Serving the State: Constitutionalism and Social Spending, 1860s-1920s

In the 19th century, courts supervised states' social spending by limiting taxation to public purposes. The focus of this article is the courts' approach to pensions. Under a 19th-century doctrine, states could pay money to those who had served the state or, under the rubric of charity, to those who were the indigent helpless. States first paid pensions to people for military service and for serving as firemen; later in the century, the doctrine from these cases provided a framework for expanding civil service pensions as states expanded their civil service. Courts characterized the earlier pensions as earned because the service had been dangerous, requiring bravery from men and possibly leaving helpless women and children without protection. This characterization later shaped evaluations of civil service pensions. The doctrine persisted as states enacted pensions for widowed mothers; when these pensions were challenged in state courts, the courts approved of them as payments to helpless people, not as rewards to those who had served. This characterization counters recent scholarship that argues that mothers' pensions rewarded service as military pensions did.     

Anti-Discrimination Rights Without Equality

Anti-discrimination rights are nearly always thought to be justified or explained by equality, although the precise nature of this relationship is rarely considered. In this article I consider the two most plausible relationships, both of which are commonly at least implicitly asserted: that anti-discrimination rights are deontic equal treatment norms, and that anti-discrimination rights are instrumentally aimed at achieving telic equality. I try to show that, as a conceptual matter, anti-discrimination rights are not equal treatment norms: they do not require that all people (perhaps in a certain category) are treated the same. They allow for different treatment, but they prohibit different treatment only on some grounds. Although the suggestion that anti-discrimination rights are instrumentally aimed at telic equality (in some dimension) is conceptually plausible (like all instrumental relationships), it is most unlikely that anti-discrimination rights can be justified on this ground.     

Gender Equality, Citizenship, and the EU's Constitutional Future

Abstract:  While gender equality has been a matter of some concern for EU law and policy makers over the past half century, this concern has tended, at least historically, to focus upon equal treatment in employment and has not yet materialised into the delivery of a broader package of civil, political, and social rights for women. Taking the concept of EU citizenship as a framework within which to view the promotion of gender equality, this article assesses the debate on the constitutional future of the EU. This is with a view to examining the possible amelioration of women's social position through the exploitation of opportunities that the constitutionalisation of EU law presents. Looking at women's citizenship through the lens of political rights to participate in the debate on the EU's future, together with examining substantive aspects of the Constitutional Treaty for their gender equality content, the article suggests that a more comprehensive endeavour by all institutional actors to engage in gender mainstreaming is needed in order to give effect to a broader form of equality between women and men.     

Dignity and Equality

Inequality remains one of the most challenging issues on theglobal human rights agenda. It is widely recognised that a formalapproach to the assessment of inequality has failed to eliminateentrenched structural social and economic inequality and thata different approach is required in order to tackle the rootsof inequality and achieve substantive equality. In seeking toimplement an approach to equality that addresses the historyof apartheid and the social and economic inequality endemicin South African society, the South African Constitutional Courthas rejected formal equality, and is in the process of developinga substantive interpretation of equality based on the protectionof human dignity. Critics of this approach have argued thatthe concept of human dignity is too indeterminate to providea stable foundation for equality law and that it promotes anexcessively individualistic conception of equality. Focussingon key developments in defining human dignity in German andSouth African constitutional law, this article argues that theconcept of dignity is rooted in a rich tradition which is capableof underpinning an approach to equality which avoids excessiveindividualism and fully recognises the interplay between individualand community needs. A detailed exploration of the equalityjurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court revealshow the dignity-based approach has been developed in order toprovide a framework within which the actual experience of victimsof discrimination can be explored. It is concluded that thisapproach has the potential to engage with the realities of thewide range of divisions within South African society and theireffects in order to address not only the legacy of apartheidbut also to contribute to the creation of a society in whichevery person is valued equally.     

