China's aggressive ‘periphery diplomacy’ and South Korean perspectives

In this special section, the present article reviews South Korean perspectives on China's ‘periphery diplomacy’ with a focus on Chinese behaviour with respect to the East China Sea maritime territory and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). By analysing research papers published by various Korean research institutions and academic journals, this article demonstrates that most Korean scholars hold that as long as China's growth goes on, the tensions between the US and China are likely to intensify. The article also shows that one of the primary concerns of South Korean scholars lies in the question of how South Korea should respond to changing regional orders and a rising China. The article argues that South Korea's strategic dilemma is reflected in a regional structure in which competition between two great powers has recently forced the periphery to impose bilateral ties on.     

China's domestic strategic debate and confusion over the South China Sea issue

The article looks at China's strategic debate and confusion over the South China Sea (SCS) issue and explores why it has occurred. This article recognizes that China has not yet decided whether the SCS issue should be included among China's core national interests. Additionally, China has not quite figured out whether the priorities should be placed on the SCS claims or the Sino-US relationship. In addition, China has not worked out exactly what the Nine-Dash Line (NDL) means. It contends that identity is a key factor in informing a state's strategic concerns and policy objectives regarding the SCS. This article argues that China's dual identities force China to strike a middle ground, which causes domestic strategic debate and confusion. In the final analysis, this article tries to determine what salient implications a prevailing identity of China as a rising power would yield for its SCS policies.     

Reappraising the debate and practice of US strategic ambiguity/clarity in cross-strait relations

Abstract

China's influence in the South Pacific appears to be growing rapidly. Some analysts are concerned that China is on its way to replacing the West as the dominant power and China's rise in the region poses a major threat to the West. However, there is no clear evidence to suggest that China's deepening involvement in the South Pacific is a calculated strategic move for its military security. The move can be strategic mainly in the sense that it has strong implications for China's reunification strategy and it serves China's long-term development strategy. The strategic value of the South Pacific to China's national security is limited at present and will remain so in the foreseeable future. China also lacks the military capability to challenge the US-led West in the region in the years to come. Chinese influence in the region is not deep-rooted and is largely based on its ‘no-strings-attached’ aid and its increasing economic interactions with the region. China has serious image problems in the region and these problems are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. China thus has neither the hard power nor the soft power to become a genuine hegemon in the region.     

The impact of Illicit Financial Flows on the South African political economy under Jacob Zuma, 2009–2018

South Africa has also fallen a victim of a greater major concern over the scale and negative impact of Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) on the country's governance and developmental agenda. However, there is an unjustified observation that as one of Africa's biggest economies, South Africa is not a victim of IFFs. This observation shows that scholars and academic practitioners have not yet uniformly come to a cul‐de‐sac on this subject, and as such, this confusion constitutes a huge dichotomy on the subject matter. Based on Afrocentricity as the alternative lens, this article argues that there are after effects of the practice of IFFs in South Africa and that IFFs need to be given a special attention in order to curb them from destabilising South Africa's economic and political stability. Although this article discusses IFFs in general and how they come about, the central focus of this article is to unpack the impacts of IFFs under the Zuma administration and provide possible solutions. Methodically, this article relied on the prevailing continental and South African discourse circulating and thematic content analysis on conversations.     

China's engagement-oriented strategy towards North Korea: achievements and limitations

In response to the challenge of unstable North Korea (weak economy, weapons of mass destruction [WMD] development), China has followed an engagement-oriented strategy based on diplomatic persuasion, economic interaction and moderate economic sanctions. Intensified engagement (2009–2012) facilitated North Korean convergence with China in respect of economic reform but divergence has persisted over WMD development. Despite the widening of divergence since 2013, China has refrained from applying crippling sanctions. This article seeks to explain these diverging results and their implications for China's strategy towards North Korea. Reviewing recent literature and data, it will argue that Chinese economic input reinforced the trend of economic reform that formed the basis of political consolidation under the new hereditary regime. On the other hand, the prospect of stable dependence on China ran counter to that regime's pursuit of WMDs as the basis of security and diplomatic diversification. These mixed results reveal the limits of China's strategy: its economic input involuntarily reinforces North Korea's WMD potential but it is not prepared to accept the risks of enforcing WMD restraint by crippling sanctions either. With limited room for manoeuvre, the attainment of China's strategic objectives ultimately depends upon policy change from the US or South Korea.     

