Legal Validity, Acceptance of Law, Legitimacy. Some Critical Comments and Constructive Proposals

In this paper the author first presents a critical account of some basic views of Habermas' Discourse Philosophy. He points out some difficulties inherent in notions such as valid justification in argumentation theory, in the notion of ideal form of discourses, and in consensus theory of truth. Secondly, he focuses on Habermas' conceptions of validity, acceptance and legitimacy of law from the perspective of neo-institutionalism. In particular, (i) the author argues that Habermas' definition of legal validity is unclear and unrealistic; (ii) the author stresses the distinction between acceptance and acceptability; (iii) Habermas presupposes harmony between sovereignty and human rights postulates, but the present author takes into account the possibility of conflicts between autonomous popular decisions and human rights which must be resolved by methods of discursive democracy; (iv) criteria for acceptance of law cannot be fixed by a stipulative definition, but are in social discussion; (v) legitimacy is not an objective feature of valid law and presupposes an evaluation based on our political convictions.     

Human Dignity as a Form of Life: Notes on Its Foundations and Meaning in Institutional Morality

In normative terms, human dignity usually implies two consequences: (a) human beings cannot be treated in some particular ways due to their condition as humans; and (b) some forms of life do not correspond to the ideal life of our community. This study consists in discussing the meaning of this idea of human dignity in contrast to the concept of humiliation in the context of institutional, i.e. political and legal, rights. Two concepts of human dignity will be discussed. The first absolute/necessary and formal/transcendental concept implies the proposition “because human beings have dignity, the following cluster of rights is valid”. Conversely, the second contingent and material concept corresponds to the thought “for being able to live in dignity, we must respect the following rights”. This paper claims that human dignity should be understood as the right to be protected from humiliation. Humiliation is the situation of incapacity or absence of self-determination.

     

Please Don't Use Science or Mathematics in Arguing for Human Rights or Natural Law

In the vast literature on human rights and natural law one finds arguments that draw on science or mathematics to support claims to universality and objectivity. Here are two such arguments: 1) Human rights are as universal (i.e., valid independently of their specific historical and cultural Western origin) as the laws and theories of science; and 2) principles of natural law have the same objective (metahistorical) validity as mathematical principles. In what follows I will examine these arguments in some detail and argue that both are misplaced. A section of the paper will be devoted to a discussion of arguments relying on the historical and cultural specificity (and intrinsic superiority) of Western science. The conclusion is that both science and mathematics offer little help to anyone wanting to make use of them as paradigms of universality, objectivity, and rationality. Finally, I will draw some consequences for the idea of human rights.     

人权与人文--珠泉商贸城故事与波茨坦磨坊故事比较

人权入宪是人权发展历史上的重要事件,但并不等于人权的真正实现.人权的实现受到物质条件、主体的自觉程度、思想文化基础的制约,只有在适宜的人文环境中,人权才可能成为有约束力的法则.文章从两个公法事件出发引出人权的人文需求和人文基础,论证了人权的文化本性和社会向度,并提出建构人权的人文基础的必要性和意义.     

Government(ality) by Experts: Human Rights as Governance

The suggestion that the general economy of power in our societies is becoming a domain of security was made by Michel Foucault in the late 1970s. This paper takes inspiration from Foucault’s work to interpret human rights as technologies of governmentality, which make possible the safe and secure society. I examine, by way of illustration, the site of the European Union and its use of new modes of governance to regulate rights discourse—in particular via the emergence of a new Fundamental Rights Agency. ‘Governance’ in the EU is constructed in an apolitical way, as a departure from traditional legal and juridical methods of governing. I argue, however, that the features of governance represent technologies of government(ality), a new form of both being governed through rights and of governing rights. The governance feature that this article is most interested in is experts. The article aims to show, first and foremost, how rights operate as technologies of governmentality via a new relation to expertise. Second, it considers the significant implications that this reading of rights has for rights as a regulatory and normalising discourse. Finally, it highlights how the overlap between rights and governance discourses can be problematic because (as the EU model illustrates) governance conceals the power relations of governmentality, allowing, for instance, the unproblematic representation of the EU as an international human rights actor.     

