Exploitation dressed in a suit,shining shoes,and carrying a suitcase full of dollars: What does China want in Africa?

China has provided billions of dollars in loans to African countries with no strings attached compared with Western financial aid. Although the argument that China is exploiting Africa for its resources has often clouded Beijing's continued support for Africa, many African leaders have welcomed China's economic assistance and have begun to see China as a more reliable partner compared with the West. By strictly examining relevant literature on Sino–African relations, this study comprehensively explores the dynamics, implications, and benefits of Chinese investments in Africa. Whether China is indeed exploiting Africa, which will continue to be debated, it is clear that Chinese investments have contributed significantly to the development of Africa and will continue to do so as the West has been replaced by Beijing as Africa's biggest trading partner. African countries are therefore likely to continue strengthening their relationship with China further jeopardising the interests of West in the continent.     

An Afrocentric critique of China's security concerns in Africa: The cases of Mali and South Sudan

China's security concerns in Africa has recently become a subject of much academic debate. Most of the academic studies on this subject have wrongly assumed a continental standpoint, which does not take into contemplation the distinctive national captivates of China toward each distinctive African State. Such analytic discourse analysis were also heavily subjected to North [ern] angled perspectives as expressed in either liberal or realist contextual lens, views, and critics. Despite this, the Scholarly discourse on the security concerns of China towards Mali and South Sudan have not been proportionately apprehended. Based on the alternative Afrocentric perspective, this article seeks to employ Mali and South Sudan as test cases to critique the Security Concerns of China toward Mali and South Sudan. The central argument of this article is that, China's Security Concerns towards Mali and South Sudan can best be understood when located within the context of mineral resources complex. Methodologically, this article is based on document review and interdisciplinary discourse analysis in their comprehensive form.     

China's security agenda after the cold war

The end of the cold war has changed China's basic perception of world politics and its conception of national security. In the cold war era, Chinese leaders tended to view national security from the perspective of global balance of power and China's strategic relations with the two superpowers. It was in Beijing's security interests to maintain a comfortable position in a strategic triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States. When the Soviet Empire and the East European communist regimes collapsed, the structure of the postwar international system dissolved, and the old parameters for Beijing's security strategy disappeared. The Chinese leadership suddenly found itself in a totally new world in which China needed to reorient and redefine its security strategy on a new strategic axis.

Beijing's security strategy after the cold war is redefined by its domestic priorities, growing foreign economic relations, the new security environment in Asia, and concerns over territorial disputes. In a sense, the myopic conception of security based on war and peace is fading away. Beijing's thinking on national security becomes more inclusive, diverse, and complicated. The nature and intensity of external threats has changed. China's growing economic ties with the outside world have redirected Beijing's attention to economic interests and security. The Chinese leadership realizes that its security is affected not only by the military forces of other countries, but also by political, economic, societal, and environmental factors in international relations Beijing needs to employ both traditional military defence and non‐military actions to safeguard its territorial integrity and to realize its full capacity in world affairs.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse China's security agendas after the cold war. It first examines the impact of the end of the cold war on China's thinking on national security, then discusses Beijing's threat perception and changing defence strategy. This is followed by an examination of domestic stability considerations and economic interests in Beijing's security strategy. Finally, it discusses the implications of China's growing power for regional security.     

Why cooperate with others? Demystifying China's trilateral aid cooperation

This article examines China's motivations for trilateral aid cooperation in the context of its seemingly assertive diplomacy in recent years. Previously known for its preference for bilateral aid delivery, China, however, is increasingly conducting trilateral cooperation with western donor states and UN agencies. By employing constructivism and cognitive learning theories, this paper focuses on two perspectives: China's calculation of national interests and international engagement, and is structured around two case studies: UNDP's advisory role for China on development cooperation, and China–US trilateral aid cooperation. It argues that strategically, China is putting growing emphasis on its identity as a growing great power in the development sector, using trilateral cooperation to build its global image. Technically, China's four-decade long external engagement has promoted changes in its ideas about aid cooperation, thus reinforcing its desire for cognitive learning to improve its aid performance.     

