Bargaining and Bicameralism

In bicameral legislatures, the protection of small states often motivates the malapportionment of the upper house. Using a legislative bargaining model, I show that malapportionment may produce the opposite effect. Under unicameralism, same‐state legislators are shown to not inherently be coordinated to cooperate, diminishing the fear of a big‐state conspiracy. By contrast, under bicameralism, preference complementarities enable upper‐house legislators to effectively coordinate their state delegations, and this skews the expected allocation in favor of big states. Hence, unless bicameralism significantly increases their agenda power, small states will fare even worse under bicameralism whenever they are disadvantaged under unicameralism.     

Influence without Confidence: Upper Chambers and Government Formation

In most parliamentary democracies, governments must maintain the confidence of a single legislative chamber only. But in bicameral parliaments, upper chambers can affect the fortunes of government policy proposals. Recent work shows that parliamentary governments that lack control over the upper house also tend to collapse sooner than those with upper‐house majorities. In this article, we show that coalition builders anticipate the importance of upper‐chamber status (majority or minority) in making their formation decisions. After controlling for a host of “usual suspect” variables concerning the institutional, ideological, and partisan context of coalition building, and examining 15,590 potential governments in 129 bargaining situations, we found that potential coalitions that control upper‐house majorities are significantly more likely to form than are those with upper‐house minorities. Our findings are important for students of bicameralism, government formation, institutions, and, perhaps most significantly, for those who study policymaking in parliamentary democracies.     

Legislative recruitment to upper houses: The Australian senate and house of representatives compared

Although a majority of liberal democracies are bicameral, only four – Australia, the United States, Germany and Switzerland – have upper houses which have any significant legislative authority. However, it is unclear to what extent upper house members differ – in their backgrounds and beliefs – from their lower house counterparts. This article applies multivariate methods to survey data collected among 1993 Australian federal election candidates to examine patterns of legislative recruitment and political attitudes among Australian Senate and House of Representatives candidates. The results show that Senate candidates differ significantly in their personal : and political backgrounds when compared to House of Representatives candidates, although there are few, if any, differences in political views. The findings confirm the strong discipline that the major parties exercise over the Senate, particularly by selecting candidates who are more party – oriented than their lower house counterparts. This is anomalous given that the original purpose of the upper house was to defend the interests of the smaller states and territories. Finally, the article discusses the implications of this increasing partisan control of upper houses for responsible party government.     

Majority Party Change and Committee Jurisdictions in State Legislatures

Committee jurisdictions are important in legislative organization, but the reorganization of jurisdictions has received scant attention, particularly in state legislatures, where the fluidity of committee organization allows us to examine rationales for change. In this article, I examine whether new majorities use jurisdiction reorganization for agenda‐control purposes. Examining 39 state legislatures between 2003 and 2012, I test whether committee patterns are less stable in legislative sessions under new majorities and the extent to which reorganization reflects party priorities. I find that new majority parties eliminate committees that reflect the other party's policy priorities and create committees that reflect their priorities.     

Instituting Authority. Some Kelsenian Notes

A rule of recognition for a legal order L seems utterly circular if it refers to behaviour of “officials.” For it takes a rule of recognition to identify who, for L, counts as an official and who does not. I will argue that a Kelsenian account of legal authority can solve the aporia, provided that we accept a, perhaps unorthodox, re‐interpretation of Kelsen's norm theory and his idea of the Grundnorm. I submit that we should learn to see it as the vanishing point rather than the final basis of validity in a legal order. To prepare the ground for this proposal, I will briefly explore the claim to authority that is characteristic of politics. Then I sketch a multi‐layered canonical form of the legal norm, including their “empowering” character (Paulson) in terms of performative operators. I show how it leads to a “perspectival” account of the basic norm. In conclusion, I briefly point to the example of sovereignty and acquis communautair in international law to illustrate this view     

How the Party Can Win in Personal Vote Systems: The “Selectoral Connection” and Legislative Voting in Lithuania

Electoral rules can motivate politicians to cultivate a “personal vote” through their legislative voting records. However, I argue that candidate‐selection procedures have the ability to overpower these electoral incentives. This study—the first systematic study of how candidate selection and electoral rules interact—takes advantage of Lithuania's unique mixed electoral rules and fortuitous candidate‐selection procedures. Regardless of electoral rules, MPs whose future careers depend on getting renominated by central party leaders vote against the party less than those whose careers do not. This evidence of a “selectoral connection” suggests candidate‐selection procedures must be studied much more seriously.     