论政治文明与经济法--一种基于理念的解释

政治文明与经济法之间有着共同的社会公正理念、共同的经济人权理念和共同的和谐理念.经济法的产生带来了崭新的法律理念--社会公正,而社会公正也是文明的政治理念的基本内涵.经济法意义上的经济人权更多地体现为一种集体性的人权,从经济法调整对象的具体形态来看,几乎所有经济法律关系都包含着经济人权的基本内容,这些权利的实现状况也是一国政治文明实现程度的标志.作为克服"市场失灵"和"政府失败"缺陷的现代法,经济法的和谐理念是政治文明的和谐理念的法律表现和最终保障.     

Hegel, Human Rights, and Particularism

Hegel's political philosophy gives prominence to the theme that human beings have a need for recognition of those qualities, characteristics, and attributes that make them distinctive. Hegel thus speaks to the question whether human rights law should recognize and accommodate the nuances of individual make-up. Likewise, he speaks to the question whether human rights law should be applied in ways that are sensitive to the cultural contexts in which it operates. But Hegel's political philosophy evaluates norms and practices within particular cultures by reference to the higher-order and universal criterion of abstract right. In light of this point and the inadequacies of political philosophy that privileges local norms and practices, a third approach to the protection of human rights is canvassed. This approach prioritizes neither universal nor local norms. Its aim is to ensure that both human rights and the cultures in which they are applied are taken seriously.     

Challenging Corporate 'Humanity': Legal Disembodiment, Embodiment and Human Rights

This article interrogates the corporate use of human rightsdiscourse. It does so in light of concern surrounding corporatedistortion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)paradigm,¹ and in light of the fact that corporations can claimshelter under human rights documents, particularly—asrecently discussed by Emberland²—the European Conventionof Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The authoroffers a critical exploration of corporate human rights claims(and some arguments advanced in their favour), and identifiesthe phenomenon of legal disembodiment (or ‘quasi-disembodiment’),linking it to both a genealogical account of human rights andthe nature of liberal legal personality. This reading of humanrights genealogy invites the reader to focus on a series ofparadoxes surrounding human rights, including their nature asa form of sacral construct, and locates human rights at an entrenchedand challenging interface between historical and contemporarypatterns of inclusion and exclusion. Quasi-disembodiment emergesfrom the analysis as a key conceptual conduit for the legalreception of corporate human rights claims. Linking the ECHRto the liberal human rights tradition, the author suggests thatnotwithstanding judicial protection of corporations as beneficiariesof ECHR protection, it remains essential to engage in a normativecritique of the very notion of corporate human rights. Beneathhuman rights law (and the related closures of legal discourse)it is possible to trace a human rights-oriented critique thatadopts human embodiment (and its quintessential link with humanvulnerability) as the ethical foundation of human rights.³ Emphasisingembodied vulnerability as the foundation of human rights yieldsa significant and ethically relevant distinction between corporationsand human beings—a distinction with intriguing possibilitiesfor the future theorisation of human rights—and one thatarguably problematises the corporate use of human rights discourse.     

You have the right to understand: The deleterious effect of stress on suspects' ability to comprehend Miranda

Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436, 1966) required that suspects be explicitly warned of the right to avoid self-incrimination and the right to legal representation. This research was designed to examine whether stress, induced via an accusation of wrong-doing, undermined or enhanced suspects' ability to comprehend their Miranda rights. Participants were randomly assigned to either be accused (n = 15) or not accused (n = 15) of having cheated on an experimental task in a two-cell between-subjects experimental design. Results supported the hypothesis that stress undermines suspects' ability to comprehend their Miranda rights. Participants who were accused of cheating exhibited significantly lower levels of Miranda comprehension than participants who were not accused of cheating. The theoretical processes responsible for these effects and the implications of the findings for police interrogation are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Interpreting the Political Theory in the Practice of Human Rights

In this discussion of The Heart of Human Rights, I support Allen Buchanan’s pursuit of a theory-in-practice methodology for interpreting the foundations and meaning of international legal human rights from within the practice. Following my use of that methodology, I recharacterize the theory of rights revealed by this methodology as political not moral. I clarify the import of this interpretation of international legal human rights for two problems that trouble Buchanan: (1) whether the scope of ‘basic equal status’ is a global or an ‘intrasocial’ standard and (2) whether there is a ‘proliferation’ of rights that risks undermining the legitimacy of international legal human rights. I argue that the scope of basic equal status is global and that the practice of making what he calls ‘new’ rights claims is part of the practice of human rights.     

