of NTT. The causal framework is also applied to contemporary Ministry of International Trade and Industry economic policy-making to highlight the argument's preliminary applicability to Japanese policy-making. This analysis of Japanese policy-making lays a base for further analysis of variation in policy-making in general.     

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING THE SOURCES OF VARIATION IN PROGRAM EFFECTS

Evaluations of public programs in many fields reveal that different types of programs—or different versions of the same program—vary in their effectiveness. Moreover, a program that is effective for one group of people might not be effective for other groups, and a program that is effective in one set of circumstances may not be effective in other circumstances. This paper presents a conceptual framework for research on such variation in program effects and the sources of this variation. The framework is intended to help researchers—both those who focus mainly on studying program implementation and those who focus mainly on estimating program effects—see how their respective pieces fit together in a way that helps to identify factors that explain variation in program effects, and thereby support more systematic data collection. The ultimate goal of the framework is to enable researchers to offer better guidance to policymakers and program operators on the conditions and practices that are associated with larger and more positive effects.     

External Pressures and Internal Dynamics in the Institutionalization of Performance-Based Budgeting: An Endless Process?

The well-known practice of performance-based budgeting (PBB) is a relevant component of the New Public Management (NPM) reform agenda and has become widespread, with varying approaches and results across countries. However, its variation within specific countries has remained largely unexplored. This study analyzes three organizations operating within the same context—three ministries in Italy—to contribute to a new understanding of PBB variation by illustrating why the same PBB practice can or cannot be implemented and internalized similarly across these organizations and thus become (or not) fully institutionalized. The study adopts and enriches the institutional approach by extending beyond isomorphic convergence toward PBB and explaining practice variation, linking the interactions between external pressures and internal dynamics at the organizational level to PBB institutionalization. The empirical analysis shows how a lack of alignment between external pressures and internal dynamics contributes to an unfinished and apparently endless process of institutionalization.     

An Experimental Template for Case Study Research

Methods are usually classified as either "experimental" or "observational," a dichotomy that has governed social science research for centuries. By implication, this dichotomization precludes a consideration of experimental strategies in case study work. Yet, we argue that one gains purchase on the tasks of research design by integrating the criteria traditionally applied to experimental work to all research in the social sciences—including case study work, the focus of this article. Experimental research designs aim to achieve variation through time and across space while maintaining ceteris paribus assumptions, thus maximizing leverage into the fundamental problem of causal inference. We propose to capture these multiple criteria in a four-fold typology: (1) A Dynamic comparison mirrors laboratory experimentation through the use of both temporal and spatial variation; (2) A Longitudinal comparison employs temporal variation; (3) A Spatial comparison exploits variation through space; and (4) A Counterfactual comparison relies on imagined comparison. All comparison case study research designs can be slotted into one of these four categories. Moreover, the typology illustrates in a concise fashion the ways in which case study research designs attempt to mimic the virtues of experimental design and the degree to which they succeed. The classic experiment, with manipulated treatment and randomized control, thus provides a useful template for discussion about methodological issues in experimental and observational contexts.     

Financial support of children involved in special needs adoption: A policy evaluation

This article represents one of the first systematic analyses of state subsidy payments to families adopting children with special needs (children with physical and/or mental disabilities and children who are classified as hard-to-place). The analysis focuses on the monetary subsidies provided to adoptive parents of special needs children. It attempts to characterize variation in subsidy levels between counties and the impact of subsidy levels on a child's length of time until adoptive placement. The data set employed in the analysis was collected from primary sources and is one ofthe first available depositories of information on subsidy payments for special needs adoption. Results indicate that child and case characteristics explain a significant proportion of the variation in state adoption subsidy levels, but that a substantial proportion of between-county variation in subsidy levels remains unexplained. Subsidy level was not found to affect the adoption placement rate at the margin, except for children with mental disabilities. The policy implications of these results are discussed.     

The purpose of intergovernmental councils: A framework for analysis and comparison

ABSTRACT

Intergovernmental councils (IGCs) are specific, institutionalized forums of intergovernmental relations. They provide essential horizontal and/or vertical executive channels for preparing, deciding, and implementing multilevel policies. We assume there to be variation, both across federal systems and policy domains, in the purpose they serve – from mutual influence and protection of autonomy through joint decision-making to mere exchange of information – the use that central or sub-state actors make of IGCs, as well as their effectivity. In order to map and explain such variation, this introductory article provides a framework for analysis that includes both conceptual building blocks and conjectural relationships, laying the comparative groundwork for the case studies included in this Special Issue. Findings from the case studies indicate that it is primarily the institutional architecture, but also the structure of the multilevel party system, that account for variation in the purpose and effectiveness of IGCs.     

Sex, Resources, and Political Participation: Direct and Indirect Effects*

This article discusses the impact of sex and resources on political participation. The independent variables in the causal model are sex, education, organizational membership, and political involvement. Two measures of participation are used: frequency of voting and campaign participation. The results show that organization membership is the most important resource of participation. Organization is the only resource to have both indirect and direct effects. For sex and education, the effects are mediated through political involvement. The model is very weak in explaining variation in voting, but is clearly stronger in explaining variation in campaign participation.     

Arenas as Institutional Sites for Policymaking: Patterns and Effects in Comparative Perspective

In comparative approaches to the policy process, policymaking institutions are usually considered at the level of political systems. Countries, however, may vary not only in systemic institutions but also in types of policymaking arenas within specific domains. Systematic attention to this variation in policy arenas at both levels may complement existing theories of the policy process that focus on other explanatory variables and may increase the comparative potential of these approaches. As an explanatory variable, arena variation makes a difference to policy results in that it may increase or decrease the potential for policy change sought by policy entrepreneurs.     

