Political Competition,Path Dependence,and the Strategy of Sustainable Energy Transitions

Previous research emphasizes the importance of path dependence for sustainable energy transitions, but their strategic nature is frequently overlooked. We examine formally how exogenous shocks, such as changes in international energy prices, interact with positive reinforcement factors, such as the growing strength of the renewables advocacy coalition. We find that political competition modifies the effect of path dependence on policy and outcomes. Specifically, while “green” governments can use positive reinforcement mechanisms to lock in policy commitments (by creating green constituencies), “brown” governments strategically underprovide public support for renewable energy (to avoid creating green constituencies). The effect of positive reinforcement also decreases with international energy prices. Our empirical analysis shows that (1) political competition conditions the policy response to exogenous shocks and market failures, while (2) governments strategically exploit path dependence for political gain.     

Immigration,Globalization, and Unemployment Benefits in Developed EU States

At a time of mounting concern about how traditional welfare states will react to globalization, there has been increasing interest in specifying how global economic forces affect welfare policies in industrialized states. Building on theories from the political economy and comparative institutional literatures, we analyze the influence of an important aspect of globalization—the flow of immigration. Focusing on states in the European Union, we present a theoretical model that illustrates the interactive relationships between immigration, EU labor market integration, and domestic institutions. Our findings highlight how immigration in conjunction with domestic political institutions affects unemployment provisions, while labor market integrative forces remain in the background. The story of immigration and unemployment compensation in the EU is less about the opening of borders and the market forces of integration and more about the domestic political pressures.     

Economy,state and civil society

The paper identifies a double crisis of agency facing socialists-the inability of the state to act effectively as the agent of society as a whole, and of the party adequately to represent the diversity of people's interests. It argues that this crisis can be resolved by the development of civil society, enabling the exercise of social control over the state and the economy.

An institutional framework for participatory economic democracy is then outlined, based on the author's model of 'negotiated co-ordination'. The model incorporates market exchange, since enterprises use their existing capacity to meet market demand, but not market forces, since interdependent investment decisions are not taken separately by enterprises acting independently, but collectively through negotiation involving all those with an interest in their combined outcome.

The model is constructed on this basic principle of self-government-that decisions should be taken by those affected by them. The conclusion reached is that the dual crisis of agency can be resolved by the development of civil society, but that a role remains for the state, in resolving residual conflicts of interest when negotiation fails to produce agreement, and for political parties, in promoting alternative perspectives on the distribution of resources, rights and responsibilities.     

The distribution of honoraria income in the U.S. Congress: Who gets rents in legislatures and why?

The major conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that low-cost suppliers of political favors receive the highest honoraria incomes. There is no evidence that being a lawyer, acquiring a large number of committee assignments, receiving high ratings by labor unions, representing a safe district, or introducing numerous legislative bills, increases one's honoraria income in any significant way. The wider dispersal of power reduces the effects of seniority, and membership on the Finance Committee, in determining institutional power in the Senate; hence, these variables are only significantly related to honoraria income in the House. The smaller the number of suppliers in the Senate, relative to the House, means that senators obtain higher prices for their services. As a result, business groups are more willing to pay extra — a price premium — to assure that no shirking occurs.While the distribution of honoraria has caused considerable concern and given rise to cynical explanations as to who gets them and why (see, for example, McChesney, 1987), this analysis suggests a less pejorative but empirically valid conclusion: business, and therefore honoraria, gravitate to those who can supply political favors at a lower cost than other legislators, just as low-cost suppliers gain a greater proportion of the sales in the market than those who supply the same service but at a higher price.     

Political Equilibrium and the Provision of Public Goods

This paper treats interest groups – peoplein their role as consumers of a public goodand people in their role as taxpayers – asthe unit of account for representativevoting. Each group is allowed to make aneffort to support its preferred candidateand, at the margin, the effort-benefitratio is the political price the group iswilling to pay to secure an additionaldollar of benefits.

Under reasonable assumptions, a uniqueequilibrium is assured and itscharacteristics are quite intuitive. Inparticular, the marginal political benefit(from consumers) of the last unit of outputmust equal the marginal political cost(from taxpayers). Alternatively, the rateat which the politician can transformtaxpayer income into consumer surplus mustequal the ratio of their political prices. The result will be optimal only on the rareoccasion when the effort-benefit ratios ofthe two groups are equal.

Since political goals are themselves ``public goods'' for thetwo interest groups,they face all the normal free riderproblems. Moreover, even small differencesin the effort-benefit ratios of the twogroups lead to large welfare losses.

How bad can things get? Each group has anincentive to try to overcome free-riderproblems and divert resources from privatesector activities to politics. And anyincrease in political effort is alwaysrewarded. However, (1) the marginal returnis always higher for the group with thesmaller effort-benefit ratio; (2) thedifferential return between the two groupsgrows the further we stray from optimality;and (3) both groups face diminishingreturns. These incentives may act asnatural checks on political outcomes –placing some limit on the amount of wasteand inefficiency democracy is likely toproduce.