The politics of race and juvenile justice: The “due process revolution” and the conservative reaction

Through the prism of race, this article analyzes the social structural and political context of juvenile justice law reforms over the past half century. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court imposed national legal and equality norms on recalcitrant southern states that still adhered to a segregated Jim Crow legal regime, and these norms provided the impetus for the Supreme Court's juvenile court “due process” decisions in the 1960s. The article then analyzes sociological, criminological, racial factors, media coverage, and political dynamics of the 1970s and 1980s that contributed to the “get tough” legislative reformulation of juvenile justice policies in the 1990s. During this period, conservative Republican politicians pursued a “southern strategy,” used crime as a code word for race for electoral advantage, and advocated “get tough” policies, which led to punitive changes in juvenile justice laws and practices and have had a disproportionate impact on racial minorities.     

When Voters Pull the Trigger: Can Direct Democracy Restrain Legislative Excesses?

Direct democracy is sometimes described as a “gun behind the door,” but how do legislators react when voters pull the trigger? Leveraging the high‐profile referendum defeat of a controversial law passed by the Ohio legislature, I examine how legislators respond to voter disaffection. Using interest groups to “bridge” votes before and after the election, I show that the measure's defeat induced moderation on the part of the Republican legislative majority, while leaving the behavior of opposition Democrats largely unchanged. The results suggest that direct democracy has the potential to restrain legislative excesses and alleviate polarization in state legislatures.     

Legislative Waiver Reconsidered: General Deterrent Effects of Statutory Exclusion Laws Enacted Post‐1979

In recent years, the juvenile justice system has undergone a “get tough” transformation. One component of the system which has experienced substantial alteration is the mechanism by which states allow for the waiver of juvenile offenders to adult criminal court. Most of the state systems now have some form of transfer procedure in place and many allow for the automatic transfer (or statutory exclusion) of juveniles who have been charged with certain offenses. Although the effects of waiver laws on individuals have received much empirical attention, their effects on the respective states’ aggregate level violent juvenile crime rates are less understood. In this study, we examine the relative effects of legislative waiver laws in 22 states that have added statutory exclusion provisions since 1979. In doing so, we assess whether legislative waiver should be reconsidered.     

The Power of an Hour: Effects of Candidate Time Expenditure in State Legislative Elections

Using survey data from more than 500 legislative candidates in 17 states during the 2008 election, I examine whether state house candidates who devote more time to their campaign win a larger share of the major‐party vote. Consistent with previous work studying campaign spending in state legislative elections, I find a positive and significant association between campaign time and vote percentage for challengers—but not incumbents—in incumbent‐contested elections.     

Sovereignty and International Order

Abstract. Sovereignty may be threatened by obligations and relations with other nations, states or powers from either an “internal” or “external” perspective. In this paper, I argue that these obligations and relationships may be compatible with a state's sovereignty if we understand the proper nature of authoritative relationships. This requires a model of “rational authority” which places emphasis on the first-person perspective of the subjects to authority.     

How Parties Create Electoral Democracy,Chapter 2

Parties neither cease to exist nor cease to compete for office when the general election is over. Instead, a new round of competition begins, with legislators as voters and party leaders as candidates. The offices at stake are what we call “mega‐seats.” We consider the selection of three different types of mega‐seats—cabinet portfolios, seats on directing boards, and permanent committee chairs—in 57 democratic assemblies. If winning parties select the rules by which mega‐seats are chosen and those rules affect which parties can attain mega‐seats (one important payoff of “winning”), then parties and rules should coevolve in the long run. We find two main patterns relating to legislative party systems and a country's length of experience with democratic governance.     

Presidential Support in the Russian State Duma

Recent comparative research on presidential systems has analyzed the ways in which presidents build majorities for their legislative agendas. Through an analysis of roll‐call votes from the 2000‐03 Russian State Duma on a set of issues reflecting President Putin's legislative agenda, I examine the impact of parliamentary party affiliation, policy preferences, issue type, and electoral mandate type on structuring floor support for the president. I also assess the implications of a mixed electoral system for building legislative coalitions in multiparty legislatures. Further, my findings shed light on Putin's recent reforms of the Duma's rules and procedures and the country's electoral system.     

