Partisan effects in morality policy making

Current comparative policy research gives no clear answer to the question of whether partisan politics in general or the partisan composition of governments in particular matter for different morality policy outputs across countries and over time. This article addresses this desideratum by employing a new encompassing dataset that captures the regulatory permissiveness in six morality policies that are homosexuality, same‐sex partnership, prostitution, pornography, abortion and euthanasia in 16 European countries over five decades from 1960 to 2010. Given the prevalent scepticism about a role for political parties for morality policies in existing research, this is a ‘hard’ test case for the ‘parties do matter’ argument. Starting from the basic theoretical assumption that different party families, if represented in national governments to varying degrees, ought to leave differing imprints on morality policy making, this research demonstrates that parties matter when accounting for the variation in morality policy outputs. This general statement needs to be qualified in three important ways. First, the nature of morality policy implies that party positions or preferences cannot be fully understood by merely focusing on one single cleavage alone. Instead, morality policy is located at the interface of different cleavages, including not only left‐right and secular‐religious dimensions, but also the conflicts between materialism and postmaterialism, green‐alternative‐libertarian and traditional‐authoritarian‐nationalist (GAL‐TAN) parties, and integration and demarcation. Second, it is argued in this article that the relevance of different cleavages for morality issues varies over time. Third, partisan effects can be found only if individual cabinets, rather than country‐years, are used as the unit of analysis in the research design. In particular, party families that tend to prioritise individual freedom over collective interests (i.e., left and liberal parties) are associated with significantly more liberal morality policies than party families that stress societal values and order (i.e., conservative/right and religious parties). While the latter are unlikely to overturn previous moves towards permissiveness, these results suggest that they might preserve the status quo at least. Curiously, no systematic effects of green parties are found, which may be because they have been represented in European governments at later periods when morality policy outputs were already quite permissive.     

Representation and voter participation

This paper presents results from a study of turnout in the 1994 European Parliament elections which inserted several new questions into the post–election Eurobarometer, including some open–ended questions. It distinguishes between circumstantial and voluntary abstention and shows how each type varies depending on the institutional arrangements for the election. Using both the subjective reasons given for abstention and a range of more objective measures of attitudes, it makes the case that conventional views as to the impact of Sunday–voting and the proportionality of the electoral system and as to the non–impact of attitudes to the European Union need to be modified. It concludes by identifying some practical institutional and political measures that could encourage higher levels of participation.     

Vetoing and inaugurating policy like others do: evidence on spatial interactions in voter initiatives

A sizeable literature studies strategic interactions between governments. In this paper, we ask whether, in the presence of direct democratic institutions, voters’ actions in vetoing a decision or inaugurating a policy by a binding initiative in their jurisdiction have spillover effects on the actions of voters in neighboring jurisdictions. We collect (and make available) data on 3300 initiatives in German towns from 2002 to 2014 and match these to panel data on the towns’ sociodemographic and fiscal characteristics. We apply an instrumental variables approach and find that a jurisdiction’s probability of hosting an initiative is positively driven by the neighbors’ direct democratic activity. The size of the estimated average effect peaks around a 20 km neighborhood—where a standard deviation change of neighbors’ activity increases the probability of hosting an initiative by 5 percentage points—then gradually declines and fades away after around 60 km. This effect is driven by spillovers in similar policy areas and by successful initiatives, and is stronger in towns with relatively more information flows (measured by newspaper consumption and commuter flows).     

Representation and voter participation

Abstract This paper presents results from a study of turnout in the 1994 European Parliament elections which inserted several new questions into the post–election Eurobarometer, including some open–ended questions. It distinguishes between circumstantial and voluntary abstention and shows how each type varies depending on the institutional arrangements for the election. Using both the subjective reasons given for abstention and a range of more objective measures of attitudes, it makes the case that conventional views as to the impact of Sunday–voting and the proportionality of the electoral system and as to the non–impact of attitudes to the European Union need to be modified. It concludes by identifying some practical institutional and political measures that could encourage higher levels of participation.     

