US 'Dual Track' Policy: Arms sales and technology transfer to China mainland and Taiwan

This article analyzes the United States 'dual track' policy on arms sales and technology transfers to the China mainland and Taiwan. Despite its 'one China' policy, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and provide Taiwan with military technology. At the same time, Washington is unwilling to transfer certain technology to the China mainland. The US 'dual track' policy of arms sales and technology transfer to both sides of the Taiwan Strait has maintained a strategic balance by developing closer relations with Beijing while maintaining the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Washington's objectives are to enhance Sino‐American relations and to maintain Taiwan's security while not unsettling the generally positive Sino‐American relationship. While this policy has caused tensions in US‐PRC relations, this 'unbalanced balance' has served US interests in maintaining Taiwan's security and has not strained Washington‐Beijing relations to the breaking point.     

Explaining Taiwan's Revisionist Diplomacy

Taiwan is a revisionist power. Its independence movement challenges a vital status-quo interest of mainland China's opposition to a de jure Taiwan declaration of independence and maintaining, however ambiguously, Taiwan's commitment to the ‘one-China’ formulation. Why is it that a small and vulnerable island off the coast of a great power has continued to challenge the vital interest of that great power and risk war? Adopting a ‘levels of analysis’ approach to Taiwan's mainland policy, this paper addresses this question by examining four prevalent explanations for Taiwan's revisionist diplomacy: (1) the mainland deterrent is ineffective, reflecting Taiwan doubts about either mainland capabilities or mainland resolve to wage a retaliatory war; (2) in an example of the security dilemma in alliance politics, US commitment to Taiwan, although aimed at deterring PRC use of force, encourages Taiwan to challenge the status quo because the Taiwan leadership is confident of US intervention and US ability to defend Taiwan; (3) because of the development of a ‘Taiwan identity’ and of corresponding domestic political pressures, the Democratic Progressive Party has been compelled to adopt a pro-independence policy; (4) Chen Shui-bian has a personal commitment to Taiwan independence and has been willing to challenge the mainland's interest in one-China, despite risk of heightened conflict and regardless of domestic political considerations.     

China's good neighbor policy and its implications for Taiwan

Chinese leaders in recent years have been following a coherent policy toward Asia that emphasizes moderation and accommodation while preserving core PRC interests. China's prevailing ‘good neighbor’ policy approach—backed by improvement in US–China relations—provides important opportunities and challenges for Taiwan. It clearly inclines the PRC leaders to avoid more aggressive or harder‐line tactics in the mix of carrots and sticks that makes up China's recent approach toward Taiwan. To follow a more disruptive course would undermine the influence and advantage Beijing has been seeking with its ongoing moderate approach toward the United States and other Asian powers. The main challenge for Taiwan is how to deal with the current balance of carrots and sticks in China's policy. Much depends on the ability of Taiwan's leaders and populace to turn the prevailing balance in PRC policy to Taiwan's advantage. This presumably will involve reviving their economy, promoting effective governance and prudent defense, while consolidating relations with the United States and managing tensions in cross‐Strait relations to the advantage of Taiwan's future security and development. Unfortunately, there is no political consensus on Taiwan to mobilize domestic resources and opinion in a concerted effort to protect Taiwan's future as an entity independent of PRC control. Those outsiders who have followed with positive interest Taiwan's remarkable development over the past decades hope that Taiwan makes good use of the opportunities posed by China's good neighbor policy to adopt prudent and concrete measures beneficial to Taiwan's long range prospects.     

Research note on the Taiwan relations act: Executive and legislative differences

Since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, the executive branch and the legislative branch have diverged on US‐Taiwan relations. As the executive branch created its version of the TRA, the Congress exerted its influence by adding security provisions. Yielding to the influence of Congress, President Carter accepted and signed into law the TRA. The 1982 Joint Communiqué contradicts the TRA. President Reagan signed this Communiqué which pledges that the US will decrease its arms sales to Taiwan. However, the TRA binds the US, by law, to sell a sufficient amount of defensive weapons to Taiwan for its security. How can the US provide sufficient amounts of defensive weapons to Taiwan if the US is decreasing its arms sales to Taiwan? The security provisions that Congress placed in the TRA comes into conflict with a presidential foreign policy statement. This paper finds that there is and has been a divergence of actions that occur even though the rhetoric and statements made by both sides seem similar. Traditionally, the Congress, has been the supporter, friend, and ally of Taiwan, whereas the administrations have been more concerned with US‐PRC relations. The TRA, being the law of the land, is contradicted by the 1982 Joint Communiqué. This paper illustrates the most recent differences between the Congress and Clinton administration.     

