Promotion of the Agricultural Sector and Political Power in Austria

In most industrialized countries farmers as a small and well orgnized group are ableto influence government decisions to get rent creating proposals enacted. Two different viewsare presented to explain why: the Chicagoan view (“Efficient Redistribution Hypothesis”)and the Virginian view (inefficient outcome of political bargaining). A vertically structuredempirical model of the Austrian farm sector is employed to test both hypotheses. Quantitativeresults of the welfare transfers from consumers/taxpayers to farmers and agribusiness firmsare derived and the political weights of these groups are presented.     

Variation in central bank independence across countries: Some provisional empirical evidence

In this paper seven hypotheses to explain variation in central bank independence across countries are tested. The predictions based upon the theory that delegation of authority by politicians to the central bank is used as a commitment device are not supported: central bank independence is not higher the larger the employment motivated inflationary bias, the higher political instability or the larger the government debt. Central bank independence is positively related to historical inflation experience and negatively with political instability. We do only find limited support for the view that countries with a universal banking system and countries whose central banks do not regulate financial institutions have more independent central banks.     

Foreign Direct Investment,Regime Type,and Labor Protest in Developing Countries

We explore the relationship between FDI, regime type, and strikes in low‐ and middle‐income countries. We argue that FDI produces social tensions and opportunities for protest that can result in higher levels of industrial conflict. However, the effect of FDI is moderated by regime type. While democracies tend to have higher levels of protest overall, they are better able than authoritarian regimes to cope with the strains arising from FDI. We cite two reasons. First, political competition forces regimes to incorporate workers, which shifts conflict from industrial relations to the political arena. Second, democracies provide workers with freedom of association rights, which facilitate institutionalized grievance resolution. We test the argument using a new dataset of labor protest in low‐ and middle‐income countries for the period 1980–2005.     

Domestic political determinants of inflation

Abstract. Political economists have advanced a variety of diverse and competing hypotheses to explain the domestic political dimension of inflation. With few exceptions, however, these hypotheses have been tested individually without regard to competing explanations. This study uses pooled time-series data on fifteen industrial democracies to examine five prominent political hypotheses that purport to explain either political pressures that cause inflation or institutional arrangements that insulate governments from these pressures. The results indicate that: (1) Central Bank independence provides an effective counterweight to inflation by insulating monetary policy making from inflationary (particularly, partisan) impulses; (2) Government spending increases caused by distributive and redistributive politics intensify inflationary pressures even in countries with independent Central Banks and neocorporatist arrangements; (3) Inflation is determined partially by the ideology of the party controlling government. Leftist governments in pursuit of income redistribution produce higher inflation than conservative governments; (4) Elections do not have significant effects on inflation under any structural circumstances; and (5) Neocorporatism does not consistently reduce inflation or contain the inflationary effects of partisan manipulation and fiscal expansion. However, neocorporatism may stop inflation if wage moderation by labour is accompanied by the government's commitment to pursue restrictive monetary policy.     

Basic Personal Values Underlie and Give Coherence to Political Values: A Cross National Study in 15 Countries

Do the political values of the general public form a coherent system? What might be the source of coherence? We view political values as expressions, in the political domain, of more basic personal values. Basic personal values (e.g., security, achievement, benevolence, hedonism) are organized on a circular continuum that reflects their conflicting and compatible motivations. We theorize that this circular motivational structure also gives coherence to political values. We assess this theorizing with data from 15 countries, using eight core political values (e.g., free enterprise, law and order) and ten basic personal values. We specify the underlying basic values expected to promote or oppose each political value. We offer different hypotheses for the 12 non-communist and three post-communist countries studied, where the political context suggests different meanings of a basic or political value. Correlation and regression analyses support almost all hypotheses. Moreover, basic values account for substantially more variance in political values than age, gender, education, and income. Multidimensional scaling analyses demonstrate graphically how the circular motivational continuum of basic personal values structures relations among core political values. This study strengthens the assumption that individual differences in basic personal values play a critical role in political thought.     

