Positive obligations under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: the duty of the Nigerian Government to enact a Freedom of Information Act

Beginning with the Independence Constitution of 1960, the right to freedom of information and other civil and political rights have been guaranteed by successive Nigerian Constitutions as fundamental human rights. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, which incorporated the provisions of the African Charter on Human and People’s Right into Nigerian law in 1983 consolidated these and a plethora of other social, economic and cultural rights and imposed a positive duty on the government to adopt legislative and other measures to give them effect. This article develops this potentially revolutionary principle of positive obligations, which amazingly remains unsung and unused more than a quarter of a century after it became an integral part of Nigerian law. The first part of the article proposes the principle as the most effective basis to compel the enactment of a Freedom of Information legislation, which successive governments have refused to enact despite overwhelming public support and sustained lobbying for a Freedom of Information Bill first introduced in the National Assembly in 1997. The second part critically analyses the latest (2007) version of the Bill. It concludes that its provisions are inadequate to give effect to the right to freedom of information in view of the legal and bureaucratic environment under which it will operate, and suggests remedial measures.     

试论中国区际刑事司法协助的职能机关

在我国,区际刑事司法协助的主体是指内地、香港、澳门、台湾等四个法域,而其职能机关是指具体办理刑事司法协助事务的部门,它不仅限于司法机关,还应包括实际从事区际刑事司法协助活动的其他机关。中国的区际刑事司法协助是一个崭新而复杂的问题。在复合法域刚刚开始形成的背景下,中国区际刑事司法协助职能机关的确定,不仅取决于有关法律的规定,而且取决于实践的发展,并将随着各个法域行政和司法体制的变化而变化。     

Autonomous weapon system: Law of armed conflict (LOAC) and other legal challenges

The legality of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) under international law is a swiftly growing issue of importance as technology advances and machines acquire the capacity to operate without human control. This paper argues that the existing laws are ineffective and that a different set of laws are needed. This paper examines several issues that are critical for the development and use of AWS in warfare. It argues that a preemptive ban on AWS is irrelevant at this point and urges the appropriate authorities to develop a modern legal framework that is tailored to embrace these state-of-the-art weapons as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) develops. First, this paper explores the myriad of laws designed to govern the potential future development and deployment of artificial intelligence and AWS in the context of International Humanitarian Law or LAOC. Second, the paper argues that it will be challenging for AWS to fulfill the requirements laid out under the International Committee of the Red Cross and LOAC for the rules of humanity, military necessity, distinction, proportionality and precaution, especially as it is related to noncombatants. Third, the paper discusses command responsibility and argues that states should establish accountability for wrongful acts committed by the AWS. Finally, this paper contends that there is an urgent need for a new legal framework to regulate these AWS and presents different solutions for the legal framework of AWS.     

Changes in the Sources of Law in Information Society

The purpose of the paper is to indicate in which way modern digital information systems influence the range of legal sources and to assess whether such changes improve the quality of judgements and other legal decisions. The paper uses examples from Danish law but does not in any detail describe specific information systems. It takes a more general approach. At the beginning the concept of a legal source is briefly discussed and it is considered why these sources are used. Preconditions for their usage are mainly availability and comprehensibility. With this background changes with respect to general legal rules, judicial and administrative decisions in national law are discussed with emphasis on the general considerations that are made in connection with developing information systems. Next developments in connection with EU law, international law and foreign law are considered and the importance of the Internet is emphasized. At the end it is briefly considered whether the different changes will lead to an improved legal system, to better decisions. This is a possibility but only if the potential of the information society is utilized.     

Building sustainable free legal advisory systems: Experiences from the history of AI & law

