Democracy and Capitalism: Collective Action Theory and Structural Analysis

The problem which I address in this paper consists in the connection between democracy and capitalism. I begin by specifying a model of actor theory which indicates a number of methods of achieving co-operation between actors I then review different structural theories of democracy which link up with these methods. Against this background I then seek to clarify—and to some extent evaluate—the arguments which different researchers have adduced in support of the thesis that capitalism is a prerequisite for democracy.     

Collective Action for Smallholder Market Access: Evidence and Implications for Africa

It is widely acknowledged that the involvement of small farmers into markets can contribute to higher productivity and income growth, which in turn can enhance food security, poverty reduction efforts, and overall economic growth. In Africa, as in other parts of the developing world, agricultural production systems and their participants face significant challenges as a result of changing economic, environmental, and sociopolitical context. New dynamics in the global agricultural economy, such as the growth of supermarkets, are providing smallholders with both the new opportunities and new constraints to participate in and benefit from market exchanges. Collective action in the form of producer groups can enable African smallholders to take advantage of the new value chains and deal with existing market imperfections. However, certain conditions must be in place to create and sustain incentives for farmers to organize around marketing. Experiences from collective action in natural resource management (NRM) have shown that the types of markets and products, characteristics of user groups, institutional arrangements, and external environment need to be considered in order to determine the effectiveness and sustainability of collective marketing for smallholders. This paper applies the lessons from collective action in NRM to marketing, using existing case studies of producer groups in Africa, and offers policy recommendations on the factors that contribute to the success of collective marketing efforts.     

Republican Freedom,Popular Control,and Collective Action

Republicans hold that people are dominated merely in virtue of others' having unconstrained abilities to frustrate their choices. They argue further that public officials may dominate citizens unless subject to popular control. Critics identify a dilemma. To maintain the possibility of popular control, republicans must attribute to the people an ability to control public officials merely in virtue of the possibility that they might coordinate their actions. But if the possibility of coordination suffices for attributing abilities to groups, then, even in the best case, countless groups will be dominating because it will be possible for their members to coordinate their actions with the aim of frustrating others' choices. We argue the dilemma is apparent only. To make our argument, we present a novel interpretation of the republican concept of domination with the help of a game‐theoretic model that clarifies the significance of collective action problems for republican theory.     

Social Networks and Collective Action

Despite growing attention to the role of social context in determining political participation, the effect of the structure of social networks remains little examined. This article introduces a model of interdependent decision making within social networks, in which individuals have heterogeneous motivations to participate, and networks are defined via a qualitative typology mirroring common empirical contexts. The analysis finds that some metrics for networks' influence—size, the prevalence of weak ties, the presence of elites—have a more complex interaction with network structure and individual motivations than has been previously acknowledged. For example, in some contexts additional network ties decrease participation. This presents the potential for selection bias in empirical studies. The model offers a fuller characterization of the role of network structure and predicts expected levels of participation across network types and distributions of motivations as a function of network size, weak and strong ties, and elite influence.     

Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action

In recent years, scholarshave turned to alternative representationsof utility to capture motivationalheterogeneity across individuals. In theresearch reported here, we examine twomodels of heterogeneous utility –linear-altruism and inequity-aversion – inthe context of two-person, social dilemmagames. Empirical tests are conducteddrawing on data from experiments andsurveys. We find that the model ofinequity-aversion accounts for asubstantial proportion of the preferencetypes and behavior that are not explainedby the standard model of self-interestedpreferences. In contrast, the altruismmodel does not provide a significantincrease in explanatory power over theinequity-aversion model.     

Collective Action,Civil Society,and Public Policy in Turkey

Abstract

Understanding policy change mechanisms has been a key question for scholars of public policy and collective action. However, policy scholarship mostly ignores civil society-based explanations of policy processes. In order to address this gap, this study combines the Advocacy Coalition Framework with networked collective action perspectives and analyzes a successful case of mobilization of women’s rights organizations in Turkey to reverse a bill on child marriage. Study findings suggest that advocacy coalitions are not static entities. When different issues in a policy subsystem are invoked, the structure of inter-coalition networks can change substantially and these variations in inter-coalition interactions may have consequences for influencing policy change. Moreover, this paper argues that extensive street protests and online campaigns by civil society organizations have the capacity to boost the bargaining power of minority coalitions, especially in contexts that lack multiple formal venues for making policy claims.     

