‘Bumps in the Road Ahead’: How External Actors Defuse Power-Sharing Crises

ABSTRACT

Power-sharing is a governance approach favoured by external actors for building state capacity and legitimacy in post-conflict societies. Yet it can be unstable and crisis-prone, compelling external actors to guide cross-community cooperation. Why and how do external actors seek to maintain power-sharing and prevent its collapse when operational difficulties emerge? We explore the distinction between ‘light touch’ and ‘heavy hand’ techniques and the motivations of external actors in defusing power-sharing crises. We find a trade-off between the short-term value of crisis management (‘putting out fires’) and the long-term objectives of sustainable local arrangements and external exit (local actors ‘going it alone’).     

Semi-peripheral Islamophobias: the political diversity of anti-Muslim discourses in Poland

ABSTRACT

Bobako’s paper examines two genres of Polish Islamophobic discourse, a liberal and a nationalist one, and links their specificity to the semi-peripheral position of Poland. It argues that the liberal endorsement of Islamophobia is a way to confirm symbolically Poland’s belonging to ‘the West’ and its commitment to the normative project of European modernity, with its affirmation of individualism, human rights, sexual freedom and secularism. On the other hand, Bobako shows that the Islamophobia of the resurgent nationalist forces in Poland is, paradoxically, the outcome of a rejection of this very project, which is perceived as a threat to national political sovereignty and cultural autonomy. She connects this rejection to Poland’s post-Communist trajectory of economic marginalization and instability, providing a context for the widespread dissatisfaction with Poland’s place in the European Union.     

The “dictator’s endgame”: Explaining military behavior in nonviolent anti-incumbent mass protests

This article introduces a configurative theory to explain military reactions to nonviolent mass protests in dictatorships. An empirical analysis of three cases of such “dictators endgames” (Burma in 1988, Sudan in 1985, and East Germany in 1989), shows that militaries will defend the dictator against the masses if the military leadership’s physical and economic well-being is linked to the dictator’s survival in office. In turn, military leaders will defect from the regime incumbent only if the alternatives of siding with the opposition or staging a coup d’état is expected to be more beneficial to their interests than staying loyal to the regime.     

The 2003 and 2015 Constitutional Referenda in Rwanda: A Significant Change in Voter Turnout

Data on voter turnout and choice at the Rwanda’s 2003 and 2015 constitutional referenda were acquired and analyzed. The results revealed contrasting changes in voter turnout between diaspora and in-country electorate. Arguably, at home, lack of freedom on the part of registered voters to make independent choices may explain the 9.3 percent and 5.2 percent increase in voter turnout and “yes” vote, respectively. On the other hand, while the repressive arm of the regime can reach Rwandan citizens both at home and abroad so as to compel them not oppose its political agenda, voters in diaspora enjoy some level of relaxation, especially those staying in Western democracies, which could explain the 37.8 percent drop in voter turnout. The article further argues that the results of the 2003 and 2015 referenda could be used to support suggestions that the Tutsi electorate indeed stands more divided than it was a decade ago.     

Walking a tightrope: democracy versus sovereignty in ASEAN's illiberal peace

Abstract

Since 1967, ASEAN has established intramural relations that forsake war as a means for resolving conflict. While this is a remarkable achievement for the region, it must be balanced against a concomitant hindrance of democratic reform. I argue in this paper that ASEAN's nascent security community must be seen as an ‘illiberal peace’. Underlying ASEAN's peaceful community are the same principles that support illiberalism in the region, namely sovereignty and non-interference. While sovereignty has historically been a cherished norm for developing countries, ASEAN lags behind other regions, particularly Latin America, in attempting to reconcile tensions between democratic norms and the respect for sovereignty. This tension is most evident in ASEAN's relations with Myanmar. Recent events indicate that ASEAN's non-interference norm may no longer be sacrosanct, but the association is a long way from shunning illiberal politics for the sake of democratic values.     