法律案合宪性审查的程序、事项与方法

法律案的合宪性审查是立法机关在立法过程中对法律案是否符合宪法进行的自我、事前控制形式,是我国合宪性审查机制的重要组成部分。在不存在根本性制度障碍的前提下,先行激活法律案的合宪性审查对于提升宪法实施和宪法监督水平,维护宪法的权威性具有非常重要的实践意义。《立法法》设定的审议程序(包括“前置性”审议程序与正式审议程序)蕴含着对法律案进行合宪性审查的契机。立法机关可以根据我国宪法在内容构造上的特点,立足于本国立法的现实需要并借鉴其他国家的合宪性审查经验,将合宪性审查的对象锁定在法律草案在内容上最有可能涉及违宪的某些具体事项上,如此才能提高审查效率;针对较为具体的审查事项,立法机关需要创造性运用“抽象公益条款的禁止”“平等原则的过滤”以及“比例原则的审视”等方法,有效地排除法律草案中的违宪情形,稳健地推进与我国国情相适应的合宪性审查工作。     

Reclaiming the Power to Punish: Legislating and Administrating the California Supermax, 1982–1989

This article examines how increasingly punitive prison conditions, epitomized by the birth and spread of the supermax prison, developed in the United States. This analysis builds on a growing literature about the “new punitiveness” of U.S. punishment policy and its global proliferation. This article shifts the focus away from the policies that have led to increasing rates of incarceration, however, and toward the policies that have shaped the conditions of incarceration. Drawing on archival research and more than 30 oral history interviews with key informants, I examine the administrative and legislative processes that underwrote the supermax innovation in California in the 1980s. During California's late twentieth‐century prison‐building spree, prison administrators deployed multiple rhetorics of risk to extend their control over conditions of confinement in state prisons. As the state invested billions of dollars in prison building initiatives, legislators, who were focused primarily on building prisons faster, ceded authority over prison design and conditions to prison administrators. In the end, rather than implementing legislative policy, prison administrators initiated their own policies, institutionalizing a new form of “supermax” confinement, pushing at the limits of constitutionally acceptable practices.     

The New Puritanism: The Resurgence of Contractarian Citizenship in Common Law Welfare States

In common law jurisdictions, legislative reforms to their welfare states are frequently framed in terms of their innovative nature. However, such legislative reforms, on the contrary, may be representative of a more historical ‘puritan’ view of welfare and citizenship, the doctrines of which originate in the aftermath of the sixteenth‐century Protestant Reformation, and which developed in the following centuries. The core values of this era have always remained within welfare legislation and policy in common law states, and appear to have experienced a resurgence in recent times. These puritan values manifest themselves within welfare legislation under certain distinct themes, which will be expanded upon. The extent to which values of puritan Christianity renders welfare legislation in common law welfare states distinct from that of other welfare states is also a theme which is examined. In addition, the utility of this ‘puritan’ approach towards welfare law and policy is also discussed.     

State Tasks and Human Rights

This paper analyses the change in the notion of fundamental and human rights in Germany and throughout the European Union during the process of European integration. This change, that can be summarized in the formula “from human rights to state tasks,” signifies the integration and partial amendment of the French Revolution's ideals (liberté, égalité, fraternité) with the new ideals of security, diversity and solidarity. These new ideals make it necessary for the state to play a positive role in devising, for example, a policy of minority recognition and a long list of social rights. These rights are often translated into merely generic “norms on state objectives” and not directly binding law in force. This means that such rights increasingly become a political and legislative issue making it more difficult for the Courts to offer guarantees. 1 Abstract by Giorgio Bongiovanni.
     

Criminalization,Legitimacy, and Welfare

A standard view about criminal law distinguishes between two kinds of offenses, “mala in se” and “mala prohibita.” This view also corresponds to a distinction between two bases for criminalization: certain acts should be criminalized because they are moral wrongs; other acts may be criminalized for the sake of promoting overall welfare. This paper aims to show two things: first, that allowing for criminalization for the sake of promoting welfare renders the category of wrongfulness crimes largely redundant. Second, and more importantly, accepting welfare as a legitimate ground for criminalization implies a certain view about legitimate state action, which makes criminalization for wrongfulness more difficult to justify. If I am right, the view that keeps the two categories of criminalization as largely separate is untenable. I conclude with some remarks about the advantages of welfare (and not wrongfulness) as the basis for criminalization.     

What Does It Mean to Control Migration? Soviet Mobility Policies in Comparative Perspective

The migration policies of the former Soviet Union (or USSR) included a virtual abolition of emigration and immigration, an effective ban on private travel abroad, and pervasive bureaucratic controls on internal migration. This article outlines this Soviet package of migration controls and assesses its historical and international distinctiveness through comparison with a liberal state, the United States, and an authoritarian capitalist state, Apartheid South Africa. Soviet limitations on external migration were more restrictive than those of contemporary capitalist states, and Soviet regulation of internal migration was unusual in its direct bureaucratic supervision of the individual. However, Soviet policy did not aim at the suppression of internal migration, but at its complete regularization. The ultimate goal was “regime adherence”: the full integration of the citizen into the Soviet political order. In contrast to the USSR, migration in the contemporary world is marked by “irregularization”: policies that lead to the proliferation of insecure and unauthorized migration.