Reframing Democracy: Governance, Civic Agency, and Politics

Developments in public affairs that stress governance— not simply government—hold possibilities for reframing democracy. Governance intimates a paradigm shift in the meaning of democracy and civic agency—that is, who is to address public problems and promote the general welfare? The shift involves a move from citizens as simply voters, volunteers, and consumers to citizens as problem solvers and cocreators of public goods; from public leaders, such as public affairs professionals and politicians, as providers of services and solutions to partners, educators, and organizers of citizen action; and from democracy as elections to democratic society. Such a shift has the potential to address public problems that cannot be solved without governments, but that governments alone cannot solve, and to cultivate an appreciation for the commonwealth. Effecting this shift requires politicizing governance in nonpartisan, democratizing ways and deepening the civic, horizontal, pluralist, and productive dimensions of politics.     

Fiscal consequences of public corruption: Empirical evidence from state bond ratings

Empirical analyses of public corruption focus predominantly on international differences; regional differences in public corruption within a single country receive little attention. We empirically investigate the effect of public corruption in the United States on state bond ratings, which previous research shows are inversely related to net interest costs on public debt. After controlling for various economic influences on bond ratings, we find that more corrupt states have lower bond ratings, which implies that taxpayers in more corrupt states face a negative pecuniary externality by paying a premium for debt.     

The “growth tax” in the United States

By providing public goods, including law and order, national defense, and income redistribution that expands the gains from exchange (the scope and membership of the constitutional agreement), government expenditures act as a positive externality on the growth rate. Beyond that level, taxes act as a negative externality. In this paper a simple model is formulated and the optimal (growth-maximizing) tax rate found. Empirical estimation finds it to be in the range of 21.5–22.9 percent. The effect of taxation beyond this level is a cumulative loss of about $30 trillion (1972 dollars) in GNP over the period 1949–89.     

Why Is the Intelligence Community So Difficult to Redesign? Smart Practices,Conflicting Goals,and the Creation of Purpose‐Based Organizations

The adoption of “smart practices” requires that smart practices can actually be identified for the areas of public policy in which we are interested. For the problem of designing structures for public agencies, however, identifying smart practices is not easy. This article explores the reasons for the substantial conservativism, lasting over 50 years, regarding the structural design of the U.S. intelligence community. One central argument is simply that it was very difficult to discover a clearly superior structure; in fact, the long‐standing structure may have had some unrecognized virtues. But the other central argument is that one smart practice may have emerged since the 9/11 attacks: It involves the creation of problem‐focused interagency centers that are intended to enhance the sharing and integration of information within the intelligence community. These conclusions about redesigning the structure of the intelligence community are based on the arguments of Luther Gulick on methods of departmentalization and Martin Landau on redundancy and system reliability.     

Pigou, Coase, common law, and environmental policy: Implications of the calculation debate

The implications of the calculation debate are explored for Pigouvian, Coasean, and common-law liability approaches to externality problems. There is no escaping Hayekian-Misean information problems, but the institutional setting within which environmental policies are resolved affects the domain of third-party calculation. The calculation required is likely to be significantly less under common-law arrangements than under administrative processes. The primary implication for environmental policy is that increased reliance on competitive market processes and the common law in copying with externality problems may be more effective than attempts to improve current administrative approaches.     

The creation of multi-ethnic nations with or without a?core region

What holds a multi-ethnic nation together? To answer this question, we take region as the unit of analysis and focus on factors such as the size of a region, its geographical location, and its external factors. A large region or a ??core state?? can enhance a coalition by providing more public goods, but it can also deter a coalition from forming by discouraging the existing members from accepting new members. When the net impact is positive, the large region acts like Huntington??s ??core state,?? i.e., it helps to sustain the coalition. External effects induce coalition formation when the externality is negative, while positive externality discourages formation by encouraging free-riding.     

The Other Side of the Coin: NGOs,Rights‐Based Approaches,and Public Administration

The majority of the world's population resides in low‐ and middle‐income countries, where the problem of sustainable development is among the most pressing public administration challenges. As principal actors within the international development community, transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play a leading role in piloting a wide variety of development‐focused strategies. During the past decade, many of these transnational NGOs, along with the United Nations, have embraced a rights‐based approach (RBA) to development as an alternative to traditional service delivery. Despite the growing popularity of RBA among NGOs and other development actors, surprisingly little attention has been paid to understanding the significance of RBA for public administration and for public managers—the “other side of the coin.” Drawing on current research in NGO studies and international development, this article describes several varieties of contemporary rights‐based approaches, analyzes their impact on development practices, and examines the intersection of RBA and public administration.     

