Theories of coalition formation: An empirical test using data from Danish local government

Abstract.  Theories of coalition formation represent a diverse set of arguments about why some government coalitions form while others do not. In this article, the authors present a systematic empirical test of the relative importance of the various arguments. The test is designed to avoid a circularity problem present in many coalition studies – namely that the theories are tested on data of national government coalitions in postwar Europe: the very data that gave rise to the theories in the first place. Instead, the authors focus on government coalitions at the municipal level. They base their analysis on an expert survey of almost 3,000 local councillors from all municipalities in Denmark. They use conditional logit analysis to model government formation as a discrete choice between all potential governments. The analysis confirms some, but far from all, traditional explanations such as those based on office and policy motives. At the same time, the analysis raises the question of whether actors really seek minimal coalitions.     

Identification,Agreement and Government Performance: The Relative Impact on Voting*

Debating explanations of electoral behavior, American scholars have focused on three main theories: The identification model relying on underlying loyalty of voters towards specific parties; the political agreement or proximity model assuming a rational calculation of parties' ideological positions or stand on salient political issues as the yardstick for choice of party; and the investment model relying on voters' ability to calculate which government alternative will bring most utility for the individual voter. Examining these theories with the use of Norwegian data from the elections of 1965, 1969 and 1977, we find that the identification model is far the most powerful in predicting individual voting behavior. This model also has an edge in explaining support for the individual parties and the total distribution of voters. However, at the major postwar government election in 1965, the investment model certainly is of importance, and at the election in 1977 the significance of the proximity model has increased.     

Intelligence Studies on the Continent

The study of intelligence is often inward-looking. Scholars focus upon the means of gathering, evaluating, and distributing information with subsequent evaluation of its impact on decision making. Institution-based analysis ignores the role that the intelligence craft plays in the broader social and political context. This is apparent in the case of intelligence failures which reach beyond government to influence public opinion and ultimately the ability of authorities to mobilise support and govern. In the wake of failure, competing elites contest for power with conspiratorial interpretations of events that provide psychological comfort by offering explanations for events, targeting culprits, and fixing blame. This essay considers the intelligence failure of September 11, 2001, and outlines the conspiracy theories of left and right raised in its wake. Among those charged were the usual suspects - Zionists, the anti-Christ, advocates of a New World Order, and members of the military-industrial complex. In response, American government authorities validated their opponents' plot-making by defending themselves with their own cries of conspiracy. Heightened government secrecy, efforts to intensify surveillance, and the rhetoric of fear deepened the intrigue. In such a culture of conspiracy, charges of subversion bring only short-run gain. Public faith in institutions is eroded and paranoia becomes the conventional wisdom.     

对新公共管理的几点反思

新公共管理是公共行政在新形势下的发展，它的一些理论和方法是值得我们借鉴的。但是，新公共管理是否能够成为一门独立的新学科，政府和政府官员是否是利己的，政府是否一定低效以及顾客导向等理论，是值得深入研究的。     

Divided Government and the Fragmentation of American Law

We investigate institutional explanations for Congress's choice to fragment statutory frameworks for policy implementation. We argue that divided party government, which fuels legislative‐executive conflict over control of the bureaucracy, motivates Congress to fragment implementation power as a strategy to enhance its control over implementation. We develop a novel measure of fragmentation in policy implementation, collect data on it over the period 1947–2008, and test hypotheses linking separation‐of‐powers structures to legislative design of fragmented implementation power. We find that divided party government is powerfully associated with fragmentation in policy implementation, and that this association contributed to the long‐run growth of fragmentation in the postwar United States. We further find that legislative coalitions are more likely to fragment implementation power in the face of greater uncertainty about remaining in the majority.     

