Endogenous timing of contest with asymmetric information

Simultaneous moves have been conventionally assumed in modeling rent-seeking competition. However, in reality many forms of contests involve contestants sequentially choosing their effort entries. This study allows agents to choose the timing of their moves before the contest takes place. In contrast to the previous literature, we introduce information asymmetries across agents. We find that in all sequential-move equilibria, the uninformed agent moves first. More generally we show that the order of agents’ moves in a sequential contest is a regularity stemming from information asymmetries. Furthermore, under plausible assumptions, sequential moves Pareto dominate simultaneous moves (from the view point of the players) and also result in lower rent-seeking expenditures. Our result explains the timing pattern in National Presidential Conventions observed from 1948 through 2004. Our result also applies to many other formal or informal institutions, which give rise to sequential contests.     

Rent dissipation and efficiency in a contest with asymmetric valuations

This paper introduces contest efficiency as an alternative to rent dissipation when measuring efficiency in a contest with asymmetric valuations. Contest efficiency is defined as the expected proportion of the maximum obtainable benefit captured by the contest, and differs from rent dissipation because it values the expected winner of the contest. Therefore, rent dissipation and contest efficiency may suggest contradictory conclusions when agents have asymmetric valuations. This result is illustrated when comparing alternative equilibria in contests with asymmetric reimbursement and when analyzing the comparative static effect of a change in the relative benefit of two agents in a Cournot-Nash contest.     

State legislation on smoking and health: A comparison of two policies

The two principal smoking-related state legislative activities stand in sharp contrast to one another. Cigarette excise taxation diffused among the states well before the connection between smoking and illness became a public issue, yet more recent tax increases appear to reflect a response to the national anti-smoking campaign. The growing disparity in cigarette prices between tobacco and other states has created a lucrative market in bootlegged cigarettes and has thereby brought new taxation to a virtual standstill for six years. Laws restricting smoking in public places represent a phenomenon of the 1970's clearly bearing the imprint of the anti-smoking campaign. From 1972 through 1978, the number of states with such laws in effect grew from 5 to 36, and the restrictiveness of the laws also increased. The dramatic correlation between diffusion of the laws and decreases in cigarette consumption rates seems best interpreted as each of these reflecting changes in social attitudes toward smoking.     

Rent seeking and rent setting with asymmetric effectiveness of lobbying

This paper provides a more general model of the determination of rent-seeking costs by combining the following features: endogenous rent determination, asymmetric effectiveness of contending agents in their lobbying efforts, and multiple periods. In doing so, the paper generalizes some aspects of the work of Applelbaum and Katz (1987), Rogerson (1982), Leininger (1992) and Kohli (1992). Some results obtained are: (i) in the short run, when the regulator's salary is higher than in an alternative occupation, both the per unit cost of rent-seeking and the total rent set by regulator are highest for the same value of the relative effectiveness parameter; (ii) in the long run, an increase in the effectiveness parameter leads to a reduction in the social costs of rent seeking; (iii) in a repeated game, the equilibrium rent is lower the higher is the regulator's discount factor.     

Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or deletion of a player

We consider an extension of Tullock's (1980) N-player contest under which prize valuations may vary across players. We show that the pure-strategy equilibrium of this contest is unique. We also establish the following results: rent dissipation increases, individual winning probabilities decrease, and individual spending either increases or decreases with the addition of a player.     

A comparison of prospective and retrospective voting with heterogeneous politicians

A long-standing empirical literature has been concerned with determining whether voters vote “prospectively or “retrospectively.” Despite this interest, little is known about the consequences of one voting regime versus another. This study addresses this deficiency. We find that voter welfare can be greatly affected by the candidate selection technique employed by voters. Among other findings, we show that “electing the best candidate” does not always maximize voter welfare. Furthermore, “myopic” voting is sometimes superior to “farsighted” voting. These findings have implications for interpretations of empirical studies of voter behavior.     