The enthusiasm for artificial intelligence (AI) as a source of solutions to problems is not new. In law, from the early 1980s until at least the early 2000s, considerable work was done on developing ‘legal expert systems.’ As the DataLex project, we participated in those developments, through research and publications, commercial and non-commercial systems, and teaching students application development. This paper commences with a brief account of that work to situate our perspective.The main aim of this paper is an assessment of what might be of value from the experience of the DataLex Project to contemporary use of ‘AI and law’ by free legal advice services, who must necessarily work within funding and other constraints in developing and sustaining such systems. We draw fifteen conclusions from this experience, which we consider are relevant to development of systems for free legal advice services. The desired result, we argue, is the development of integrated legal decision-support systems, not ‘expert systems’ or ‘robot lawyers’. We compare our insights with the approach of the leading recent text in the field, and with a critical review of the field over twenty-five years. We conclude that the approach taken by the DataLex Project, and now applied to free legal advice services, remains consistent with leading work in field of AI and law.The paper concludes with brief suggestions of what are the most desirable improvements to tools and platforms to enable development of free legal advice systems. The objectives of free access to legal information services have much in common with those of free legal advice services. The information resources that free access to law providers (including LIIs) can provide will often be those that free legal advice services will need to use to develop and sustain free legal advisory systems. There is therefore strong potential for valuable collaborations between these two types of services providers.     

The Biological Essence of Law

This paper contends that law is in essence an evolutionary phenomenon that can, and indeed should, be studied in the light of biological mechanisms. Law can be seen as an extended phenotype of underlying genes. In addition, legal systems can be seen as congruous to genetic mechanisms. Properties of genes have an impact on legal systems in a fractal‐like manner. Hence, it is not surprising that notions of stability, replication, and reciprocity that are important in biological systems will also be important in legal systems. As a result legal systems can be constructed in a way that is congruent with the genetic advantage of group members. Law, exposure, and punishment can diminish deviant behaviour and restore balance. Law may not be particularly subject to natural selection, but it will certainly be built on the foundations of natural selection.     

IT and Law,and Law Schools

If 'computing and law' as a discipline is to push forward and develop, it will do so best within the context of the law school rather than as a joint enterprise between law and other disciplines. It is in the law school that the understanding of the nature of law is at its height. Yet there are problems here-law schools have a strained relationship with technology and their concept of the breadth of 'legal scholarship' can be limited by conventional (or ideologically-biased) views of law and an undergraduate-oriented view of the law school's purpose. There are also problems arising from the nature of communications between lawyers and computer scientists. In this article, I highlight these problems and also argue for a more developed and extended view of legal scholarship which will be able to incorporate study and research of the impact of the computer upon legal society as well as the legal control of the unwanted elements arising from these new technologies. Most writings on IT and the law school concentrate upon its use as an educational tool. My interest here is not so much in this side of things, but in the research culture of the law school. Whilst there is sometimes a view that the linkage of law school and IT is purely related to the use of technology in legal education, the remit is wider and includes the understanding of the link between substantive law and the context of the new computerized world and also the impact of the computer in the practice of law. This latter aspect is becoming increasingly important with the Woolf reforms and computerization of the procedural elements of law, but also in substantive law: for example, administrative systems are becoming more and more mediated by technology, and administrative law must be reviewed and re-worked in this context.     

Foreign Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The Challenges of Convergence

International organizations have increasingly joined statesas occupiers of territory. Yet international law doctrine andpolicymakers have regarded occupation by states and administrationby international organizations as distinct legal and politicalphenomena. The stigma associated with state occupation has translatedinto an assumption that the two operations are governed by differentnorms and their tactics for asserting control subject to differentstandards of legitimacy. This article rejects that dichotomyand the doctrinal parsing that comes with it. It emphasizesthe common traits and challenges of these occupations and arguesfor a joint legal and political appraisal. From the legal perspective,the two sorts of missions operate under common legal frameworks;those managing both need to find the proper balance among internationalhumanitarian law, international human rights law, local law,and any mandate from an international organization. As a politicalmatter, each encounters resistance from those in the territoryopposed to its presence, leading to coercive responses whoselegitimacy will be questioned from within and outside the territory.The article concludes with some modest thoughts on how eachsort of occupier might learn something from the other.     

论体育赛事转播权的体育法规制

体育赛事转播权作为一种体育行业约定俗成的惯用语,在我国并未构成法律权利。体育赛事转播“三点三层”的商业模式和法律构架能够证明,体育赛事转播建筑于赛事组织者对于体育赛事所享有的某种未经法律认可的基础性权利。学理分析表明,“商品化权”和“无形财产权”的学说并不能正确解释此种基础权利,而“物权”和“民事权益”的解释方法也难以精确的定位该权利属性。因此,赛事组织者对体育赛事所拥有的绝对权难以在现有法律体系内得到妥善解释。在比较欧美体育强国有关体育赛事转播权法律定性的基础上,本文指出,赛事权利应由体育法进行规范,赋予体育协会赛事权利人的合法地位,从而借助民法和体育法间的一般法和特别法关系完整保障赛事权利,这也是解决具有行业特殊性的体育法律问题的一种有效方式。     