诚实信用原则对于规范行政权行使的意义——对当前学说及司法实践的检讨

诚实信用原则应当作为与信赖保护原则、依法行政原则、比例原则、平等原则等行政法基本原则相平行的一项原则引入行政法体系,使其作为法解释之基准,担负补充既有法律规范的漏洞、修正法律体系中的错误之机能。诚实信用原则在行政法领域的适用受公益优先、平等原则以及依法行政等原则的限制,是否应予适用,须以利益衡量方法定夺之。诚实信用原则的规范意涵需在个案中加以确定,但须对个案所应符合的最低限度的标准有所认识。     

Equality,fairness, and social conflict

There are three generic problems that arise in the use of the concept of equality as a principle of fairness. These problems concern (i) determining when equality is appropriate as opposed to some other principle, (ii) deciding how equality is to be operationalized, and (iii) determining how to implement equality. The proposal is made that these intrapersonal decision conflicts are mirrored by social conflicts when multiple interests are involved. This way of looking at social conflicts also suggests some novel ways to approach conflict resolution.     

合同无效时建设工程优先受偿权的教义学探析

由于对《合同法》第286条及相关司法解释的理解不同,司法实践中对合同无效时施工单位能否主张建设工程优先受偿权存在争议。作为对债权平等性的法定突破,建设工程优先受偿权必须具备充足的正当性基础;同时,出于对其他债权人利益衡平之考虑,必须严格限制可以优先受偿的债权的范围。合同无效体现了法律的否定性评价,相关司法解释不具有赋予特定情况下的无效施工合同以有效合同效果的正当性,因此产生的债权不应具有优先受偿之效力。     

刑法平等原则辨析

刑法已经对平等作了明确的规定,但刑法学界对于刑法平等是单纯的司法平等还是立法平等与司法平等的统一、刑法平等是纯粹打击犯罪上的平等还是打击犯罪与保护权益平等的结合、刑法平等是否仅为自然人间的平等、刑法平等要排除哪些因素的干扰、刑法平等与区别对待关系如何处理,争议颇大。对这些争议予以澄清是正确把握刑法平等原则内涵和外延的需要。     

论平等在刑法中的地位

刑法第四条就适用刑法人人平等作了明确的规定,但关于平等在刑法中处于什么位置一直备受争议。关于平等在刑法中的地位,主要涉及三个问题,即:平等是法律原则还是法律权利;平等是否能为刑法的基本原则;刑法平等原则与罪刑法定原则、罪责刑相适应原则之间是什么关系。     

Bentham on the Interpretation of Laws

A widely accepted view is that, for Bentham, legal interpretation was a mechanical or technical matter. This paper reconstructs Bentham’s complex theory of legal interpretation and challenges the above view. It demonstrates that Bentham’s theory of legal interpretation consists of three major theses. First, when there are different interpretations of a law, the authoritative interpreter ought to be the sovereign legislature. Second, strict interpretation attributes to the legislature the will it actually has when making the law. The strict interpretation of a law ought to take the text of the law itself as the standard, and then be guided by its purpose. Third, liberal interpretation attributes to the legislature a will that it would have had if it had been aware of the case before the court, but which it in fact failed to have through inadvertency. Liberal interpretation is a necessary evil, and must be checked: liberal interpretation ought to be made according to the pattern and materials of the old laws, and be subject to the authority of the sovereign legislature.     

法律解释（学）的理据、概念及价值

法律解释学自产生之日起,就一直受到种种质疑（如它可能导致法治的消解）,而法律解释学界迄今似乎并未有力地回应这些质疑。之所以造成这种局面,主要是因为法律解释学本身还没能清楚地解决如下一些问题：它的理论依据似乎游移于传统解释学与哲学解释学之间;它对“解释”的解释并不清晰,因为当前的法律解释学似乎没能意识到解释其实同时是方法、存在并且还具有哲学研究的属性;它一定程度上无视法律解释学与法律解释之间的互渗、纠缠,这种无视反过来又模糊了它对自身的定位;等等。可以说,只有当法律解释学厘清了上述问题,才可能较好地回应当前的诸种质疑,进而证立其自身的必要性和正当性。     