The US,Japan, and trade liberalization: from bilateralism to regional multilateralism to regionalism+

Abstract

Amid growing alarm over the rising atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases, increasing attention is being given to ‘geo-engineering’ technologies that could counteract some of the impacts of global warming by either reducing absorption of solar energy (solar radiation management (SRM)) or removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Geo-engineering has the potential to dramatically alter the dynamics of global climate change negotiations because it might cool the climate without constraining fossil fuel use. Some scholars have expressed concern that certain states may be tempted to act unilaterally. This paper assesses the approach that China is likely to adopt towards governance of SRM and the implications this holds for broader international climate negotiations. We survey Chinese public discourse, examine the policy factors that will influence China's position, and assess the likelihood of certain future scenarios. While Chinese climate scientists are keenly aware of the potential benefits of geo-engineering as well as its risks, we find that no significant constituency is currently promoting unilateral implementation of SRM. China will probably play a broadly cooperative role in negotiations toward a multilaterally governed geo-engineering programme but will seek to promote a distinctive developing world perspective that reflects concerns over sovereignty, Western imperialism and maintenance of a strict interpretation of the norm of common but differentiated responsibility.     

The non-traditional security concept and the EU-ASEAN relationship against the backdrop of China's rise

The rise of China raises questions about international order and whether traditional power structures will be transformed peacefully or confrontationally. Actively engaged in trade and investment activities with its Southeast Asian neighbourhood, China has been exerting political influence on many Southeast Asian states, cleaving regional cohesion and raising levels of tensity in the region. This article presupposes that within so-called non-traditional security (NTS) areas, there is room for China and Southeast Asian countries to circumvent the political tensions, to some extent. It presumes that NTS issues facilitate greater interaction with/on China for Southeast Asian states, including enhanced European Union (EU)-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) engagement on China. Recognising the increasing and rather underexplored importance of the NTS perspective on the official and scholarly levels, this article delves into the rhetoric of NTS from a European perspective with particular view towards the South China Sea issue to demonstrate the use and utility of the NTS concept in the EU-ASEAN context against the backdrop of China's rise.     

Acting one way and talking another: China's coercive economic diplomacy in East Asia and beyond

Over the last two decades, China has experienced one of the most dramatic and sustained periods of economic growth in world history. China's use of economic statecraft provides an important venue in which to examine the role of unacknowledged ‘coercive diplomacy’ within the context of China's ‘peaceful rise discourse.’ In contrast to Western countries, which have overtly used sanctions and other forms of economic coercion, China has publicly denied any such policies while at the same time quietly pursuing them. China's denial of using coercive economic statecraft has muted the reactions of neighboring publics and government, but it cannot entirely forestall them. Without seriously undermining China's ‘peaceful-rising’ image, a more explicit statement from Beijing regarding its coercive economic measure could provide deterrence and assurance to China's neighbors in resolving the disputes. This article first surveys existing literature on economic statecraft focusing on the coercive aspects of such strategies. Second, it presents an in-depth case study on how China uses economic leverages over its neighbors in East Asia: North Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Finally, it highlights the limits of China's economic statecraft within the constraints of China's ‘peaceful rise’ discourse. It concludes with implications for Asian politics and beyond.     

Negotiating new conjunctures of citizenship: experiences of ‘illegality’ in Burmese-Rohingya and Bangladeshi migrant enclaves in Karachi

In this article, I examine aspects of recent shifts in Pakistani citizenship norms and the implications for migrant populations. In doing so, I investigate how the coalescing of national security concerns with broader issues of immigration has brought ‘illegal’ migrants like the Burmese-Rohingya and Bangladeshis into the state's documented embrace. My purpose is threefold: to record the modalities of change through the discourse of ‘illegality’ which articulate the exigencies of the ‘war on terror’; to explore the implications of such change on certain Muslim migrant populations resident in Pakistan for several decades; and, through these discussions, to show how citizenship and belonging have played out in a very different way for them. The subject of immigration/migration and illegality in Pakistan, especially in the post-9/11 frame, has remained largely below the threshold of academic attention.     

China's economic slowdown: implications for Beijing's institutional power and global governance role

China's spectacular economic growth over the past decades has given rise to a more confident and proactive China in global governance. China is now an institution-builder, with new Chinese-led institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank designed to cement Beijing's central role in global economic governance. What, then, are the potential implications of a slowing economy for China's institutional power and global governance role? This article locates China's economic growth and slowdown in broader discussions about China's global position and questions about responsibility, order and governance. It argues that China's economic slowdown will not result in a drastic impact on Beijing's institutional power as there are key material, historical and ideational drivers at play here. Unless China is confronted with the prospect of an economic collapse, it will continue to pursue an active institutional role, speak the rhetoric of South–South solidarity with emerging economies and seek a leadership role in reforming global economic governance, even with a slowing economy, because this is intrinsically tied to its identity and how China now positions itself in an evolving global order.     