The influence of a producer (of the publicgood) group that collects a rent increasesthe likelihood that public goods will beoverproduced. In fact, it is conceivableto have a good with no value to consumersproduced, solely because of the influenceof producers. Comparative static analysisreveal that the political system willrespond to changes in market conditions ina way similar to economic markets. Themagnitude of these shifts differs fromeconomic markets, however. For goods thatare being overproduced, the politicalmarketplace overresponds to changes indemand and underresponds to changes incosts. The converse is true for goods thatare being underproduced.

     

企业-政府互动依赖关系与企业政治行为

随着现代商业体系的不断发展,企业在政治上的成功与在市场上的成功同样重要,于是企业政治行为就逐渐成为了企业战略的重要组成部分。通过对西方企业政府关系和企业政治行为的相关理论的回溯和总结,在分析企业与政府之间的互动依赖关系之上,将企业政治行为与企业战略相联系,讨论了在激烈的竞争环境下政府管制和公共政策对企业的影响,认为企业要合理地实施政治行为,可以根据自身不同的资源状态和个体独特优势状态,在个体独立策略、集体性策略和混合策略中进行平衡和选择。最后指出,我国的企业政治行为研究需要在学习借鉴西方理论的基础上,结合自身特殊的国情,从研究内容、研究方法等各个方面进一步进行拓展和创新。     

Sliding doors in Brussels: A career path analysis of EU affairs managers

This article investigates the revolving doors phenomenon in the European Union (EU). It proposes a management approach that treats this phenomenon as a form of corporate political activity through which companies try to gain access to decision makers. By using sequence analysis to examine the career paths of almost 300 EU affairs managers based in public and private companies across 26 countries, three different ideal‐typical managers are identified: those EU affairs managers coming from EU institutions and public affairs; those who make a career through the private sector; and those who establish themselves in national political institutions. This identification confirms that EU institutions need different types of information and companies need EU affairs managers with different professional backgrounds able to provide it. Rather than observing a revolving door of EU officials into EU government affairs, what the authors term ‘sliding doors’ – namely the separation of careers, especially between the public and private sectors – is discerned.     

非公有制领域职务犯罪及其预防

非公有制领域职务犯罪是指在非公有制部门中承担一定职务的人员,利用其职务,严重危害部门利益,刑法规定应该受到刑罚处罚的行为。非公有制领域职务犯罪大体可以分为贪利型职务犯罪、背信竞业型职务犯罪和渎职型职务犯罪三种类型。分析非公有制领域职务犯罪的形成原因必须从社会、非公有制部门及个人三个角度来进行,是动机、机会和条件相结合的产物。预防非公有制领域职务犯罪具有重要的现实意义,能够增强非公有制部门信誉,净化市场环境促进良性竞争,抑制官员腐败与打击贿赂行为。预防策略主要包括以下三个方面:加强职工思想教育,重视部门文化建设;加快部门制度建设,规范市场秩序;完善相关法制和监督体系建设。     

Towards a stages theory approach to privatization

In analysing the path of optimal sequencing of privatizations by public administrations, it is too simplistic to characterize the process as one in which in the early phase small state-owned enterprises are disposed of and, in the later stage, the larger enterprises. Such a dichotomy fails to capture fully the market failure elements, technological dimensions, sociological imperatives and political constraints that help to determine the choice and timing of enterprises to be privatized. Rather, the privatization experience of the developing and developed countries, including the former centrally planned economies, can be eclectically analysed as traditional, transitional and transformation stages in an almost inexorable movement towards a pure capitalist economy. In the traditional stage, countries have tended to privatize those enterprises for which the private sector has an obvious comparative advantage. In the transitional stage, the privatization programme includes certain important enterprises, which, despite a considerable amount of government subsidy or tariff protection, have performed ‘inefficiently’. In the stage of transformation from a still basically mixed economy to a near pure capitalist economy, there is privatization of the strategic enterprises. Although the stages approach varies between countries, the above-mentioned sequencing allows for more effective cumulative internalization of the learning experience.     

Labour protest in China’s private sector: responses to Chinese communism with capitalist characteristics

Abstract

Building on existing studies of worker activism in formerly communist states, this paper examines the context, nature and consequences of labour protest in China’s private sector – highlighting the specific features that have emerged from China’s unique ‘communist’ political regime and partially privatized economy. As private enterprises have grown in China, private sector worker protests have been common. Three key factors have shaped this activism: (i) a disjuncture between benevolent and protective national laws and the lived experience of workers; (ii) fluctuations in the labour market; and (iii) generational shifts and learning among workers, employers and political authorities. The interplay of these factors has led protesting private sector workers to focus their ire on their employers and on occasion local political authorities, while viewing national political leaders as sources of worker support. These dynamics have had both positive and negative consequences for private sector workers and political authorities. Making comparisons with other authoritarian and communist states, this study adds to current understandings of how specific economic and political configurations engender particular characteristics of labour activism – and how these change over time.     