证人、鉴定人出庭作证费用补偿范围和标准研究

我国现行《民事诉讼法》及司法解释中关于证人出作证庭费用之规范存在补偿范围不具体和补偿标准不明晰等诸多问题，关于鉴定人出庭费用的补偿范围和标准之规定更是付之阙如。民事司法实践中各地方法院关于证人、鉴定人出庭费用的补偿范围和标准的认定混乱且随意性大，严重损害了当事人的合法权益。《民诉法解释》规定“按照机关事业单位工作人员差旅费和补贴为标准”计算证人出庭作证费用更是有违平等原则。我国民诉立法应在厘清证人、鉴定人出庭作证费用性质的基础上，采用列举规范的方式明确规定证人、鉴定人出庭费用的补偿范围，统一并明晰证人、鉴定人的补偿标准。     

Practical reason and the ontology of statutes

Conclusion A common working assumption of theories of statutory interpretation is that the object of interpretation is uncontroversial. It is assumed that dispute only centers on the epistemics of interpretation. The assumption is unsound. Theories of statutory interpretation are importantly different from other sorts of theories. The subject matter of other sorts of theories can be identified uncontroversially. In the case of statutory interpretation, the object of interpretation is controversial. What counts as the object of interpretation therefore needs specification. Without the required specification, criteria of evidence and warrant justifying an interpretation are not well-defined.An adequate theory of statutory interpreation must contain both epistemic and ontological components. It must provide criteria for treating information as evidence relevant to, and standards for, interpreting a statute. Providing such criteria in turn requires also giving an account of the object of interpretation — what a statute consists in. Practical reason theories fail to provide acceptable criteria and standards for interpreting a statute. These accounts therefore fail to supply an adequate epistemic components for a theory of statutory interpretation. As to the ontological component, things are less clear. I have argued in sections II and III that this component is partly a matter of substantive political theory. Although practical reason theorists fail to offer a substantive political theory for defining the proper object of interpretation, their accounts are in principle ontologically unobjectionable. At most, practical reason accounts are incomplete. Of course, practical reason accounts might still be defective for other reasons. They may invoke a defective substantive political theory. Or the constraints imposed on properties of a statute or relations between them may not in fact affectuate the goals set by the theory. Such failings would be normative, not metaphysical. Since practical reason accounts are epistemically inadequate and ontologically incomplete, legal theorists should find the accounts less attractive than they do, even putting aside the normative soundness of the accounts.I thank Barry Adler, John Harrison, George Rutherglen, William Stuntz and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. I am particularly grateful to Larry Alexander for discussions and comments on previous drafts of this article. The usual disclaimer applies.     

刑事自由裁量权与刑法基本原则关系研究

刑法基本原则不但是制定、解释和适用刑法的准则,而且体现了刑法的基本精神。刑事自由裁量权是刑法适用过程中普遍存在的一种权力。罪刑法定原则并不排斥刑事自由裁量权,罪刑法定原则认可以严格规则为主、以自由裁量为补充的立法模式。自由裁量权对适用刑法人人平等原则有一定的冲击,所谓的适用刑法人人平等实际上是包括了自由裁量因素在内的相对意义的人人平等。罪责刑相适应原则,在本质上确认法官的刑事自由裁量权,罪责刑相适应原则与法官的自由裁量权具相辅相成性。     

修正辩论主义与武器平等的证明责任

修正辩论主义为证明责任理论中武器平等原则的实现提供了新的契机。法官对双方当事人的主观证明责任进行干预在公益诉讼等现代型诉讼中具有相当的必要性，有利于平衡双方利益。为实现武器平等原则，在证据事实提出方面，强调法官的释明权和当事人证据协力义务的合理运用。另外，非讼法理和自由证明方式向诉讼程序的扩张，也是构建武器平等的证明责任理论与制度有效路径。     

Polarization and Policy: The Politics of Public‐Sector Pensions

For decades, America's state and local governments have promised their workers increasingly generous pensions but failed to fully fund them, producing a fiscal problem of staggering proportions. In this article, we examine the politics of public pensions. While mainstream theoretical ideas in the American politics literature would suggest the pension issue should be polarized, with Democrats pushing for generous pensions over Republican resistance, we develop an argument—rooted in more traditional theoretical work by Schattschneider, Lowi, Wilson, and others—implying that both parties should be expected to support generous pensions during normal times and that only after the onset of the Great Recession, which expanded the scope of conflict, should the parties begin to diverge. Using a new data set of state legislators' votes on hundreds of pension bills passed between 1999 and 2011, we carry out an empirical analysis that supports these expectations.     

