The effect of electoral rules on voting behavior: the electoral college and shift voting

The Electoral College has a measurable effect on the propensity of the rational voter to vote for the candidate he most prefers. The ‘slippage’ between the individual's articulated preference ordering and his actual vote is analyzed (using 1968 data) with respect to the strategic position of the voter in his state. The direction of the findings support the theoretically-derived propositions. Nevertheless, the low overall incidence of shifts and the reluctance of voters to shift from nationally-viable candidates demonstrates the overwhelming influence of the national electoral environment.     

The British general election of 2010 under different voting rules

The 2010 British election resulted in what the British refer to as a “hung Parliament” for the first time in over a generation. This result further heightened the debate over the fairness and utility of the nation’s centuries-old first-past-the-post (FPTP) system. Survey data are used to simulate the election outcome under four different electoral systems beyond FPTP: round-robin pair-wise comparisons, the Borda count, the alternative vote, and Coombs' method. Results suggest that in 2010, the Liberal-Democrats were Condorcet preferred to all other parties and would have won a national election under every tested method except the alternative vote, the method supported by the Liberal-Democrats during the referendum in May 2011 and, of course, FPTP as actually used.     

Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules

We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from dominating minorities: whether a voting rule makes a majority powerful and whether minorities can veto the candidates they do not prefer. For a given voting rule, the minimal share of voters that guarantees a victory to one of the majority’s most preferred candidates is the measure of majority power; and the minimal share of voters that allows the minority to veto each of their least preferred candidates is the measure of veto power. We find tight bounds on such minimal shares for voting rules that are popular in the literature and used in real elections. We order the rules according to majority power and veto power. Instant-runoff voting has both the highest majority power and the highest veto power; plurality rule has the lowest. In general, the greater is the majority power of a voting rule, the greater its veto power. The three exceptions are: voting with proportional veto power, Black’s rule and Borda’s rule, which have relatively weak majority power and strong veto power, thus providing minority protection. Our results can shed light on how voting rules provide different incentives for voter participation and candidate nomination.

     

Voters and roll call voting: The effect on congressional elections

The subject of this research is whether ideological preferences play a major role in explaining voters' refusal to reelect some members of the U.S. House of Representatives. If ideological control is important, one would expect to find a large difference between the voting record of a rejected incumbent and his or her replacement. In distinction, whenever voters must replace a congressman or congresswoman because that person had died in office or chose to run for higher office, the hypothesis of ideological tracking implies that the newly elected member of Congress will resemble his or her predecessor. The data confirm these hypotheses and show, as well, that ideological control exists within parties and not only between them; that the degree of voters' ideological control is as great over senior congressmen and congresswomen as over junior ones; and that voters' concern about ideology has increased over the last two decades.     

The international politics of climate change after Brexit

The Paris Agreement provides a framework for achieving cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions that could mitigate the worst of global warming, and there has been a trend of increased participation and stronger national institutional support, cooperation and ambition towards that end. Among EU states, the United Kingdom has led that trend for three decades. The uncertainty introduced by the Brexit vote may weaken it.     

The stability of international coalitions in United Nations voting from 1946 to 1973

The stability of outcomes under democratic decision-making is a significant issue in public choice. Several factors might make U.N. voting blocs less stable than blocs in national legislatures. Nevertheless, the data suggest that from 1946 to 1973 United Nations voting blocs were relatively stable. Nations that leave their blocs tend to vote with nearby blocs rather than making large ideological shifts, and tend to return to their old blocs. There does not appear to be cycles in United Nations voting blocs. Furthermore, the blocs can be ranked on a stable single-dimensioned continuum, lending further evidence that United Nations voting blocs are stable.     

Veto players, electoral incentives and international commitments: The impact of domestic institutions on intergovernmental organization membership

Abstract.  The conventional literature on international cooperation in general, and intergovernmental organization membership in particular, depicts a regular, positive relationship between wealthy capitalist democracies and participation in international institutions. While empirical evidence supports this assertion, it says little about the mechanisms, and the accompanying variation among them, by which states enter into international institutions. This study distinguishes industrialized democracies along two dimensions: the nature of their constitutional structures and the organization of their electoral politics. Variations in these features produce variations in the institutional constraints and electoral incentives that matter in determining state participation in international organizations. Results of a pooled cross-sectional time series analysis of 23 democracies in 1981 and 1992 indicate that the structure of governing institutions and the nature of electoral systems account for much of the variation in intergovernmental organization membership. This study concludes that domestic institutions matter in determining international cooperation through international organizations – a novel insight overlooked by most international relations theories.     

