泡沫政绩:也是一种腐败行为

“实事求是”是我党倡导的优良传统和作风。但是,少数干部为了快出“政绩”,过去是“官出数字,数字出官”,不惜一切弄虚作假,虚报浮夸;现在是“官出新闻,新闻出官”,不惜一切投机取巧,沽名钓誉……这种——     

“非物质形象工程”

一提起“形象工程”,人们首先想到的是楼堂馆所、大街马路以及空壳开发区之类的物质世界。这是一种片面,甚至可以说是一种误区。实际上,主要的、广泛的、大量的、有效的“形象工程”,则是在非物质世界。数字“形象工程”。老百姓叫做“数字出官,官出数字”。所谓“数字出官”,就是把效益作数字化的夸大处理,以此作政绩、为     

治治“浮夸官”

近日报载:江苏某市在乡镇班子换届时,把四个在报表上做手脚、弄虚作假、虚报浮夸的乡镇一把手降职使用并通报全市。无独有偶,河南某市最近也撤换了一批靠玩数字游戏“脱颖而出”的升迁者,并予以党纪政纪的严厉制裁。读后拍手大快。看来,人们对“官出数字,数字出官”深恶痛绝,官场打假已是大势所趋、民心所向,到了非下狠劲不可的时候了。 “官出数字”陋习,古已有之。曾几何时,有人把这种“滑吏之风”带到以实事求     

刹造假之风应标本兼治

大众瞩目的“新统计法”，在六月二十七日闭幕的十一届全国人大常委会第九次会议上获得通过。此间媒体评论，“数字出官，官出数字”的造假现象将受法律约束，这是一个治本之道。     

虚假无德

古人云,“诚者万善之本;伪者万恶之基”人的许多优良品质都与诚信有关,而许多不良品质都源于弄虚作假,欺人欺世之“伪”值得人们注意的是,当今我们一些党员干部,在工作中耍花架子,搞形式主义,浮夸虚报,欺上瞒下。他们挖空心思编造虚假数字,玩弄“数字游戏”,夸大成绩,投机取巧,骗取荣誉,糊弄上级更可怕的是少数地方甚至形成了说假话的环境,不拿虚假当回事。在那里,官出数字,数字出官,成为一种“时尚”,成为一     

也说政绩靠“炒”

近日,在北京市公开选拔"副局级"领导干部的考试中,一道《论"政绩靠炒"》的考题让400多名考生感慨不已。这个话题经过媒体报道后,再度成为人们关注的热点。所谓"炒",在这里就是"夸大、拔高、不实"的意思。政绩原本是个褒义词,可因为与"炒"做了搭档,便成了不受欢迎的词语,这也许就是近墨者黑吧。那么,为什么政绩要靠"炒"呢?也许我们该从近些年愈来愈多的"数字出官,     

透明革命与监督革命 政治生态重构亟需国家廉政体系

<正>腐败是当前世界各国政府和公众普遍关注的重大问题。官场边腐边升的现象更是毒化了政治生态,客观上导致了"官场逆淘汰"。治理与防范腐败的国际经验与中国实践表明,与腐败作斗争是一个复杂的博弈过程,反腐败的根本措施是制度建设,即建设现代国家廉政体系。中国特色国家廉政体     

从政府垄断到多元互动——农村公共产品民营化进程中的多重博弈关系解读

农村公共产品民营化实质上就是农村公共服务领域内的一场制度变迁,即打破农村公共事业领域原有的政府一元供给的制度格局,确立政府、民营经济、村民组织多元互动的制度格局.在这一过程中存在着多重博弈关系,即中央政府与地方政府的博弈、民营化与民营经济的博弈、民营化与村民组织的博弈.以博弈论作为基本分析工具,深入探究各自的博弈过程与博弈策略,推导出可能出现的各种博弈局面甚至是博弈困境,提出相应的引导性对策.     