差异和平等——兼论法律上的平等

＂平等＂是现代文明中一个重要的价值观念,但对它的理解却颇有争议,包括法律上的平等。人与人的差异显示了平等观念的核心——人权,人权的基本要求是人格的独立和与此适应的最基本的生存条件。因此不能把平等理解为无差异或把所有的差异理解为不平等。因为人与人的差异并不一定是不合理的,人与人的差异的产生有自然的原因,有社会的原因,只有后者才可能是不合理的,才是平等观念所反对的,其中的要义就是使所有人享有＂人权＂,即与现代文明相适应的＂人＂的尊严和与之适应的物质待遇。平等的要求仅限于此,超出此义,必陷入荒谬。现代法律应以平等为原则,从制度上限制因社会原因所造成的人与人的不平等,并平等地适用法律,坚持法律面前人人平等的法治原则。法律可以从立法和司法多种途径追求平等和保护人权,但其只能从制度层面为平等的实现创造条件,法律不可能消除一切不平等,法律更不会消灭一切差别。相反,法律在对平等的追求中还要保护合理的差别,故此,法律的公平原则中包含着差别原则。     

Habermas,Feminism, and Law: Beyond Equality and Difference?*

In this paper, I argue that Habermas' proceduralist model of law can be put to feminist ends in at least two significant ways. First, in presenting an alternative to the liberal and welfare models of laws, the proceduralist model offers feminism a way out of the equality/difference dilemma. Both these attempts to secure women's equality by emphasising women's sameness to men or their difference from men have placed the onus on women to either find a way of integrating themselves into existing institutions or to confront the so‐called question of women's difference. The proceduralist model renders this dilemma irrelevant. Instead, it proceeds from the fact of sexual difference; a fact that produces competing and conflicting needs and interests that require interpretation by both men and women. This, I argue, marks a change in the very way we conceptualise the so‐called problem of women's difference, insofar as the question is no longer framed in these terms. Second, I argue that this deliberative process over the interpretation of conflicting interests affects a fundamental shift in the nature of legal institutions themselves, insofar as law is no longer a vehicle for promoting male interests.     

Headscarves, Human Rights, and Harmonious Multicultural Society: Implications of the French Ban for Interpretations of Equality

Through the lens of the French law prohibiting Muslim headscarves in schools, this article examines the way in which societal tensions that arise in the context of religious and cultural pluralism are translated into legal discourses relating to human rights and equality. It explores the way in which the law is rooted in France's broader sociopolitical structure and history and contrasts it to the United Kingdom and Turkey. It proposes that the law is based on an anachronistic, formal interpretation of equality that is inappropriate for addressing the inevitable cultural diversity of modern French society, and through its permeation into law and policymaking more widely, it is a primary cause of the heightened social tensions involving the Muslim minority. An assessment of the legitimacy of a law that restricts minority groups' cultural practices in this way in any society should be based on a substantive interpretation of equality and should necessarily involve an active endeavor to understand the meanings of those cultural practices for those groups within their distinct context. Upon this foundation, law and policy can be developed in a way that better reconciles the pluralism of modern society with the common objectives of social harmony, stability, and tolerance.     

论宪法上的“宗教”概念——从美国最高法院判例法的发展切入

"宗教"一词的法律意涵与社会学意涵并不重合。美国联邦最高法院对宪法中"宗教"概念的认知之扩展契合美国社会宗教多元化的进程,但同时亦带来一系列问题:超越"宗教"一词的语义极限,增加了与禁止国教条款相抵触的可能性;而且界定"宗教"本身便可能违反禁止确立国教条款。与他国宪法解释实践对比可知,美国的经验虽不具有普适性,但各国多试图抽象地把握宪法上的"宗教"概念之结构性特征,而非对各教派进行简单罗列。