The Supreme Court and the pledge of allegiance: a hollow victory

In Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow (Elk Grove),1 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). View all notes the Supreme Court, in an 8–0 judgment,2 Justice Scalia chose not to participate in the outcome since he criticized the Ninth Circuit's ruling before it reached the High Court. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 384 (Mem) (2003). See also Mark Walsh, Scalia: Courts go too far on Church State, Education Week, 22 January 2003, p. 22; Houston Chronicle, Justice decries courts removal of God, 13 January 2003, p. 5. View all notes with three concurrences, upheld the words ‘under God’ in the Pledge of Allegiance. In light of the uproar caused by Elk Grove, this article is divided into three parts. After reviewing the history of the Pledge the second section examines the litigation involving the pledge, including Elk Grove in this regard. The article concludes with brief reflections on the meaning of Elk Grove.     

The Supreme Court and Police Practices: The Last Two Terms

The 2003–2004 term of the Supreme Court was noteworthy because it decided a relatively large number of cases dealing with police practices, many of which were of special significance. The next two terms (2004–2005 and 2005–2006 terms) were not quite as noteworthy, but still the Court decided eight police practices cases, dealing with such important issues as the detention of the residents of a home while executing a search warrant, the use of canine sniffs during a traffic stop, the validity of anticipatory search warrants, and the validity of third party consent to search when another person with authority to consent is present and objects to the search. These two terms do not provide enough cases to permit a confident prediction about the approach that the two new members of the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito, are likely to take in police practices cases. However, their positions in the cases discussed in this article suggest that both will take positions in support of the police in these cases.     

The US Supreme Court Affirms the Filartiga Paradigm

In 2004, for the first time in history, the United States SupremeCourt addressed the meaning and scope of the Alien Tort Statute(ATS) of 1789. Originally intended to provide redress for actsof piracy or offences against ambassadors, the Statute has beenused since the 1980 watershed case of Filartiga v. Peña-Iralato award damages in civil trials in the United States to foreignvictims of, inter alia, torture, summary execution and forceddisappearance. Opponents have claimed, among other things, thatuse of the ATS shows disregard for principles of internationalcomity; is inconsistent with principles governing the use ofuniversal jurisdiction; and results in an imperialist Americanprivatization of human rights. The author argues that the SupremeCourt's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain limits the ATS toa tool of complementary justice consistent with prevailing principlesof global accountability.     

Abela and Others v Baadarani: The Politics Within the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court deals with many political cases, where policies are at stake, while on the other hand there is the politics within the Court which can also play an important role. It is difficult to judge the current system without sound empirical and theoretical studies, so one cannot confidently assess the effectiveness of the paper appeals in the American System in the light of the long history of the UK system, of different career paths of advocates in these two countries and of different routes of appointment for judges in both jurisdictions. Nevertheless, any interviews that were conducted with senior judges in the UK were conducted a long time ago and might not be applicable to the current realities. It is true that the British system is open to moderation—the elimination of the House of Lords and its replacement with the Supreme Court is the best example—but maybe more changes are needed. It is paramount that greater diversity in the profession brings fresh perspectives. This is evident in electing practitioners with different career paths, such as Justice Kennedy and Lord Sumption. The president of the Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger, even suggested advertising the next position in the Supreme Court to be on a part time basis, to enable the election of an academic. As stated in the introduction, since Abela and others v Baadarani is a case with important principles at stake, is there a space for political disagreement?     

The Problem of Emergency in the American Supreme Court

Sixty years before Carl Schmitt wrote his Political Theology, and more than a 100 years before President Bush announced a ‘war on terrorism’ the American Supreme Court grappled with the difficult issue of emergency powers in connection with issues arising out of the American Civil War (1861–1865). The question confronting the Court in a set of cases named the Prize Cases was whether President Lincoln’s decision to respond to acts of aggression by the secessionist Southern states with measures of war was lawful. The legal problem was that Lincoln had made this decision unilaterally although the American Constitution specifically allocates the power to declare war to Congress. The Court solved the dilemma by arguing that in cases where no war has been declared, the decision whether the country is in a state of war is ultimately ‘a question to be decided by him [the President], and [the Supreme] Court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the Government to which this power was entrusted’ (Prize, p. 669). The precedent, which the Court thereby laid down, has since played out as an important leverage for the Bush government’s legal arguments in connection with the war on terrorism. This article engages the theoretical framework of Locke, Schmitt and Agamben in order to come to a better understanding of this important set of cases.     

Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint

This paper addresses the contradictory results obtained by Segal (1997) and Spiller and Gely (1992) concerning the impact of institutional constraints on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision making. By adapting the Spiller and Gely maximum likelihood model to the Segal dataset, we find support for the hypothesis that the Court adjusts its decisions to presidential and congressional preferences. Data from 1947 to 1992 indicate that the average probability of the Court being constrained has been approximately one‐third. Further, we show that the results obtained by Segal are the product of biases introduced by a misspecified econometric model. We also discuss how our estimation highlights the usefulness of Krehbiel's model of legislative decision making.