Locating Humour in Indian Buddhist Monastic Law Codes: A Comparative Approach

It has been claimed that Indian Buddhism, as opposed to East Asian Chan/Zen traditions, was somehow against humour. In this paper I contend that humour is discernible in canonical Indian Buddhist texts, particularly in Indian Buddhist monastic law codes (Vinaya). I will attempt to establish that what we find in these texts sometimes is not only humourous but that it is intentionally so. I approach this topic by comparing different versions of the same narratives preserved in Indian Buddhist monastic law codes. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the XVth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, June 23-29, 2008. I wish to acknowledge financial assistance from the Arts Research Board, McMaster University.     

What similes in Sāṃkhya do: a comparison of the similes in the Sāṃkhya texts in the Mahābhārata, the Sāṃkhyakārikā and the Sāṃkhyasūtra

In Sāṃkhya similes are an important means to communicate basic philosophical teachings. In the texts similes are frequently used, especially in the Sāṃkhya passages in the Mahābhārata, in the Sāṃkhyakārikā and in the Sāṃkhyasūtra. This paper compares the similes in these three texts and analyses changes in the philosophy as revealed in the similes. A comparison of the similes of Sāṃkhya texts produced over more than one thousand years reveals changes in the emphasis in this philosophical system. The purpose of the similes in the Sāṃkhya passages of the Mahābhārata is to produce an intuitive understanding of the separateness of puruṣa and prakṛti. The similes are designed to lead the listener to understand this basic dualism. In the Sāṃkhyakārikā the most difficult issues are the relationship between prakṛti and puruṣa and the idea of prakṛti working for the salvation of puruṣa. One whole chapter of the Sāṃkhyasūtra is devoted to similes.     

The Problem with Pretending: Rāmānuja’s Arguments Against <Emphasis Type="Italic">Jīvanmukti</Emphasis>

In his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1.1.4, Rāmānuja argues that the knowledge of the liberated person precludes ignorance and its effects, and therefore precludes the possibility of jīvanmukti (embodied liberation). The Advaitin replies that the knowledge of the liberated is consistent with a certain kind of karma that prolongs embodiment, hence jīvanmukti is possible. In his Bhagavadgītābhāṣya 2.12, however, Rāmānuja points out that even if the jīvanmukta (embodied liberated person) still experiences appearances, he does not count them as reasons for acting, and therefore does not act. Hence Rāmānuja’s objection to jīvanmukti is both conceptual and practical, and it is the practical problem that is the more difficult to resolve.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Anyathākhyāti</Emphasis>: A Critique by Appaya Dīkṣita in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Parimala</Emphasis>

In this paper, the problem of illusory perception, as approached by the Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta schools of philosophy, is discussed from the standpoint of the Parimala. This seminal work belonging to the Bhāmatī tradition of Advaita Vedānta was composed in the sixteenth century by the polymath Appaya Dīk?ita. In the context of discussing various theories of illusion, Dīk?ita dwells upon the Nyāya theory of anyathākhyāti, and its connection with jñānalak?a?apratyāsatti as a causal factor for perception, and closely examines if such an extraordinary (alaukika) perception is tenable to explain illusory perception. He then proceeds to point out the deficiencies of this model and thereby brings to the fore the anirvacanīyakhyāti of Advaitins as the only theory which stands scrutiny.     

The Supreme Array Scripture: A New Interpretation of the Title “Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra”

This article argues for a new interpretation of the Sanskrit compound gaṇḍa-vyūha as it is used in the common title of the Mahāyāna text the Gaṇḍavyūha-Sūtra.The author begins by providing a brief history of the sūtra’s appellations in Chinese and Tibetan sources. Next, the meanings of gaṇḍa (the problematic member of the compound) are explored. The author proposes that contemporary scholars have overlooked a meaning of gaṇḍa occurring in some compounds, wherein gaṇḍa can mean simply “great,” “big” or “massive.” This general sense is particularly common in the compound gaṇda-śaila (a “massive rock” or “boulder”) and is found in such texts as the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Harivaṃśa and the Harṣacarita. Following the discussion of Gaṇḍa, the author examines the term vyūha (“array”) as it is used in the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra. The article concludes with the suggestion that a more appropriate translation of the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra would be “The Supreme array Scripture.”     