Public preferences about government spending: Partisan,social, and attitudinal sources of policy differences

Although the causes and consequences of the growth of government have become the focus of increasing scholarly attention, relatively little empirical research has been done about the nature and determinants of individual fiscal preferences. The present study analyzes patterns of partisan, socioeconomic, and attitudinal differentiation in public spending preferences for a variety of government functions. Two important findings emerge from our analysis. First, attitudes about the adequacy of government spending for each of the functions considered are shown to have two dimensions—a support for spending dimension and a support for change dimension. Second, the patterns of partisan and socioeconomic cleavages about government spending are shown to vary significantly across policy domains. This fracturing of demand structures, it is argued, may be one of the root causes of the performance crisis of political institutions.     

Regional stabilization: a model for policy decision

A policy simulative model with the main purpose of simulating the effects of alternative policy moves and obtaining an accurate read-out of resulting urban-suburban conditions is the focus of this paper. The model deals with the movement of various population groups and the resulting effects on some very broad indicators of city-suburban life, rather than with particular topics like transportation, land use and the like. The level of abstraction is thus intermediate and is directed at providing practical policy suggestions for a particular city—Newark—for which the model is calibrated. The model, however, is general enough in nature so that it can be applied to other urban-suburban complexes and therefore the policy suggestions made on a fairly broad basis. The outputs of the model are graphically represented to show the results of alternative policies which then may be compared. As a side benefit the inputs to the model can also serve as a “social report” on the present status of an area. Policy questions to be answered by the model include: Should a city budget be directed somewhat differently? Should a city ask the state or federal government for funding and for how much? What may be expected from imposing a city sales tax, weighing the revenue benefit against costs of lost sales or citizens? And last, would the federal government not be better off by simply giving money to the poor directly instead of to cities?     

Representative voter theorems

The representative voter is an individual whose strict preference for any alternative x over any alternative y implies 1) x strictly defeats y by majority rule, if there are an odd number of voters, and 2) x weakly defeats y otherwise. This result holds for the median voter if x is his ideal point or if preferences satisfy a generalized symmetry property, but not in general. We examine a formal condition that guarantees the existence of a representative voter and an economic model in which this condition holds. We also indicate a method for estimating representative voting behavior that is justified when a representative voter exists, and compare this with a method for deriving median voting behavior from an estimated demand curve.     

The microeconomic voter

In the United States, aggregate and individual level studies of economic voting for the Congress have produced contradictory findings. The same is true for models of economic voting for the Australian Parliament. This paper presents data taken from a series of individual level studies which show that voters' attitudes towards fiscal and microeconomic issues have been better predictors of the vote for the Australian House of Representatives over the last four elections than their attitudes towards macroeconomic issues. This finding suggests that the cause of the inconsistency between aggregate and individual level models of voting may be that aggregate models of economic voting which include only macroeconomic variables are inadequately specified, since they do not take broader aspects of the economy into account.     

The personal vote and voter turnout

The level of electoral turnout is arguably the most widely monitored form of electoral participation. Consequently, electoral systems have often been cited as having a significant effect on turnout levels even though scholars do not agree on the effects of these complex institutions. Since most previous studies have relied on categorical or dichotomous electoral system indicators, this study utilizes Carey and Shugart’s personal vote index to gain theoretical leverage on other electoral system components. In short, I find that where electoral competition is predicated on party, rather than candidates’, reputations, turnout levels rise. The results of a time-series cross-sectional analysis reveal that the personal vote index significantly influences turnout levels even when controlling for a host of other factors.     

US voter registration reform

Voter registration in the United States changed after the 2000 election with a requirement that states adopt statewide voter registries. However, these registries vary in design in practice, with some states having state managed “top–down” registries and other states having more decentralized “bottom–up” registries. I compare the effect of moving to a top–down registry with the adoption of Election Day registration – where voters can register to vote the day of the election – on voters saying that they are not registered because of election management problems or not voting because of a voter registration issue. EDR had a pronounced effect on reducing voter registration problems but the adoption of new voter registries had minimal effect on the same problems.     

