British Intelligence in the Middle East, 1898–1906

This article examines British intelligence efforts in Turkish Arabia at the turn of the twentieth century. It argues that intelligence collection was really three separate efforts, carried out by the War Office, the Foreign Office, and the Government of India, and it reflected concerns about British decline, the problems experienced during the Boer War, as well as an effort to penetrate the ‘information order’ of India's sub-empire. Although intelligence efforts suffered from bureaucratic disharmony in Whitehall, and between London and the Government of India, valuable contributions were nevertheless made to Britain's knowledge of Turkish Arabia.     

The Making of Bletchley Park and Signals Intelligence 1939–42

The article argues that signals intelligence was an organizational accomplishment in the sense of requiring a) the establishment of an independent organization and b) that this organization combine cryptanalysis with intelligence analysis, traffic analysis and interception. This was not pre-ordained but the outcome of specific conflicts and decisions at Bletchley Park during the first three years of the Second World War which transformed the Government Code and Cypher School from a cryptanalytical bureau to a fully-fledged signals intelligence agency. Detailed archival evidence is presented in support of this claim.     

Intelligence,diplomacy and the Japanese threat to British interests, 1914–41

This contribution looks at the ways in which the intelligence releases in the 1990s have helped to illuminate previously unknown or misunderstood aspects of the Anglo-Japanese relationship from 1914 to 1941. Although attention in the media has been focused on the release of the Security Service's records, these are of limited use in this area of study. Much more significant are the diplomatic intercepts that were collected by the Government Code and Cipher School, which not only add new angles to old questions, but also reveal British suspicions of Japan in areas not previously studied, such as Japanese pan-Asianism.     

The First China Watchers: British Intelligence Officers in China, 1878–1900

In 1878, Britain developed the first systematic intelligence collection and analysis of China by a Western nation. Undertaken in response to intelligence failure and military defeat, the British Army in India established an intelligence section in Beijing using small numbers of Chinese-speaking British military officers. Their reports reveal their struggles to understand a culture and government radically different than their own and express a strong respect for Chinese military capabilities. The intelligence reports produced are a unique window into British history, intelligence practices and Chinese strategic thinking.     

The Future of Civil–Military Intelligence Cooperation Based on Lessons Learned in Iraq

As part of the infrastructure for monitoring the movements of Private Security Companies (PSCs) in Iraq, a unique intelligence interface has been constructed to enhance cooperation between the military and PSCs. Using a wide range of existing intelligence-sharing agreements and guidelines for handling classified information, PSC contractors working with the US military have been able to provide unclassified intelligence products to the wider PSC community. Using lessons learned in Iraq as a contractor building this interface, the author explains how institutional difficulties were overcome and argues that the US military should be better prepared to share intelligence with the wide range of organizations it can expect to work with in future unconventional warfare or nation-building operations. Some of the lessons learned in Iraq can also be applied to the US Department of Homeland Security's Regional Fusion Centers, where many of the same difficulties with intelligence-sharing and integration with commercial organizations are being encountered.     

British Intelligence and the Jewish Resistance Movement in the Palestine Mandate, 1945–46

At the end of the Second World War, British and Zionist interests came into conflict over the issue of Jewish immigration to Palestine, which raised the broader issue of what sort of National Home could exist within the British Mandate. As a result, in 1945–46, the three Jewish armed groups in the Mandate, the Haganah, Etzel and Lehi, started a loosely coordinated armed struggle against British rule. Even the moderates in the Jewish Agency rejected their former partner against Hitler, Britain, and used force against it in order to achieve their political goals. This article assesses British intelligence on these developments, and demonstrates that it failed to anticipate or even to understand the threat until the destruction of the King David Hotel. The article demonstrates that these mistakes occurred because British intelligence relied heavily on the intelligence organs of the Jewish Agency itself for intelligence about political threats within Palestine. The article assesses this intelligence failure, and its heavy costs. However, it denies that bad intelligence caused British failures in the Mandate. On the contrary, that failure stemmed from deeper problems of policy.     

Deadly catch: shrimp boat captains as United States Naval Intelligence informants, 1942–1945

During World War II, the United States Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) created a confidential fishermen informants program to ensure the security of the fishing industry vital to the U.S. and its allies and to relay intelligence on enemy military and espionage activity along the coasts. In the Sixth Naval District, headquartered in Charleston, South Carolina, the program relied on shrimp boat captains who volunteered to be confidential observers. Those deemed loyal were indoctrinated, equipped with confidential grid charts and the means and procedures to communicate with case officers, and assigned code names to protect their identity as they fished the Atlantic. Although aspects of this secret domestic counterintelligence program were inherently flawed and provided limited intelligence, it reveals how ONI recruited Americans to engage in domestic spying and provide early warning without devolving into vigilantism.     

Franco-German Intelligence Cooperation and the Internationalization of Algeria's War of Independence (1954–62)

Between 1958 and 1960, the French domestic security and intelligence services came to establish a close, multi-layered, and secret working relationship with their German counterparts. The purpose of this collaborative arrangement was to enlist German support in combating the subversive activities of the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale, whose members had taken refuge in Germany. In particular, the metropolitan authorities sought to impose on their German counterparts some of the same methods of colonial policing and intelligence that characterized their own counter-insurgency in France. These efforts proved counter-productive, however, for in internationalizing the Algerian war, they drew public attention to the colonial nature of France's hold over Algeria.     

Spying on Nasser: British Signals Intelligence in Middle East Crises and Conflicts, 1956–67

This article examines British signals intelligence on Egypt during the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1958 Middle East Crisis and the Egyptian intervention in the Yemen. It explains the production of signals intelligence and reviews the evidence that GCHQ could read Egyptian and other Arab communications. It then identifies some of the intelligence provided by GCHQ and considers its influence on British policy.     