Unraveling the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Kāvyaprakāśa</Emphasis>: Jayadeva Pīyūṣavarṣa’s idiosyncratic sequence of topics in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Candrāloka</Emphasis>

In his twelfth century alaṃkāraśāstra, the Candrāloka, Jayadeva Pīyūṣavarṣa reverses the sequence of topics found in Mammaṭa’s Kāvyapr-akāśa, an earlier and immensely popular work. With such a structural revisionism, Jayadeva asserts the autonomy of his own work and puts forth an ambitious critique of earlier approaches to literary analysis. Jayadeva investigates the technical and aesthetic components of poetry in the first part of the Candrāloka, prior to his formal semantic investigations in the latter half of the text, thus suggesting that aesthetic evaluations of poetry beneficially inform scientific investigations of language. Jayadeva’s organization of his chapters on the semantic operations, moreover, intimates that the study of suggestive and metaphoric functions of language clarifies our understanding of denotation, which is conventionally understood to be the primary and direct path of verbal designation.     

Studies in Dhāraṇī Literature I: Revisiting the Meaning of the Term <Emphasis Type="Italic">Dhāraṇī</Emphasis>

The Mahāyāna Buddhist term dhāraṇī has been understood to be problematic since the mid-nineteenth century, when it was often translated as “magical phrase” or “magical formula” and was considered to be emblematic of tantric Buddhism. The situation improved in contributions by Bernhard, Lamotte and Braarvig, and the latter two suggested the translation be “memory,” but this remained difficult in many environments. This paper argues that dhāraṇī is a function term denoting “codes/coding,” so that the category dhāraṇī is polysemic and context-sensitive. After reviewing Western scholarship, the article discusses dhāraṇī semantic values and issues of synonymy, the early applications of mantras, the sonic/graphic background of coding in India extended into Buddhist applications, and the soteriological ideology of dhāraṇīs along with some of its many varieties.     

Otherness in the Pratyabhijñā philosophy

Idealism is the core of the Pratyabhijñã philosophy: the main goal of Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–950 AD) and of his commentator Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025 AD) is to establish that nothing exists outside of consciousness. In the course of their demonstration, these ?aiva philosophers endeavour to distinguish their idealism from that of a rival system, the Buddhist Vijñānavāda. This article aims at examining the concept of otherness (paratva) as it is presented in the Pratyabhijñā philosophy in contrast with that of the Vijñānavādins’. Although, according to the Pratyabhijñā, the other subjects are not ultimately real since all subjects are nothing but limited manifestations of a single absolute subject, the fact that we are aware of their existence in the practical world has to be accounted for. The Vijñānavādins explain it by arguing the we infer the others’ existence. The Pratyabhijñā philosophers, while refuting their opponents’ reasoning as it is expounded in Dharmakīrti’s Santānāntarasiddhi, develop a particulary original analysis of our awareness of the others, stating that this awareness is neither a perception (pratyak?a) nor an inference (anumāna), but rather a guess (ūha) in which we sense the others’ freedom (svātantrya).     

Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana on Avidyā

The concept of avidyā is one of the central categories in the Advaita of Śaṇkara and Maṇḍana. Shifting the focus from māyā, interpreted either as illusion or as the divine power, this concept brings ignorance to the forefront in describing duality and bondage. Although all Advaitins accept avidyā as a category, its scope and nature is interpreted in multiple ways. Key elements in Maṇḍana’s philosophy include the plurality of avidyā, individual selves as its substrate and the Brahman as its field (viṣaya), and the distinction in avidyā between non-apprehension and misapprehension. A closer investigation shows that Maṇḍana is directly influenced by Bhartṛhari’s linguistic non-dualism in developing the concept of avidyā. This study also compares other key constituents such as vivartta and pariṇāma that are relevant to the analysis of avidyā. As the concept of counter-image (pratibimba) emerges as a distinct stream of Advaita subsequent to Maṇḍana, this study also compares the application of pratibimba in the writings of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana.     

Illumination,Imagination, Creativity: Rājaśekhara,Kuntaka, and Jagannātha on <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pratibhā</Emphasis>

Sanskrit poeticians make the visionary faculty of pratibhā a necessary part of the professional poet’s make-up. The term has a pre-history in Bhartṛhari’s linguistic metaphysics, where it is used to explain the unitary perception of meaning. This essay examines the relation between pratibhā and possible theories of the imagination, with a focus on three unusual theoreticians—Rājaśekhara, Kuntaka, and Jagannātha Paṇḍita. Rājaśekhara offers an analysis of pratibhā that is heavily interactive, requiring the discerning presence of the bhāvaka listener or critic; he also positions pratibhā in relation to Bildung (vyutpatti) and practice. For Kuntaka, pratibhā, never an ex nihilo creation by a poet, serves as the basis for the peculiar forms of intensified insight and experience that constitute poetry; these may also involve the creative scrambling and re-articulation of the object in terms of its systemic composition. At times, Kuntaka’s pratibhā comes close to a strong notion of imaginative process. But the full-fledged thematization of the imagination, and of pratibhā as its support and mechanism, is best seen in the seventeenth-century debates preserved for us by Jagannātha. A link is suggested between the discourse of poetic imagination in Jagannātha and similar themes that turn up in Indo-Persian poets such as Bedil.     