The Logic of Private and Collective Action

Since Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action (1965), it is impossible for political scientists to conceive of political participation without reference to his powerful argument linking numbers of participants, public goods, and participatory outcomes. What is puzzling is the poor empirical support for this argument in the domain where it should work best, namely explaining business political activity. Olson thought his arguments principally applicable to economic groups, and for the empirical development of his arguments Olson drew heavily on business interests, the most active segment of the interest group community. We explore these arguments with business political activities data by examining the statistical performance of various measures of market structure in determining business political activity, and find little empirical support. We do offer an alternative basis for business behavior lodged in both private and collective goods that preserves business rationality and also helps explain not only the amount of business political participation but the modes of business participation .     

The Consequences of Collective Action: An Incomplete-Contracts Approach

Public policy may be determined as much by what cannot be agreed to by politicians and organized interests as by what can. Focusing on the inability of organized groups to credibly promise that their members will fully report revenues to tax authorities, I develop an incomplete-contracts lobbying model that shows that the provision of collective goods may be influenced by the anticipated tax compliance of economic sectors as well as by the organization of interests. Data from a survey of firms in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are broadly supportive of the theory: the ability of firms to hide revenues from tax authorities rivals conventional collective-action variables in explaining variation in collective-goods provision, but only in that part of the postcommunist world where differences in revenue hiding across sectors are especially large.     

Institutional Analysis of Neighborhood Collective Action

Sublocal governance organizations may provide a way for some urban neighborhoods to stabilize and improve property values. Recent advances in collective action theory, spatial statistical methods, and data availability now make it possible to more directly evaluate the effects of these organizations. The analysis combines geocoded assessor's data and data from a survey of neighborhood and homeowner associations to analyze a model of prices of single‐family homes in Little Rock, Arkansas, from 2012 to 2016. The results show that neighborhood and homeowner associations both have significant positive effects on neighborhood property values relative to unorganized neighborhoods and that the effect of neighborhood associations is at least as large as that of homeowner associations. Moreover, the results indicate that neighborhood association structure mediates the effect on property values, although this is not the case for homeowner associations.     

The Fog of Humanitarianism: Collective Action Problems and Learning-Challenged Organizations

This essay explores humanitarian action, and by effect post-conflict state-building, in the so-called new wars of the post-cold war period – especially the targeting of civilians, the proliferation of non-state actors, and the perils of war economies. The host of reactions by aid agencies, termed ‘new humanitarianisms’, has called into question traditional operating principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence while the system has experienced dramatic increases in the number of organizations and available funds. Arguing that too little institutional learning has yet occurred, the authors call for changing the culture of aid agencies and investing in information gathering and sharing, policy analysis, and planning. In an era when reflection time is as valuable as reaction time, they stress the need to develop a humanitarian equivalent of military science.     

Institutional Collective Action and Economic Development Joint Ventures

There is high interest in economic development efforts involving cooperation or collaboration among metropolitan jurisdictions. To determine why some local governments engage in cooperative agreements while others do not, this paper investigates transaction obstacles, including bargaining, information, agency, enforcement, and division problems. The authors then advance an institutional collective action explanation for intergovernmental cooperation, focusing on the conditions under which these transactions costs are low. This work anticipates that the costs associated with interlocal cooperation are influenced by the demographic characteristics of communities, local political institutions, and the nature of regional government networks. Empirical analysis based on a national survey of local development officials provides support for several predictions from this model and identifies policy variables that, in turn, increase the prospects for cooperation, specifically through the development of informal policy networks.     