Economic Threats or Societal Turmoil? Understanding Preferences for Authoritarian Political Systems

Why do some individuals prefer to be governed in an authoritarian political system? One intuitive answer is that citizens prefer authoritarian rule when the economy and society are in turmoil. These are common explanations for democratic backsliding, and the emergence and success of authoritarian leaders in the twentieth century. Which of these explanations better explains preferences for authoritarian rule? Both types of threat coincide in small samples and high-profile cases, creating inferential problems. I address this by using three waves of World Values Survey data to look at individual-level preferences for different forms of authoritarian government. Using multiple macroeconomic and societal indicators, I find that economic threats, especially increasing income inequality, better explain preferences for authoritarian government. I conclude with implications for understanding the emergence of support for authoritarianism in fledgling democracies.     

Persistence in government spending fluctuations: New evidence on the displacement effect

In spite of Peacock and Wiseman's 1961 NBER study demonstrating the “displacement effect”, simplistic theoretical and empirical distinctions between temporary and permanent spending are common. In this paper, impulse response functions from ARMA models as well as Cochrane's non-parametric method support Peacock and Wiseman's conclusion by showing 1) government spending in the aggregate displays strong persistence to temporary shocks, 2) simple decomposition methods intended to yield a “temporary” spending series have a weak statitistical foundation, and 3) persistence in spending has increased during this century. Also, as a basic “fact” of government spending behavior, the displacement effect lends support to interest group and bureaucracy models of government spending growth.     

Explaining and predicting coalition outcomes: Conclusions from studying data on local coalitions

Abstract. Because the importance of coalition formation has been long established, there is no shortage of ideas explaining and predicting coalition outcomes. However, one of the problems for contemporary coalition research is that most coalition theories have been thoroughly tested on the same data on national governments that have formed in the West European postwar democracies. This stresses the need for finding new data that can increase our ability to test and refine coalition theories. This article uses unique elite survey data from an investigation conducted among councilors in a large sample of local authorities in Sweden to test hypotheses on coalition formation.
Another problem in coalition research is that the large number of coalition hypotheses have not been tested extensively using multivariate models that provide sufficient controls. By using a methodological approach that models government formation as a discrete choice between potential governments, we can draw conclusions about the relative importance of different types of variables. The results found in this analysis indicate that we have to pay attention to both traditional variables, such as size and policy, and institutional variables if our aim is to explain and predict coalition formation.     

新世纪政府管理改革的新课题

新世纪的到来给各国政府管理改革带来了新的课题。新世纪是信息通讯技术高度发达,公民参与政府管理及政策制定的机会和期望不断增强的朝代;新世纪将是政府机构改革和组织变革需要不断按照企业精神和再造模式广泛推进的时代;新世纪将是政府官员需要在思想观念和行为方式上革心洗面,脱胎换骨,从而要求行政教育培训目标和模式进行相庆变革的时代。这些新的课题正日益引起各国政府和专家学的关注和兴趣,如何积极主动地迎接新世纪     

Electoral Competition, Participation, and Government Responsiveness in Mexico

In this article I test two competing visions about how democracy produces responsive government. Electoral theories of democracy posit that elected governments are responsive to public demands because citizens are able to sanction bad politicians and select good ones. Participatory theories attribute responsiveness to a citizenry's ability to articulate demands and pressure government through a wider range of political action. I test hypotheses derived from these two approaches, using an original dataset that combines electoral, socioeconomic, and public-financial indicators for Mexico's 2,400 municipalities, from 1989 to 2000. The data show that electoral competition has no effect on municipal government performance. But the results are consistent with the hypothesis that nonelectoral participation causes improved performance. Thus, I suggest that the quality of municipal government in Mexico depends on an engaged citizenry and cooperation between political leaders and their constituents, rather than the threat of electoral punishment. I recommend that scholars broaden the study of government responsiveness to account for participatory strategies of political influence and critically assess the claims of those who would promote elections as a cure-all for poor democratic performance.     