Conceptualizing economic security and governance: China confronts globalization

Abstract

With the expansion and deepening of globalization, as well as China's entry into the World Trade Organization, the nexus between economic growth and national security has gained prominence in China since the mid-1990s. How to ensure socio-economic security while maintaining its robust economic growth is now the most serious concern of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government. This paper addresses three questions: first, it explores why and how the transformation of economic growth and national security as two separate logics to a single domain evolved conceptually over the past two decades in China; second, what kinds of insecurities are generated by China's robust economic growth coupled with the expansion and deepening of globalization, and in which way and to what extent do they challenge China's government; third, what kinds of mechanisms or policy instruments have been adopted by China's government to address emerging economic insecurities while maintaining robust economic growth. The paper concludes that in the case of China, globalization has posed new challenges to economic security, but given that economic insecurity has its particular salience in individual countries, national institutional adjustment or adaptation becomes increasingly important for each country to govern in the interests of economic security while maintaining economic growth.     

Offensive for defensive: the belt and road initiative and China's new grand strategy

China's Belt and Road initiative came from the combined pressure of slowing down of Chinese economy, US pivot to Asia and deterioration of the relations with neighboring countries after weathering the storm of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. It also symbolizes a more proactive approach of Chinese new leader Xi Jinping in meeting the expectation on China's international obligation and leadership. Aimed to link Asia, Europe, Africa and Oceania, the initiative provides tremendous opportunities of international economic cooperation. The paper argues that as China's contribution to international public goods, it is in the line of economic liberalism; as China's grand strategy, it is more of defensive than offensive by nature. Despite risks and uncertainties exist, the enforcement will boost China's influence and position in regional and international institutions. US should consider making more strategic space to the rising China, and a better coordinated China–US relations will make Asia Pacific a safer and more promising region.     

Towards naval normalcy: 'open seas protection' and Sino-US maritime relations

On May 26th, 2015, China published its 10th Defense White Paper which integrated 'open seas protection', along with 'offshore waters defense', into its naval strategy. This shift in naval strategy, albeit largely anticipated, raises a series of important questions about China's maritime ambitions. This article seeks to analyze the causes, nature and challenges of China's latest shift in naval strategy, and its implications for Sino-US maritime relations. The article argues that China's latest shift in naval strategy is a logical corollary of the tension between China's expanding global interests and its asymmetric approach to sea power, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides the necessary stimulus and justification for such a shift. China's new naval strategy, the paper contends, denotes that it will develop a Mahanian blue-water navy and a basic network of overseas bases in the years ahead. Those two developments are expected to pose a series of significant challenges for China's foreign policy. The article argues that China's new naval strategy presents both challenges and opportunities for China and the world. To accomplish 'open seas protection', China will probably have to modify its policies on a range of issues, and moderate its competitive stance in the near seas. Although China's new naval strategy need not be interpreted in a competitive framework, it does present China with a stark choice: either it pursues more friendly attitudes towards its maritime ambitions by modifying its current policy, or it will be increasingly confronted by a coalition of hostile states.     

Food in China's international relations

Abstract Food is a tireless referent in international relations studies about China and its ties with the rest of the world. This paper addresses two contemporary issues. First, why is China so sensitive about grain self-sufficiency? Second, why does there seem to be a lack of effective dialogue between epistemic communities in China and outside over China's overseas agricultural activities? The first part of the paper reviews the development of China's agricultural sector and underlines the importance of China's contribution in stabilizing the world food markets. Next, it explores the ideational sources of Chinese food insecurity, in spite of its success in attaining high levels of self-sufficiency in grain. The third part of the paper reviews the evolution of China's overseas agricultural activities and analyzes the factors that contribute to a mismatch of understanding about the political implications therein. The paper concludes by proposing a couple of conceptual road maps for securitizing food as a referent in debates about China's security environment and Chinese international relations.     

Uneven institutional configurations and sectoral variation in China's socialist market economy: a comparative study of three pillar industries

By comparing three Chinese pillar industries, automobile, petroleum, and machinery, this paper analyzes how the development of uneven institutional configurations bred sectoral variation in transitional China. In 1994, at the dawn of the Chinese socialist market economy, the State Council issued guidelines for national industrial policy and proposed the enactment of similar growth-promoting policies for all pillar industries. The level of policy enactment and the resulting outcomes, however, vary significantly across the industries. Previous literature on China's rapid industrialization has sought to build a single model encompassing China as a whole, and has emphasized either the state's institutional capacity or China's unique governance mechanisms. This study investigates China's industrialization by taking account of the uneven development of institutional capacity amid macro institutional reforms. Every idea and institution evolved at a different pace in these reforms, and the incremental nature of the reforms further deepened the gaps between sectors. This paper argues that, due to this uneven development, the Chinese state was not strong enough to be considered a developmental state until at least the early 2000s.     