Legal evaluation of the attacks caused by artificial intelligence-based lethal weapon systems within the context of Rome statute

Artificial intelligence (AI) as of the level of development reached today has become a scientific reality that is subject to study in the fields of law, political science, and other social sciences besides computer and software engineering. AI systems which perform relatively simple tasks in the early stages of the development period are expected to become fully or largely autonomous in the near future. Thanks to this, AI which includes the concepts of machine learning, deep learning, and autonomy, has begun to play an important role in producing and using smart arms. However, questions about AI-Based Lethal Weapon Systems (AILWS) and attacks that can be carried out by such systems have not been fully answered under legal aspect. More particularly, it is a controversial issue who will be responsible for the actions that an AILWS has committed. In this article, we discussed whether AILWS can commit offense in the context of the Rome Statute, examined the applicable law regarding the responsibility of AILWS, and tried to assess whether these systems can be held responsible in the context of international law, crime of aggression, and individual responsibility. It is our finding that international legal rules including the Rome Statute can be applied regarding the responsibility for the act/crime of aggression caused by AILWS. However, no matter how advanced the cognitive capacity of an AI software, it will not be possible to resort to the personal responsibility of this kind of system since it has no legal personality at all. In such a case, responsibility will remain with the actors who design, produce, and use the system. Last but not least, since no AILWS software does have specific codes of conduct that can make legal and ethical reasonings for today, at the end of the study it was recommended that states and non-governmental organizations together with manifacturers should constitute the necessary ethical rules written in software programs to prevent these systems from unlawful acts and to develop mechanisms that would restrain AI from working outside human control.     

The concept of free will and forensic psychiatry

This text examines how conceptions of free will impact on legal systems and forensic psychiatry: free will is generally regarded as a prerequisite for responsibility, criminal responsibility included, while forensic psychiatry to a large extent deals with the limits imposed on responsibility by mental disorder. First we discuss the question of whether there is and has been such an impact. The answer is yes: different conceptions of free will have inspired different systems of law and forensic psychiatry, as becomes clear when looking at the accountability doctrine as compared to the unique Swedish system rejecting this doctrine. However, there is no necessary connection between doctrines of responsibility and conceptions of free will, since the former primarily says something about when someone should be held responsible and the latter says something about when someone really is free in a sense relevant to responsibility. This leads to the second question: should conceptions of free will have an impact on law and forensic psychiatry? We argue: that they should not, given the implausibility the normative theory retributivism, which posits a direct connection between free will and punishment. More importantly, questions of free will are complicated and unresolved philosophical issues that are better left out of the everyday decision-making incumbent on the legal and psychiatric systems. Instead, we recommend using an empirically useful and gradual conception of autonomy to facilitate the determination of legal responsibility. This autonomy conception, being neutral on the question of free will, eliminates the need to take a stand on it.     

A European Legal Method? On European Private Law and Scientific Method

This article examines the relationship between European private law and scientific method. It argues that a European legal method is a good idea. Not primarily because it will make European private law scholarship look more scientific, but because a debate on the method of a normative science necessarily has to be a debate on its normative assumptions. In other words, a debate on a European legal method will have much in common with the much desired debate on social justice in European law. Moreover, it submits that, at least after the adoption of the Common Frame of Reference by the European institutions, European contract law can be regarded as a developing multi-level system that can be studied from the inside. Finally, it concludes that the Europeanisation of private law is gradually blurring the dividing line between the internal and external perspectives, with their respective appropriate methods, in two mutually reinforcing ways. First, in the developing multi-level system it is unclear where the external borders of the system lie, in particular the borders between Community law and national law. Second, because of the less formal legal culture the (formerly) external perspectives, such as the economic perspective, have easier access and play an increasing role as policy considerations.     