The Growth of Government: Sources and Limits

Theories of the size of government focus on either the demandfor government or the supply of tax revenues. Demand sidetheories such as those of Peltzman, Meltzer and Richard,Husted and Kenny, and Lott and Kenny are essentially politicaltheories. They emphasize the role of voters or interest groupsin expanding government. Supply side theories such as those ofKau and Rubin, Baumol, West, and Ferris and West emphasize theability of government to collect taxes. In this paper, wecombine both demand and supply side theories. For demand, weuse the Poole-Rosenthal time series data on the ideology ofCongress, on the theory that all political forces mustultimately express themselves in voting which is measured byideology. For supply, we use the Kau-Rubin measures of theability of government to collect taxes as a function of thedeadweight costs of tax collection and ability of individualsto hide revenues. We find that female labor forceparticipation and the associated ability to tax femaleproductivity is the most important factor associated withgovernment, and it alone explains about 60% of the actualgrowth of government. The ideology of the Senate is alsosignificant, but has a small effect. This paper may be thefirst to examine the influence of ideology on the time path ofa policy; other research examining ideology (including ours)has been cross sectional. Further research on the role ofideology in changing policies over time is clearly warranted.     

How does the economy shape policy preferences?

How do changes in the economy translate into shifts in aggregate preferences for a more or less activist government in the U.S.—a construct referred to as “policy mood”? Existing theories pose alternative explanations based on either a Maslow Hierarchy of Needs model, where citizens prefer an activist federal government to expand the social safety net when the economic future looks bright (Durr, 1993), or a Phillips Curve model (Erikson et al., 2002), in which the objective economic maladies of inflation and unemployment drive policy mood. We show that neither of these explanations withstands empirical scrutiny when analysis is extended beyond the time period of the original authors' work, suggest the existing wisdom tying the economy to policy mood is wrong, and offer some alternative avenues to pursue in search of an answer to the question: What moves policy mood?     

Does the flypaper model stick? A test of the relative performance of the flypaper and conventional models of local government budgetary behaviour

Two of the most widely referred to models of local (or state) budgetary behaviour are developed and tested. The models considered are a variant of the flypaper model (see, for example, Courant et al., 1979 and Oates, 1979) and a conventional model which builds on the seminal work of Wilde (1969, 1971). The models are developed in a manner which allows them to be tested empirically using data for English local governments. Two types of test are employed: the ability of the two models to explain the variations in expenditure levels across local governments within any given fiscal year; the ability of the models to predict future levels of expenditure given changes to local government budget constraints (as brought about, for example, by changs in grants-in-aid from central government).     

TESTING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF CAPITAL CONTROL LIBERALIZATION*

The literature on why restrictions over capital flows have been liberalized is filled with alternative causal stories (the pluralist, statist and systemic model, and economic explanations). In this article, we provide a test of these models of capital control liberalization within the context of 18 OECD countries from 1967 to 1995. We have avoided the usual practice of aggregating multiple governments in one country within one year into one country‐year observation, and use the country‐year‐government as the unit of analysis instead to correctly test the relationship between government characteristics and liberalization policy. We find that when the government considers lifting or imposing restrictions over capital flows, it responds to both systemic pressures and the key supporters of free capital flows. Governments also consider the current account balance and are heavily influenced by the prior policy choice regarding restrictions on capital transactions. We fail to find support for such explanations as the impact of government ideology, government strength, and central bank independence.     

Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000

In this article, we provide a critical review of the evidence and arguments about party polarization in the House of Representatives during the late 20th century. We show that inferences about party polarization are significantly affected by voting reform in the early 1970s. We observe that a decomposed roll-call record alters our view of the timing of changes in party polarization and therefore requires that we reconsider explanations of the trend. We revisit explanations of party polarization and establish a strong case for placing substantial emphasis on party strategies in explanations of party polarization in floor behavior during the 1980s and 1990s.     