China's security agenda after the cold war

The end of the cold war has changed China's basic perception of world politics and its conception of national security. In the cold war era, Chinese leaders tended to view national security from the perspective of global balance of power and China's strategic relations with the two superpowers. It was in Beijing's security interests to maintain a comfortable position in a strategic triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States. When the Soviet Empire and the East European communist regimes collapsed, the structure of the postwar international system dissolved, and the old parameters for Beijing's security strategy disappeared. The Chinese leadership suddenly found itself in a totally new world in which China needed to reorient and redefine its security strategy on a new strategic axis.

Beijing's security strategy after the cold war is redefined by its domestic priorities, growing foreign economic relations, the new security environment in Asia, and concerns over territorial disputes. In a sense, the myopic conception of security based on war and peace is fading away. Beijing's thinking on national security becomes more inclusive, diverse, and complicated. The nature and intensity of external threats has changed. China's growing economic ties with the outside world have redirected Beijing's attention to economic interests and security. The Chinese leadership realizes that its security is affected not only by the military forces of other countries, but also by political, economic, societal, and environmental factors in international relations Beijing needs to employ both traditional military defence and non‐military actions to safeguard its territorial integrity and to realize its full capacity in world affairs.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse China's security agendas after the cold war. It first examines the impact of the end of the cold war on China's thinking on national security, then discusses Beijing's threat perception and changing defence strategy. This is followed by an examination of domestic stability considerations and economic interests in Beijing's security strategy. Finally, it discusses the implications of China's growing power for regional security.     

China's dual strategy of coercion and inducement towards ASEAN

ABSTRACT

This article contributes to the discussion about China's divisive influence on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It argues that recent China–ASEAN relations are based on Beijing's successful implementation of a dual strategy of coercion and inducement. The effectiveness of this strategy is tested against the South China Sea disputes – the issue that lies in the core of regional security and a key platform of power display. The article outlines Beijing's recent interaction with individual ASEAN member-states and its implications for the regional multilateral diplomacy. While by no means identical, Beijing's dual strategy of coercion and inducement with individual ASEAN states have resulted in an effective abuse of the ASEAN consensus principle – a tactic often referred to as ‘divide and rule’. Consequently, the group's internal discord has further eroded and affected the institutional confidence of ASEAN. This article draws attention to the psychological effect of coercion as a perception of punishment, and inducement as a perception of reward.     

Global citizenship as a national project: the evolution of segye shimin in South Korean public discourse

The idea of global citizenship in contemporary South Korean public discourse has revolved mainly around a national endeavor to boost the county's stature and competitiveness amid economic globalization. Based on a review of two decades of published media references to segye shimin (‘global citizen’ in the Korean language), this article shows that the specific usages of segye shimin – mainly by elites from government, academia, and journalism – underscore how the ‘developmental citizenship’ that marked South Korea's past authoritarian military regimes has carried on since the transition to civilian-led democracy. In contrast with the burgeoning academic discourse on cosmopolitanism that focuses heavily on moral responsibilities to humanity and the planet, South Korea's discourse of global citizenship has been closely aligned with neoliberalism and filled with exhortations to the domestic population to overcome numerous perceived liabilities seen as impeding the country's advancement. While global citizenship discourse in South Korea has emphasized top-down national strategic imperatives, a bottom-up approach to cosmopolitanism is also emerging as the country gains confidence and the notion of segye shimin gradually gains traction across the wider society.     

Refining the prize: Chinese oil refineries and its energy security

Since China became a net oil importer in 1993, oil refineries have played integral roles in China's quest for oil security. And yet, the capacity, security, and configurations of refineries were rarely featured in the discussions about China's oil policy. To fill this gap, this paper explains the basics of refinery economics and technology, and details the development in China's refining industry since the early 1990s. By taking refineries into consideration, it then revisits and reassesses the existing literature regarding the motives and drivers behind China's foreign oil policy, its effectiveness, and the political interactions between China and crude oil producers.     

Conceptualizing China–Latin America relations in the twenty-first century: the boom,the bust,and the aftermath

Despite the emergence of a rich literature on the rise of China in Latin America (LAC) since 2000, we are still grappling with this phenomenon. In this article we seek to theorize this expanding South–South relationship from two vantage points. First, from the perspective of China, we argue that, by necessity, the PRC has had to internationalize its development strategy in order to compensate for its serious natural resource deficit, feed the world's largest domestic population, and fuel the soon-to-be largest economy in the world. LAC has been just one slice of China's ‘go out’ strategy. Our second perspective probes the effect of China's entry into the region. Through the lens of development economics, we identify three separate political economy scenarios that have been accentuated within those countries that have the strongest economic ties with China. We rely on measures of institutional performance and macro-economic trends to illustrate the variable effects of China on LAC.     