The Taiwan strait crisis of 1996: Implications for US security policy

The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 was the greatest challenge to Sino‐American relations in several decades. This study examines the crisis and its implications for US security policy. It outlines US policy toward the defense of Taiwan, discusses the US response to Beijing's military intimidation of Taiwan and analyzes several of the major lessons gleaned from the crisis. The paper suggests that, while China's aggressive behavior should not lead to a dramatic shift in the American position toward Taiwan's defense, some modest adjustments in policy may be warranted.     

美国民众对军售台湾支持率的影响因素研究——基于美国人对华态度实证调研

美国对外政策的制定通常需要有民意基础,然而现有研究鲜有从美国民众的视角探究美国对台军售。本文基于美国人对华态度实证调研的数据,利用单因子试验法测试美国民众在“中美关系”和“对台军售”间的权衡,并采用logistic模型来检查影响美国民众对台军售支持率的主要因素。结果表明即使对台军售会严重恶化或危害中美关系,58％的美国民众依然支持美国对台军售。政治倾向（温和派）、媒体和信息渠道（收听广播和浏览网络频率）、个人因素（性别、年龄）等是影响美国民众对台军售支持率的主要因素。终止美国对台军售,我国一方面需要有更加强有力的反制措施,另一方面可以尝试通过长期规划的网络传播手段来扭转美国民众对对台军售的支持。     

Accounting for Taiwan's economic policy toward China

This article explores the ideas, institutions, and interests in which Taiwan's economic policy toward China is embedded. The authors indicate that the ideas behind Taiwan's economic policy toward China are as vibrant as ever, the political foundation for a coherent and feasible policy is eroding, and commercial interests are digressing from the Taiwan government's policy goals. Political forces around ideas have strong hearing on the formation of Taiwan's economic policy toward China. The truthfulness or falseness of the security argument is of intrinsic value to Taiwan's decision makers. The authors also point out that in order to have a complete picture of cross‐Strait economic relations, we need to specify how trade and investment with China influence Taiwan's distribution of political interests.     

The Taiwan Problem in the Second George W. Bush Administration—US officials' views and their implications for US policy

The behavior of Taiwan leaders and people in 2003–2004 raised the salience of Taiwan's assertive movement toward permanent independence for US policy makers. No longer did US officials responsible for assessing cross-Strait relations and their implications for US policy take it for granted that such assertiveness and moves toward independence would be held in check by the mainstream opinion in Taiwan, previously but no longer viewed as pragmatic by US decision makers. In response to the new situation, US policy makers intervened in Taiwan politics, trying to channel Taiwan assertiveness along lines less likely to lead to war with China. US interventions were widely seen to have had a moderating effect on the Taiwan elite and public opinion in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative election that resulted in a significant setback for President Chen Shui-bian's push toward greater independence. Taiwan's political opposition leaders pursued high-level contacts with China. Chinese leaders warmly welcomed the Taiwan opposition leaders who renounced Taiwan independence. However, Taiwan politics remained sharply divided over cross-Strait issues, with President Chen unwilling to renounce Taiwan independence or accept a version of the so-called one China principle seen by China as a prerequisite for improved relations with the Taiwan government. President Bush and other US officials encouraged both governments to show greater flexibility in order to promote dialogue that would reduce misunderstanding and ease tensions. The uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations included the possibility of talks, improved relations, and agreements on managing cross-Strait tensions between the Taiwan and Chinese governments. On the other hand, the impasse between China and Taiwan could deepen. The Bush administration appeared to have settled on a policy that endeavored to deter China from using force against Taiwan and deter Taiwan from taking provocative steps toward independence. The main alternatives to this approach seemed less acceptable to US policy makers under prevailing conditions, suggesting that US policy is likely to persist with a dual deterrence policy for the rest of President Bush's term in office.     

Comparing Jiang Zemin's Impatience with Hu Jintao's Patience Regarding the Taiwan Issue, 1989–2012

Although the essence of China's Taiwan policy has not changed from the era of Jiang Zemin to the present, the era of Hu Jintao, Jiang's and Hu's attitudes are different. Jiang was impatient with the delay in the unification of China and Taiwan, talking about timetables for unification; however, Hu has so far been patient, saying that he is not afraid of delaying unification. The purpose of this paper is to explain why their attitudes are different. I argue that two factors combine to result in Jiang's impatience and Hu's patience: conflicting ‘perceptions of Taiwan's domestic politics and Taiwan's China policy’ and differing ‘perceptions of the US behavior and attitude regarding Taiwan’.     