Ethnic Diversity and Social Capital in Europe: Tests of Putnam's Thesis in European Countries

This article focuses on the core theory recently proposed by Putnam on the relationship between ethnic diversity and dimensions of social capital. Hypotheses are derived from this theory, but also from other theories that propose competing hypotheses on relationships between national characteristics and dimensions of social capital. Essentially, the authors propose more rigorous empirical tests of Putnam's hypotheses by including these competing hypotheses: tests of these hypotheses provide possibilities to evaluate Putnam's and these other theories in terms of general (i.e. cross‐national) tenability for the European continent. The general question is: To what extent do national‐level characteristics like ethnic diversity, next to other national characteristics, actually affect dimensions of social capital of individual citizens in European countries? The authors set out to answer this question by testing hypotheses on cross‐national data from 28 European countries. These data contain valid measurements of a number of dimensions of social capital. The individual‐level data are enriched with contextual‐ (i.e. national‐) level characteristics to be included in more advanced multilevel analyses. The main finding is that Putnam's hypothesis on ethnic diversity must be refuted in European societies. Instead, it is found that economic inequality and the national history of continuous democracy in European societies turn out to be more important for explaining cross‐national differences in social capital in Europe.     

Economic integration and the relationship between profit and wage taxes

This paper analyzes the development of the ratio of corporate taxes to wage taxes using a simple political economy model with workers and capitalists that own internationally mobile and immobile firms. Among other results, our model predicts that countries reduce their corporate tax rate, relative to the wage tax, when preferences for public goods increase, or when the share of capital employed in multinational firms is rising. We further show how an increase in the wage share changes both the relative size of tax bases and the political influence of different income groups. The predicted relationships are tested using panel data for 23 OECD countries for the period 1980 through 2004. The results of the empirical analysis support our main hypotheses.     

Democratic accountability and central bank independence: A response to Elgie

Empirical evidence is presented on the development of (violent) political conflict in 19 West European countries during the 1970s, the early 1980s and the entire post‐Second World War period. It is possible to identify three types of nation‐groups: ‘noisy‐participatory’ states such as the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and more recently Spain and Portugal ‐ and Greece if taken on a per capita base. The group of rather ‘quiet’ democracies consists of the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and Luxembourg, with the remaining countries forming the middle, less clearly delineated group. There are two dimensions of political conflict: collective protest, made up of variables such as protest demonstrations, political strikes and riots, and internal war, characterised by the breakdown of the slate monopoly of violence and the organised use of violence by anti‐system groups. A causal model of political protest is presented and confronted with rival explanations. Empirical evidence and theoretical arguments lead to scepticism about accurate predictions of political violence and political instability.     

Does political connection influence corporate financial decisions in unstable political environment?

The aim of this study is to examine the impact of political connection on the cost of debt, the cost of equity and the investment level in an unstable political environment. We use a sample of 55 Tunisian listed firms during the post-revolution period (2011–2018) and we apply a generalized least square (GLS) approach to test our hypotheses. Findings highlight that political connections increase the corporate financial costs and reduce the investment level. Furthermore, in an additional analysis, we show on the one hand that political instability negatively affects the investment and affects positively the cost of debt and the cost of equity. On the other hand, we make evidence that the political instability level negatively affects the relation between the political connection and the cost of debt. The contribution is, to the best of our knowledge, the absence of studies conducted in Tunisia countries examining the impact of political connection on the financial cost and investment level in an unstable political environment such as Tunisia.     

The friend of my enemy is my enemy: International alliances and international terrorism

Terrorism is an instrument for groups that cannot achieve their political goals legally. One important strategic function of terrorism is to weaken the government – either directly by attacking representatives or supporters of the government or indirectly by causing a political response that is unpopular among the population. Often, however, political stability of the home government is buttressed by foreign powers. In this case, the terrorists can have a strategic interest in attacking nationals of these foreign countries. This article analyses this logic by looking at international alliances as a proxy for international support. If the friend of my enemy is my enemy, then terror entrepreneurs, which seek to overthrow their home country's government (the enemy), may find it attractive to target nationals of the foreign allies of their country (the friends of the enemy). The theory in this article predicts that attacking nationals of a foreign ally is particularly attractive if this ally is militarily more powerful than the home country. Moreover, the combined effect of alliance and relative power differentials becomes stronger the more democratic the ally and becomes weaker the more democratic the terrorists' home country. Empirical support for the hypotheses in this article is found in an analysis of a directed country dyad sample of international terrorism.     