Indonesian perceptions of the rise of China: dare you,dare you not

The fall of Suharto's regime brought substantial changes in relations between Indonesia and China, and unleashed diverse perceptions of China. Reasons for these changes include the changing nature of Indonesian politics, Indonesia's position in between the US and China, and the direct results of China's policy and behaviour. In turn, sectors of Indonesian society, Indonesian business communities and the government have reacted differently and at different times to China and its growing influence. This article explores the inherent variability of Indonesia's relationship with China over the last fifteen years, which has emanated from different perceptions of Indonesian stakeholders toward China's rise.     

Towards naval normalcy: 'open seas protection' and Sino-US maritime relations

On May 26th, 2015, China published its 10th Defense White Paper which integrated 'open seas protection', along with 'offshore waters defense', into its naval strategy. This shift in naval strategy, albeit largely anticipated, raises a series of important questions about China's maritime ambitions. This article seeks to analyze the causes, nature and challenges of China's latest shift in naval strategy, and its implications for Sino-US maritime relations. The article argues that China's latest shift in naval strategy is a logical corollary of the tension between China's expanding global interests and its asymmetric approach to sea power, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides the necessary stimulus and justification for such a shift. China's new naval strategy, the paper contends, denotes that it will develop a Mahanian blue-water navy and a basic network of overseas bases in the years ahead. Those two developments are expected to pose a series of significant challenges for China's foreign policy. The article argues that China's new naval strategy presents both challenges and opportunities for China and the world. To accomplish 'open seas protection', China will probably have to modify its policies on a range of issues, and moderate its competitive stance in the near seas. Although China's new naval strategy need not be interpreted in a competitive framework, it does present China with a stark choice: either it pursues more friendly attitudes towards its maritime ambitions by modifying its current policy, or it will be increasingly confronted by a coalition of hostile states.     

The death of scientific knowledge in [South] Africa: An Afrocentric response to M. P. Sebola

On the basis of the Afrocentric perspective, this article uses South Africa as a test case to critique Mokoko Piet Sebola's piece titled “Peer review, scholarship and editors of scientific publications: the death of scientific knowledge in Africa,” which appeared in Koers ‐ Bulletin for Christian Scholarship, Volume 83 (1): 1–13. I argue that Sebola's piece provides a partial guide to understanding the state of the knowledge industry in Africa, particularly in South Africa. Safe to say that Sebola's work deepens scholarly and public discourse on the politics of scholarship in Africa and the world at large. However, I do not intend to blatantly praise Sebola's contribution to this academic area, which remains under researched due to the reasons that are beyond the scope of this article. In particular, the current article aspires to identify scholarly weaknesses in Sebola's work with a view to correcting them by offering an alternative view. This correction deserves the attention of all scholars and practitioners especially because it is interdisciplinary in nature, and it is poised to undo the misinformation disseminated in Sebola's piece. Such misinformation has a potential to overshadow the few truths advanced in his article. Methodologically, this article is based on document review, conversations, and interdisciplinary discourse analysis in its broadest form.     

EU Counterterrorism and the Southern Mediterranean Countries after the Arab Spring: New Potential for Cooperation?

The European Union's (EU) relationship with North African countries has long been the subject of intense academic enquiry. For many years, the EU has performed a difficult balancing act between managing the security concerns of its member states, dealing with authoritarian regimes that have questionable human rights records, creating and maintaining good economic relations, and pursuing more normative objectives. Have security objectives overridden other concerns? While the EU has cooperated with regimes with questionable human rights records, counterterrorism cooperation between the EU and North African countries has not developed as much as previous academic studies believe. However, what are the prospects of this changing with more recent developments after the Arab Spring? This article examines in detail the reasons why the EU does not currently conduct significant counterterrorism cooperation with North African countries and discusses whether this situation is likely to change as a result of the events of the Arab Spring, which has swept through North Africa and the Middle East since 2010.     

North Korea and the East Asian Security order: competing views on what South Korea ought to do

This article investigates South Korean views on how to deal with the two major security issues regarding North Korea: its nuclear threat and regime instability. In this Special Section, the article analyzes the ongoing debate in South Korea over the government's policy toward North Korea in regard to these two issues. It argues that uncertainties about these two major issues are shaping the regional order in East Asia. In particular, the different levels of cooperation between South Korea and the United States may affect the regional security order in East Asia. In analyzing policy options available to South Korea, the riskiest option would be to employ early preemptive attacks and accelerate the collapse of North Korea given the security dilemma-driven action?reaction in East Asia. Given that the role of China has become the most crucial factor in dealing with North Korea, the most promising strategy would be to reinforce guarantees of extended nuclear deterrence and prompt a soft-landing unification.