When legal rights are not a reality: do individuals know their rights and how can we tell?

Public knowledge of rights has been the subject of a number of empirical enquiries over the last decade. In England and Wales, knowledge of rights and its relationship with an individual's capacity to ‘self-help’ and ‘self-represent’ when faced with a civil justice problem has become the subject of renewed attention following changes to legal aid which, from March 2013, will see the availability of legal advice and representation dramatically reduced. Previous studies focusing on public knowledge of rights in this (and other) jurisdictions have illustrated a lack of knowledge amongst the general population and more specifically, a widespread tendency of individuals to assume that the law aligns with their own moral, ethical or social attitudes. However, many of these studies have also suffered from methodological shortcomings. In attempting to address some of these shortcomings this study uses an open-ended format to ask individuals with one or one or more civil or social justice problems to describe their rights/legal position. We find that whilst an open-ended question approach to exploring knowledge of rights yields insight not acquired by other formats, its utility is constrained by difficulty reconciling articulation and actual knowledge of rights. We discuss the implications of these findings as they relate to the development of future research in the field of family and social welfare law, Public Legal Education (PLE) and access to justice post-March 2013.     

Evaluating the Human Rights Performance of Legislatures

Despite increased recognition of the role of legislatures inprotecting human rights, particularly through their scrutinyof proposed legislation, there has been little detailed considerationof how best to evaluate their performance in discharging thisrole. This article aims to fill this significant gap by outliningand defending a methodology for carrying out such an evaluation.Our objective is to provide a rich and valid account of theperformance of legislatures by identifying strengths and weaknessesof existing legislative institutions and processes. Such a processcan also inform recommendations as to how institutions and processes,in particular legislatures, might be improved.     

俄罗斯行政救济制度述评

俄罗斯行政救济制度在其国内表述为“行政司法制度”,其形成和发展经历了由权力救济模式向权利救济模式的转换过程。而促成这一转换则依赖于当代俄罗斯奉行的人权保障原则以及经济转轨、政治转型等社会条件。俄罗斯行政救济制度的内容主要包括公民请愿制度、行政重新审查制度、行政诉讼制度、人权全权代表制度以及公民权利的国际司法救济制度等。俄罗斯行政救济制度未来发展的应然选择是改革和完善行政系统内的行政重新审查制度和行政系统外的行政诉讼制度。     

Reconstructing the hymen: mutilation or restoration?

Female genital mutilation (FGM)--previously known as female circumcision--was criminalised in many countries in the 1990s. This occurred mainly in Western nations and responded to the perception that FGM was intended to subjugate women and was an abuse of human rights. However, other female genital surgical procedures have a totally different intent and are designed to restore the integrity of the hymen, correct deformity or simply enhance the appearance of the female genitalia. Such procedures, unlike FGM, are performed on women who have reached the age of consent and who request the surgery themselves. Restoring the integrity of the hymen (so-called "hymenoplasty") can erase evidence of the sexual history of a woman. "Revirgination" may have particular importance to women contemplating marriage in cultures where a high value is placed on virginity Some commentators have equated hymenoplasty with corrective surgery intended to restore the condition of female circumcision--techniques which are prohibited by most Australian criminal statutes. However, the medical, ethical and human rights arguments against FGM are not easily extended to revirgination and other cosmetic genital surgery. This article examines whether revirgination surgery has effectively been criminalised in Australia and whether this is appropriate from a medical and ethical perspective.     

‘Tolling for the luckless,the abandoned and forsaked’: Therapeutic jurisprudence and international human rights law as applied to prisoners and detainees by forensic psychologists

Objectives. There has been an explosion of interest in therapeutic jurisprudence as both a filter and lens for viewing the extent to which the legal system serves therapeutic or anti‐therapeutic consequences. However, little attention has been paid to the impact of therapeutic jurisprudence on questions of international human rights law and the role of forensic psychologists. The paper aims to provide an intersection between human rights, therapeutic jurisprudence, and forensic psychology. Method. Human rights are based on legal, social, and moral rules. Human rights literature generally considers legal rights but such policy statements do not provide principles to guide forensic psychologists in addressing moral or social rights. Therefore, a framework to guide forensic psychologists is required. Conclusion. As duty‐bearers, forensic psychologists need to address the core values of freedom and well‐being in rights holders (in this instance, prisoners and detainees with a mental illness). The paper proposes that human rights principles can add to the normative base of a therapeutic jurisprudence framework, and in‐turn, therapeutic jurisprudence can assist forensic psychologists to actively address human rights.     

