The European regulation of corporate social responsibility: The role of beneficiaries' intermediaries

Intended beneficiaries have an undeniable relevance to regulation. However, current research has focused mainly on the two‐party relationship between rulemaking and rule‐taking. We attempt to fill this gap by exploring the formal and informal roles that beneficiaries’ intermediaries played in co‐creating European Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) rules and associated practices between 2000 and 2017. By linking recent conceptualizations of regulatory intermediaries with the literature on critical political CSR, we offer a more dynamic and contextualized understanding of the roles of beneficiaries’ intermediaries. Specifically, we identify six micro‐dynamics through which they influenced the regulatory process. Notably, our findings highlight how the convergence of interests between three groups of beneficiaries’ intermediaries – the Non‐governmental organization–Investor–Union nexus – had a key role in reshaping CSR rules. We conclude that, in the European context, stronger and better‐coordinated beneficiaries’ intermediaries are crucial in order to achieve more effective corporate conduct regulation.     

The determinants of cross-border corruption

Public Choice - We reconsider the question of what determines corruption at the cross-national level, using new methods and data: observations of occurrences of cross-national...     

腐败的发生机理及腐败风险的预警

腐败的本质是权力的滥用和异化,腐败的发生具有其内在机理。权力是腐败发生的根本性基础,制度或体制的缺陷是腐败发生的客观条件,腐败动机和成分分析是腐败发生的决定性因素。预防腐败的重点是能够发现腐败的苗头、把握腐败的发展趋势。因此,构建腐败风险预警机制就十分必要,腐败风险防范机制、发现机制和警示机制构成了腐败风险预警机制的基本结构。结合教育、制度、监督等反腐败途径,以预防腐败为工作重点,依据腐败行为的发生过程,科学设定腐败风险预警机制的运行程序,保证预防腐败行为的发生和蔓延。     

Understanding the role of technology in reducing corruption: a transaction cost approach

Prior research suggests that computerization of government services can help reduce corruption involved in government transactions, but there is no clear understanding of the process through which computer‐mediated transactions reduce corruption. We attempt to fill this gap by using a transaction cost economics framework, and argue that uncertainty and asset specificity associated with government transactions allow bureaucrats to act opportunistically and demand bribes. Therefore, those computerization initiatives that reduce uncertainty and asset specificity of government services lead to lowered perceptions of corruption. Our findings, based on a survey of 101 managers of domestic and multinational enterprises in India, support our hypotheses. We also compare the websites of Indian government organizations with European government websites on the dimensions of transparency and interactivity, and find that the Indian websites do not provide as much interactivity as the European websites. Our multi‐method study offers important theoretical and practical insights on effectively using technology to reduce corruption. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The policy consequences of political corruption

Controversies abound over whether political corruption handicaps the disadvantaged, facilitates government action, or simply inflates government costs. Multivariate analysis using data from the American states supports none of the hypotheses. Rather, corruption appears to have virtually no policy impact, either directly or in interaction with party competition.     

Coordinating intermediaries: The prospects and limitations of professional associations in decentralized regulation

A key question in understanding regulation through independent intermediaries is the extent to which intermediary actions are either coordinated, thereby supporting consistency in regulatory application, or uncoordinated, leading to monitoring and enforcement disparities. This paper examines professional associations as one mechanism by which policy action may be coordinated in decentralized arrangements. Professional associations provide means and venues for members to interact, offer training and education that develops shared understanding of policy directives, are collective representation bodies for professional members, and may play an important role in establishing and enforcing collective standards for appropriate behavior. We examine these functions in the decentralized administration of United States organic food certification, focusing on two relevant professional associations – the Accredited Certifiers Association and the International Organic Inspectors Association. Drawing on multiple methods, including interviews and survey data, our findings indicate that professional organic certification associations provide valuable education and training, disseminate information, and facilitate knowledge sharing among administrative entities and with regulatory authorities. We conclude with a discussion of the prospects and limitations of professional associations for third‐party regulation, and how accounting for professional association functions can improve our understanding of regulatory intermediary coordination and conduct.     

Complexities of corruption

He has worked for various political organizations and governmental offices. Among his books are American Business and Public Policy (with Raymond Bauer); Tyranny of Schooling: An Inquiry into the Problem of Stupidity;and Representation Versus Direct Democracy.He is at work on a paper on loyalty and reform as sources of corruption.     

Droughts and corruption

Public Choice - Natural disasters are challenges for good governance. That conclusion follows from recent research investigating the effects of natural disasters on one important force hostile to...     

The nexus between corruption and capital account restrictions

We provide a formal model illustrating the mutual relationship between corruption and capital account restrictions. Corrupt countries are more likely to impose capital controls because corruption reduces a government’s ability to collect tax revenue. If controls exist, however, individuals try to mitigate the burden by offering bribes, thereby increasing corruption. We test the model using panel data for 80 countries over the period 1984–2002 and find that corruption and restrictions indeed affect each other. Government’s attempts to increase revenue via controls on capital might thus invoke a restrictions-rent-seeking spiral with destructively high levels of both. Using capital controls to increase revenue should be reconsidered.     

