The political consequences of thatcherism

While the economic changes effected by the British Conservative government in the 1980s are transparent, there is considerable debate as to whether there was a political dimension to the Thatcher Revolution. This paper argues that the Conservatives were successful in undertaking social structural reforms that effectively moved the political center of gravity in Britain to the right and toward the government's preferred market-oriented policy agenda. The government's strategy—manifest in the sale of council houses to tenants and of shares in privatized corporations to individuals, and its attack on organized labor—was narrowly targeted on the swing electorate among wealthier members of the lower socioeconomic strata. The Labour party has acknowledged the successes of the Conservatives' structural reforms, and has moved its policy platform, in Downsian fashion, to the right in order to regain electoral competitiveness.     

The electoral consequences of voter ignorance

A great deal of research has suggested that scholarly and popular concerns about low levels of citizen political knowledge are exaggerated. One implication of that research is that political history would have unfolded just as it did even if electorates had been more politically informed. This paper presents evidence that counters these claims, showing an infusion of electorally relevant information in twenty-seven democracies would have likely led to a lot of vote “switching”, ultimately changing the composition of many governments. The paper also directly and systematically examines what we might call the “enlightened natural constituency” hypothesis, which expects lower-income citizens to vote disproportionately for left parties once armed with more political knowledge. While the basic argument about how political ignorance disproportionately affects the left’s natural constituency is not new, the hypothesis has thus far not been tested. The analysis provides provisional support for the hypothesis.     

The policy consequences of political corruption

Controversies abound over whether political corruption handicaps the disadvantaged, facilitates government action, or simply inflates government costs. Multivariate analysis using data from the American states supports none of the hypotheses. Rather, corruption appears to have virtually no policy impact, either directly or in interaction with party competition.     

The efficiency of regulatory arbitrage

Public Choice - Classic public choice skepticism about the regulatory state, based on theories of rent-seeking, rent extraction and regulatory capture, is based on the unrealistic, and usually...     

The electoral consequences of the financial and economic crisis in Europe

The electoral consequences of the Great Recession are analysed in this article by combining insights from economic voting theories and the literature on party system change. Taking cues from these two theoretical perspectives, the impact of the Great Recession on the stability and change of Western, Central and Eastern European party systems is assessed. The article starts from the premise that, in order to fully assess the impact of the contemporary crisis, classic economic voting hypotheses focused on incumbent parties need to be combined with accounts of long‐term party system change provided by realignment and dealignment theories. The empirical analysis draws on an original dataset of election results and economic and political indicators in 30 European democracies. The results indicate that during the Great Recession economic strain was associated with sizable losses for incumbent parties and an increasing destabilisation of Western European party systems, while its impact was significantly weaker in Central and Eastern European countries, where political rather than economic failures appeared to be more relevant. In line with the realignment perspective, the results also reveal that in Western Europe populist radical right, radical left and non‐mainstream parties benefited the most from the economic hardship, while support for mainstream parties decreased further.     

The political economy linkage between trade liberalization and domestic environmental regulations

This paper considers the political economy linkage between trade liberalization and domestic environmental regulations in a duopolistic product market. We investigate the environmental consequences and welfare implications of a home country’s unilateral tariff reduction on a polluting good. In a framework where the domestic environmental tax is subject to the influence of the home firm, we find that a tariff reduction on a good producing a consumption-type externality will improve the home country’s environmental quality. Moreover, we find that the home country’s tariff reduction will unambiguously enhance the home country’s welfare; and it will damage the foreign firm’s profits and thus the foreign country’s welfare, provided that the weight that the home government attaches to its social welfare is sufficiently small. This result also suggests the possibility that a unilateral tariff reduction will achieve a Pareto improvement.     

The attitudinal consequences of the tax revolt

This paper attempts to assess the strength and direction of the attitudinal consequences of the tax revolt. An initial taxonomy of potential attitudinal effects is developed in the first section via a brief examination of the attitude-based explanations of the revolt. Those effect hypotheses are then tested via a pretest-posttest comparison group design analysis of 1976, 1978, and 1980 American National Election Study data. The results of those tests are discussed in the final section.     

The electoral consequences of two great crises

Who benefits from deep economic crises: the left, the right or neither? On the basis of evidence from elections in 1929–1933 and 2008–2013 in all states that were democracies in both periods, it is argued in this article that the electoral consequences of the Great Depression and the Great Recession were surprisingly similar: in both periods, right‐wing parties were at first more successful than left‐wing parties, although this effect only lasted for a few years. The manner in which a crisis develops over time should be taken into account when examining the effects of deep economic downturns on the electoral fortunes of the left and the right.     