Comparative Law for Legal Translation: Through Multiple Perspectives to Multidimensional Knowledge

With this paper, I suggest a multiperspectivist approach for assessing conceptual legal knowledge with relevance for the translation of legal terms in translation between two or more different legal systems. The basic quest is to present a set of categories and analytical approaches for legal translators to generate (collect) and classify knowledge necessary for their professional conceptual needs. In this paper, I will focus on the translational, juridical, and cognitive basics of such an approach. In order to cope with the broad range of possible translational purposes in different translational situations and choose relevantly between alternative formulations, translators need methods and strategies in order to construct the necessary conceptual knowledge. This presupposes a broad knowledge structured in ways that enable the translator to recognize relevant characteristics of legal systems and relevant differences between different legal systems. Concerning translational theory, the basis is the functional theory of translation as adapted to legal translation, based upon the idea of translation as choice between alternatives and distinguishing between documentary translation, at one end of a scale, and instrumental translation, at the other. This basis and the distinction presuppose relevant knowledge from comparative law. Hence, existing approaches and fundamental tenets concerning comparative law inside and outside of translation are presented. In order for knowledge to be presented in a manageable way with relevance to translators, I work with the approach of concept frames as basic unit of knowledge gathering and categorization. This way of presenting knowledge is embedded more generally in a knowledge communication approach, focusing on knowledge asymmetry. Within this general framework, the multiperspectivist approach combines insights from cultural studies (especially the study of law-as-culture), law as a disciplinary social system, and communicative interaction generating meanings in legal communication, also across national borders.

     

A Shift in Focus: Systematisation in European Private Law through EU Law

The discourse on the Europeanisation of private law appears gradually to be moving into new territory in which the central debate on convergence of private laws in Europe makes place for structural questions on private law development in a multi‐level European legal order. With the realisation that private law is and will remain complementary regulated at EU level and in national laws, a re‐orientation is called for that, in the words of Micklitz, ‘allows one to determine which norms shall be elaborated and enforced at what level and by whom’. This article accepts that such a re‐orientation is needed in relation to substance, process, instruments and enforcement; a more fundamental question needs to be addressed, however, in order to ensure coherence in the development of private law in Europe. As can be gleaned from existing practice in EU consumer law, competition law, and financial market regulation, a deeply engrained tension between market integration and protectionist policies in Community law has resulted in incoherent regulation at EU level, which filters through into national legal systems. This puts at risk fundamental values of private law, such as certainty and fairness. A solution for this is proposed by shifting the focus from national private laws to the political and doctrinal structure of EU private law, and the normative framework it provides. General principles of EU private law, it is argued, could and should provide a counterweight to the problem of conflicting policies and set out a guideline for the future development of European private law.     

Angels of mercy? The legal and professional implications of withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment by nurses in England and Wales

In circumstances where life-sustaining treatment appears merely to be drawing out the inevitable, it is usual practice for the healthcare team to withdraw aggressive life-sustaining measures, once agreement is reached with the patient and their family. Common law gives doctors several defences to allegations of criminality or malpractice in taking the key actions that withdraw treatment and result in the patient's death; however, the legal defensibility of nurses undertaking this role has not been explored. In the absence of a specific body of law related to nurses taking the actions that withdraw life-sustaining treatment, I discuss the probable legal response by considering parallel cases. Examining some of the circumstances in which doctors are allowed to take life, I argue that the legal dispensation by which doctors are permitted to perform these tasks rests largely on their identity as doctors rather than any distinctive feature of their activities themselves. This uniqueness means that medical law for nurses is quite distinct from that for doctors. While it may nevertheless give nurses practical exemption from the legal consequences of their actions in withdrawal, it depends upon a judicial view that nurses are instruments of doctors. This judicial position is at odds with nurses' professional responsibilities, which envisage them as independent professionals who are liable for their own actions, inviting potentially adverse consequences from their professional registrar.     

Comparative Sociology of Law: Legal Fields, Legal Scholarships, and Social Sciences in Europe and the United States

This article attempts to gain a better understanding of the sociology(ies) of law in a comparative perspective through a structural and comparative explanation of the American and the French legal fields. It is argued that comparative sociology of law will not be able to explain the difference among countries, scholars, movements, and schools of thought in short, it will not be able to compare—as long as it avoids the analysis of some social and cultural presuppositions related to the context in which these differences take place. It focuses mainly on two of these presuppositions. First, legal fields, with their history, their internal structure, and their power relations, and second the type of relation between the legal field and the state. The empirical examination provided in this article explicitly seeks to offer insights for the reconstruction of Bourdieu's structural theory of the legal field.     