Ethnic politics,complex legitimacy crisis,and intramural relations within ASEAN

This article examines ethnic conflict and its impacts on intramural relations within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It suggests that ethnic politics at home often propels leaders to get involved in ethnic conflict elsewhere. In the ASEAN context, regional institutions, especially the principle of non-interference, mitigate the effects of ethnic politics and preclude the possibility of coercive intervention. The third state is more likely to appeal to facilitation or mediation. On the side of the host state, when the regime faces complex legitimacy crisis, it is more likely to reject the third state's involvement. Ethnic conflict is likely to cause diplomatic tussles between the two states. In contrast, when the regime of the host state enjoys a higher level of legitimacy, it is more amenable to the third party's mediation. Cooperation on conflict management will foster inter-state trust. This article illustrates the above mechanism by examining Malaysia's role in Thailand and the Philippines’ ethnic insurgencies.     

The Singapore developmental state in the new economy and polity

Abstract

This article presents a counterpoint to the popular portrayals of political transitions in the Philippines and Indonesia as ‘people power’ driven by civil society mobilisation. Inherent in this kind of analysis is the popular assumption that transitions from sultanistic regimes are likely to be driven almost completely by forces outside of the regime, as they do not allow for independent actors or institutions that could peacefully arrange for transition ‘from within’. This article suggests that, despite the appearance of a ‘people power’ revolution, the key driver behind the fall of the Marcos and Suharto regimes was forces internal to the regimes. Sultanistic regimes could collapse not only as a result of society-led displacement; sultanistic rulers could also be brought down by an alliance of moderate opposition elites and regime soft-liners, which opens up the way for a much less revolutionary path out of sultanism. More importantly, this article suggests that these elites emerged as a result of their growing marginalisation in the patronage system. Their challenge to the sultan was motivated less by strong democratic conviction than by desire to gain greater access to state patronage.     

The dictators’ domino theory: a Caribbean Basin anti-communist network, 1947–1952

This article uncovers a Caribbean Basin anti-communist intelligence network independent of the U.S. government and the international Cold War. Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, Honduran dictator Tiburcio Carías, and Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo characterized local democratic developments as communist threats to their regimes’ national security. With the 1947 Cayo Confites expedition and the 1948 Costa Rican Civil War, the military dictators coalesced into an informal network that increasingly shared intelligence. Joined by the Venezuelan military junta and Fulgencio Batista’s Cuban dictatorship, members nurtured a Caribbean Basin anti-communist domino theory characterising threats to one regime as a transnational danger to regional stability.     

Lobbying and (de)centralization

This paper presents a positive theory of (de)centralization of policy decisions in an international union -defined as a supranational jurisdiction that may exercise a policy prerogative on behalf of member countries. I build a benchmark model where national lobbies can coordinate (i.e. form a trans-national lobby) at no cost and show that lobbying does not affect the fiscal regime. On the other hand, when interest groups cannot coordinate, decentralization emerges as a political equilibrium with lobbying. Policy centralization hurts national lobbies by increasing competition for influence. At a constitutional stage, interest groups induce politically motivated governments to reject centralization. Three extensions show that this result depends on the level of cross-border externalities; the voting rule at the constitutional stage; and the details of the institutional decision mechanism under centralization.     

‘Party competition and dual accountability in multi-level systems’ the independence echo: the rise of the constitutional question in Scottish election manifestos and voter behaviour

ABSTRACT

Since the formation of the Scottish Parliament, the idea of Scottish independence increased in salience and popularity among Scottish voters to such an extent that it now constitutes the country’s defining political cleavage. Given that Scottish politics is increasingly organized around this constitutional question, support for either side of the debate among voters and elites drives political engagement, election turnout and public attitudes to other major issues. Although much popular and academic work has sought to explain the rise of support for independence, few scholars have explored changes in elite behaviour or its consequences for public opinion. From an elite-driven perspective, the increased salience of independence may be but an echo of elite and partisan attention. Developing hypotheses from this approach, we predict that voters identifying with parties developed stronger views on independence following increased attention in parties’ campaigns. We examine these hypotheses by performing computer assisted, unsupervised content analysis of Scottish Parties’ election manifestos. We then use estimates from a structural topic model to predict change in voter support for independence from the British Election Study. The theory and results suggest that increasing salience on alternative dimensions of politics likely closely relates to elite-driven choices in their election campaigns.     

