Donors,Primary Elections,and Polarization in the United States

I examine the influence of partisan donors on the district-level ideological polarization of congressional candidates in the United States. I use data from 2002–10 U.S. House elections, which provide for the placement of major party primary winners on the same ideological dimension as their primary, general election, and partisan donor constituencies. Using this unique data set, I find strong evidence that the influence of donors in nominating contests is a source of polarization in the United States. House nominees are more responsive to their donor constituencies than either their primary or general electorates. I also find some evidence that the lack of general election competition affects nominee extremity. In safer districts, Democratic incumbents appear more responsive to donors. However, Republican donors seem to demand proximity regardless of district competitiveness. Overall, the polarizing effects of donor constituencies dominate any moderating effects, resulting in ideologically extreme nominees and, ultimately, members of Congress.     

Partisanship,Religion, and Issue Polarization in the United States: A Reassessment

Political Behavior - Researchers debate the extent of issue polarization in the United States, as well as what role (if any) social identities such as partisanship and religion play in issue...     

Competitive Government in the United States: Policy Promotion and Divided Party Control

Divided party control of the executive and legislative branches of American government has traditionally been thought to contribute to the system's tendencies toward policy stalemate and paralysis. Based on a series of brief case studies over the past twenty-five years, this article argues that, under certain circumstances, divided party government may promote rather than hinder the enactment of legislation. It sketches an analytical framework that suggests a range of policymaking outcomes may result from party competition under conditions of divided government, including stalemate, neglect, accommodation, and promotion.     

Party incumbency and economic growth in the United States: 1929 to 1984

This paper investigates the relationship between Democratic presidential incumbency and economic growth in the United States in the long run. The analysis shows the Democrats have stimulated growth beyond trends when two conditions are met: first, when an incoming administration is formally committed to promoting growth and employment, and second, when that administration has at least two terms of office to implement those goals. The transmission mechanisms linking incumbency and growth are explored by means of a standard Keynesian IS-LM model, which is augmented by additional relevant variables. The transmissions process works via monetary policy, fiscal policy, and welfare expenditure. It also seems likely that changing expectations of consumers and investors stimulated the economy beyond trends for some Democratic administrations.     

Measuring Party Identification: Britain, Canada, and the United States

The article proposes an empirically based reflection on how to measure party identification cross nationally, using data from the 1997 Canadian Election Study, the 1997 British Election Study, and the 1996 American National Election Study. These studies included both traditional national questions and a new common one, which allows for an assessment of the effects of question wording on the distribution and correlates of party identification. We show that the distribution of party identification is strongly affected by question wording and that the relationship between party identification and variables such as party and leader ratings, and voting behavior does not quite conform to theoretical expectations. We point out problems in the wording of party identification questions and propose an alternative formulation.     

Business conflict and international law: The political economy of copyright in the United States

The internet industry has emerged as an important economic and political actor, both within the United States and internationally. Internet companies depend on exceptions from copyright law in order to operate. As a result, internet companies have considerable incentive to try and influence international copyright law. However, the current literature has neglected the role of the internet industry, instead focusing on the influence of copyright owning media companies. This has largely homogenized the concerns of business interests, neglecting the interests of business actors which do not favor stricter copyright protection. By examining business conflict over recent copyright initiatives by the United States, this article criticizes the literature. It illustrates that the internet industry has been able to alter the negotiating preferences of the United States against the wishes of copyright owners. This argues against the homogenization of business interests regarding copyright while illustrating the importance of material over discursive factors in determining political outcomes.     

Party strategies,world demand,and unemployment in Britain and the United States, 1947–1983

This paper replicates and extends earlier work on the politics of macroeconomic policy by considering political effects on unemployment in Britain and the United States from 1947 to 1983. Unemployment falls under left-wing governments and rises under right-wing governments. However, these partisan effects on unemployment in an open economy like Britain's can only be satisfactorily estimated relative to the level of world economic activity. The United States has major effects on world economic activity but is also subject to feedback from the economies of other countries. Politicians' strategic incentives and economic regime constraints determine whether partisan effects on unemployment will be sustained, transitory, or absent. In Britain, only a model in which partisan impacts are transitory satisfactorily estimates the effects of changes of party control. In the United States, only the transitory-impact model is able to estimate partisan effects in recent administrations.