Congressional Dominance and the International Trade Commission

This study examines the unfair trade decisions of the InternationalTrade Commission (ITC) and how they have been affected by Congress.It begins by identifying the means Congress can use to influenceITC decisions and then estimates both the extent to which thesemeans have been used and the extent to which they have shaped theITC's behavior. The study reaches two conclusions. First, Congresshas tried to shape the ITC's behavior, but it has not tried tomicromanage this behavior. Second, while the ITC's behavior hasbeen influenced by Congress, congressional influence is not asimportant as other factors, such as statutory criteria.     

Congressional rationality and spatial voting

It is very difficult to demonstrate that representatives employ sophisticated cost-benefit calculations in evaluating constituent benefits when making many legislative decisions. This is because most modern American legislation is ambiguous about which constituencies will receive particularized benefits. This paper examines a series of locational rollcall votes in which the benefits going to constituents were obvious. In such cases representatives balance increases in voter support within their congressional districts and potential increases in their political power within Congress to be gained by vote trading. If constituency benefits are great, representatives overwhelmingly support legislation to provide such benefits. As the benefits decline, vote trading increases.     

Presidential and Congressional Vote-Share Equations

Three vote-share equations are estimated and analyzed in this article, one for presidential elections, one for on-term House elections, and one for midterm House elections. The sample period is 1916–2006. Considering the three equations together allows one to test whether the same economic variables affect each and to examine various serial correlation and coattail possibilities. The main conclusions are (1) there is strong evidence that the economy affects all three vote shares and in remarkably similar ways; (2) there is no evidence of any presidential coattail effects on the on-term House elections; (3) there is positive serial correlation in the House vote, which likely reflects a positive incumbency effect for elected representatives; and (4) the presidential vote share has a negative effect on the next midterm House vote share, which is likely explained by a balance argument.     

Congressional tenure: Myth and reality

Congressional tenure is longer now than in earlier times, but it is largely a myth that the era of the professional politician is a modern phenomenon. Here, tenure is compared between the 57th and 86th Congresses. Tenure is linked to a simple median voter model. Increased tenure is associated with an increased ability to transfer government expenditures to the political unit. The increased size of government at the time of the 86th Congress compared to the 57th Congress, largely explains the greater length of time in office. The higher tenure of southern legislators is linked to lower per capita incomes.     

Congressional committees and the political economy of federal outlays

The literature on the organization of the United States Congress has been dominated by “distributive” and “informational” theory. One important source of disagreement between these two theories is their characterization of whether individual legislators can engage in pork-barrel activities. Here we provide evidence which indicates that the pork-barrel is alive and well in the contemporary United States Congress. We focus on whether members of power and constituency committees can direct disproportionate federal expenditures to their districts. Finding strong and systematic evidence of pork-barrel activities by committee members provides empirical support for distributive theories of legislative organization.     

Congressional distributive politics and state economic performance

States that were represented by very senior Democratic congressmen grew more quickly during the 1953–1990 period than states that were represented by more junior congressional delegations. States with a large fraction of politically competitive House districts also grew faster than average. The first finding is consistent with traditional legislator-based models of distributive politics, the second with partisan models. We cannot detect any substantively important association between seniority, state political competition, and the geographic distribution of federal funds, so higher district- specific federal spending does not appear to be the source of the link between state economic growth and congressional representation.     

Congressional Response to Mandate Elections

Elections from time to time are widely believed to carry a mandate, to express a message about changed policy preferences of the electorate. Whatever the accuracy of such beliefs—a matter about which we are skeptical—perceptions of a mandate should affect the behavior of actors in government. Politicians lack the scholarly luxury of waiting for careful analyses. They must act in the months following elections. We postulate that many will act as if the mandate perceptions were true, veering away from their normal voting patterns. This is driven by election results and interpretations that undermine old calculations about what voters want. As the flow of information gradually changes these perceptions, and the election becomes more distant, members of Congress return to their normal position. We first ask, how would members observe an emerging consensus of mandate? And then we model the duration of the change in behavior in an event‐history framework. That permits a depiction of important movements of the median member and, from this, inferences about policy impact.     