Can China’s Economic Statecraft Win Soft Power in Africa? Unpacking Trade,Investment and Aid

Boosting China’s soft power is an important goal of Chinese economic statecraft in Africa. However, African opinions of China – in particular those of ordinary people – are understudied, and existing evidence suggests African viewpoints on China are highly varied and polarized. On the one hand, China’s growing economic linkages are welcomed by Africans as an important alternative to traditional partners, and a vital source of funding for development needs. On the other hand, Africans see China as a source of poor-quality products and an exploitative threat to local markets. How can scholars understand these polarized opinions on China? Using data from the Afrobarometer Round 6 survey (2016), this article aims to untangle African perceptions of Chinese economic engagement through unpacking the distinctive effects of China’s three tools of economic statecraft: trade, foreign direct investment, and aid. Analyses of Chinese influence frequently package these three modes of engagement together, but in practice they have very different consequences for China’s soft power. Negative perceptions of China among African citizens are primarily associated with trade-related issues. China’s investment and aid, on the other hand, generally make a positive contribution to Chinese soft power in Africa. By highlighting the contrasting effects of different instruments of economic engagement, this analysis contributes insight into Sino-African relations and China’s wider economic diplomacy.

     

Taking cues from the government: heuristic versus systematic processing in a constitutional referendum

Abstract

One of the main criticisms of direct democracy is that it places excessive demands on voters. Are citizens competent enough to vote directly on policy issues? When stakes are high, do citizens mainly follow elites’ signals or do they decide in line with their issue preferences? This article addresses these questions in a multi-method setting by combining observational and experimental data from an original three-wave panel survey conducted during the 2016 Italian constitutional referendum. In particular, Finite Mixture Models are employed to model voters’ heterogeneous strategies of information processing. Findings show that heuristic voting based on government evaluation prevails over policy-related voting. More specifically, less politically sophisticated and partisan voters relied on government assessment as a heuristic, while sophisticated and independent voters based their decisions mostly on their assessment of the reform. Implications for the question of citizens’ competence in direct democracy are discussed.     

Bagehot Smiling: Gordon Brown's ‘New Constitution’ and the Revolution that Did Not Happen

The MPs expenses scandal that erupted in May 2009 has certainly rekindled interest in the next stage of constitutional reform and democratic renewal in Britain. This article examines how Gordon Brown's tenure as Prime Minister has differed from Tony Blair's in relation to the ‘new politics’ narrative. It argues that despite his long‐term personal commitment to major constitutional reforms, the role of crises in recalibrating the political opportunity structure and the manner in which electoral incentives can alter elite attitudes to institutional change that Brown's tenure can be characterised by optimism followed by timidity. Gordon Brown may have flown a few kites in relation to a written constitution, electoral reform, English devolution and the future of the House of Lords but he has left things far too late for a ‘constitutional moment’. Brown may have the political inclination but he lacks the capacity to deliver far‐reaching reform; Cameron is likely to have the capacity but not the inclination.     

The changing political economy of Taiwan‐Southeast Asia relations

This paper examines the possibility that the United States could ‘capture’ the Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and use it to impose America's economic agenda on the region. It discusses Washington's ability to shape the choices of APEC's East Asian members at APEC negotiations to reflect US interests through employing its military, economic, cultural, and ideological resources as instruments of leverage and influence. While interdependence constrains Washington's use of military and/or economic leverage to influence the choices of APEC's East Asian members, the complex bargaining and consensual decision‐making features of APEC further prevent Washington from imposing its agenda on APEC. On the other hand, Washington's capture of APEC could be facilitated if East Asian policy‐making elites were socialized through the APEC process to accept American norms. This would tend to lead to preference convergence since the values of both the US and East Asia would coincide. The analysis suggests, however, that American norms are unlikely to prevail within APEC in the near to medium term primarily because APEC's East Asian members consider East Asian norms to be superior. American culture and especially ideology are not sufficiently attractive to East Asian elites and are thus unable to be used as instruments of influence. For these reasons, the paper concludes that the United States will find it difficult to impose its economic agenda on the region through APEC.     