Monks Who Have Sex: Pārājika Penance in Indian Buddhist Monasticisms

In the study of Buddhism it is commonly accepted that a monk or nun who commits a pārājika offence is permanently and irrevocably expelled from the Buddhist monastic order. This view is based primarily on readings of the Pāli Vinaya. With the exception of the Pāli Vinaya, however, all other extant Buddhist monastic law codes (Dharmaguptaka, Mahāsāṅghika, Mahīśāsaka, Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda) contain detailed provisions for monks and nuns who commit pārājikas but nevertheless wish to remain within the saṅgha. These monastics are not expelled. Rather, they are granted a special status known as the śikṣādattaka. In this paper I explore the rules. concerning pārājika penance and the śikṣādattaka with specific regard to monastic celibacy. Given that five out of six extant law codes recognise this remarkable accommodation to the rule of celibacy, I argue that we must look to Vinayas other than the Pāli Vinaya if we are to arrive at a nuanced and representative view of Indian Buddhist monasticism.

Grant me chastity and continence, but not yet. Augustine of Hippo (354–430 C.E.)

     

The Brahman and the Word Principle (Śabda)

The literature of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana attention in contemporary times. The writings of the prominent linguistic philosopher and grammarian Bhartṛhari and of Manḍana, an encyclopedic scholar of later seventh century and most likely a senior contemporary of Śaṅkara, shape Indian philosophical thinking to a great extent. On this premise, this study of the influence of Bhartṛhari on Maṇḍana’s literature, the scope of this essay, allows us to explore the significance of Bhartṛhari’s writings, not only to comprehend the philosophy of language, but also to understand the contribution of linguistic philosophy in shaping Advaita philosophy in subsequent times. This comparison is not to question originality on the part of Maṇḍana, but rather to explore the interrelationship between linguistic philosophy and the monistic philosophy of the Upaniṣadic tradition. Besides excavating the role of Bhartṛhari writings on the texts of Maṇḍana, analysis this will reveal the interrelatedness of the Advaita school of Śaṅkara often addressed as ‘pure non-dualism’ (Kevalādvaita) and the Advaita of Bhartṛhari, identified as ‘non-dualism of the word-principle’ (Śabdādvaita).     

Divine Witness

Journal of Indian Philosophy - When People were falsely accused, and yet there existed no human means to testify to the truth, to whom did they resort for the final judgment? In ancient India, it...     

The Realism of Universals in Plato and Nyāya

It has become commonplace in introductions to Indian philosophy to construe Plato’s discussion of forms (εἶδος/ἰδέα) and the treatment in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika of universals (sāmānya/jāti) as addressing the same philosophical issue, albeit in somewhat different ways. While such a comparison of the similarities and differences has interest and value as an initial reconnaissance of what each says about common properties, an examination of the roles that universals play in the rest of their philosophical enquiries vitiates this commonplace. This paper draws upon the primary texts to identify the following metaphysical, epistemological, semantic and soteriological roles that universals play in the philosophy of Plato and of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika:

Metaphysical: causal of the existence of x Metaphysical: constitutive of the identity/essence of x Epistemological: cognitively causal (i.e. of the cognition of one over many) Epistemological: epistemically causal (i.e. of knowledge of x) Semantic: necessary condition of speech and reason Epistemological: vindicatory of induction (Nyāya only) Metaphysical: explanatory of causation (Nyāya only) Soteriological: cathartic contemplation (Plato only)

These roles provide us with motivations or reasons to believe that universals exist. As we examine these motivations, we find pressures mounting against our assimilating Platonic forms and the universals of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in the discourse about common properties. It is especially when we appreciate the utterly different contribution that universals make in securing our highest welfare that we realize how Plato and the two sister schools are not so much talking somewhat differently about the same thing, but talking somewhat similarly about different things. This better understanding of this difference in these philosophies opens a route for our better understanding of their unique contributions in the ongoing dialogue of philosophy.     

Gradual and Sudden Enlightenment: The Attainment of Yogipratyakṣa in the Later Indian Yogācāra School

Journal of Indian Philosophy - In the later Indian Yogācāra school, yogipratyak?a, the cognition of yogins is a key concept used to explain the Buddhist goal of enlightenment. It...     