"材料出政绩"现象的根源与治理

"材料出政绩"现象在部分党政机关蔓延滋长,破坏了政治生态、干扰了工作开展、影响了干群关系。之所以出现"材料出政绩"现象,主要有"政绩观"扭曲、命令主义、制度阙如等原因。要根治"材料出政绩"现象,需综合施策,让干部把正思想之帆、拉紧作风之弦、扎牢制度之笼。     

政绩考核模式“误导”中国

"政绩工程"泛滥的绩效管理模式之所以形成,是因为在较大程度上受到了西方新公共管理理论的"误导"障碍六政绩考核模式弊端37.6%的受调查者选择"政绩考核模式弊端",该项得票率列科学发展十大障碍第六位表现:中国干部绩效考核制度有四个显著特征:指标数量化、形式统一、过程简单、自上而下。当上级领导或组织考评下级绩效时,往往来去匆匆、走马观花,留下印象的通常是大规划、大项目、大工程、好数字、宽马路、大广场、靓景观等表面化、形式化的东西,"政绩工程"屡禁不止。     

Performing Bribery in China: guanxi-practice,corruption with a human face

Unlike most current academic studies on corruption in China, which focus on the theme of how political, economic and social environments have caused corruption at the macro-level, this paper takes a micro-view. It concentrates on the question of how corruption, notably bribery, takes place between a briber and the bribed. Moreover, it examines what exact role guanxi-practice plays in corrupt exchange and, more importantly, why it constitutes a critical element. Through in-depth case-studies derived from extensive fieldwork, this paper comes to the conclusion that the micro-level operation of corruption in China is not due to some haphazard aggregation of sporadic acts but follows certain rules and codes of conduct, which should be seen as an informal institutional mechanism facilitating the contracting process of corrupt exchange. This paper also demonstrates that guanxi-practice embodies such rules and codes of conduct. Such conduct purports to remove the legal, moral and cognitive barriers impeding the contracting process of corrupt exchange by grafting a corrupt agreement upon a social setting, in which risk of exchange safety is controlled, and moral costs and cognitive dissonance are reduced. Therefore, this paper contends that the causality link between guanxi-practice and corruption is the inverse of the view held by many. It is not that the participants of corruption are compelled to corrupt conduct because of the existence of the guanxi-practice, but on the contrary, these participants adopt guanxi-practice as an alternative operating mechanism that facilitates corruption.     

试论遏制腐败现象的法制对策

法制建设在反腐败斗争中具有重要地位和作用。我国现行法律制度对一些腐败现象或边缘性腐败问题不能给予有效制裁,与有关反腐败立法深度不够、某些罪名的可操作性不强等弊端有关。为此,要进一步加强廉政立法,加大依法惩治腐败的力度,从根本上遏制腐败现象的滋生和蔓延。     

Hard Rules and Soft Constraints: regulating conflict of interest in China

The initial paragraphs of this article outline the broad themes of this special section, drawing attention to changing perceptions and definitions of corruption and to corruption prevention practices in Greater China. The remainder of the article focuses on a particular theme: the relationship between conflicts of interest and corruption in both theoretical terms and in its application in mainland China. Conflicts of interest are conceptualized as the incompatibility between the public interest associated with official duties and interests derived from the private domain. Such conflicts do not always necessarily lead to corruption and may be distinguished from it. By examining the way in which they are regulated in China, we argue that although an intricate web of rules has been established, regulations alone cannot guarantee ethically sound behaviour if there is no supportive value framework of like-minded civil servants. Rules require interpretation and if this discretion means that civil servants choose to follow an administrative culture and personal values that conflict with the regulations, they will have little effect. Hard rules may mean soft constraints.     

