Information is important to Condorcet jurors

Group decision making is very significant in a broad variety of settings. This paper deals with committees that make binary decisions and addresses the question of whether informative decisions can be assumed within this framework. We show that when using the optimal decision rule, informative decision making is a Nash equilibrium. Thus we justify the assumption of informative decision making and provide support for the relevance of assumptions such as independent decision making, when using the optimal decision rule.     

Polling effects in election campaigns

The effects of polls on public opinion and voting behavior have begun to attract considerable attention. However, aside from experimental studies and research on exit polls, the impact of preelection polls has not received adequate analysis. This paper investigates whether exposure to polls released during the campaign influences voter choices and how the electoral context of referendum versus candidate elections makes a difference in terms of polling effects. These questions were addressed in a cross-election comparison of the 1980 presidential campaign and a 1986 state referendum on the right-to-life issue. Basically, I found significant effects during the referendum, but weak effects in the presidential general election.     

Weak Condorcet winner(s) revisited

A strong Condorcet winner (SCW) is an alternative, x, that a majority of voters rank higher than z, for every other alternative, z. A weak Condorcet winner (WCW) is an alternative, y, that no majority of voters rank below any other alternative, z, but is not a SCW. There has been some confusion in the voting/social choice literature as to whether particular voting rules that are SCW-consistent are also WCW-consistent. The purpose of this paper is to revisit this issue, clear up the confusion that has developed, and determine whether three additional SCW-consistent voting rules—that as far as we know have not been investigated to date regarding their possible WCW consistency—are indeed WCW-consistent.     

Condorcet: Communication/Science/Democracy

Abstract

Condorcet's arguments concerning the dependence of unhindered scientific development on the presence of democratic conditions still sounds relevant today, because they are based on specific and complex considerations concerning the character of the social enterprise of science that articulates problems that still continue. The implicit dispute between Condorcet and Rousseau is also the first great historical example of the conflict between the Enlightenment and Romanticism, which accompanies the history of modernity, as an unresolved and indeed irresolvable opposition that belongs to the prehistory of our own confusions and quandaries concerning the relations between culture, science, politics and society.     

The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern

‘Condorcet cycles’ (or ‘paradoxes of cyclical majorities’) are an empirically rare phenomenon. A referendum in the Swiss canton of Bern on 28 November 2004 presents a rare occurrence. This study presents a new multi-option referendum procedure that makes Condorcet cycles visible, and it argues that in this case, the paradox might have resulted from strategic voting patterns.     

Endogenous competence and a limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem

We describe and compare the experiences of academic exclusion of Alexander Del Mar, J.A. Hobson, and Gordon Tullock. While aspects of the circumstances differed, a common element was academic exclusion because of challenges to mainstream views. Alexander Del Mar, J.A. Hobson, and Gordon Tullock were in due course recognized for the originality and merit of their contributions, although each incurred personal costs because of the exclusion by the academic elites of their time. Our study takes us into the role of ideologically based prejudice in judgment of the worthiness of economic ideas.     

Selecting the Condorcet Winner: single-stage versus multi-stage voting rules

In this paper, I study elections where voters are strategic. I find that the commonly used voting rules, such as Plurality Rule, Majority Rule, Approval Voting, and Single Transferable Vote, do not always select the Condorcet Winner and suffer from multiple equilibria. Multi-stage voting rules offer a way to get around this problem. I introduce two voting rules—Multi-Stage Runoff and the Nominate-Two Rule—that select the Condorcet Winner as the unique equilibrium outcome under mild conditions. I show that a third class of voting rules—Binary Voting Trees—also select the Condorcet Winner.     

An elementary proof of the conditions for a generalized Condorcet paradox

We give an elementary proof of the relationship between the possibility of a generalized majority rule cycle and the number of voters, V, the number of alternatives, A, and the number required for a majority, M.     

A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions

This essay evaluates six single-winner, multicandidate electoral systems with respect to their tendency to choose Condorcet candidates. To this end I calibrate a logistic multiple regression model from Monte Carlo simulations, based on a multivariate normal spatial model, in which I vary the number of candidates, number of dimensions, correlation structure, and relative dispersion of candidates and voters. I investigate additional spatial-model variations by comparing further simulation results with predictions of the basic statistical model. The results suggest that for many electoral systems, Condorcet efficiency would increase with perceptual uncertainty of candidates' positions and would be low in a polarized society. Of the voting systems studied, approval voting and the Coombs systems appear least sensitive to variations in assumptions.     

An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate

Social choice theory suggests that the occurrence of cyclical collective preferences should be a widespread phenomenon, especially in large groups of decision-makers. However, empirical research has so far failed to produce evidence of the existence of many real-world examples of such, and none in large electorates. This paper demonstrates the existence of a real cyclical majority in a poll of Danish voters' preferred prime minister, using pair-wise comparisons. This result is compared with those of a similar poll, but by using different voting methods, each resulting in different choices. The example demonstrates the empirical reality of cyclical collective preferences and the importance of the choice of institutions.     

Could the Florida Election Disaster have been Avoided by Competition Among Polling Stations?

We study a model of competition among polling stations wherepolling stations have to invest in counting precision toattract voters. The benchmark is the (current) monopolisticcase in which there is no incentive to provide particularlygood counting technologies. Unsurprisingly, we find thatcompetition enhances precision when compared to a monopoly.The somewhat surprising part of our result is that the optimalnumber of polling stations is two.     

What Happens at the Polling Place: Using Administrative Data to Look Inside Elections

Tremendous attention has been paid to local election administration since the 2000 presidential election meltdown, yet policy makers still lack basic information about what happens at the polling place. One strategy to understand the interactions between citizens and street‐level election bureaucrats is to turn to administrative data. Using logs collected by polling place workers, the authors analyze more than 66,000 individual incidents recorded from four different statewide elections. Such data provide novel insights and guidance for the administration of elections. Findings indicate that task scale (in terms of the number of ballots) and complexity (in terms of absentee ballots) increase the incident rate. Managerial choices about how polling places are run also matter: the use of electronic voting machines and central count processing of ballots reduce the incident rate, while splitting poll worker shifts increases it. Operator capacity, measured in terms of experience, also reduces the number of incidents.