In search of the ‘Other’ in Asia: Russia–China relations revisited

This paper argues that Russia and China are partners of consequence and that the neglect of the normative dimension of the Sino-Russian relationship has led its impact on global governance to be undervalued and misunderstood. Following a constructivist approach, the paper examines the shared norms underlying an ever closer Sino-Russian partnership, despite divergent interests in a number of areas. A first section examines how shared norms lead Russia and China to define their identity similarly, facilitate joint actions, and constrain their individual policy choices. For Russia, elaborating its own unique identity is crucial to its claim to global status, though complicated by interactions with multiple ‘Others.’ Russia's effort to engage Asian partners is often viewed as hedging against China, but as second section argues that Russian engagement in Asia is better understood in terms of Russia's effort to define an Asian identity. A third section highlights the securitization/desecuritization dynamic in Sino-Russian economic relations. Xi Jinping's efforts to redefine China's global role reinforces its tendency to desecuritize the vulnerabilities that lead China to seek economic cooperation with Russia. Russia, fearing becoming a ‘resource appendage’ of China, then securitizes economic relations with China.     

A new dynamism in Sino-Japanese security relations: Japan's strategic use of foreign aid

Abstract

In November 2004 a Chinese nuclear submarine cruised into Japan's territorial waters near the Okinawa Islands. In response, the Japanese government dispatched several Japanese naval ships and planes to chase the Chinese submarine until it navigated into international waters. This event, which potentially could have become the first exchange of fire between Japan and China since the Second World War, illuminated increasingly problematic security relations between the two neighbouring countries in the twenty-first century. In fact, deterioration of Sino-Japanese security relations is not a recent phenomenon but has already been evident since the mid-1990s, when Japan imposed a series of economic sanctions on China. Between 1995 and 2000 Japan had suspended its foreign aid to China in protest against: China's nuclear weapons tests; China's large scale war game including the launch of missiles across the Taiwan Strait; and Chinese naval activities in disputed areas in the East China Sea. This article looks at Sino-Japanese security relations since the mid-1990s through three case studies of the aid sanctions imposed by Japan on China. It clarifies the domestic political and bureaucratic interests that motivated aid sanctions and determined the decision-making process leading to these sanctions. The article argues, that with certain politico-security interests, Japanese governments actively used foreign aid as a strategic instrument to counter provocative military actions by China in the East Asian region since the mid-1990s. Despite the limited influence that Japanese aid sanctions have actually had on Chinese military behaviour, Japan's strategic use of foreign aid has undeniably created a new dynamism in security relations between the two neighbouring great powers in Asia.     

Refining the prize: Chinese oil refineries and its energy security

Since China became a net oil importer in 1993, oil refineries have played integral roles in China's quest for oil security. And yet, the capacity, security, and configurations of refineries were rarely featured in the discussions about China's oil policy. To fill this gap, this paper explains the basics of refinery economics and technology, and details the development in China's refining industry since the early 1990s. By taking refineries into consideration, it then revisits and reassesses the existing literature regarding the motives and drivers behind China's foreign oil policy, its effectiveness, and the political interactions between China and crude oil producers.     

China's domestic strategic debate and confusion over the South China Sea issue

The article looks at China's strategic debate and confusion over the South China Sea (SCS) issue and explores why it has occurred. This article recognizes that China has not yet decided whether the SCS issue should be included among China's core national interests. Additionally, China has not quite figured out whether the priorities should be placed on the SCS claims or the Sino-US relationship. In addition, China has not worked out exactly what the Nine-Dash Line (NDL) means. It contends that identity is a key factor in informing a state's strategic concerns and policy objectives regarding the SCS. This article argues that China's dual identities force China to strike a middle ground, which causes domestic strategic debate and confusion. In the final analysis, this article tries to determine what salient implications a prevailing identity of China as a rising power would yield for its SCS policies.     

China's evolving role in African security

China’s engagement in Africa is increasingly defined by its role in bolstering peace and security. Beijing has signalled greater political will with peacekeeping deployments on the continent, as well as increasing capabilities with its new naval base in Djibouti. Positive outcomes could include greater Chinese support for African security efforts and increased regional security cooperation with the United States. But these will depend substantially on how China's wider strategic outlook and relationships evolve.     