Partisan Politics and Institutional (Re)Creation: Locating and Explaining the Origins of Modern Finance Capitalism

Why do some countries rely more heavily on equities markets, while others depend more on commercial banking? Analyses of the origins of contemporary capitalist institutions usually look back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. However, this paper demonstrates that financial institutions – regarded as central to the way capitalist systems are organised – changed radically in the mid-twentieth century in many countries. This paper argues that government partisanship in formative moments of institutional (re)creation can better account for their modern manifestation than prominent alternative explanations. A new measure of partisanship that is sensitive to these institutional transformations is presented. Case studies on Germany and France offer evidence consistent with this argument.     

The Impact of Political Debate on Government Trust: Reminding the Public What the Federal Government Does

Americans' confidence in government is low by historical standards. We fielded a national telephone survey to examine influences on government confidence and whether public discontent was affected by altering the salience of specific government operations. We used a question order experiment where we alternated between first asking a general question about confidence in government and first asking about confidence in specific government operations. We found that posing the specific policy questions first elevated general confidence more than the reverse. The largest and most noticeable effects were observed for Republicans and those most knowledgeable and attentive to politics. Findings of context effects and the partisan subgroup differences are consistent with existing theories on public opinion change as well as with previous question order experiments. But, evidence that the cognitive elite was especially influenced by question order challenges previous theories that presumed that its sophistication made it immune to influence. We suggest that education and political knowledge expand rather than contract the opportunities for priming.     

The Black body and the Jewish body: a comparison of medical images

Hödl attempts to show how deeply the medical views of Blacks and Jews were embedded in racial theories in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Concepts of racial distinctiveness formed the framework that purportedly explained a specific liability of African Americans and Jews to various ailments. In particular, he compares the prevailing perception of the susceptibility of Jews and Blacks to tuberculosis in the United States from the 1840s to the early twentieth century, and shows that physicians advanced widely differing explanations for the proclivity to this disease, explanations that fall into three distinct periods. Within the same time span, however, there is continuity in the concepts of the 'sick Negro' and the 'healthy Jew'. The aetiologies were largely dependent on stereotypes of the bodily constructs of Jews and Blacks. Hödl thereby demonstrates the interdependence of racism and medicine.     

The Budget‐Minimizing Bureaucrat? Empirical Evidence from the Senior Executive Service

In a representative democracy, we assume the populace exerts some control over the actions and outputs of government officials, ensuring they comport with public preferences. However, the growth of the fourth branch of government has created a paradox: Unelected bureaucrats now have the power to affect government decisions (Meier 1993; Rourke 1984; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981).
In this article, I rely on two competing theories of bureaucratic behavior-representative-bureaucracy theory and Niskanen's budget-maximization theory-to assess how well the top ranks of the federal government represent the demands of the citizenry. Focusing on federal-spending priorities, I assess whether Senior Executive Service (SES) members mirror the attitudes of the populace or are likely to inflate budgets for their own personal gain. Contrary to the popular portrayal of the budget-maximizing bureaucrat (Niskanen 1971), I find these federal administrators prefer less spending than the public on most broad spending categories, even on issues that fall within their own departments' jurisdictions. As such, it may be time to revise our theories about bureaucratic self-interest and spending priorities.     

Explaining national environmental performance: approaches,evidence, and implications

Since environmental problems rose to prominence in the last third of the twentieth century, they have been a major area of policy for national governments. A large body of research has explored the explanations for different levels of environmental policy performance among countries. This article begins with a discussion of approaches to measuring national performance before reviewing and assessing four categories of explanations in the literature, which may be summarized in four questions: (1) What are the relationships between economic growth and environmental protection? (2) Do democratic regimes have advantages over more authoritarian ones in adopting effective policies and reducing harm? (3) Do such institutional characteristics as pluralism or neo-corporatism and federalism affect a nation’s ability to deal with environmental problems? (4) Are there institutional or societal capacities or relationships within or among nations that may explain policy success? By adopting a broad perspective on the literature on national environmental performance, the article is able to explore and compare the principal findings of these categories of research and assess the relationships among them.