税收负担、公共品层次与私人公共品需求——以山东省面板数据为例

个人税收负担的增长会对公共品需求产生负向影响,这一结论在西方的研究中被普遍证明。本文从中国实际出发,借助经典的中位选民模型,考察了个人税收负担对公共品需求的影响。通过对山东省17市1997～2007年的面板数据进行实证分析,发现个人税收负担对公共品需求的负向影响在中国并不普遍存在。就影响公共品需求的各因素来看,公共品需求的收入弹性以及人口拥挤效应普遍存在;个人税收负担对济南、烟台两市一般公共品需求产生负向影响,对其余15个市产生正向效应。为进一步揭示税收负担对不同层次公共品需求的影响差异,选取了教育和公共安全这两类特殊公共品进行研究。山东省17地市的个人税收负担对教育这类公共品普遍产生负向影响;对公共安全类公共品产生完全正向效应。因此,本文认为山东省一般公共品市场是供给导向的市场,税收弹性与公共品需求层次相关,建议建立引导公民合理表达公共品需求意向机制。     

论流域政府间横向协调机制——流域水资源消费负外部性治理的视阈

当前,流域水资源消费负外部性问题愈益尖锐,现实症结应在于流域政府纷纷实施了地方保护的策略选择,体现为一种政府外部性,其衍生的根由则在于流域政府权力产权界定不清导致了相互间正交易成本的出现.根据新制度经济学相关启示,须建构流域政府间横向协调机制,从而规范流域政府各自权力产权,降低因相互摩擦所引发的交易成本,由此即可以减少或消除此种政府外部性,最终求解流域水资源消费负外部性问题.由于反复博弈模型和制度主义的援证,公民退出选择与呼吁力量的驱动以及流域公共利益观念凸显和官员的理性自觉,流域政府间横向协调机制之建构成为可能.而其主要类型的界分则同样可以受新制度经济学启发并吻合治理的行动逻辑,进而区分为科层机制、市场机制和府际治理机制等三种,它们相互存在替代性但更应实现有机的结合.     

Funding Global Public Goods: The Dark Side of Multilateralism

The funding of global public goods, such as climate mitigation, presents a complex strategic problem. Potential recipients demand side payments for implementing projects that furnish global public goods, and donors can cooperate to provide the funding. We offer a game‐theoretic analysis of this problem. In our model, a recipient demands project funding. Donors can form a multilateral program to jointly fund the project. If no program is formed, bilateral funding remains a possibility. We find that donors rely on multilateralism if their preferences are relatively symmetric and domestic political constraints on funding are lax. In this case, the recipient secures large rents from project implementation. Thus, even donors with strong interests in global public good provision have incentives to oppose institutional arrangements that promote multilateral funding. These incentives have played an important role in multilateral negotiations on climate finance, especially in Cancun (2010) and Durban (2011).     

Protecting the Common Good: Technology, Objectivity, and Privacy

The rhetoric of public policy after September 11 encourages us to believe that the preservation of freedom and the safety of the common good requires our universal acquiescence to technological invasions of privacy. The purpose of this article is simply to warn that the rhetoric of public policy solutions post–September 11 may be inconsistent with the philosophical and legal framework of American democracy. While serving as a solution today, this rhetoric may pose a devastating blow to the balance of individual privacy and common good that is essential to the preservation of freedom.     

Local interests,central leadership,and the passage of TRA86

The U.S. federalist public economy is an ever-evolving system of financing and expenditure responsibilities between local, state, and federal governments. The past decades have seen a significant centralization of responsibility for the financing of state and local public services through grants-in-aid and federal tax subsidies. This article advances a model of local constituent influence in central government fiscal policies which seeks to explain this trend, and then examines how strong executive branch and congressional leadership might begin to control the local pressures for central government financing. TRA86 is offered as one example in which this leaedership proved effective. The general lesson is that good fiscal policy in federalist public economies requires not only capable local governments, but central government political institutions with the strength to meet national needs as well.     

All spending is not equal: European Union public spending,policy feedback and citizens’ support for the EU

While public support is central to the problem‐solving capacity of the European Union, we know little about when and why the EU can increase its citizens’ support through spending. Extensive research finds that citizens living in countries that are net beneficiaries of the EU budget are more supportive of the EU, assuming that citizens care equally about all forms of spending. It is argued in this article, however, that the amount of spending is only part of the story. Understanding the effects of spending on support requires a consideration of how transfers are spent. Drawing on policy feedback theories in comparative politics, it is shown that support for the EU is a function of the fit between the spending area and economic need in individuals’ immediate living context. Results from a statistical analysis of EU spending on human capital, infrastructure, agriculture, energy and environmental protection in 127 EU regions over the period 2001–2011 corroborate this argument. As the EU and other international organisations become increasingly publicly contested, the organisations themselves may increasingly try to shore up public support through spending, but they will only be successful under specific conditions.     