In search of blue water power: The PLA navy's maritime strategy in the 1990s

Abstract

A new literature attributes the resilience of hybrid regimes to the ways in which institutions and procedures can be manipulated. This article contends, however, that more crucial for resilience than manipulable institutions are the distinct and prior sets of relations between elites, mass publics and foreign investors. To test this thesis, analysis focuses on Malaysia, a country whose regime is regarded as hybrid, yet whose resilience has recently fluctuated. The last years of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad's prime ministership are thus contrasted with the first year in office of his successor, Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi. Greater attention is given to Abdullah's tenure, finding that under his leadership, Malaysia's hybrid regime has re-equilibrated.     

Federal Dynamics in Canada, the United States, and Switzerland: How Substates' Internal Organization Affects Intergovernmental Relations

This article argues that internal substate dynamics can systematicallyaccount for the organization of intergovernmental relations(IGR) in dual federal systems. Whereas majoritarian executive-legislativerelations tend to weaken the institutionalization of intergovernmentalarrangements (IGAs), power-sharing executive-legislative relationstend to facilitate it. Two of the mechanisms at work serve toillustrate this point. Given one-party majority cabinets, completegovernment alternations strongly alter actors' interest constellationsover time, thereby increasing the costs of maintaining stablecross-boundary IGR. Moreover, the heavy impact of a potentialelectoral loss induces politicians to shift blame to other governments,thereby undermining cross-boundary cooperation. Majoritariandynamics also weaken integration between IGAs. Furthermore,integration is weakened by compulsory power-sharing structuresunbridged by party ties. In contrast to noncompulsory partycooperation, such internal constitutional divides easily underminethe setup of strong interorganizational linkages.     

The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession

The paper extends and empirically tests GordonTullock's public choice theory of the nature of autocracy. A simple model of the relationship between constitutional rules governing succession in autocratic regimes and the occurrence of coups against autocrats is sketched. The model is applied to a case study of coups against monarchs in Denmark in the period ca. 935–1849. A clear connection is found between the specific constitutional rules governing succession and the frequency of coups. Specifically, the introduction of automatic hereditary succession inan autocracy provides stability and limits the number of coups conducted by contenders.     

Succession,power-sharing and the development of representative institutions in medieval Europe

Historians have documented that in medieval Europe, bargaining over the loyalty of lay magnates and high clergy was most intense during successions and that this often forced monarchs to give political concessions. We argue that matters related to succession predict short-term power-sharing concessions by rulers but that – because they do not permanently alter the balance of power between ruler and elite – they only trigger lasting changes of political institutions if these changes are in the mutual interest of the ruler and the elite groups. It follows that successions are unlikely to have long-term effects on representative institutions but that they may consolidate the rules regulating succession (the succession order). Using the natural deaths of monarchs as an instrument for successions, we confirm these claims with a new dataset that includes fine-grained data on succession and parliament-like assemblies in 16 European polities between 1000 and 1600. These findings shed new light on the development of representative institutions in medieval Europe, on the changes in succession orders that brought about clear rules about primogeniture and on the political leeway of legislatures in authoritarian regimes more generally.     

Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Persuasion and Legitimacy: Official Framing in the Case of the Chinese Communist Party

In the debate on authoritarian resilience, the importance of persuasion to regime legitimacy has been widely acknowledged, yet a conceptual framework explaining the role of persuasion is still lacking. Against this backdrop, we argue that the framing perspective (Benford and Snow 1988) provides a useful basis for such a framework. Drawing on Beetham’s (1991) legitimacy model, we contend that the ruling elites in authoritarian regimes propagate official frames in a continuous effort to reproduce the belief of the populace in the elites’ leadership qualities and their determination to serve the common interest. In the empirical part of our paper we look at the case of China, where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has in recent years reemphasized persuasion as a means of reproducing legitimacy. We then apply our theory in an analysis of the conceptual shifts in the CCP’s frames and ideology, as propagated under its secretary general, Hu Jintao.