Schools of democracy? Disentangling the relationship between civic participation and political action in 17 European countries

Since Tocqueville's seminal writings, voluntary associations have been proclaimed to be schools of democracy. According to this claim, which regained popularity during the 1990s, involvement in voluntary associations stimulates political action. By participating in these associations, members are socialised to become politically active. Supposedly, having face‐to‐face contact with other members induces civic mindedness – the propensity to think and care more about the wider world. Participating in shared activities, organising meetings and events, and cooperating with other members are claimed to induce civic skills and political efficacy. Over the years, many authors have elaborated on these ideas. This article offers a systematic examination of the neo‐Tocquevillian approach, putting the theoretical ideas to an empirical test. It offers a critical overview of the literature on the beneficial role of voluntary associations and dissects it into five testable claims. Subsequently, these claims are tested by cross‐sectional, hierarchical analyses of 17 European countries. The authors conclude that the neo‐Tocquevillian theory faces serious lack of empirical support. In line with the expectations, they find a strong, positive correlation between associational involvement and political action. Moreover, this correlation is positive in all countries under study. However, more informative hypotheses on this correlation are falsified. First, the correlation is stronger for interest and activist organisations than for leisure organisations. Second, passive (or ‘checkbook’) members show much higher levels of political action than non‐involved, whereas the additional effects of active participation are marginal. Third, the correlation between associational involvement and political action is not explained by civic skills and civic mindedness. In sum, the authors find no evidence for a direct, causal relation between associational involvement and political action. The socialisation mechanism plays a marginal role at best. Rather, this article's findings imply that selection effects account for a large part of the correlation between associational involvement and political action. The conclusion reached therefore is that voluntary associations are not the schools of democracy they are proclaimed to be, but rather pools of democracy.     

Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical analysis

This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption and the shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are tested for a cross-section of 98 countries. Our results show that there is no robust relationship between corruption and the size of the shadow economy when perceptions-based indices of corruption are used. Employing an index of corruption based on a structural model, however, corruption and the shadow economy are complements in countries with low income, but not in high income countries.     

Support for radical left ideologies in Europe

This article examines support for radical left ideologies in 32 European countries. It thus extends the relatively scant empirical research available in this field. The hypotheses tested are derived mainly from group‐interest theory. Data are deployed from the 2002–2010 European Social Surveys (N = 174,868), supplemented by characteristics at the country level. The results show that, also in the new millennium, unemployed people and those with a lower income are more likely to support a radical left ideology. This is only partly explained by their stronger opinion that governments should take measures to reduce income differences. In contrast to expectations, the findings show that greater income inequality within a country is associated with reduced likelihood of an individual supporting a radical left ideology. Furthermore, cross‐national differences in the likelihood of supporting the radical left are strongly associated with whether a country has a legacy of an authoritarian regime.     

Political instability and inflation volatility

The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the effects of political instability, social polarization and the quality of institutions on inflation volatility over time and across countries. Using the system-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models on a sample covering 160 countries, analyzed in the period from 1960 to 1999, this paper finds that higher degrees of political instability and social polarization, less democracy, and lower de facto central bank independence are associated with more volatile inflation rates. Furthermore, political instability has greater effects on inflation volatility in developing countries with lower degrees of central bank independence and economic freedom.     

Adult roles and the gender gap in political knowledge: a comparative study

The unusual size and persistence of the gender gap in political knowledge is perplexing in comparison to other dimensions of politics. Building on situational explanations of political engagement, this article claims that women’s and men’s specific adult roles lead to an enlargement of the gender gap in knowledge. The present study analyses men and women’s levels of political knowledge at different life stages by means of two unique datasets specifically collected to measure what people know about politics. Findings show that adult roles provide more opportunities for men to gain political knowledge than for women. Furthermore, the comparison of levels of political knowledge in two such dissimilar countries as Finland and Spain suggests that while gender equality policies are successful in tearing down some of the obstacles that hinder women’s contact with the political world, they are still insufficient to completely bridge the gender gap in political knowledge during adulthood.     