The Special Case Thesis. An Assessment of R. Alexy's Discursive Theory of Law

Legal Argumentation Theories seek mainly to develop procedures, criteria and principles which can guarantee a proper justification of legal propositions within modern legal systems. In doing this, those theories solicit in general an interconnection between practical reasoning and legal reasoning. This paper refers mainly to what seems currently to be the most elaborate theory of legal argumentation, that is R. Alexy's Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Although the discussion is mainly concentrated on critical points of R. Alexy's theory, this paper's scope is slightly broader; it attempts to present an overall view of the current discursive theory of law. This is mainly performed through the critical examination of R. Alexy's Special Case Thesis, which seems to raise a handful of counter arguments on behalf of the other proponents of Legal Argumentation. In the first part the special case thesis is presented, as well as the main objections to it. In the second part the validity of the special case thesis is checked against K. Günther's model of practical discourse, which proves to be more elaborate in certain points, when compared with the corresponding model of R. Alexy. In the third part it is shown that the special case thesis can be accepted consistently only if it is combined with a normative theory of law that advocates the interconnection of the concept of law with the idea of right morality. It is further suggested that legal discourse has to be perceived as a special case of a broader moral-political discourse that “explains” or “justifies” (morally) the various restrictions that the positive legal systems impose on the legal discourse.     

The Possibility and Value of Coherence

It would seem axiomatic that the law should be coherent in the sense that it should be consistent and correspond to an underlying justificatory rationale. Indeed, coherence would appear to be a good, in and of itself, and give rise to other benefits which are desirable in a legal system. In this article, I explore the value and achievability of coherence. I argue that it is largely inevitable that common law legal systems are not coherent, but that each legal system will comprise areas of coherence. I examine whether it is possible to improve coherence through legislation or adjudication but conclude that any coherence attained through the former may be temporary and achieving coherence through the latter is difficult both in principle and in practice. In looking at the value of coherence, I contend that while coherence may have various intrinsic and instrumental benefits, its value should not be overstated; many of the benefits which coherence is said to provide are present in legal systems where it is lacking; other benefits depend on the awareness of a country’s citizens and I suggest that, outside of extremes, citizens are probably unaware of the degree to which their legal system is coherent. Moreover, full coherence may lead to characteristics which are undesirable in a legal system.     

The Traditionality of Statutes*

Abstract. The author begins by sketching the characteristics or elements of every tradition. Some reasons are then suggested for the propensity of so many authors to contrast statutes with other, allegedly more traditional kinds of law. However, it is argued that statutes are deeply embedded, along with customary and judge-made law, in the highly traditional practices of law and that this matters much more than is commonly suspected. The thesis being defended here is not merely that law includes traditions along with rules, principles, maxims, and so on, but rather that legal systems should be understood as traditions, albeit highly complex ones. Not only are ancient legal systems (the Talmudic, for example) held to be traditional; modem legal positive orders are viewed as being traditional too. Finally, the concept of “communities of interpretation” is applied to the contemporary posited statutes which are believed by many to be a distinguishing feature of modem legal systems.     

Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance

Abstract.  It is commonplace that economic globalization poses new challenges to legal theory. But instead of responding to these challenges, legal scholars often get caught up in heated yet purely abstract discussions of positivist and legal pluralist conceptions of the law. Meanwhile, economics-based theories such as "Law and Social Norms" have much less difficulty in analysing the newly arising forms of private and hybrid "governance without government" from a functional perspective. While legal theory has much to learn from these approaches, we argue that they fail in one crucial point: They cannot uphold the analytical distinction between law and non-law. The reasons for this shortcoming are theory-immanent in that the economic theories' focus on efficiency and their actor-based perspective are necessarily blind to "law's own rationality." We therefore propose to further develop those functional approaches to the study of global governance by complementing them with elements from Niklas Luhmann's systems theory of law. This will provide us with a conceptual framework for analyzing the workings of global governance regimes without ignoring their potential for "legalisation" and "constitutionalisation." As we will show in three concrete examples (Corporate Social Responsibility, lex mercatoria , and internet regulation) we can thus describe the evolution of new forms of legal regulation beyond the nation-state. This will also allow us to draw some preliminary conclusions on the role of law in the context of globalization and, at the same time, show the direction for further empirical research.