关于无罪推定的文本表述

我国《刑事诉讼法》第12条的表述是故意歪曲《关于〈中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法修正案（草案）〉的说明》之意图而形成的，草案明明限定了“进一步保障诉讼参与人的权利”的目的，但是学术界却要强迫人们接受它为“法院统一定罪权”原则，从而把“人权”条款变成“公权”设置条款。这种法律现象可以从1789年以来无罪推定文本表述的变化规律（某种蜕变模式）得到解释。令人忧虑的是，纷纷推出的无罪推定文本建议又因为ICCPR中法文本与英俄西文本的冲突，而在“确定有罪”与“证实有罪”之间选择了较差的表述。为此，发现IC—CPR文本的冲突解决方法与借鉴俄罗斯国内法文本的先进经验，对于改善未来刑事诉讼法的无罪推定立法表述都有积极的比较法意义。。     

犯罪嫌疑人、被告人诉讼人权与诉讼权利比较研究

基于人的身份 ,犯罪嫌疑人、被告人享有广泛的实体人权 ,基于被嫌疑的身份 ,犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的实体人权将会受到一定的限制或剥夺。为了保障其实体人权免受不正当侵害 ,国际人权法为犯罪嫌疑人、被告人设定了许多诉讼人权 ,与此相应的是 ,我国法律赋予了犯罪嫌疑人、被告人广泛的诉讼权利。但与国际人权法规定相比 ,我国法律规定仍有较大差距 ,有进一步完善之必要。     

Human Rights: Existential,Not Metaphysical

My paper consists of four sections. The first is concerned with the distinction and connection between fundamental and human rights. Here I shall just introduce a few conceptual notions and definitions that are more or less widely used, but that may help us to frame the issue and better focus on the most relevant question of the foundation or justification of human rights. In the second and third sections I will present what I believe to be the four fundamental normative situations that shape our understanding and use of human rights. In the second section attention will focus on what in my opinion is the most basic of these four normative situations, which I call the “existential” situation. This is intended to offer a strong foundation for human rights as “not metaphysical,” without appealing to or relying on heavy metaphysical assumptions. I will try to stick more or less to an argumentative strategy based on common sense. The third section, dealing with the three other normative situations, will to some extent be an exercise in eclecticism, trying to combine different approaches to (and schools of thought on) the question of normativity. Here eclecticism will not be trivial, or at least I hope not. In the fourth and final section I will briefly conclude with a general overview on the issue of the “existence” of normativity and human rights.     

Insolvency and employment protection: the mixed effects of the Acquired Rights Directive

The statutory protection provided by European Community law to employees during transfers of undertakings and other restructurings has been criticised on the grounds that it undermines insolvency procedures and interferes with the ‘rescue’ process. We present an analysis which suggests that granting employees rights of this kind may be an efficient means of recognising their firm-specific human capital. Case-study evidence is then presented to show that while in some situations employment rights may obstruct reorganisations, in others they allow employee interests to be factored into the bargaining process in such a way as to enhance the survival chances of enterprises undergoing restructuring. The law functions best when effective mechanisms of employee representation are in place and when the conditions under which employees’ acquired rights can be waived in the interests of preserving employment are clearly specified.     

执行前和解协议法律效力研究

生效裁判确定的权利义务,当事人有权进行处分;当事人在执行前达成和解协议,应当理解为履行义务、处分权利的表现形式;执行前和解协议本质上是以生效裁判确定的义务为基础和前提,双方履行该义务达成的民事协议,应当具有可争议性和可诉性;对执行前和解协议进行审理和裁判应当以生效裁判作为事实基础,不构成重复诉讼,也不违背生效裁判的既判力;执行前和解协议仅仅具有实体法效果,而执行程序中达成的执行和解协议则同时具有程序法和实体法双重效力。