Muffling the swing: STV and the Irish general election of 1981

This article explores alternative hypotheses for variation in the political salience of unemployment. The differences between the political opinions of employed and unemployed people are used as a proxy for the qualitative importance of unemployment. Unemployment is not found to be more politically salient when government support of the unemployed is more generous or when jobless spells are shorter. Far more important is the character of employment. Unemployment is more politically salient in countries where employment guarantees a basic livelihood. The data also suggest that unemployment has greater salience in countries where the unemployed are more likely to use state employment exchanges in searching for work. Two conclusions are suggested. First, public toleration of high unemployment in recent decades may be partly the result of the rise of atypical work arrangements. Second, while it is debatable whether social‐democratic protections of employment standards increase unemployment rates, such efforts may inadvertently increase the political costs of high unemployment.     

Implementing independent regulatory agencies in Brazil: The contrasting experiences in the electricity and telecommunications sectors

This paper explores hypotheses that could explain both the creation of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in Brazil, and the differences in the design of the Brazilian IRAs in the telecommunications and electricity sectors. To formulate specific hypotheses that make sense of the Brazilian case, the paper critically interrogates the “weak state” hypothesis and the “political bias” hypothesis. The first argues that countries with flawed governance structures, such as Latin American countries, are less likely to establish independent regulators than European countries. The second argues that “political bias” is a determinant factor in predicting the implementation of IRAs in Latin America. The first part of the paper uses these two general hypotheses as a basis to formulate specific hypotheses to explain the creation of IRAs in Brazil. The second part of the paper formulates specific hypotheses that could explain why institutional guarantees of IRA independence are stronger in the telecommunications sector, than in the electricity sector. In particular, the paper argues in support of a revised version of the “political bias” hypothesis to explain sectoral divergence, suggesting that bureaucratic resistance to reform may be the cause for the variations observed in Brazil between regulatory reform in electricity and in telecommunications.     

The two freedoms,economic growth and development: An empirical study

Log-linear methods are applied to categorical data containing economic freedom, political freedom, the level of income, and the rate of economic growth for a panel of about 100 countries from 1975 to 1992. The main results are: given economic freedom, the rate of economic growth is independent of political freedom and the level of income; given the level of income, political freedom is independent of economic freedom and the growth rate. The analysis suggests the fundamental effects of economic freedom in fostering economic growth, and a high level of income as the condition of a high degree of political freedom.     

Torture Approval in Comparative Perspective

Torture is (almost) universally condemned as barbaric and ineffective, yet it persists in the modern world. What factors influence levels of support for torture? Public opinion data from 31 countries in 2006 and 2008 (a total of 44 country-years) are used to test three hypotheses related to the acceptability of torture. The findings, first, show that outright majorities in 31 country-years reject the use of torture. Multiple regression results show that countries with high per capita income and low domestic repression are less likely to support torture. Constraints on the executive have no significant effect on public opinion on torture.     

Testing the Development and Diffusion of E‐Government and E‐Democracy: A Global Perspective

E‐government uses information and communication technology to provide citizens with information about public services. Less pervasive, e‐democracy offers greater electronic community access to political processes and policy choices. Few studies have examined these twin applications separately, although they are widely discussed in the literature as distinct. The authors, Chung‐pin Lee of Tamkang University and Kaiju Chang and Frances Stokes Berry of Florida State University, empirically analyze factors associated with the relative level of development of e‐government and e‐democracy across 131 countries. Their hypotheses draw on four explanations of policy change—learning, political norms, competition, and citizen pressures. All four explanations are strongly linked to nations where e‐government policy is highly advanced, whereas a country’s e‐democracy development is connected to complex internal factors, such as political norms and citizen pressures.