Taiwan's Overseas Opposition Movement and Grassroots Diplomacy in the United States: the case of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs

This article examines the advocacy of overseas Taiwanese, particularly those in the United States, and their influence on US foreign policy and subsequently upon democratization in Taiwan. It concentrates particularly on the work of a Taiwanese non-governmental, non-profit advocacy group in the US—the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA). This article first composes an organizational history of FAPA by investigating the questions and processes of why and how FAPA was formed at the local level in the US. Further, it analyzes how the organization mobilized its relatively modest local resources in the US through grassroots diplomacy to promote Taiwan's visibility in the US, to influence the US government on Taiwan-related issues, and to attempt to impact upon Taiwan's democratization. Through the presentation of FAPA's organizational history, this article ultimately tries to answer the question of whether a non-governmental organization such as FAPA and its grassroots diplomacy has had an impact on US foreign policy and Taiwan's democratization. Besides adding to the existing scholarly literature on the causes of Taiwan's democratization, this study on the formation and effectiveness of FAPA seeks to contribute to studies on NGOs' or non-state actors' grassroots diplomacy and lobbying efforts on governmental policies. Because FAPA functioned as an important diplomatic channel for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan's first opposition party in the post-World War II era, before it matured into a fully-developed national opposition party in the 1990s and consequently unseated the Kuomintang (KMT) in 2000, this article is also an examination of an opposition movement's informal diplomacy.     

From functional integration to structural readjustment: Taipei–Beijing relations and the role of the United States

Regardless of the continued stalemate in the political arena, trade and economic interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased steadily. Both aggregate data and the results of survey research have testified to the existence of functional integration of the two societies across the Taiwan Strait. In addition to functional integration, structural readjustments have also been made by political authorities both in Taipei and Beijing so as to facilitate continuity of trade and economic relations. These types of mutual accommodations include: establishing proper ‘unofficial’ agencies on both sides to serve as instruments of practical contacts and negotiation; the more flexible definition of ‘One China’ by Beijing; and the opening of ‘small links’ between Quemoy and Amoy by Taipei. Beijing's refusal to grant Taipei any official diplomatic status and Taipei's reluctance to accept the ‘One China’ principle remain major obstacles to cross‐Taiwan Strait relations. The United States will continue playing a key role in future cross‐Strait relations. Beijing seems to be content, at least temporarily, to maintain cordial relations with the United States in exchange for the latter's adherence to the ‘One China’ principle and rejection of the option of Taiwan independence. Whether Taipei will use enhanced US commitment to Taiwan's security to strike a better deal with Beijing for gradual cross‐Strait integration or to utilize increased American protection to move onto the separatist road will be affected by domestic politics in Taiwan, future US policy toward to the island, and Beijing's response to Taipei's demand for security and international recognition.     

US‐China relations and the Taiwan factor

With the diplomatic warming of US‐China relations, the recent resumption of the Koo — Wang meeting and Taiwan's elections for legislators, mayors, and city councilors, cross‐Taiwan Strait relations are at another historical turning point. While the improvement of US‐China relations tends to relieve both sides from rhetoric exchanges of ‘China threat’ and ‘US‐Taiwan conspiracy’, Clinton's oral declaration of the ‘Three No's’ has raised serious concerns in Taiwan. With such a background, a group of experts and policy‐making participants from the US, Taiwan and Mainland China gathered again at a conference on ‘US‐China Relations and the Taiwan Factor’ in Washington, DC in mid‐October 1998. This was the second episode in a series of symposia on US‐China relations sponsored by the Association of Chinese Political Studies (ACPS). The symposium attempts to provide a free, intimate, and long‐term forum for a group of influential experts with different perspectives from the US, Taiwan and Mainland China. As a result, a deep understanding of common interests has been reached and clear differences have also been recognized through direct dialogue and frank exchange of ideas.     

National identity and Taiwan's Mainland China policy

Taiwan is a mildly divided society—divided essentially along the lines of national identity. Indeed, there is no doubt that national identity is the dominant factor affecting Taiwan's mainland China policy. Other factors such as business interests and security concerns may enter the picture from time to time, but they often get bogged down in the national identity controversies. As a matter of fact, there is high correlation between people's attitudes toward business and security concerns and their positions on the national identity issue. The key to understanding Taiwan's mainland China policy is thus the distribution of voters on the national identity issue and how it is translated into the political fortunes of various political parties in the electoral game.     

Sino-US and Cross-Strait Relations under the Post-'11 September' Strategic Settings

Sino-US relations and cross-Strait relations are always interrelated and so is the US policy towards cross-Strait relations. The United States has taken its global strategic and fundamental national interests as points of departure. The Bush Administration has undergone a cycle of being tough towards China and titling towards Taiwan first and then readjusting towards the middle ground. There are many reasons to explain this change and the events of 11 September stand out very prominently. This change once again proves that once the US put strategic consideration first it will take all the necessary steps to ensure that the Taiwan issue should not be a damaging and/or diverting factor. However, there still exist fundamental differences over the Taiwan issue and the Bush Administration's military-to-military relations with and arms sales to Taiwan are matters of great concern.     