China's defence industries

Abstract

The implementation of foreign direct investment (FDI) policies in China shows that domestic considerations were not the only factors shaping the course of China's opening up to the world economy. Foreign response was often taken into account as the Chinese government felt its way through the process of reform. Focusing on Japanese FDI in China, this article explores the liberalization of China's FDI regime and traces the impact of China's negotiations with and accommodation to pressure from foreign business and governments.     

Fire over water: China's strategic engagement of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden crisis

Abstract

Since China agreed to join the international counter-piracy coalition in late 2008, a watershed development in Chinese strategic policy, Beijing's engagement in Somalia is now following two separate streams. First, China is seeking to engage Somalia as part of its expanding number of African diplomatic partners via its participation in the coalition. Second, China is attempting to demonstrate, on the international level, its growing commitment to developing its naval capabilities, and protecting its maritime trade interests, by engaging in multilateral and coalition-based operations, namely to combat piracy off the Somali coast, in order to deflect criticism from the United States and its allies of China's overall military expansion and modernization.     

Reappraising the debate and practice of US strategic ambiguity/clarity in cross-strait relations

Abstract

China's influence in the South Pacific appears to be growing rapidly. Some analysts are concerned that China is on its way to replacing the West as the dominant power and China's rise in the region poses a major threat to the West. However, there is no clear evidence to suggest that China's deepening involvement in the South Pacific is a calculated strategic move for its military security. The move can be strategic mainly in the sense that it has strong implications for China's reunification strategy and it serves China's long-term development strategy. The strategic value of the South Pacific to China's national security is limited at present and will remain so in the foreseeable future. China also lacks the military capability to challenge the US-led West in the region in the years to come. Chinese influence in the region is not deep-rooted and is largely based on its ‘no-strings-attached’ aid and its increasing economic interactions with the region. China has serious image problems in the region and these problems are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. China thus has neither the hard power nor the soft power to become a genuine hegemon in the region.     

Response and responsibility: China in East Asian financial cooperation

Abstract

China's behaviour in East Asian financial cooperation has overall changed from passively responding to external pressures to taking proactive initiatives, which are highlighted by Chinese elites as evidence of a sense of responsibility. China has taken varied positions towards proposals for Asian financial regionalism, from ‘silent’ objection, to lukewarm or superficial support, to enthusiastic participation and substantial contribution, and this variance has not always taken place in a chronological order. Despite much speculation over the trajectory of China's role in East Asian regionalism, there has not been a study focused on China's policymaking towards East Asian financial cooperation. Therefore, this paper fills the gap by analysing the factors and policymaking processes that have led to those varied positions. It argues that China, recognising the momentum in the region to enhance cooperation, has replaced the blunt dismissals of proposals, particularly those from Japan, with a more subtle approach that is aimed at ensuring China's influence and promoting the image of a responsible great power; that the extent to which it can contribute to this process is mainly constrained by its economic conditions, particularly the financial institutions.     

The social order of Chinese capitalism: socio-economic uncertainty,communist party rule and economic development, 1990–2000

China's financially repressed economy remains characterized by a distinctly resilient political structure (the Chinese Communist Party, CCP) that penetrates both increasingly rational ‘private’ (market) and ‘public’ (state) organizations. How are we to understand the financial system's role in this persistently illiberal yet marketizing political economy? This paper develops a theory of China's financial reform as the management of socio-economic uncertainty by the CCP. Since the early 1990s, the financial system has formed a locus of the CCP's capacity both to manage and to propagate socio-economic uncertainty through the path of reform. The unique path of financial reform in China should thus not be viewed solely in terms of ‘partial’ or ‘failed’ free-market reform, but rather as the product of a more concerted vision of how the financial system enabled a mode of economic growth that combined the drive for accumulation of capital with the distinctive legacies of China's post-1989 socio-political circumstances.     

China's corporate credit reporting system: A comparison with the United States and Germany

Corporate credit reporting (CCR), which aims at increasing trust in corporates, constitutes an intriguing, yet understudied set of regulatory institutions as it is both a regulatory object and subject at the same time. Differences in national CCR systems pose challenges for multinational companies and have increasingly become a subject of international conflicts on regulatory standards. In this context, the case of China deserves special attention since the country pursues both institutional divergence and convergence with international examples. Hence, the characterization of China's regulatory regime remains difficult. By comparing the institutional context of CCR in China to those in the United States and Germany, this paper sheds light on a specific aspect of China's complex regulatory regime. At the same time, it provides insights into the Chinese manifestation of CCR, which are important for the international business community.