Anti-Corruption Approaches in Macao: lawmaking and legal enforcement

Successive governments have sought to address the enduring problem of corruption in Macao. Yet the institutional framework for dealing with corrupt practices has singularly failed to live up to political promises and public expectations of clean government. The Ao Man-long case, in which a former Secretary for Transport and Public Works was found guilty of corrupt practices involving an estimated $800 million (about US$100 million), rocked public confidence in the anti-corruption institutions and gave credence to the widely-held view that an expanded gaming industry had provided more opportunities for illicit behavior. Diagnosing the causes of failure suggests that neither a lack of resources nor the absence of rules serves to explain the continuing high levels of bureaucratic corruption. Rather the explanation for the failure of the institutional framework lies in the content of the rules and the way in which they are implemented. While this situation continues to persist, it is unlikely that the problem of bureaucratic corruption will be resolved or that its wider impact on the government's legitimacy will be reduced.     

WTO：遏制腐败的外部推动力

我国已经加入了WTO ,必然会对传统体制下的政府产生有力的冲击。WTO规则客观上要求我国的政府必须由过去的无限政府转为有限政府 ,由神秘政府转向透明政府。同时 ,WTO规则还将推动我国改革行政审批制度 ,开放政府采购市场 ,打击地方保护主义。这些都将从制度的变革层面有力地遏制腐败     

论电子商务中的不正当竞争行为及其防范

随着Internet的发展,电子商务的广泛开展,电子商务公司之间的竞争变得日益尖锐。利益的驱动,法律的空缺,使众多电子商务主体采取非正当手段从事经营活动,不正当竞争行为大量涌现。研究电子商务中不正当竞争的特点、表现以及对其在法律、司法、执法上进行规制是非常必要的。     

严惩商业贿赂犯罪刻不容缓

伴随着商业活动的日益繁荣，利益逐渐成为社会主义市场经济活动的主要目的，商业经营者为了争夺商业资源、获取高额的商业利润，不惜利用各种不正当的竞争手段，于是，商业贿赂犯罪就在利益的驱使下出现了。商业贿赂是市场经济的一颗毒瘤，如果不能得到有效治理和清除，将会造成经济秩序混乱、市场腐败盛行与经济增长乏力并危及社会稳定。究其原因，市场体系发育不成熟、竞争机制不健全、公共权力干预过当以及反商业贿赂法律体系的缺陷，是产生商业贿赂的土壤和根源。     

电力企业滥用市场支配地位行为的法律规制

随着技术革新和经济的迅速发展,作为传统自然垄断产业的电力行业已呈现出潜在的竞争性.目前,世界各国政府正通过一系列的立法活动对电力行业的竞争行为进行规制.电力企业滥用市场支配地位行为是一种妨碍市场竞争、损害消费者利益的非结构性垄断行为,对此类行为的规制是各国反垄断法的重要内容,属于完全的行为规制.     

折贪污贿赂案件的侦查

贪污犯罪历来为社会大众所不齿,其严重危害一直备受古今各国所关注。我国是社会主义国家,贪污犯罪更加为我国的基本制度所不容,因此,贪污犯罪的查办工作十分重要。本文从分析贪污案件查办的必要性入手,提出侦查贪污犯罪应当遵循依法侦查、实事求是、迅速及时、重证据不轻信口供等四个原则,然后归纳了贪污案件侦查中常用的方法,对贪污案件的侦查作了初步研究。     

Critical Review of Conceptual Definitions of Chinese Corruption: a formal–legal perspective

This paper examines definitions of Chinese corruption. While many Chinese corruption studies have argued that Chinese corruption has its own unique features, our review of definitions of Chinese corruption featured in current academic literature reveals that most definitions in use are similar to the general definition of corruption: abuse of public office for private gains. Valuable as it is, such a general definition does not adequately specify the actors, behavior and motives in Chinese corruption. This paper argues that actors in Chinese corruption are not limited to employees in the public sector but also include any Chinese state functionary engaging in public activities. In addition, corrupt behavior refers to both economic (embezzlement, misappropriation of public funds, and bribery) and disciplinary corruption (violation of social norms and the dereliction of duty) that are damaging to public interests. In doing so, this paper finds that even behavior such as the dereliction of duty and violations of social norms, that is not motivated by private gain, is regarded as corruption in China. We also discuss the political nature of this broadly defined Chinese corruption.