Partisan legitimacy across generations

In this paper we argue that parties shape their supporters’ views about the political system via the messages they communicate about the desirability of the political system. Moreover, we contend that the effectiveness of such communication varies considerably across generations. Combining data from election surveys collected in 15 democracies as part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project with data on the policy positions of 116 political parties collected by the Comparative Manifestos Project, we find that supporters of parties that express positive positions toward the political system report systematically higher levels of political legitimacy than supporters of parties that communicate negative views. Moreover, this communication is particularly effective among older party identifiers whose partisan identification tends to be more pronounced. Taken together, these findings suggest that political parties play an active role in shaping citizens’ views of the political system but their success in mobilizing consent among citizens in contemporary democracies may weaken with partisan de-alignment and generational change.     

Issues and the presidential primary voter

Most agree that voting in presidential general elections is largely contingent on the evaluations of the candidates, issues, and parties. Yet inpresidential primary elections the determinants of voter choices are less clear. Partisanship is inconsequential, information about candidate personalities and policy positions is scarce, and a fourth factor, expectations, may influence voters. In this paper, we reconsider the influence ofpolitical issues in presidential primaries. We argue that past work has not adequately considered how issues matter in primary elections. Primaries are intraparty affairs, and the political issues that typically divide the parties are not very relevant in primaries. Instead, we focus on the policy issues each candidate chooses to emphasize in their quest for the nomination, which we call policy priorities. With data gathered about media coverage of the presidential contenders in the 1988 primaries, and using exit poll data from the 1988 Super Tuesday primaries, we show that issues, as policy priorities, do matter in presidential primary elections. This research also implies that primary campaigns matter, since information concerning the policy priorities of the candidates reaches the intended audience.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 1992.     

Corrupt political jurisdictions and voter participation

An FBI investigation of county purchasing activities in the mid 1980s resulted in the conviction of 55 of Mississippi's 410 county supervisors. Analyzing data from the state's 1987 county supervisor elections and hypothesizing that candidates' demands for votes increase as the gains from holding public office increase, we predict larger voter turnouts in the 26 of the state's 82 counties where supervisor corruption was exposed. Holding constant average voter turnout in the preceding U.S. presidential election and controlling for the competitiveness of supervisor races, we find that more Mississippians indeed voted in corrupt than in non-corrupt counties.     

Partisan issue preferences and partisan change

This paper addresses the relationship between changes in issue preferences and changes in partisanship, and examines the possibility that different types of issues may be associated with different dimensions of partisanship. A discriminant function analysis using the 1972–74–76 CPS Panel reveals that Democrats, Independents, and Republicans are very different from one another in terms of partisan issue preferences on a New Deal and a racial issue. The association between issue preferences and changes in strength among partisans is less stable, but the Democratic identification seems to be more closely aligned with the New Deal and racial issues than the Republican identification. Leaners appear to be more partisan in their issue preferences than weak identifiers are.     

Community size, heterogeneity and voter turnouts

Numerous studies have found a negative relationship between the closeness of an election, the size of the electorate and voter turnout. It is often claimed that this relationship supports the rational voter hypothesis, with closeness and size proxying for the decisiveness of a vote. We offer a different interpretation. Larger communities are more heterogeneous than smaller ones, and turnouts are inversely related to the heterogeneity of a community. We present empirical support for this hypothesis using data for voter turnouts in Norwegian school language referendums. Community size is found to have a negative effect on voter turnouts, even after accounting for the probability of a single vote being decisive and the linguistic dimension of this heterogeneity. Our findings question the adequacy of the turnout regression in testing the rational voter hypothesis, as neither a positive correlation between closeness and turnout, nor a negative correlation between size and turnout can be exclusively attributed to instrumental voting.