Collective Action and Citizen Responses to Global Warming

This paper expands the relevance of the collective interest model of mass political action to explain collective-action behavior in the context of global warming and climate change. The analysis is an attempt to answer Ostrom’s call for a behavioral model of collective action that can be generalized beyond political protest to other collective-action problems. We elaborate, specify, and empirically test a collective interest model approach to citizen policy support, environmental political participation, and environmental behavior related to the issue of global warming. Key elements of the collective interest model—perceived risk, personal efficacy, and environmental values—are found to be directly, and positively, related to support of government policies and personal behaviors that affect global warming. We also discuss the links between the collective interest model and other important approaches to political behavior.

Harmonization of Earth Observation Data: Global Change and Collective Action Conflict

ABSTRACT

Earth observation by satellites is the basis for integrated scientific assessment of global environmental change. Institutional arrangements to coordinate Earth observation data collection efforts recognize harmonization as essential for the scientific assessments that are sought. The goal of harmonization is to achieve compatibility of data polices among the various Earth observation science missions. In this article, I discuss the concept of harmonization and evaluate how Earth observation data policies influence the implementation of harmonization through an examination of a number of relevant actors, strategies, and systems. This includes the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, the Integrated Global Observing Strategy, the former International Earth Observing System, the Group on Earth Observations, the Global Earth Observation System-of-Systems, and the Earth observation programs in the United States and Europe. The results of this study indicate that the problem for realizing an optimal harmonization lies in the differing preferences among actors as to how harmonization is formulated and then implemented. A number of recommendations are put forward here that can ameliorate the problems concerning the implementation of harmonization.     

Religion,Sectarianism, and Democracy: Theory and Evidence from Lebanon

Political Behavior - Why does religion sometimes increase support for democracy and sometimes do just the opposite? Using data from an original survey conducted in Lebanon, I present and test a...     

试论集体行动的困境

集体行动问题是现代经济学中的分支之一——公共选择理论的主要研究对象。美国著名经济学家曼瑟尔·奥尔森（Mancur Olson）1965年出版的《集体行动的逻辑》可谓研究该领域的奠基之作。他站在方法论的个人主义立场,认为集团是由各构成主体的自发意志所形成的,其理论主要阐述的是以谋求集体财富为目的的集团规模问题。其论点为旨在获得集体财富的集团,其规模的大小直接关系到目标能否实现的问题。具体而言,他认为规模小的集团比规模大的集团更能实现集体行动。但在书中,奥尔森认为规模小的集团情况复杂,故其研究的对象为大集团,更为确切地说强调大集团的“集体行动的困境”。     

Voting,Collective Action,and Liberalisation in Latin America: The Rise and Fall of the Hillinger Paradox

Chile's economic and political evolution after the 1982–83 financial crisis has been offered as a model for the rest of Latin America. This paper interprets the 1973 military coup, and national recovery during the 1980s and 1990s, in terms of the presence and absence, respectively, of the Hillinger (1971) paradox. The paradox arises when democratic voting on platforms consisting of several issues leads to majority support for a platform, itself consisting of issues, none of which is supported by the majority. In the early 1970s, a particular expression of the Hillinger paradox led Chile to the verge of a bloody civil war, and to a prolonged military dictatorship. In the mid 1980s, an important policy question, that of differentiated industrial protection versus free trade, was solved by a stable compromise in favour of the latter. This avoided the Hillinger paradox and eventually made electoral politics possible again.     

'All for One and One for All': Transactions Cost and Collective Action

Rational choice analysis of collective action predicts that individual members of a large group will not contribute voluntarily towards a common cause; members of large groups attribute no significance to individual action. Large groups are mobilised by the attraction of private goods and services; private interest, rather than identity with a common cause, is the stimulus. Yet the efficacy of such selective incentives depends on the signal that erstwhile 'profits' (from the provision of private goods) are dedicated to achieving a collective goal. At the same time, the signal that collective action is 'non-profit' enhances the intrinsic value of the act of participation. When the impact of individual action on outcome is difficult to discern, individuals rely on low-cost signals relating to process . There are incentives to identify with the pursuit of a common cause when collective action is deemed 'non-profit' and a common goal is non-rival.