Political Positions,Hierarchies and Political Markets: Towards a New Theory on Political Recruitment*

This article adresses itself to the problem of political recruitment. Most recruitment studies are based on models of recruitment where the model presupposes more candidates than positions. Studying local committees we cannot presuppose excess demand for political positions. The article tries to introduce economic theory into the study of political recruitment. With concepts of market, supply, demand and prices, the article discusses recruitment to various types of positions. When we have extreme market conditions with either excess demand or lack of demand, the recruitment processes can best be understood in terms of hierarchical forces. The sales of less important positions in a situation with low demand for these positions could best be understood in terms of market mechanism. Comparing an economic market with a political market, the article finds variation in the transaction structure. The economic markets have a specific transaction structure, with specific obligations linked to transactions, while the political markets have a more unspecified transaction structure with more unspecified obligations linked to the transactions. A less specified transaction structure has lower transaction costs in a hierarchy than in a market. This, the author believes, could explain why some transactions take place in markets while others take place in hierarchies.     

Doctors with borders: occupational licensing as an implicit barrier to high skill migration

Research on the political economy of immigration overlooks the specificity of human capital in skilled occupations and its implications for immigration preferences and policymaking. Conclusions that skilled Americans are unconcerned about labor market competition from skilled migrants build on a simple dichotomy between high and low skill migrants. In this article we show that natives turn to occupational licensing regulations as occupation-specific protectionist barriers to skilled migrant labor competition. In practice, high skill natives face labor market competition only from those high-skill migrants who share their occupation-specific skills. Licensure regulations ostensibly serve the public interest by certifying competence, but they can simultaneously be formidable barriers to entry by skilled migrants. From a collective action perspective, skilled natives can more easily secure sub-national, occupation-specific policies than influence national immigration policy. We exploit the unique structure of the American medical profession that allows us to distinguish between public interest and protectionist motives for migrant physician licensure regulations. We show that over the 1973–2010 period states with greater physician control over licensure requirements imposed more stringent requirements for migrant physician licensure and, as a consequence, received fewer new migrant physicians. By our estimates over a third of all US states could reduce their physician shortages by at least 10 percent within 5 years just by equalizing migrant and native licensure requirements. This article advances research on the political economy of immigration and highlights an overlooked dimension of international economic integration: regulatory rent-seeking as a barrier to the cross-national mobility of human capital, and the public policy implications of such barriers.     

Market making via regulation: The role of the state in carbon markets

Proponents as well as critics of carbon trading underestimate the institutional and political underpinnings of evolving carbon markets. Based on institutionalist approaches, this paper argues that the strong embeddedness of carbon markets explains why certain characteristics (positive and negative) materialize. Focusing on the actors who initiate and who influence carbon markets, this article also shows that currently only states and intergovernmental agreements provide the necessary regulation for carbon markets to exist and to work. Today, neither market actors nor NGOs nor public private partnerships have the political power to set up, regulate or capture evolving market structures. Thus, whether or not market‐based instruments bring about the desired results depends on good public regulation, which is – at least up to now – represented by the state. Four instances of the commodification of carbon serve as illustrations: the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS); the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM); the voluntary market; and new sectoral approaches, particularly Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+).     

Comparing the Politics of Hydraulic Fracturing in New York,Colorado, and Texas

The purpose of this article is to analyze perceptions and activities of policy actors, who are actively involved in or knowledgeable about the politics of hydraulic fracturing in New York, Colorado, and Texas. The analysis is guided by research questions drawn from the Advocacy Coalition Framework that focus on policy actors’ policy positions, problem perceptions, political capacity, activities, and interactions. In doing so, we examine the differences between those policy actors who are opposed to hydraulic fracturing relative to those who support hydraulic fracturing across the three states using data from online surveys administered in 2013 and 2014. The results show polarization between opponents and proponents in their policy positions on hydraulic fracturing, which are associated with problem perceptions. Proponents and opponents of hydraulic fracturing also have different capacities, activities, and interactions. The results are similar across states but not without nuanced differences, including greater polarization in New York, higher levels of government support for proponents of hydraulic fracturing in Texas, and more frequent coalition building in Colorado.     