Individual Autonomy and Local-Level Solidarity in Africa

Come election time, many localities in Africa seem to speak with one voice. Vote totals often suggest near-unanimity within villages and neighborhoods, even when national-level results demonstrate greater competitiveness. However, there is substantial variation in the electoral solidarity of local communities, with some demonstrating significantly less cohesion than others. Few if any scholars have tried to explain this variation. I theorize that solidarity levels are largely a function of community members' abilities to act autonomously. Namely, communities will be more likely to vote en bloc when residents are less able to resist pressures from local elites, who often act as brokers for national politicians, due to elite-empowering land-tenure regimes, poverty, and information scarcity. I test this theory with data from Uganda, which displays significant variation in local-level electoral solidarity. I find that electoral solidarity is lower in communities where freehold land arrangements are more common, living standards are higher, and mass media (i.e., radio signals) are more accessible.     

Timely shirking: time-dependent monitoring and?its?effects on legislative behavior in the U.S. Senate

We examine legislative shirking under conditions of imperfect constituent monitoring. Our core argument states that variation in information costs and constituent memory leads to systematic variation in constituent monitoring over time. Assuming that legislators are responsive to multiple cues, we expect to observe time-dependent legislative shirking. We develop a theoretical model of legislative behavior with time-dependent monitoring, which we test empirically using Senate roll call data. Our findings show that a substantial number of senators engage in systematic, time-dependent shirking, and that senators consistently move toward extreme positions when monitoring is low and toward moderate positions when it is high.     

Economic Perceptions and Vote Choice: Disentangling the Endogeneity

Much previous research shows that variation in vote choice closely follows variation in economic perceptions over time. A number of scholars argue that the pattern is rooted in cross-sectional effects and have found apparent evidence of such effects. However, most of these studies do not take into account the possibility that economic perceptions are themselves structured by vote choice, which poses potentially serious implications. We begin to address this endogeneity, focusing specifically on Lewis-Beck's (1988) analysis of economic voting. The results suggest that the cross-sectional effects of the economy on vote choice have been substantially overstated.     

Personal vote‐seeking in flexible list systems: How electoral incentives shape Belgian MPs' bill initiation behaviour

It is well known that different types of electoral systems create different incentives to cultivate a personal vote and that there may be variation in intra‐party competition within an electoral system. This article demonstrates that flexible list systems – where voters can choose to cast a vote for the list as ordered by the party or express preference votes for candidates – create another type of variation in personal vote‐seeking incentives within the system. This variation arises because the flexibility of party‐in‐a‐district lists results from voters' actual inclination to use preference votes and the formal weight of preference votes in changing the original list order. Hypotheses are tested which are linked to this logic for the case of Belgium, where party‐in‐a‐district constituencies vary in their use of preference votes and the electoral reform of 2001 adds interesting institutional variation in the formal impact of preference votes on intra‐party seat allocation. Since formal rules grant Belgian MPs considerable leeway in terms of bill initiation, personal vote‐seeking strategies are inferred by examining the use of legislative activity as signalling tool in the period between 1999 and 2007. The results establish that personal vote‐seeking incentives vary with the extent to which voters use preference votes and that this variable interacts with the weight of preference votes as defined by institutional rules. In addition, the article confirms the effect of intra‐party competition on personal vote‐seeking incentives and illustrates that such incentives can underlie the initiation of private members bills in a European parliamentary system.     

Rough days in democracies: Comparing protests in democracies

Abstract.  Democratic political institutions are generally designed to channel public opinion; yet citizens often take to the streets in protest. Why would citizens, provided with formal mechanisms to affect the policy process, resort to extraordinary means? This article argues that the strength of representative institutions influences the likelihood of protest. The democratic institution literature does not address the issue of protest and in the protest literature effects of the democratic governmental structure have been largely underestimated. However, the diversity in government formats across democratic states and the corresponding variation in amount of protests leads one to question the relationship between them. This article identifies the variation in the scale of protests among democratic regimes in Western European countries using the European Protest and Coercion Data and explains protest using variation in the forms of government. Protesters in democratic countries with a weak legislature find it difficult to deliver their demands to government due to the institutional environment. Therefore, they are more inclined to protest than citizens in countries with a strong legislature. This argument is tested along with other structural variables and supported by results from testing models using ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors.     

The public choice of educational choice

The very small literature explaining (i) how citizens have voted in two California voucher referenda, (ii) how legislators have voted on voucher bills in the State of Florida and the US Congress, and (iii) the variation across states in charter school provisions is summarized. New empirical evidence documenting the cross-state variation in the success of voucher referenda and voucher bills is examined. Voucher bill characteristics and state characteristics play important roles. Voucher bills have been passed only in the more conservative Republican states, and almost all of the successful voucher programs have been targeted at large, struggling school districts.     

Strategic institutional choice: Voters, states, and congressional term limits

States’ choices on term limits are quantified as a multiple-categorical variable capturing variation in the type of limits passed. Measures of relative political influence in Congress explain much of this variation. Using 1992 data on the American states, the model controls for unobserved heterogeneity due to voter access to direct democracy in some states. At 2002 values for congressional tenure and federal spending, the model predicts approximately eight to ten additional states would choose to limit their own members’ terms but cannot under a Supreme Court ruling. We discuss implications for institutional federalism and the potential passage of similar political institutions across the states.