The economics of AIDS-related health insurance regulations: Interest group influence and ideology

The projected growth in the U.S. in the number of persons with AIDS has created concern about sources of financing the costs of health care services for persons with AIDS. Private health insurers have modified or considered modifying underwriting practices in response to the AIDS epidemic, but several state governments have developed significant regulatory constraints on AIDS-related underwriting practices. We model the state government's decision to impose AIDS-related regulatory constraints (HIV testing restrictions, restrictions on the use of information about sexual orientation, and mandated AIDS coverage). We find that HIV-testing restrictions tend to be more likely in states with relatively high AIDS prevalence rates and insurance industries that are relatively weak politically. States with prevailing attitudes favorable to persons with AIDS (i.e., relatively liberal states) are more likely than other states to impose HIV-testing restrictions. Measures of prevailing attitudes (ideology) appear to be the primary determinants of regulations prohibiting questions about sexual orientation, but economic interests are the primary determinants of mandated AIDS coverage.The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of Ned Becker, Janet Bronstein, David Colby, Patrick Donnelly, Roger Faith, Robert Hughes, Robert McGuire, Delfi Mondragón, Mike Morrisey, Jack Nelson and an anonymous reviewer, with the usual disclaimer.     

The effectiveness of regulatory disclosure policies

Regulatory transparency—mandatory disclosure of information by private or public institutions with a regulatory intent—has become an important frontier of government innovation. This paper assesses the effectiveness of such transparency systems by examining the design and impact of financial disclosure, nutritional labeling, workplace hazard communication, and five other diverse systems in the United States. We argue that transparency policies are effective only when the information they produce becomes “embedded” in the everyday decision‐making routines of information users and information disclosers. This double‐sided embeddedness is the most important condition for transparency systems' effectiveness. Based on detailed case analyses, we evaluate the user and discloser embeddedness of the eight major transparency policies. We then draw on a comprehensive inventory of prior studies of regulatory effectiveness to assess whether predictions about effectiveness based on characteristics of embeddedness are consistent with those evaluations. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

State regulations and the availability of child-care services

Most state regulations do not adversely affect the availability of regulated day-care services. However, regulations differ in their costliness, intrusiveness, and enforceability. Costly regulations may reduce the number of group day-care centers, and intrusive regulations may reduce the number of family day-care homes. Unenforceable regulations have no apparent effects. In some instances, regulators face trade-offs between quality and availability. However, requirements for provider training and limitations on group size do not involve such trade-offs. More broadly, improvements in the regulatory process may result in quality gains without reductions in availability.     

Discounting the benefits and costs of environmental regulations

This paper develops a two-stage procedure for discounting the benefits and costs of environmental regulations that is a variant of the shadow price of capital approach. Under this approach, the capital costs imposed by a regulation are annualized using the marginal rate of return on capital and then both benefits and costs are discounted using the social rate of time preference. This approach yields results that differ significantly from those of conventional discounting when benefits occur with a substantial lag or when benefits are long term.     

The political consequences of transitions out of marriage in Great Britain

This article uses British Household Panel Survey data to estimate the effects of divorce and widowhood on political attitudes and political behavior. In contrast to previous research, which mostly relied on cross-sectional data, a matched propensity score analysis does not find any effects of transitions out of marriage on policy preferences, party identification, or vote choice. The results also show that divorce (but not widowhood) substantially reduces electoral participation. Some preliminary evidence suggests that this effect of divorce on turnout is partially attributable to the increased residential mobility that accompanies divorce.     

The politics of other citizens

In all kinds of political action, citizens are confronted with the performances of other citizens. An important guide to political behaviour is therefore likely to be the assumptions people make concerning how others can be expected to behave. This article explores common sense ideas about other citizens as potential political participants, drawing on a series of group interviews conducted with taxi-drivers in Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic. I argue the expectations voiced of other citizens tend to be pessimistic in nature, casting them as ill-informed, apathetic, passive and unduly self-interested, notwithstanding the appearance of a more optimistic view which holds they can be expected to follow the lead of those who ‘take a stand’. These empirical observations lead to a discussion of the theoretical issues they raise, notably where to locate the origins of such views, and how to appraise their implications for democracy.