The emergence of a group of four characters (Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha) in the Harivaṃśa: points for consideration

There are good reasons to think that Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha already form a sort of implicit tetrad in the HV. The aim of this paper is to draw attention to often overlooked data related to this tetrad. (1) Upon first reading, the sequence of the HV episodes appears to be somewhat disconnected, and might lead one to conclude that no such grouping of these figures had as of yet taken place. Nevertheless, a closer look at the structure of the text makes it clear that these four characters are one of the main focuses of the narrator’s interest. (2) The relationships of these four heroes to one another and to other deities will be examined. In addition to their close kinship, these heroes with the exception of Aniruddha, are also said to be incarnations of other entities; thus the logic underpinning this grouping must be located at this other level. (3) Considered against the backdrop of the entire HV, one realizes that a basic pattern is established in which the presence of the goddess, under various names and functions, is required not only to facilitate Saṃkarṣaṇa’s and Kr̥ṣṇa’s births and actions on earth, but also the actions of Pradyumna and Aniruddha. In fact, neither Kr̥ṣṇa Vāsudeva, nor Saṃkarṣaṇa, nor Pradyumna nor Aniruddha can act entirely independently of her assistance. (4) The HV does not employ the word vyūha in connection with the group of Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Nevertheless, during the battle waged to deliver Aniruddha, the idea of vyūha is present even if the word itself is not. HV 110.47–49 describes a true trivyūha composed of three fighters (Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa and Pradyumna), who are arranged in such a way as to protect one another. The episode of Aniruddha’s liberation appears to be the missing link, showing clearly that at least Kr̥ṣṇa, Saṃkarṣaṇa and Pradyumna are capable of assuming a vyūha as they fight the Rudraic forces.     

Finding cover: Legal trauma and how to take care of it

As law originates in violence, it is always haunted by its constitutive trauma. Recourse to law's origin, which is implicitly or explicitly sought in (constitutional) adjudication, thus requires a way to deal with law's trauma. What is needed is a cover, to be provided through (legal) interpretation. Four such interpretive ‘cover up’ operations, all necessarily somewhat duplicitous, are discussed. The first three represent main currents in legal theory. First, the standard legal view, which denies the trauma but relies on traditional authority to cover it. Second, a ‘neurotic’ solution, in which trauma is also denied but nevertheless cover is produced through collective interpretation. In the third, ‘perverse’ solution, trauma is admitted, and even enjoyed; on the other hand, it is denied that cover can be produced by any interpretive authority. The fourth option provides an alternative: recognition of law's trauma, covering it through the collectively shared practice of interpretation. It is shown that an example of such a collective effort can be found in the Dutch practice of gedogen, the deliberate under-enforcement of law, which is capable of creating an ‘informal rule of law’ that deals with intractable social problems more successfully than attempts formally to enforce applicable law. This revised version was published online in November 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Remedies for damage to property: money damages or restitution in natura?

This paper compares the tort remedies of money damages and restitution in natura from an efficiency perspective. Although there is a parallel between these remedies and the remedies for breach of contract, i.e. money damages and specific performance, the analysis is fundamentally different in torts, because of the high transaction costs involved. The basis of the comparison is the relation of each of the remedies to the subjective loss for the victim. The conclusion drawn is that no rule is generally preferable, so it is crucial to sort the different types of cases and apply in each of them the remedy, which is better suited. On this premise, are evaluated the relevant rules of Germany, England and France, since each legal system tackles this issue differently.     

Forensic DNA against wildlife poaching: Identification of a serial wolf killing in Italy

The recent expansion of the Italian wolf population through the Apennine and western Alps, after centuries of contractions, is causing conflicts with human activities leading to a rise in poaching or illegal killings. Here we show how molecular population genetics has been used to identify a suspect serial wolf killer. We analysed DNA extracted from a necklace made of ten presumed wolf canine teeth, confiscated in 2008 to a man living in the northern Italian Apennine (Liguria Region). Individual genotypes were determined using 12 unlinked autosomal microsatellites (STRs), mtDNA control-region sequences, a male-specific ZFX/ZFY restriction-site and three Y-linked STRs. Results indicate that the teeth belonged to six different individuals (three males and three females), which were assigned to the Italian wolf population with p > 0.90 by Bayesian procedures. One of these genotypes matched with the genetic profile of a male wolf previously found-dead and already non-invasively sampled in the same area. Another genotype matched with that of a female wolf non-invasively sampled twice in the same area 1 year before. These data are being used as forensic genetic evidence in the ongoing criminal trial against the suspect serial wolf killer.