Intelligence and diplomatic signalling during crises: The British experiences of 1877–78, 1922 and 1938

The roles of intelligence, communications and signals in crisis decision-making routinely are mentioned in passing but rarely assessed in detail. This study examines these issues in three international crises: the great eastern question, 1877–78, Chanak, 1922 and Munich, 1938, and briefly compares these findings to two others, July 1914 and Cuba, 1962. It demonstrates that intelligence, communications and signals are more problematical in crises than is generally believed. This study challenges the conventional view that crises are essentially something to manage. Instead, it argues, crises are explosive, unpredictable and high in risk, dominated by emotion, factionalization, communication failures, missed signals and unintended consequences.     

Colin Davidson's British Indian Intelligence Operations in Japan 1915–23 and the Demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

Colin Davidson was the British consular official in Japan during and after World War I delegated to run intelligence operations in the country on behalf of the British Indian security authorities. Davidson's original target, Indian revolutionaries based in Japan, soon expanded to include their clandestine links to powerful Japanese political patrons, violating the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902–23). Davidson's expertise on Japan, combined with intelligence on Japanese ultranationalist support of Indian independence, proved crucial for confirming suspicions about secret Japanese intent against the British Empire, contributing to the decision not to renew the Alliance.     

Iraq March–April 2003: Outcomes,a Division of Views - and an Abuse of Intelligence?

Three things happened in Iraq in March/April 2003 – an invasion, a military campaign and a start on the reconstruction of that country. In making the case for these the UK and US governments drew ‘with exceptional frankness’ on the reports of their intelligence agencies. In using and, it maybe, abusing such material the governments laid themselves open to charges of deception in arguing the case for war. All of this brought out serious differences of view between the United States and others. Such differences are argued by Robert Kagan in his book Paradise & Power: America and Europe in the New World Order as being fundamental and permanent, with the American view to prevail. This article sets out why the author believes that the American view is, at important points, fallacious.     

‘Intelligence,Public Confidence and Security’

Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover (New York: The Free Press, 1987). Pp. 624; $27.95.

Jeffrey Richelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target (New York: William Morrow, 1987).

John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York; Viking Penguin 1987). Pp. 368; $18.95.

Major General Rygor Slowikowski, In the Secret Service: The Lighting of the Torch (London: The Windrush Press, 1988). Pp. 285; £16.95.

Alexandre de Marenches and Christine Ockrent, The Evil Empire: The Third World War Now (London: Sidgwick &; Jackson, 1988), Pp. 224, £13.95

Robert Marshall, All the King's Men (London: Collins, 1988). Pp.314; £12.95. Brendan M. Murphy, Turncoat (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987). Pp. 301; $19.95.

Ray Godson (ed.), Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., the USSR, the U.K. and the Third World (New York: Pergamon Brasseys, 1988), Pp. 157; $18.95.

Stephen J. Cimbala (ed.). Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 1987). Pp. 262. $37.50.     

‘A poor thing but our own’: The Joint Intelligence Committee and Ireland, 1965–72

This article explores the role of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in assessing the development of the Northern Ireland crisis from the mid-1960s until the imposition of direct rule in 1972. It argues that the JIC's very limited engagement with Northern Ireland prior to 1969 contributed significantly to Whitehall's failure to grasp the drift of affairs from the autumn of 1968 onwards. This was due to the JIC's preoccupation with Cold War issues, compounded by reluctance to interfere in the security affairs of the Northern Ireland government. When Northern Ireland became a stock item of JIC business in 1970, the JIC secretariat became heavily involved in efforts to improve the intelligence system in Northern Ireland. The article also raises the question of the JIC's role in establishing the parameters for intelligence and security operations concerning Northern Ireland, including the controversial `Five Techniques' of interrogation, the introduction of internment in 1971, and covert activities in the Republic of Ireland. The article draws mainly on JIC, Prime Minister's Office and Foreign Office records in the National Archives.     

The Royal Navy,Intelligence and the Spanish Civil War: Lessons in Air Power, 1936–39

This article discusses the Royal Navy (RN)—Royal Air Force (RAF) feud concerning the use of air power in the round through an investigation of each service's appreciations of the lessons being learned about air power during the Spanish Civil War. It reveals that despite such bodies as the Joint Intelligence Committee existing, for the processing of operational and strategic intelligence, there was very little that was joint about the way air power lessons were being used to inform RN and RAF interwar preparations for future conflict. Not only were the RN and RAF rivals, which dragged out the process and skewed the results so that they became useless for planning, but in that non-joint age each service could use the results for its own separate purposes and avoid any synergy among the services for operational and strategic effectiveness.     

What's the Harm? The Ethics of Intelligence Collection

Abstract

As the professional practice of intelligence collection adapts to the changing environment and new threats of the twenty-first century, many academic experts and intelligence professionals call for a coherent ethical framework that outlines exactly when, by what means and to what ends intelligence is justified. Reports of abuse at detention centres such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, the ever increasing use of technological surveillance, and the increased attention on the use of torture for intelligence collection purposes have all highlighted a need to make an explicit statement about what is and what is not permissible intelligence practice. In this article an ethical framework will be established which will outline under what circumstances the use of different intelligence collection activities would be permissible. This ethical framework will first underline what it is about intelligence collection that is ‘harmful’ and, therefore, should be prohibited under normal circumstances. The ethical framework then outlines a set of ‘just intelligence principles’, based on the just war tradition, which delineate when the harm caused can be justified. As a result, this article outlines a systemic ethical framework that makes it possible to understand when intelligence collection is prohibited and when it is permissible.