The effect of the choices available on voting behaviour: the two Japanese elections of 1993

Voters make their choices based on an interaction between their preferences and the options available. One cannot vote for a candidate or a party that is not running in one's district. Voting research has heretofore focused almost exclusively upon voter preferences, assuming that all the relevant options are available to all voters. In this paper, we seek to redress the balance somewhat by focusing on variation in the options available to voters in the 1993 Japanese general election. In that election, three new parties ran and were themselves a major issue in the campaign. Voters were asked to express themselves on the question, “should we break the mold of postwar politics by voting for a new party?” We demonstrate that electoral results and voting behavior both varied significantly between those electoral districts with, and those without, a new party option. There were, in effect, two elections in 1993, one in which voters chose between new and established parties and another in which voters chose from among the established parties only. We argue that one cannot assume that an electoral outcome reflects the “will of the people” without adding the important caveat, “given the available alternatives”.     

Healthy voting: The effect of self-reported health on turnout in 30 countries

Based on five rounds of European social survey (ESS), we examine both the direct and indirect effect of health, channelled by social connectedness, on turnout in 30 countries. Our analysis is the first attempt to make a comprehensive account of the magnitude of health in electoral participation. The results show that health has an effect on turnout and that it is notably larger among older people. The impact of health is partly mediated by social connectedness, which suggests that attenuated health may weaken an individual's social network which in turn depresses voting.     

Gradient constraint in voting: The effect of intra-generational social class and income mobility on turnout

As the connection between an individual’s socioeconomic status and electoral participation originates from the socialization process in childhood and adolescence, inequalities in voting are often argued to be relatively stable throughout the life cycle. However, social mobility during adulthood may mitigate the effects of family background. Using individual-level register-based data, this study examines the extent to which changes in adults’ social class and income between 2000 and 2011 influenced voting propensity in the 2012 Finnish municipal elections. The results show that turnout among socially mobile voters settles between the stable members of their socioeconomic group of origin and destination. Our findings imply that intra-generational social and economic mobility can constrain the socioeconomic gradient in turnout.     

Normative transformations in EU external relations: the phenomenon of ‘soft’ international agreements

Abstract

The European Union increasingly uses ‘soft’ international arrangements rather than formal international agreements in establishing relations with non-EU states. This contribution aims to raise the question of to what extent a move from hard to soft law in relations between the EU and its partners can be seen as allowing the Union to ‘step outside’ the legal framework (if that indeed is what is happening) and disregard the rules and principles that define the way in which EU external relations are to take shape. Possible consequences include the risk that these instruments are not subject to appropriate safeguards, that parliamentary influence (by the European Parliament as well as by national parliaments) is by-passed and that transparency is affected. There are various reasons for the EU not to use formal procedures, but a turn to informality does come at a price.     

Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity

We propose a simple Pólya-variety urn model for calculating paradox-of-voting probabilities. The model contains a homogeneity parameter, and for specific values of this parameter the model reduces to cases previously discussed in the literature. We derive a Dirichlet family of distributions for describing the assignment of preference profiles in large committees, and we show how the homogeneity parameter relates to measures of similarity among voters, suggested in prior studies.     

Isolating the effect of compulsory voting laws on political sophistication: Leveraging intra-national variation in mandatory voting laws between the Austrian Provinces

Compulsory voting laws introduce a legal requirement to vote that substantially increases in voter turnout. Additionally, this study provides evidence that a legal requirement to vote also generates a more politically informed population. A comparative case study leverages intra-national variation in mandatory voting regulations across the Austrian Provinces over time. The analysis constructs novel measures intended to quantify recent and accumulated exposure to compulsory voting laws. The results suggest that exposure to mandatory voting laws caused Austrian citizens to increase their political interest and attention to political news, as well as their level of information about party platforms on whether or not to expand EU integration. As a whole, the study suggests that compulsory voting not only increases voter turnout; it also leads to an increase in political information.     

Attitudes to voting rules and electoral system preferences: Evidence from the 1999 and 2003 Scottish Parliament elections

Researchers have paid little attention to the way citizens evaluate different electoral systems. This reflects the limited knowledge citizens are presumed to have about alternative electoral arrangements. However, the establishment of a legislature under new electoral rules creates conditions in which citizens can make more informed judgements. Such a situation occurred with the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, elected under the Additional Member system. Using data collected in 1999 and 2003, we consider Scottish voters’ reactions to the new electoral rules. We examine how voters evaluated various features and outcomes of the rules, the structure of voters’ attitudes, and which features and outcomes of the rules were decisive in shaping overall support for plurality and proportional voting systems.