Suicidal behavior in the Ukraine, 1988-1998

This report studies the available data concerning suicide rates in the Ukraine and points to the importance of appropriate monitoring of suicides and attempted suicides. It illustrates the necessity of collecting this information and of developing "The Ukrainian National Program on Suicide Prevention." Unfortunately, suicide research and publications about suicide rates were prohibited in the former Soviet Union, so some of the data about suicidal behavior in the Ukraine is incomplete. We used the official suicide death statistics of the Ukraine from the Center of Statistics (Ukrainian Ministry of Health) for the period 1988-1998. The overall rate of suicide in the Ukraine is relatively high. Official statistics in the Ukraine show that there were 29.6 suicides per 100,000 population in 1998. The frequency of completed suicide differs in the various regions of the country, suicides being more frequent in the industrially developed regions and in the rural areas of the country than in the cities. In the western part of the Ukraine the frequency of suicide is relatively low (11.1 per 100,000). Between 1988 and 1997 the suicide rate increased by 57%. In 1998 the suicide rate for women was approximately five times lower than that for men.     

Planning,Budgeting, and Health Care Performance in Ukraine

Abstract

The Government of Ukraine has not pursued health care reforms now commonplace in the rest of Europe and Central/Eastern Europe that rely less upon centralized, state delivery of services and more on decentralized operational responsibilities and competition for services that increase patient choice. The Ukrainian health sector suffers from personnel overspecialization and facility overcapacity, resulting in high-cost, low productivity services. Budget funds are unavailable for operations and maintenance resulting in poor quality services. The state provides health care as a constitutionally-protected monopoly, relying on the traditional command and control model which ignores cost/quality competition options and responsibilities to patients. Overall, the system which produces these results is over-centralized, requiring achievement of physical service norms without providing sufficient funds. The centralized system does not monitor or evaluate services beyond narrow financial accountability and control requirements. The health care system is paradoxically over-centralized but unable to regulate or control local health care official decisions to ensure compliance with national standards. Needed are reforms in the health care policy and operational areas to produce the supply of services needed for national economic recovery. In the short-term, the budgetary framework can be improved as an operational/management guide through development of comparative information on results. Most of this information can be based on the economic classification consistent with the chart of accounts. Funding stability can be increased to improve expenditure control by implementing a new fiscal transfer formula that provides discretion (i.e., block grants) and performance criteria (i.e., outcome measures). In the medium-term, building on the technical foundation of physical norms and statistical reporting, the health care budgeting and financial management system should shift emphasis to: program planning, policy and management analysis, and public communications. The results of these reforms should lead to decentralized health care operations, service analysis, and delivery responsibilities. At the same time, the reforms should lead to proper centralization of responsibilities for strategic policy decisions, safety regulation, national standards, and program evaluation.     

Crime,politics and business in 1990s Ukraine

In contrast to Russian studies, the study of crime and corruption in Ukraine is limited to a small number of scholarly studies while there is no analysis of the nexus between crime and new business and political elites with law enforcement (Kuzio, 2003a, Kuzio, 2003b). This is the first analysis of how these links emerged in the 1990s with a focus on the Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) and the Crimea, two regions that experienced the greatest degree of violence during Ukraine's transition to a market economy. Donetsk gave birth to the Party of Regions in 2001 which has become Ukraine's only political machine winning first place plurality in three elections since 2006 and former Donetsk Governor and party leader Viktor Yanukovych was elected president in 2010 (Zimmer, 2005, Kudelia and Kuzio, 2014). Therefore, an analysis of the nexus that emerged in the 1990s in Donetsk provides the background to the political culture of the country's political machine that, as events have shown since 2010 and during the Euro-Maydan, is also the party most willing in Ukraine to use violence to achieve its objectives.     

The gender base of institutional support in Lithuania,Ukraine and Russia

This literature review pertains to women's status in Soviet society. This study examined the degree to which attitudes toward established institutions, support for the reform process, and generalized political orientations significantly reflect gender differences. Regression models were tested among Russians, Ukrainians, and Orthodox believers in Russia. Gender differences were apparent in the evaluations of the Communist Party. Ukrainian women were more supportive of the Communist Party. Age was the only significant factor in Russia; increased age was associated with more positive attitudes toward the Communists. More Ukrainian and Russian women than Orthodox women believed that political reform is moving too rapidly. Less educated and higher income women were more likely to believe that reform is proceeding too rapidly. Russian men were more likely to have participated in a political rally than Russian women in the model which includes socioeconomic controls. Russians with higher education were more frequent participants in political demonstrations than Russians with less education. Ukrainian women were more likely than men to be pacifists. Over 20% of the variance in pacifism scores was explained by sex and sociodemographic factors. The author concluded that gender differences are apparent in the strength of pacifism, the frequency of participation in demonstrations, attitudes toward reform, and evaluations of the Communist Party. Russian women compared to US women did not necessarily support liberal, democratic reforms. Lithuanian women and urban women were less supportive of the status quo and established economic and political institutions compared to Russian, Ukrainian, or rural women. Women and men responded similarly at the same educational levels. Women had a more humanitarian view of the environment and peace. A four-stage stratified sample of 2336 individuals (796 in Russia, 826 in the Ukraine, and 714 in Lithuania) was used. The survey instrument was designed by a team from the University of Iowa working with Soviet scholars.     

Nationalism,identity and civil society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution

This article is the first to study the positive correlation between nationalism and democratic revolutions using Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution as a case study. The Orange Revolution mobilized the largest number of participants of any democratic revolution and lasted the longest, 17 days. But, the Orange Revolution was also the most regionally divided of democratic revolutions with western and central Ukrainians dominating the protestors and eastern Ukrainians opposing the protests. The civic nationalism that underpinned the Orange Revolution is rooted in Ukraine’s path dependence that has made civil society stronger in western Ukraine where Austro-Hungarian rule permitted the emergence of a Ukrainian national identity that was stymied in eastern Ukraine by the Tsarist empire.     

Disrupted Democracy in Ukraine? Protest,Performance and Contention in the Verkhovna Rada

Abstract

Protest performances inside parliament during 2012–2016 articulated claims to uphold democracy that contributed to the maintenance of pluralism in Ukraine during attempted authoritarian consolidation. Simultaneously, such protests were para-institutional instruments in the ongoing power struggle engendered by a patronal system where formal institutions and norms weakly constrained actors. A diverse repertoire of protest, including rostrum-blocking, visual protest, withdrawal, auditory disruption, somatic protest and spectacle, was used frequently and adapted in response to changes in the political opportunity structure. Innovations to the repertoire drew on and modified performative methods used by social movements.     

From Balcony to Barricade: Nationalism and Popular Mobilisation in Georgia,Ukraine, and Russia

This article examines the dynamics of popular mobilisation in autocratic post-communist regimes, focusing on how opposition groups manoeuvre around cultural and structural constraints to inspire ordinary citizens to join street protests, despite the real dangers associated with political action. Using evidence from original interviews with activists in Georgia, Ukraine, and Russia, the article analyses the comparative challenges facing Russian activists in constructing new collective identities for the people they hope will become their followers, through the use of an inclusive, civic nationalism and a narrative that links action in the present to an ongoing, shared historical process.