论制药企业思想政治工作创新策略

近年来,我国制药企业在激烈的市场竞争中,其生存和发展环境正发生着复杂而深刻的变化,制药企业的思想政治工作遇到了大量的新情况,面临着一些新挑战。因此,制药企业的思想政治工作也的创新显得尤为重要。     

The Soviet Union,the Middle East,and the evolving world energy situation

Surveying and summarizing the basic issues confronting Soviet decisionmakers in the next ten years as reflected in energy and international political terms, this analysis treats the capacity and constraints mediating Soviet influence in the resolution of the future world energy balance. A scenario highlighting a “Soviet-Preferred Future World” is developed that focuses on three classes of likely energy outcomes: (1) a gradual erosion of the Western commercial position in Middle East oil, (2) repeated shortages in oil-consumer states leading to a diversion of attention away from international matters and increased preoccupation with “domestic” energy woes, and (3) a deterioration of the terms of trade for energy importers vis à vis Soviet and noncommunist trading partners. The discussion concludes with an assessment of several of the key choices confronting the major oil-importing nations and requiring resolution.     

Taking Threat Seriously: Prejudice,Principle, and Attitudes Toward Racial Policies

Drawing from group theories of race-related attitudes and electoral politics, we develop and test how anxiety influences the relative weight of prejudice as a determinant of individuals’ support for racial policies. We hypothesize that prejudice will more strongly influence the racial policy preferences of people who are feeling anxious than it will for people who are not. Using an experimental design we manipulate subjects’ levels of threat and find significant treatment effects, as hypothesized. We find that individuals’ racial policy attitudes are partially conditional on their affective states: individuals who feel anxious report less support for racial policies than those individuals who do not feel anxious, even when this threat is stimulated by non-racial content. More broadly, we conclude that affect is central to a better understanding of individuals’ political attitudes and behaviors.     

The politics of mortgage credit expansion in the small coordinated market economies

Abstract

Recent contributions to the comparative political economy literature claim that liberal market economies are vulnerable to asset booms and busts because of financial deregulation, shrinking welfare states and a political ideology emphasising financial self-sufficiency. This article examines the rapid expansion of mortgage lending in three coordinated market economies (CMEs): Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands. This expansion is puzzling given that all three countries are CMEs with generous welfare states. Yet the pattern of mortgage lending resembles the Anglo-Saxon or liberal market economies (LMEs) more than other CMEs. The article argues that mortgage bubbles in the small CMEs emerged as the unintended outcome of pairing neoliberal programmes to expand home ownership with collectivist housing institutions. This resulted in supply restrictions and rising property values which saddled households with extraordinarily high mortgage debts. In short, mortgage credit bubbles are not unique to Anglo-liberal welfare states and may have different origins.     

The limits of economic globalization in East Asian developmental states

Abstract

In an attempt to adjust to economic globalization or internationalization, East Asian developmental states have liberalized their domestic economic systems, accelerating the introduction of the free‐market ideology. Despite their plan to establish the internationally compatible open‐market economy, however, the extent to which they can advance economic liberalization is limited. Political and economic burdens that the developmental state's extensive intervention in the market has incurred in the course of state‐led mercantile economic development, make it impossible for those states to execute full‐scale economic liberalization. The South Korean case clearly shows this. The Korean developmental state retains two major economic burdens: the exclusive ownership and the poor financial structure of the chaebôl. Insofar as Korean big business preserves those weak spots, the government cannot surrender the power of regulation despite its spontaneous implementation of the economic liberalization policy. In addition, the common ‘egoistic’ interests which government bureaucrats and the political class share also limit the degree to which economic liberalization policy can be implemented. The degree of state intervention in the market in Korea has been deeper than that in Japan which pioneered Asian developmental statism, and, thus, the political and economic burdens it has incurred for itself are heavier. Consequently, the East Asian developmental state cannot entirely withdraw its intervention in the market. The ‘support’ of industries is likely to diminish, but ‘regulation’ for the formation of the autonomous market will increase. For the Korean developmental state, globalization and economic liberalization are political economic slogans to re‐launch economic growth and to elevate the international economic competitiveness of industries under the initiative of the state, and motivated by nationalistic reasons. Hence, the role of the state in the market is still far from becoming redundant even in the tide of globalization and economic liberalization in the case of South Korea, where the legacy of strong developmental statism remains considerable.     

The World Wide Web and the U.S. Political News Market

We propose a framework for understanding how the Internet has affected the U.S. political news market. The framework is driven by the lower cost of production for online news and consumers' tendency to seek out media that conform to their own beliefs. The framework predicts that consumers of Internet news sources should hold more extreme political views and be interested in more diverse political issues than those who solely consume mainstream television news. We test these predictions using two large datasets with questions about news exposure and political views. Generally speaking, we find that consumers of generally left‐of‐center (right‐of‐center) cable news sources who combine their cable news viewing with online sources are more liberal (conservative) than those who do not. We also find that those who use online news content are more likely than those who consume only television news content to be interested in niche political issues.