Terrorism, democratization, and US foreign policy

Members of the American foreign policy establishment argue that the United States should combat transnational terrorism by encouraging democratization. Yet, empirical studies indicate that democratization may increase political violence, thereby raising the question: why would American policymakers favor democratization when the empirical record shows that this course of action is so dangerous? This study develops a game theoretic model to analyze the effect of democratization on terrorism. The model demonstrates that the United States uses the commitment problems created by democratization to solve the moral hazard problem created by supporting autocratic hosts. These empirical implications are tested using a combination of two datasets.     

Natural resources, aid, and democratization: A best-case scenario

Natural resources and aid give dictators revenue to maintain power. Attempts are being made, therefore, to funnel these resources away from nondemocratic governments and toward their citizens. Using formal analysis and building on existing theories of democratization, I analyze the effects of such institutional solutions when they function perfectly (the best-case scenario). The models show that even with institutional safeguards, these resources diminish chances for democratization. In addition to their practical importance, the results have an important theoretical implication: the political resource curse may not be due to dictators' use of these resources, but simply to their existence in nondemocracies.     

War,democratization, and generational cohort effects on participation in Japan

Studies show that both democratization and war mobilization boost levels of participation enduringly among members of the generational cohort that come of age around the time. But little is known about the relative effects of war mobilization and democratization on long-term participation rates among impressionable generations that experience both. We address this question by examining generational cohort effects by gender, drawing on newly available data on the case of Japan. Age-period-cohort analyses of the Survey on Japanese Value Orientations (1973–2013) show that the increase in lifelong participation rates of the “war generation” over prewar generations was much greater for men than for women, thus suggesting that the high rates of participation among members of this cohort are driven more by mobilization than by democratization. This finding yields significant implications for the analysis of democratic consolidation in different parts of the world.     

Culture and the Study of Politics*

This article is an introduction to a new and promising alternative to dominant reductionistic, utilitarian and instrumental political theories. ‘Cultural Theory’, or ‘Grid-Group’ analysis has been developed by the British anthropologist Mary Douglas and transferred to political science by the American political scientist Aaron Wildavsky. Starting from two dimensions - ‘group’ (group strength) and ‘grid’ (the number of rules that influence the individual space of action), there exist four main forms of human interaction or ways of life - individualism (markets), sectarianism (egalitarism). collectivism (hierarchy) and fatalism (slavery) which can be applied to all kinds of societies, organizations and individuals. These cultures are then used to predict political action (politics), institutions (polity) and results (policies). The article shows how the theory is built up and where it comes from, and then concentrates on important logical and empirical problems that so far remain unsolved.     

Representation,agendas and institutions

Dynamic agenda representation can be understood through the transmission of the priorities of the public onto the policy priorities of government. The pattern of representation in policy agendas is mediated through institutions due to friction (i.e., organisational and cognitive costs imposed on change) in decision making and variation in the scarcity of policy makers' attention. This article builds on extant studies of the correspondence between public priorities and the policy activities of government, undertaking time‐series analyses using data for the United States and the United Kingdom, from 1951 to 2003, relating to executive speeches, laws and budgets in combination with data on public opinion about the ‘most important problem’. The results show that the responsiveness of policy agendas to public priorities is greater when institutions are subject to less friction (i.e., executive speeches subject to few formal rules and involving a limited number of actors) and declines as friction against policy change increases (i.e., laws and budgets subject to a greater number of veto points and political interests/coalitions).     

Regionalization,administrative reform and democratization: Nicaragua 1979–1984

The article discusses the major events and debates that have taken place during the reform and democratization of subnational government in Nicaragua from the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship to late 1984. Developments during this period highlight five distinct areas of reform that must be addressed as part of any process of state democratization: (a) selection and maintenance of local officials; (b) integration of popular participation; (c) definition of the range of local authority; (d) resources for local development; and (e) relation to other levels of government. These issues are addressed through a discussion focusing heavily on local government during the first 3 years, then on the experience of the newly created regional governments and decentralization beginning in mid—1982, and finally on the early—and quite divergent—experience with the development of zonal government between the municipal and regional levels. The specific resolution of these five sets of issues is part of the development of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua, and will strongly shape the political and developmental significance of the resulting local government.     

Debt,democratization, and development in Latin America: How policy can affect global warming

The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis conjectures a nonlinear relationship between pollution and economic growth, such that pollution per capita initially increases as countries economically develop, but then reaches a maximum point before ultimately declining. Much of the EKC literature has focused on testing this basic hypothesis and, in studies that find evidence of an EKC, estimating the “turning point” level of development at which the per capita pollution‐growth relationship changes sign. This approach has not emphasized the policy relevance of specification issues or the potential role of policy variables. This research explores a modified EKC specification which conditions the pollution‐growth relationship on a country's level of debt and degree of democratization. These variables turn out to be significant, implying that different political and economic contexts can shift EKCs and their turning points. These findings suggest that policies to relieve debt burdens and institute political reform, in addition to their usual justifications, also could be used as a strategy to reduce carbon emissions from developing countries. © 2008 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Information, institutions and constitutional arrangements

This paper develops a theory of optimal institutional structure for staggered-term (overlapping generations) organizations such as legislative bodies. Our model is a simple stochastic game of multi-principal, multi-agent dynamic relationships. Our results emphasize two key features that are determined by legislative founders at the “constitutional moment”. First, they will agree to institute a mechanism that endows (imperfectly informed) legislators with information about the history of play. Second, we provide conditions in which legislative founders will be indifferent to the structure of legislative procedures.     