Recovering,Restoring, and Renewing the Foundations of American Public Administration: The Contributions of Herbert J. Storing

Public administration continues to face an identity crisis that turns on the question of whether the animating principles of the discipline are to be discovered in the political foundations of a given regime, or whether they are to be found in more universal and transcendent principles of scientific management. Herbert J. Storing reframed the identity crisis as a problem arising from America’s constitutional system of governance. In doing so, he created an important role for public administration in democratic governance. This role took the form of “closet statesmanship” and, in practice, requires the exercise of prudential judgment that looks more like judicial decision making than scientific management. In summarizing Storing’s writings, the authors convincingly argue that he has much to teach us about the ongoing debate regarding the role of the bureaucracy within America’s 87,576 systems of government.     

Understanding and cooperation in social dilemmas

Cooperation in public dilemmas (and in externality dilemmas generally) is sometimes explained as a function of players' experience with the game: The more experience, the less cooperation. Experience, however, can produce both knowledge about how others will play the game (in particular, that they will defect) and improved understanding of the incentive structure of the game. We report data from two different experiments showing at best only a slight relationship between understanding the incentive structure of the game and cooperation. Inferences from the ‘experience’ finding that cooperation is based on misunderstanding of game incentives, therefore, seem misplaced.     

Citizen,Customer, Partner: Rethinking the Place of the Public in Public Management

Scholars and practitioners have long debated what role the public should play in public management. When members of the public interact with the administrative side of government, should they be treated as customers, as citizens, or in some other manner? This article takes as its premise that members of the public assume three principal roles relative to public management: as customers, as partners, and as citizens. After placing these roles in the context of the history of public administration, the article draws from recent research to recommend guidelines for how public managers can work effectively with the public in these several capacities.     

Evaluating and redesigning subsidy policies for home rehabilitation

A method is developed for empirically estimating the direct leveraging, indirect leveraging, and externality benefits accruing from home rehabilitation subsidy policies. The method is applied to two single-family home rehabilitation subsidy programs administered by Minneapolis from 1976 to 1980. Multivariate statistical analysis of sampled homeowners reveals that for each dollar of grant and loan received, all else equal, participants spent $1.62 and $0.345 more, respectively, of their own funds on home upkeep, all expressed as annual averages for the period. A tentative finding of indirect effects on proximate homeowners' confidence in the neighborhood and concomitant rehabilitation expenditures is also observed. These home improvements, in turn, created an additional aesthetic externality benefit.Benefit-cost analyses employing estimated parameter values are conducted. Results show that both grants and loans are net beneficial from the societal perspective. From the budgetary perspective of the public sector, the grants program was net beneficial. Loan programs involving very low interest rates, deferred payments, and/or lengthy repayment schedules typically were not. Under wide ranges of parameter values, however, subsidized loans can be devised which yield superior budgetary efficiency to grants.These findings suggest that home rehabilitation subsidy policies should be redesigned so that the mix of grants and loans for individual recipients is varied in order to enhance budgetary efficiency. The central principle is to require that recipients who can afford to do so take out loans on terms which render them more net beneficial than grants, before any grants are awarded.     

Regulatory independence, public accountability and the Victorian prison system

One of the most frequently used arguments supporting the introduction of privatization into a prison system is that it will strengthen accountability. However, to meet this claim it is maintained that a number of preconditions are necessary—one being independence of the regulator. This article examines the claims made by the Victorian Minister for Corrections that the Seamless System model would provide more independent monitoring and review of Victoria's prisons. Changes to regulatory arrangements are probed to determine if there has been any loss of independence in Victoria's prison system since the introduction of the latest model. It is concluded that the latest restructuring in 2003 of Victoria's part-privatised prison poses a significant risk for public accountability and requires attention to ensure both the private and the public prisons are held to account.     

Does Public Support Help Democracy Survive?

It is widely believed that democracy requires public support to survive. The empirical evidence for this hypothesis is weak, however, with existing tests resting on small cross-sectional samples and producing contradictory results. The underlying problem is that survey measures of support for democracy are fragmented across time, space, and different survey questions. In response, this article uses a Bayesian latent variable model to estimate a smooth country-year panel of democratic support for 135 countries and up to 29 years. The article then demonstrates a positive effect of support on subsequent democratic change, while adjusting for the possible confounding effects of prior levels of democracy and unobservable time-invariant factors. Support is, moreover, more robustly linked with the endurance of democracy than its emergence in the first place. As Lipset (1959) and Easton (1965) hypothesized over 50 years ago, public support does indeed help democracy survive.     

Enhancing public participation through narrative analysis

Effective public participation requires methods of policy analysis that can accommodate the discourse of the participants' opinions, preferences and values. This requires analytic methods that retain and convey the social and cultural contexts of the discourse of culturally diverse communities. Narrative policy analysis can incorporate cultural and social diversity within the process of analysing and presenting public preferences. Labov's evaluation model is used as a basis for describing how narrative analysis can be used to identify and present public preferences within a participation process. The value of this approach is demonstrated with reference to a participation process conducted on environmental quality.