An Emerging Consensus on the US Threat: the United States according to PLA officers

Though the PLA elite perceptions of the United States have fluctuated over time, there has been some regularity in the evolution of their perceptions. Comparing the dominant perceptions of the United States among different generations of Chinese military elites in the PRC, we find that the PLA elite perceptions of US intentions have been foremost influenced by China's strategic interest in a certain period, rather than the level and intensity of bilateral exchanges at the time. Using the case of US arms sales to Taiwan and the case of the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands, we try to assess how consistent and persistent PLA elite perceptions of the US have been in recent years. While we agree that these outspoken military men cannot be taken on the surface as indicative of China's national policies, we will also point out several important dimensions that are likely to allow the PLA to play a more influential role in setting the agenda for China's strategic interest in the era of Xi Jinping.     

美国民众涉台观点的Biprobit研究——基于美国人对华态度实证调研

自从台湾问题形成以来,美国历任总统都实行“双轨政策”,一方面承认“台湾是中国的一部分”,但又从没有放弃对“台独”的支持,如对台军售。了解美国民众涉台观点的形成和受到哪些因素的影响对我国制定相应的涉台政策有着重要意义。本文先后采用univariateprobit、bivari-ateprobit和seeminglyunrelatedbivariateprobit模型对美国民众在台湾省地位的认同和对台军售支持进行回归分析。分析结果显示美国民众对中国台湾省地位的认同显著地影响对台军售支持,认同“台湾是中国一部分”的美国民众在对台军售方面的支持也显著要高。这充分证实了美国是典型的现实主义者,他利用台湾问题来阻滞中国大陆的发展和海峡两岸的和平统一。     

Political Earthquake and Aftershocks: The DPP after the 2000 presidential election

The 2000 presidential election marked a major turning point in Taiwan's political development. For the first time since 1949 the government of Taiwan came under the control of a political party other than the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT). The seemingly peaceful transfer of power after the 18 March election leading up to the 20 May inauguration has been widely cited as evidence of Taiwan's democratic consolidation, even though the alternation of ruling power was undoubtedly a major political earthquake in Taiwan history. Since the major political earthquake took place in March 2000, numerous aftershocks have occurred. They include the opposition attempt to recall the newly elected president and vice president; the formation of a 'major opposition alliance'; a dramatic economic downturn; and the 2001 Legislative Yuan elections that resulted in another KMT defeat. Different political parties, especially the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), have been trying to learn how to cope with the new political situation.     

监督与钳制：国会监督权与美台军售决策——以美国国会对《与台湾关系法》的监督为例

对国会立法的实施进行监督是国会最重要的宪政职能之一.在<与台湾关系法>出台之后,美国国会以监督行政部门"切实"、"全面"实施该法的有关规定为名,通过推动美台军售升级、取消对台军售限制、参与军售决策过程、钳制总统军售决策权等方式,对美台军售决策施加了强大的影响,并屡屡导致中美关系因军售问题而出现波折起伏.     

Beyond Power Politics: institution-building and Mainland China's Taiwan policy transition

Facing the ever-growing interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, Mainland China's strategy towards Taiwan is undergoing a profound change, that is, transcending the staunch realpolitik mentality and turning to an institutional arrangement in policy making. Especially since President Hu Jintao took up his position, the Mainland has endeavored to improve cross-Strait relations through the institutionalization of a series of sensitive issues, such as the proposals and signatures of some long-term accords aiming to advocate economic cooperation, promote social exchanges, weaken political opposition and foster mutual trust. By taking the Mainland's national development strategy shift, Taiwan's domestic reality and ‘institution deficit’ in cross-Strait relations into consideration, this paper analyzes the reasons, efforts and features of the Mainland's recent institutional-orientated policy transition.     

Securing Economic Relations Across the Taiwan Straits: New challenges and opportunities

Cross-Taiwan Straits economic interaction is a political as well as an economic issue. General trends of economic interdependence and globalization that are weakening the role of the nation state should promote a focus of shared 'civilian governance' between Taiwan and mainland China. WTO entry will provide opportunities as well as challenges for cross-Strait economic relations. In anticipation of this dynamic, the new government in Taiwan is attempting to design a new national security web to guarantee Taiwan's 'economic security' in coping with Taiwan's increasing economic dependence on mainland China. As one key agent of globalization, economic cooperation in the urban areas on both sides of the Taiwan Strait may potentially improve relations between Taiwan and mainland China. As decentralization and privatization on mainland China proceed, major cities have developed closer interaction and systems of accountability with the civil society. From a prudent perspective, developing functional cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China at the urban level could be a first substantial step to confidence building between these two economies.