Congressional Voting on Term Limits

Between 1990 and 1995,twenty-three states unilaterally imposedterm limits on their own delegations toCongress. In 1995 the House ofRepresentatives defeated a constitutionalamendment that would have limited the termsfor all of Congress. Only weeks later, theSupreme Court struck down the individualstate laws. In 1997 the House againbrought the issue to a vote, which alsofailed. This paper models congressionalvoting on term limits with a simple gamewithin an interest-group theory withlegislators as imperfect agents ofconstituents. The game foremost predictsthat members from term-limited states wouldbe more likely to support term limits inthe first vote but no more likely on thesecond vote. The empirical section employsprobit, multinomial logit, and orderedprobit maximum likelihood estimations toconfirm the stated hypotheses. Among otherresults, in particular both the joint andconditional probability of a `yea' on thefirst vote and a subsequent `nay' on thesecond vote is higher for members fromstates that had unilaterally self-imposedterm limits. The results are robust tomodel specification, estimator, andalternative sampling. Implications areproposed in the concluding comments.     

Reassessing the Role of Constituency in Congressional Voting

Poole and Rosenthal (1997) argue that mostcongressional voting can be understood in terms of alow-dimensional spatial model. This paper uses their model toassess the importance of the two mechanisms that couldcontribute to the vote-predicting power of constituencyvariables: (i) constituency variables may predict wherelegislators fall along one or two dimensions in thevote-predicting spatial model and (ii) constituency variablesmay account for errors in the spatial model's predictions. Thepaper compares different methods of using a basicset of constituency variables to generate out-of-sample predictionsfor representatives' votes. The analysis covers a large numberof recent House roll call votes, considering Democrats andRepublicans separately and using Poole and Rosenthal'sW-NOMINATE scores to measure legislators' locations invote-predicting space. The results show that the predictivepower of a basic set of constituency variables arisesprincipally from its ability to predict representatives'locations in Poole and Rosenthal's space, not from its abilityto explain errors in the predictions based on that space. Thisholds true to a remarkable extent, consistent with Poole andRosenthal's argument that the influence of constituentinterests occurs largely through logrolling mechanismsreflected in their spatial model.     

Congressional Responses to the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions

Scholars who have sought to assess the consequences of the RehnquistCourt's federalism decisions have identified various means bywhich Congress can overcome the effects of these rulings, butthere have been few efforts to investigate the degree to whichCongress has employed these means. This study finds that Congresshas enjoyed limited success in responding to the Court's rulings.Significantly, though, the failure to overcome the effects ofthese decisions is rarely attributable to the fact that theCourt's constitutional doctrines have erected insurmountablebarriers to congressional action. Rather, the Court's decisionshave forced congressional supporters of the invalidated statutoryprovisions to build and hold political coalitions in supportof the repassage of these laws, and this has frequently provedto be difficult to accomplish, whether due to a lack of enthusiasmfor such efforts, conflicts with other policy goals, or oppositionfrom other groups.     

Congressional Use of the Program Assessment Rating Tool

This paper seeks to advance knowledge about congressional use of the program assessment rating tool (PART) in the 109th Congress. The research suggest that both congressional chambers use PART on a limited basis; affirms that congressional committees are exposed to PART scores through congressional budget justification score inclusion and in federal agency testimony; and that use was primarily driven by non‐congressional actors.     

Congressional campaign effects on candidate recognition and evaluation

To date, most congressional scholars have relied upon a standard model of American electoral behavior developed in the presidential setting. This research extends our knowledge of Congressmen's incumbency advantages and their sources. Candidate preference is viewed as a function of the relative recognition and evaluation of incumbents and their challengers, as well as of Democrats and Republicans. In the recognition model, contact with voters and media effects are quite important, but there is no direct role for party identification. Evaluation is a function of personal contact and party identification, and media variables are insignificant. Relative recognition, relative evaluation, and party identification are three important predictors of candidate preference, and incumbency itself adds little beyond what is contained in incumbent recognition and evaluation advantages.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1980 annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco, March 1980.     

Congressional committees as users of analysis

Structural arrangements in the Congress work against the use of analysis, but newer developments, such as growth in staff professionalism and activity of the congressional support agencies, tend to promote it. Interviews with committee staff show that they are aware of much analysis, use it primarily for political advantage, but that they also take it seriously as warning of problems and as guidance on particular issues. Staff value information more when they know and trust its source and understand its political motivations. The use of analysis to reconceptualize problems is not much in evidence, perhaps because such “enlightenment” takes place elsewhere and filters into the Congress through informal channels.