The contribution of lobby regulation initiatives in addressing political corruption in Latin America

For most of its history, Latin America has lived under authoritarian and elite rule where public decisions were often crafted in the shadows by cabinets and parliaments to the benefit of a small minority. Recently, the development of participatory political systems has brought some transparency to the policy-making process. Such scrutiny reveals evidence of the capture of aspects of policy-making by private interests that use obscure strategies to achieve their political goals. As a consequence, a widespread movement for regulating the role and tactics of interest groups emerged, which is seen as a necessary step to address the root causes of political corruption. This article provides an overview of efforts to regulate lobbying in Latin America. It explains attempts at regulation in four countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru), evaluates the level of success of these efforts, and assesses prospects for the future regarding reducing corruption through the instrument of lobby regulations. The authors argue that such regulations alone cannot eliminate political corruption. However, lobby regulations can contribute to increased transparency and aid in developing an anti-corruption culture. It will be shown that lobby laws in Latin America exhibit many of the problems long identified with similar regulations across western democracies. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The National Integrity System: assessing corruption and reform

This article builds on a Transparency International (TI)‐sponsored research study funded by the Dutch Government into the National Integrity System (NIS) in practice. The NIS is a framework approach developed by TI that proposes assessing corruption and reform holistically. The NIS not only looks at separate institutions or separate areas of activity or separate rules and practices, but also bases its perspective on institutional and other inter‐relationships, inter‐dependence and combined effectiveness. The study involved 18 countries, using in‐country researchers and an overview report. This article assesses the findings of the study to consider how the approach can work in practice, and what the approach can reveal about the causes and nature of corruption as well as the implications for reform. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political parties and corruption in Portugal

Portugal is often considered an example of successful democratic consolidation. Yet it has not been exempt from corruption scandals. By the mid‐1990s, transparency and the moralisation of political life had come to dominate parliamentary debates and reforms. The illegality surrounding party life must be seen against the background of dominant ethical standards in society. Voters appear tolerant of the unethical behaviour of political leaders, while parties are gradually becoming less responsive to their electorate. Representation and delegation rely more on tacit consent than on voice, thus encouraging complacency over corruption.     

The rise of populist parties in the aftermath of a massive corruption scandal

Public Choice - Populism is on the rise in Europe and America, and understanding its origins and evolution is becoming increasingly important. In this study, I investigate the effects of the...     

Big audit firms as regulatory intermediaries in transnational labor governance

Due diligence and corporate disclosure initiatives effectively expand the role of professional service firms as regulatory intermediaries in the governance of conditions of production in global supply chains. In this paper, we examine the rise of the “Big Four” audit firms in the market for services connected to transnational labor governance. Through a qualitative case study of audit firms in modern slavery governance, we argue that the Big Four's political repertoire for transnational labor governance expands beyond the roles that are typically linked to their services, and promotes an agenda that touches on key debates on what constitutes proper transnational labor governance. Big audit firms engage in a variety of informal and covert influencing practices and are shown to promote an agenda of incrementalist soft‐law labor governance, opposing concrete performance targets, binding public regulation and an independent watchdog role for civil society.     

标本兼治:建立完善的反腐保廉预防体系

中国共产党建党 80年来 ,始终高扬反腐败的旗帜 ,坚持不懈地清除党内各种消极腐败现象 ,保持党的先进性和纯洁性。党的十一届三中全会以来 ,党的第二、第三代领导核心坚持“两手抓、两手都要硬”方针 ,坚定不移地深入开展反腐倡廉工作 ,促进了两个文明建设的健康发展。去年底 ,江泽民同志在中央纪委第五次全会上作重要讲话 ,从巩固党的执政地位的高度 ,进一步强调反腐败斗争要在坚持治标、严惩各种腐败行为的同时 ,逐步加大治本力度 ,努力从源头上预防和治理腐败。这是我们党对反腐败斗争认识上的一次质的飞跃 ,战略上的一次重大调整。为此 …     

Trends and mechanisms of corruption in South Korea

Corruption remains one of the key obstacles to democratization and good governance. Given the nature of the subject, corruption is notoriously difficult to study. International comparisons and rankings of good governance such as the World Bank World Governance Indicators, the Bertelsmann Sustainable Governance Index, or Transparency International's Global Corruption Index are very useful for providing the big picture on corruption. To understand trends and mechanisms of corruption, however, it is necessary to conduct case studies on both successful and failed cases of anti-corruption policies. This paper investigates the successes and challenges of the fight against corruption in South Korea since the beginning of democratization in 1987. The investigation shows that Korea has generally been successful in controlling corruption. The paper argues that the remaining problems can be largely explained by the legacy of authoritarian rule and the undermining of state autonomy through the concentration of economic power.     

Exploring the formal and informal roles of regulatory intermediaries in transnational multistakeholder regulation

Research on regulation and regulatory processes has traditionally focused on two prominent roles: rulemaking and rule‐taking. Recently, the mediating role of third party actors, regulatory intermediaries, has started to be explored – notably in a dedicated special issue of the ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The present special issue extends this line of research by elaborating the distinction between formal and informal modes of regulatory intermediation, in the specific context of transnational multistakeholder regulation. In this introduction, we identify two key dimensions of intermediation (in)formalism: officialization and formalization. This allows us to develop a typology of intermediation in multistakeholder regulatory processes: formal, interpretive, alternative, and emergent. Leveraging examples from the papers in this special issue, we discuss how these four types of intermediation coexist and evolve over time. Finally, we elaborate on the implications of our typology for regulatory processes and outcomes.