Electoral outcomes and satisfaction with democracy: A comparison of regional and national elections

Subnational governments have become more numerous and more powerful around the world, increasing the importance of subnational elections. However, we still know little about the impact of regional electoral outcomes on citizens' political support, and there is no systematic comparison of the impact of election outcomes on citizens' satisfaction with democracy. In this research note, we provide such a comparison by investigating how the winner-loser gap in citizens’ satisfaction with democracy differs across regional and national elections. Using data from Canada, Germany and Spain, we first show that there is a winner-loser gap in satisfaction with democracy following regional elections. The winner-loser gap at the regional level is, however, substantially smaller than the one generated by national election outcomes. Next, we find heterogeneous effects for voters who believe that the regional government strongly influences their quality of life. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings.     

A general equilibrium model of two group conflict with endogenous intra-group sharing rules

This paper explores the interactions among intra-group sharing rules, the competition between two groups over the common pool of output, and the allocation of resources between productive and appropriate activities. In the interior solution, the use of egalitarian method for the distribution of group income among members plays no distributional role but only affects the allocation of resources. It releases resources into the productive sector from the group that adopts the egalitarian rule by making the internal conflict among the members less intense. The sequential choice of intra-group sharing rules and resource allocations produce the adoption of fully egalitarian intra-group sharing rules in both groups. These rules minimize the amount of resources allocated to appropriate activities and maximize the welfare level of all individuals in the economy. This result suggests that inter-group competition with the use of egalitarian principle in the distribution of group income among group members, which is not available to the Hobbesian state of nature, is one of the cheaper social devices in restraining individuals from engaging in costly appropriative activities.     

Administrative aspects of the Uganda election—December 1980: A comparison with Zimbabwe

Since international observers were used to give legitimacy both to the Uganda and Zimbabwe elections in 1980 there is an obvious point of comparison between them. Despite this initial similarity comparing the administration of the elections in the two emphasizes the differences and draws attention to the administrative problems in Uganda resulting from the use of a law and procedures which derived from different circumstances in the country and which assumed an experience in operating elections which was largely lacking. This article explains problems encountered and points to lessons to be learnt.     

Non-repellency of two insect growth regulators with juvenile hormone activity to Blattella germanica

Blattella germanica (L.) (Dictyoptera: Blattellidae) adults and nymphs provided with choice food did not discriminate against food treated (200 ppm) with either R-20458 or Ro 20-3600 indicating the absence of non-preference. Also, in a separate study with treated paper cards (0.5 mg/cm²), these two insect growth regulators did not exhibit any significant repellency to the German cockroach adults. Farnesol, however, was found to be significantly repellent. The bait formulations of synthetic insect growth regulators with juvenile hormone activity appear promising for the control of German cockroach.

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Zusammenfassung Bei Wahlversuchen entschieden sich Adulte und Nymphen vonBlattella germanica (L.) nicht gegen Nahrung, die mit R-20458 oder mit Ro 20-3600 behandelt war (200 ppm), womit das Fehlen einer Non-Pr?ferenz erwiesen war. Ferner zeigten in einer gesonderten Studie mit behandelten Papierkarten (0,5 mg/cm²) diese zwei Insektenwachstumsregulatoren keine signifikante Abschreckung gegenüber Adulten der Deutschen Schabe. Dagegen erwies sich Farnesol signifikant als repellent. K?derformulierungen von synthetischen Insektenwachstumsregulatoren mit Juvenilhormonaktivit?t erscheinen aussichtsreich für die Bek?mpfung der Deutschen Schabe.

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Paper of the Journal Series, New Jersey Agricultural Experiment Station.     

At the Nexus of Observational and Experimental Research: Theory,Specification, and Analysis of Experiments with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Experimentalists are increasingly examining heterogeneous treatment effects, in which observed individual-level characteristics are hypothesized to moderate an experimental treatment effect. Such work places researchers at the nexus of experimental and observational approaches. In this paper, we discuss the theoretical and statistical issues that can arise in testing such hypotheses. We note that inclusion of an observed (as opposed to randomly-assigned) moderator introduces the possibility of confounds that are commonplace in observational data analysis but too-easily ignored in experimental data analysis. We simulate several different data generating processes that include heterogeneous treatment effects, and we discuss the implications of various statistical models. We aim to provide researchers who examine heterogeneous treatment effects with background and advice that enable them to identify where common issues may arise and to develop research designs and implement statistical tests that will mitigate them.