Politische Institutionen und die Entwicklung generalisierten Vertrauens. Ein internationaler Vergleich

Trust functions as an instrument for establishing long-term and mutually beneficial cooperative relationships. In this paper we investigate the sources of generalized trust. The main focus of the research is the role of the political-institutional context in allowing trust-based relationships to form, controlling for the attributes and motives of individual agents. The central contention of the paper is that political institutions that support norms of fairness, universality, and the division of power contribute to the formation of inter-personal trust. Using data from the World Values Survey we run multi-level models to test for links between differences between the responses of individuals in various countries and the trust-supporting context, in terms of different institutional configurations. Alongside individual resources and attitudes, aspects of social integration and other sociodemographic characteristics, we test for significant effects of contextual factors — such as the influence of formal rule-of-law institutions, social inequality, and the division of power or pluralistic democratic procedures. The study comes to the conclusion that universalistic, impartial and power-sharing institutions increase the prospects for the development of generalized trust.     

Parteien und Bürgermeister in der Repräsentativen Demokratie. Kommunale Konkordanz- und Konkurrenzdemokratie im Vergleich

Analogous to Lehmbruch’s model, two ideal types of representative democracy may also be distinguished in respect of local politics. Proportional democracy is characterised by a low degree of party politisation of both parish councils and mayors. This holds for the nomination period, on the hustings, for the election and during government, and induces the dominance of the mayor in all periods. Local competitive democracy, however, may be described in terms of a less influential mayor in all phases and a high degree of party politisation. There is empirical evidence that patterns of proportional democracy prevail in Baden-Wuerttemberg, whereas North Rhine-Westphalian communities are dominated by actors’ constellations similar to the competitive democracy model. These differences can be explained by diverging communal laws, a lower degree of party organisation in Baden-Wuerttemberg, and a lower average population size in the southern communities. Legal conditions, the degree of party organisation and population size as independent variables can be subsumed into an index of proportional democracy, which may be helpful for a preliminary indexing of communities in other German Laender states.     

Normative Modelle, institutionelle Typen und beobachtbare Verhaltensmuster: Ein Vorschlag zum Vergleich parlamentarischer Demokratien

The article proposes a two-dimensional, institutional determination of types of parliamentary democracy, with respect to the proportionality of the electoral system and (quasi-)legislative veto points. Three basic types of parliamentary democracy are distinguished: pluralitarian, majoritarian and supermajoritarian. The typology has important advantages over the approach of Arend Lijphart. It has a consistent two-dimensional conceptual foundation, it can be directly related to central controversies in normative democratic theory, it can be systematically linked to action theory approaches such as Veto Player Theory, and it highlights the characteristics of democracies with majoritarian constitutions, which are systematically downplayed in Lijphart’s approach. The most important variant of this type uses a proportionality principle in the electoral system and a majoritarian principle in the legislative system. It is shown that in these democracies, legislative majority rule can itself contribute to “consensual” patterns of behavior.     

Entwicklungswege des regulativen Staates — Ein Vergleich zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und Kanada

The paper takes Giandomenico Majone’s characterization of the regulatory state as starting point for a comparative analysis of the structures, politics and policies of regulation in the United States and Canada. It argues that Majone’s approach only partly captures the reality of the US regulatory system and, by concentrating on the US, fails to incorporate other versions of the regulatory state. The American regulatory state is only of limited value as a reference model for the European nation states, because the characteristics of national regulatory regimes are shaped by political culture and state structures. In this regard, Canada bears a much stronger resemblance to the European nations. Therefore, its long experience with regulatory institutions and practices is likely to be more instructive for the European debates. Future analysis should focus more strongly on the filtering processes by which national responses to general trends are shaped and on the distinct paths of development resulting from these processes.