Economic liberalisation,market institutions and labour rights

What effect do pro‐market economic policies have on labour rights? Despite significant debate in policy and academic circles about the consequences of economic liberalisation, little is known about the labour rights effects of pro‐market policies. Extant literature has focused only on the possible outcomes of market‐liberalising policies, such as trade and investment flows, rather than directly assessing market‐friendly policies and institutions. Moreover, this line of research has found mixed results on how these outcomes influence labour conditions. To provide a comprehensive assessment of this linkage, this article combines data on five distinct policy areas associated with economic liberalisation with data on labour rights for the period 1981–2012. The results indicate that pro‐market policies – except the ones involving rule of law and secure property rights – undermine labour rights. Thus while there are some positive economic and political outcomes associated with market‐supporting policies, economic liberalisation comes at the cost of respect for labour rights.     

Four years of the Ghana district assemblies in operation: Decentralization,democratization and administrative performance

Ghana's District Assemblies were created in 1989 as ‘integrated’ decentralised authorities, combining oversight of deconcentrated line Ministries with the revenue powers and functions of devolved democratic local government. The frequently invoked but little studied relationships among democratisation, decentralisation and changes in the performance of government institutions are analysed on the basis of two case-study Districts, defining performance as output effectiveness, responsiveness and process acceptability. Although development output did increase after democratisation, it remained inadequate and did not show any significantly closer responsiveness to popular needs. This was mainly because local accountability was undermined by continuing central control over staffing and finances, the clash with national policies of retrenchment and the continued power of central government agents. The communal, non-party basis of representation also had a perverse effect on the ability of elected representatives to enhance the legitimacy of local taxation, particularly as the system embodied an unresolved contradiction between notions of community based self-help and representative district government. One of the lessons of the Ghanaian experience is that genuine local autonomy in an agreed area-the basic condition for effective accountability-is better based on more modest, local-level authorities, leaving larger, expensive functions as well as supervision of a deconcentrated civil service to more powerful regional administrations.     

Electoral institutions, partisan status, and political support in Lesotho

Does the introduction of proportionality in electoral systems help to boost popular evaluations of democracy? This article takes advantage of an electoral reform in Lesotho to conduct a natural experiment. We trace shifts over time in popular political support, using Afrobarometer data collected before and after reform to measure mass satisfaction with democracy and public trust in political institutions. We find both direct and indirect effects. In the aggregate, Lesotho's transition from a majoritarian to a mixed electoral system is directly associated with increased levels of citizen support for the country's state and regime. Importantly, however, formal institutions have only indirect effects at the individual level, where a person's informal partisan status – as a member of a winning majority or losing minority – mediates the impacts of institutional change.     

Threats, institutions and regulation in common pool resources

Can bureaucracies respond to threats marked by both potentially high costs and fundamental uncertainty? Standard guidelines such as maximizing expected value to the society over a period of time may be ineffective; yet, state action is often most demanded for such situations. I argue that the precautionary principle of reserved rationality helps explain the ability of bureaucracies to choose appropriate actions under uncertainty. Such bureaucracies are empowered when there is sufficient informal institutional support for their expertise and the bureaucracy has the discretion to take necessary precautions. I draw historical information from the case of Singapore's regulation of the formerly common pool resource of water catchment areas. This case reveals decision making when it is not clear that the expected-value criterion would support action, as well as the importance of political and institutional support for such action.     

Channeling frustrations: institutions, economic fluctuations, and political behavior

While the literature suggests that clear lines of responsibility lead to greater incumbent dependence on economic conditions for support, little has been said about how electorates channel frustrations in systems characterized by 'fuzzy' lines of responsibility, i.e., the shape and status of parliamentary government in relation to possible choice of electors open to them. The argument presented here is that fuzzy lines of responsibility result in lower incentives to participate in political processes and greater system dissatisfaction given economic circumstances. This decline is greater in systems in which incumbent responsibility is less easily identified by the individual citizen. To test this, data are collected from eight European nations over the period 1975–1992. Split sample and slope intervention models with robust estimation are employed at the individual level. System level aggregates are analyzed using pooled time–series analysis to confirm individual level findings. Finally, election turnout data are also analyzed to obtain election level verification of survey findings. Evidence suggests that participation is more heavily influenced by economic conditions in fuzzy settings. Coupled with existing literature, this suggests that while clear settings encourage punishment of the incumbent unclear settings tend to cause individuals to become more withdrawn and alienated. However, economic conditions are also important to overall system effects. The findings herein suggest that unclear or fuzzy settings increase the role of economic conditions in determination of system affect.